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This fifth edition of the United Nations Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) is 
being issued four years after the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 
(Sendai Framework). Now is a time of heightened global urgency, and the need for ambitious collective 
action to reduce disaster risk, build resilience and achieve sustainable development has never been greater.
At no point in human history have we faced such an array of both familiar and unfamiliar risks, interacting in a 
hyperconnected, rapidly changing world. New risks and correlations are emerging. Decades-old projections 
about climate change have come true much sooner than expected. With that come changes in the intensity 
and frequency of hazards. Risk really is systemic, and requires concerted and urgent effort to reduce it in 
integrated and innovative ways.
Countries adopted the Sendai Framework in 2015 to address a broader scope of hazards and risks. The 
Sendai Framework charts a clear policy pathway for governments and citizens to prevent and mitigate 
shocks caused by natural and man-made hazards, as well as related environmental, technological and 
biological hazards and risks. In making the logical connection between reducing risk and building resilience, 
the Sendai Framework provides the connecting tissue for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 
Paris Agreement, the New Urban Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Agenda for Humanity. 
This edition of GAR is the first punctuation mark in the implementation of the Sendai Framework. It offers an 
update on progress made in implementing the outcome, goal, targets and priorities of the Sendai Framework 
and disaster-related Sustainable Development Goals. It provides an analysis of how risk science is chang-
ing, presents areas for additional endeavour, and explores aspects of understanding and managing systemic 
risk. It presents innovative research and practice for pursuing risk-informed sustainable development, and 
provides an introduction to the wider scope and nature of hazards and related risks to be considered.  
This report represents a major step towards a twenty-first century view of risk and its reduction – an under-
standing that is imperative in our collective efforts to craft a sustainable future. We are fast approaching 
the point where we may not be able to mitigate or repair impacts from realized cascading and systemic 
risk, particularly those due to climate change. The urgency is evident. It demands much greater ambition 
around the speed and magnitude of the changes the global community needs to make; changes that must be 
proportionate to the scale of threat. Above all, we cannot let inertia and short-sightedness impede action. As 
we have been reminded recently by Greta Thunberg (the Swedish climate change activist): “There are no grey 
areas when it comes to survival. Now we all have a choice. We can create transformational action that will 
safeguard the future living conditions for humankind, or we can continue with our business as usual and fail. 
That is up to you and me.”
Foreword
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction
Head of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
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Mami Mizutori
Surprise is the 
new normal
Non-linear change is a reality and is threatening all 
three pillars (social, environmental, economic) of 
sustainable development. It is happening across 
multiple dimensions and scales, more quickly and 
surprisingly than previously thought possible. New 
risks and correlations are emerging in ways that 
had not been anticipated. Through global intercon-
nectedness of highly interdependent social, techni-
cal and biological systems, human civilization has 
become a “super-organism”, changing the envi-
ronment from which it evolved, and inducing new 
hazards with no analogue.
Human activity grows exposure, increasing the 
propensity for systems reverberations, setting up 
feedback loops with cascading consequences that 
are difficult to foresee. Small changes can produce 
initial ripples, which can be amplified by non-linear 
effects and associated path dependencies, causing 
changes that lead to significant and potentially irre-
versible consequences. With increasing complexity 
and interaction of human, economic and political 
systems within ecological systems, risk becomes 
increasingly systemic. 
To allow humankind to embark on a development 
trajectory that is at least manageable, and at best 
sustainable and regenerative (consistent with the 
aspirations for 2030), a fundamental re-exami-
nation and redesign of how to deal with risk is 
essential.
Executive Summary
Challenging the 
assumptions
The way in which such changes – including in 
the intensity and frequency of hazards – affect 
human activity is as yet difficult to foresee. Current 
approaches to risk measurement and management 
are inadequate to meet the challenges of the multi-
faceted interconnectedness of hazard, the barely 
understood breadth of exposure, and the profound 
detail of vulnerability; this inadequacy must be 
addressed if we are to ever do more than simply 
treat the symptoms. 
Existing approaches to understanding risk are 
often based on the largest and most historically 
obvious and tractable risks for humans, rather than 
on the full topography of risks. Most models draw 
on historical data and observations, assuming that 
the past is a reasonable guide to the present and 
the future. The sheer number of people on Earth, a 
changing climate and the dynamic connectedness 
of biological and physical worlds challenges this, 
requiring us to revisit assumptions about the rela-
tionship between past and future risk.
The era of hazard-by-hazard risk reduction is over; 
present and future approaches to managing risk 
require an understanding of the systemic nature 
of risk. This entails quantum improvements in our 
understanding of anthropogenic systems in nature 
to identify precursor signals and correlations to 
better prepare, anticipate and adapt. 
Major renovations of current approaches to risk 
assessment are therefore needed to be able to 
realize the outcomes and goals of the post-2015 
agreements – the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
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Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (Sendai Framework), 
the Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), the Paris 
Agreement, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) 
and the New Urban Agenda (NUA). 
Learning to deal 
with complexity
Risk is complex. While it can be practical to cate-
gorize risk so that responsibility can be delegated 
to different organizations, institutions or individu-
als, risk management must not be “departmental-
ized”. Complexity challenges the problem-solving 
model of separating issues into singularly defined 
parts and solving for the symptoms. It is imperative 
that our understanding of risk is developed without 
resorting to reductive measures that isolate and 
remove from context, and ignore systemic charac-
teristics. This applies as much to our institutional 
arrangements for risk governance as it does to 
community organization, research endeavours or 
policy formulation. 
The lens of contextual enquiry and trans-contextual 
research is one that brings together disciplines 
and many other forms of knowledge, including 
the place-based wisdom of local practitioners and 
cultural and indigenous sensitivities. By incentiv-
izing transdisciplinary, integrated, multisectoral 
research engaging non-traditional counterparts, 
risk assessment and decision-making efficiency 
can be improved, duplication of effort reduced, and 
connected collective action facilitated.
National planning bodies with representation from 
all sectors must develop risk reduction strategies 
that assume an all-of-State institutions approach 
to risk reduction, to be able to adequately address 
the expanded scope of hazards and risks repre-
sented in the Sendai Framework. A process to 
develop a Global Risk Assessment Framework 
(GRAF) has been established to facilitate the 
generation of information and insights that would 
sustain and guide the incorporation of systemic 
risk and opportunity into policies and investments. 
Sustained, multi-year and creative funding and 
collaboration must support State and non-State 
actors so that they have the tools they need to 
better recognize and address systemic risks and 
apply sustainable risk management strategies at all 
scales.
Data, direction, 
decisions 
Turning the aspirations of risk-informed sustainable 
development into reality requires robust data and 
statistics that are timely, accurate, disaggregated, 
people-centred and accessible, and which enable us 
to capture progress and direct investments accord-
ingly. Four years after the adoption of the 2030 
Agenda and the Sendai Framework, many coun-
tries have taken concrete steps towards meeting 
the ambitious aspirations of these transformative 
plans, including in the realm of data. 
Integrated monitoring and reporting on the Sendai 
Framework and disaster-related Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) is a reality – thanks to the 
use of common metrics and the online Sendai 
Framework Monitor (SFM). National statistical 
offices are building the framework to include disas-
ter-related data within the domain of official statis-
tics. The percentage of reporting by Member States 
containing economic loss data, for all income 
groups, has increased in the last four years.
Data availability and quality is steadily improv-
ing, and the realm of statistical capacity-building 
is opening up to accommodate collaboration 
and synergies across increasingly complex data 
systems. Coordinated, integrated global and 
national efforts strengthening data generation, 
taxonomy, interoperability, statistical capacity and 
reporting must continue. Leveraging related efforts 
that are ongoing across different global frameworks 
is important – this includes supporting and drawing 
from the data revolution for sustainable develop-
ment that was recommended by the United Nations 
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Secretary-General’s Independent Expert Advisory 
Group (IEAG). Increased international attention and 
targeted funding across different goals is slowly 
starting to yield results. It is critical that momentum 
is not lost.
Data collection is however often fragmented, non-
universal, incommensurable and biased, and the 
disconnect among “knowing” something, making 
it “available and accessible” and “applying” what is 
known, often remains. Many countries are unable to 
report adequately on progress in implementing the 
Sendai Framework and risk-related SDGs. Others 
lack the capacity to analyse and use data, even 
if they have the means to collect it. Development 
actors, the private sector, and the academic and 
research community may have the capacity, but the 
true dividends of interoperable, convergent data and 
analytics often remain elusive. This will not change 
without a sense of urgency translated into political 
leadership, sustained funding and commitment for 
risk-informed policies supported by accurate, timely, 
relevant, interoperable, accessible and context-
specific data.
Investment in physical infrastructure, especially in 
the information technology sector, is required to 
ensure better online reporting and loss account-
ing at all administrative levels while also building 
capacities in cartography and geospatial data. Data 
innovations, including citizen-generated data, must 
be mainstreamed. 
Partnerships with other stakeholders and expert 
organizations – including from the private sector 
– must be built on a foundation of global public 
benefit to enable strong data-sharing networks and 
comprehensive reporting, including those address-
ing the data challenges of the 2030 Agenda. Such 
partnerships should explore multiple uses of data, 
to stimulate demand and intrinsic incentivization 
for data collection and sharing – including in the 
context of aligned regional targets and indicators 
(for example of countries with similar geopolitical 
and hazard profiles) that allow spatial comparisons. 
Developments in open data and analysis, shared 
and interoperable software, computing power 
and other technologies are the technical enablers 
of improved data science, risk assessment, risk 
modelling, reporting and ultimately evidence-based 
policies. For their success, they rely on investment 
and the willingness of people to work with other 
disciplines, across cultural, language and political 
boundaries, and to create the right regulatory envi-
ronment for new and urgent work to proceed. 
These are time-critical actions for the achieve-
ment of the goals of the Sendai Framework and the 
2030 Agenda by the end of the next decade. With 
improved access to good data, Member States can 
monitor and report on progress, prioritize where to 
invest resources and determine requirements for 
course correction.
State of play 
This 2019 Global Assessment Report on Disas-
ter Risk Reduction (GAR) is informed by the latest 
data – including Sendia Framework target reporting 
by countries using SFM – and infers early lessons 
on the state of the global disaster risk landscape. 
While the observed period is still too short to reach 
definitive conclusions at a global scale, it is possi-
ble to ascertain certain patterns in terms of magni-
tude, geographic and socioeconomic distribution of 
impacts and abstract several points of departure for 
where and how countries have seen successes in 
reducing risk.
In terms of losses, severe inequalities between 
low- and high-income countries persist, with the 
lowest-income countries bearing the greatest rela-
tive costs of disasters. Human losses and asset 
losses relative to gross domestic product tend to 
be higher in the countries with the least capacity 
to prepare, finance and respond to disasters and 
climate change, such as in small island develop-
ing States.
Sendai Framework Target A – Mortality relative 
to population size has declined in the long 
term. However, since 1990, 92% of mortality 
attributed to internationally reported disasters 
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associated with natural hazards has occurred 
in low- and middle-income countries, persis-
tently concentrated in the Asia–Pacific region 
and Africa. Geophysical hazard events have 
taken the highest toll on human lives. While 
most fatalities are a result of realized intensive 
risk, the proportion of mortality accounted for 
by realized extensive risk is rising.
Occurrence of reported disasters associated 
with biological hazards has decreased over 
the past two decades, while the number of 
disasters associated with natural hazards has 
slightly increased. 
Target B – Multi-hazard disasters affected 88 
million people in countries reporting through 
SFM in the period 1997–2017, with floods 
affecting 76 million people. Disasters stem-
ming from natural hazards have displaced 
an average of almost 24 million people each 
year over the last decade and remain the main 
trigger of displacement.
Target C – 68.5% of all economic losses in the 
period 2005–2017 were attributed to extensive 
risk events, as was the persistent erosion of 
development assets identified in previous 
GARs. Losses incurred as a result of the real-
ization of extensive risk continue to be vastly 
underestimated and often absorbed by low-
income households and communities. 
Target D – Economic losses incurred in the housing 
sector account for two thirds of the total, with 
losses to agriculture the second most-affected 
sector. Data are imperfect, and disaster losses 
remain significantly underreported, compromis-
ing accurate calculations of impact. 
Target E – Immediate and focused action is 
required to meet the 2020 deadline for 
national and local disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) strategies aligned with the Sendai 
Framework. Progress has been steady, but 
is insufficient given that such strategies are 
seen as the foundation for achievement of the 
2030 targets.
Target F – Development assistance for DRR has 
been highly volatile, ex post and marginal. It is 
miniscule compared with financing for disaster 
response. A total of $5.2 billion for DRR repre-
sents 3.8% of the total humanitarian financing 
between 2005 and 2017 – less than $4 for 
every $100 spent.
Target G – Preliminary reporting on multi-hazard 
early warning system practice hints at lessons 
to be learned and efficiency improvements to 
be made in respect of analysis (data collec-
tion and risk assessment) and ensuing action 
(response). 
Greater effort is required to move beyond analysis 
of direct loss and damage, to understand impact 
more holistically. Previous GARs have argued for 
more emphasis on revealing the proportion of 
income or assets lost within loss analysis. To do 
so requires us to look at the indicators of the post-
2015 agreements afresh, across goals and targets, 
and establish metrics for those dimensions of 
disaster impacts that accrue to the most vulnerable. 
Notably, this should be done by going deeper into 
distributional analysis, moving away from regional, 
national and subnational data to the household 
level. Immediate effort is required to understand 
in finer detail how shocks affect people’s lives in 
a systemic way. Support can then be provided to 
countries to design solutions and influence human 
behaviour, to prevent the creation and propagation 
of risk, as well as to rebound from disasters.
Leaving no one behind
Just as risk is systemic and interconnected, so too 
is vulnerability. Risk, impact and capacity to cope 
evolve throughout a person’s life cycle. Vulnerabili-
ties may emerge, change, compound and persist 
over long periods, and can contribute to the inter-
generational transmission of vulnerability and 
widening inequalities. 
While disasters magnify existing social inequalities 
and further disadvantage those who are already 
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vulnerable, vulnerability is not a function of poverty 
alone. People do not all have the same opportunity 
to make positive choices. Location, age, gender, 
income group, disability, and access to social 
protection schemes and safety nets greatly affect 
the choices people have to anticipate, prevent 
and mitigate risks. Vulnerabilities accumulate and 
cascade, and so interventions that protect those 
groups whose vulnerability profiles make them 
more susceptible to disaster are imperative. 
The measurement of multidimensional vulnerabil-
ity remains immature, and systematic effort and 
sustained funding is required for disaggregated 
data collection. However, the use of quantitative 
markers, proxy indicators and extrapolated data 
represents lines of enquiry to be further elaborated. 
These can support the development of a more 
coherent, higher-resolution understanding of vulner-
ability in society that can enrich the operational 
response and coverage of those left behind. If the 
assessments of multiple organizations are pooled, 
then coordinated data collection and communica-
tion can be realized for integration within risk reduc-
tion strategies and plans. 
People must be put at the centre of data genera-
tion and collection, so that information collected is 
contextual and improves our understanding of how 
people experience risk and loss, allowing the devel-
opment of solutions that are relevant and effective. 
Risk information must be integrated into develop-
ment indicators, and inform the sequencing of plan-
ning, budgeting and action.
Designing effective interventions requires an under-
standing of context – how life circumstances 
affect individuals’ likelihood of being healthy and 
educated, accessing basic services, leading a 
dignified life and eventually “building back better” 
after a shock. This requires sound socioeconomic 
management that is more fair, inclusive and equi-
table, underpinned by a systemic, multidimensional 
understanding of vulnerability. Measuring disas-
ter impact as experienced by individuals requires 
consideration of how resources are shared among 
regions, cities, communities, as well as members of 
the same household.
Levelling the 
playing field
Most of the benefits of socioeconomic develop-
ment, economic integration and trade are shared 
by a limited number of countries, leaving others 
with constrained policy space to negotiate terms 
commensurate with their needs. There is growing 
evidence that the benefits of increasing economic 
integration have not been equitably shared among 
and within countries. Unsustainable patterns of 
growth hide the build-up of systemic risks across 
different sectors. When realized, these will severely 
disrupt economic activity and inflict long-term 
damage to sustainable development.
This calls for a fundamental redesign of global 
financing and international development coop-
eration systems to include proportionate and 
context-driven solutions commensurate with the 
disproportionate exposure to environmental and 
economic risk faced by many countries. In recogniz-
ing this challenge, the Sendai Framework set Target 
F to substantially enhance international coopera-
tion to developing countries, and allow space for 
countries to adopt effective policies that enhance 
domestic public finance for risk-informed sustain-
able development.
International pressure for a fairer, sustainable, equi-
table planet must materialize mixed and innovative 
financing approaches, pro-growth tax policies and 
well-managed domestic resource mobilization that 
respond to the cascading and interlinked nature of 
these risks. 
National and local 
enabling environments
The primary responsibility for Sendai Frame-
work implementation lies with Member States. 
The broader national frameworks of laws, poli-
cies and institutions for risk reduction, sustainable 
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development and action on climate change have a 
significant impact on States’ abilities to formulate 
and implement national and local strategies and 
plans on DRR, development and climate change 
adaptation (CCA). Such frameworks are critical 
in empowering and including all stakeholders, in 
establishing the basis for gender equality, and for 
including people and groups more exposed and 
more vulnerable to disaster impacts. 
The legislative, policy and institutional structures 
and processes that include the views and experi-
ences of women and girls, people with disabilities, 
older persons and, for example, people from differ-
ent ethnic or religious backgrounds, and which 
include protection measures for children, result in 
measures at national and local levels that allow a 
more equal and effective reduction of risk. 
These enabling frameworks can be understood as 
central components of national and local plans for 
DRR, development, CCA and emerging integrated 
approaches to risk reduction. Coherent and inte-
grated national and local plans are the means by 
which Member States can best implement the 
combined commitments made under the Sendai 
Framework, 2030 Agenda, Paris Agreement, AAAA 
and NUA, as well as other agreements related to 
particular regions, sectors or themes. The multi-
dimensional nature of these commitments, and 
more importantly the underlying risks they address, 
require systems-based approaches to assess needs 
and make national and local decisions about the 
most effective use of available resources.
Governments and national stakeholders, supported 
by the private sector and civil society, are therefore 
encouraged to review these frameworks to identify 
the enablers and opportunities, as well as the barri-
ers to integrated risk governance. These may come 
in the form of legislative mandates, institutional 
structures, capacity, resources, social equality/
vulnerability, gender roles, and people’s awareness 
of and habitual treatment of risk.
Risk reduction processes have multiple connec-
tions with climate change mitigation, adaptation 
and vulnerability reduction, and yet few DRR plans 
take these connections into account. Given the very 
threat to humanity posed by the effects of climate 
change, a more integrated approach is required to 
adapt to and reduce risk from climate change, as 
well as from shorter-term risks from natural and 
man-made hazards, and related biological, techno-
logical and environmental hazards and risks, when 
seeking to prevent the creation of new risk through 
development. Failure to include climate change 
scenarios in assessment and risk reduction plan-
ning will build inherent redundancy in all we do. 
While regional cooperation mechanisms can 
provide key support to knowledge-sharing and 
capacity-building among countries with similar risk 
profiles and regional concerns, aspects such as 
regional risk assessment, risk information systems 
and national capacity-building must be more 
actively promoted.
The regenerative potential of the social and natural 
systems envisaged in the aligned, post-2015 agree-
ments will be better understood, and progress will 
be accelerated, by incorporating systemic risk and 
systemic opportunity into the design of policies 
and investments at all scales. However, few coun-
tries operate centralized coordination mechanisms 
among DRR, CCA and development planning, let 
alone transdisciplinary, integrated, multisectoral 
assessment, planning and decision-making struc-
tures that are required to understand and address 
systemic risks. 
In seeking achievement of Target E, and the estab-
lishment or realignment of national and local DRR 
strategies consistent with the Sendai Framework, 
countries employ a variety of approaches. These 
include: stand-alone plans and strategies, full inte-
gration within sustainable development plans, inte-
grated DRR and CCA strategies, and urban DRR 
strategies or DRR strategies in complex contexts. 
With this GAR coming so soon after the adoption 
of the indicators for measuring the global targets 
of the Sendai Framework and disaster-related 
SDGs, insufficient information is available to be 
able to determine whether such measures are 
affecting outcomes, in particular to the creation of 
new risk.
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The dynamic, interrelated and multidimensional 
risks that exist in urban areas require systemic 
approaches that seek to understand the nature 
of interacting systems and adopt governance 
adapted to the context. Fragile and complex 
contexts, especially where there is significant 
internal and cross-border migration, present a 
particular set of challenges for local and national 
risk reduction and for integrated risk governance. 
As the risk context is constantly changing, flex-
ibility and agility is required of national- and local-
level processes, to be able to accommodate new 
and emerging risks.
Climate emergency
Climate change is a major driver of disaster losses 
and failed development. It amplifies risk. Decades-
old projections about climate change have come 
true much sooner than expected. The Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2018 
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C brings 
a new sense of urgency for risk reduction efforts. 
The threshold of limiting global warming increase 
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, which the Paris 
Agreement sought to cap, will be surpassed in the 
late 2030s / early 2040s. Worse, IPCC estimates 
that if countries restrict effort to the commitments 
made in the Paris Agreement (nationally determined 
contributions), we are looking at warming in the 
realm of 2.9°C–3.4°C by the end of the century.
Non- l inear  change in hazard intensity  and 
frequency is already a reality. Affecting the inten-
sive and extensive nature of risk, climate change 
can generate more powerful storms, exacerbate 
coastal flooding, and bring higher temperatures 
and longer droughts. Emergent climate-related 
risks will alter most of our current risk metrics. 
Growth in death, loss and damage will surpass 
already inadequate risk mitigation, response and 
transfer mechanisms. 
If the 1.5°C threshold is breached, the possibili-
ties to adapt will diminish as ecosystem services 
collapse. Unable to support current economic 
activity and human populations, migration on a 
scale never before seen may be triggered, with 
people moving from arid and semi-arid regions to 
low-elevation coastal zones, thus increasing risk. 
The urgency is evident;  greater ambition is 
required with regard to the speed and magnitude 
of the changes to be made. Vulnerability reduction 
measures – captured in national adaptation plans 
for action and DRR plans – must be closely linked 
to the simultaneous systemic changes that must be 
engineered in energy, industrial, land, ecological and 
urban systems if we are to remain below the 1.5°C 
threshold.
The development of DRR plans at the local, national 
and regional levels, and the assessments that 
underpin them, must integrate near-term climate 
change scenarios, and elaborate the enabling condi-
tions for transformative adaptation presented by 
IPCC.
Own the consequences 
of choice
While the onus rests with States, the responsibility 
to prevent and reduce risk is a shared one. Risk is 
ultimately the result of decisions that we all make, 
either individually or collectively.
The consequences of inaction in addressing the 
systemic nature of risk to individuals, organiza-
tions and society are becoming increasingly appar-
ent. Even half a planet away, risk that is allowed to 
grow unchecked – and in plain sight – can affect 
us (for example, the 2008 global financial crisis). 
While governments are responsible for incentiv-
izing and leading risk reduction, as individuals, we 
must own the consequences of our decisions, our 
action or inaction, and the risks that we create and 
propagate. This means fundamental changes in our 
behaviour. 
With the sense of urgency brought by IPCC, we 
must mobilize to collectively determine solutions. 
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We must examine our own decisions and choices – 
our inaction as much as our action – to determine 
how we are contributing to the risk ledger. We must 
honestly review how our relationship with behav-
iour and choice transfers to individual and collective 
accountability for risk creation, or risk reduction. 
This understanding must translate into action, for 
example, by revisiting how and what we produce 
and consume. 
More broadly, we must provide decision-friendly 
scenarios and options at relevant geospatial and 
temporal scales, providing data and information to 
support people to better understand the nature of 
their own risk and how to deal with it. 
The ambition, richness and expansive spirit of 
cooperation required to meet systemic challenges 
will require levels of selfless humanism that match 
the scale of the challenge. Humans can (or should) 
decide on changing deeply embedded values that 
define higher level rules of operation and inter-
action. If not, societies may continue to create 
wealth at the expense of declining ecological life 
support functions in a positive spiralling feedback 
loop that creates systemic risks with cascading 
effects and makes overarching economic, ecologi-
cal and social systems increasingly susceptible to 
collapse. 
This is a time of heightened global urgency; we are 
fast approaching the point where we may not be 
able to mitigate or repair impacts from cascading 
and systemic risk. This calls for intensified efforts, 
political resolve and sustained funding – by govern-
ments, by the private sector, by cities, communi-
ties and individuals – to build solutions based on a 
better understanding of systemic risk.
We must move away from short-sighted, segmented 
planning and implementation to transdisciplinary, 
collaborative approaches that build resilience and 
regenerate relevant resources, avoiding negative 
consequences. We must apply what we know and 
acknowledge the gaps in our knowledge, prioritizing 
ways to understand what we do not yet know. Our 
flexibility must be as dynamic as the changes we 
hope to survive.
Above all, we cannot let inertia and short-sighted-
ness impede action. We must act with urgency and 
with greater ambition, proportional to the scale of 
threat. 
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?We make choices as to where 
we inhabit, how we build and 
what research we do
Risk is the combination of
hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability
Death, loss and damage is 
the function of the context 
of hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability
There is no such thing as a
natural disaster, only natural 
hazards
GAR19 -  
A guided tour
Risk and the context of hazard, exposure and vulnerability
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion 2015–2030 (Sendai Framework) emphasizes 
that risk is everyone’s business – explicitly iden-
tifying the need for all-of-society and all-of-State 
institutions’ engagement. Past Global Assess-
ment Reports (GARs) presented the now-accepted 
wisdom that managing risk does not equate to 
firefighters, first responders and civil protec-
tion authorities managing the consequences of 
This puts the onus on all of us to understand 
the nature of risk – that death, loss or damage 
(impacts that define a disaster – that are the 
disaster) are a function of the context of hazard, 
realized risk. Risk must be understood in much 
broader terms – contextually and temporally. 
Previous GARs also emphasized that risk is a 
function of more than simply hazard, that disas-
ters are not natural, but a product of the interac-
tion of often naturally occurring events and human 
agency. We define these events as disasters 
when people suffer and things we care about are 
damaged or lost.
vulnerability and exposure. The Sendai Framework 
exhorts us to reduce risk by avoiding decisions 
that create risk, by reducing existing risk and by 
building resilience. 
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
xii GAR19 - A guided tour
The Sendai Framework translates those messages 
into ones that can be used in the real world:
The Sendai Framework tells us that the risk land-
scape has changed, that it is complex, that we have 
perhaps been slow to realize this, and that we have 
a lot of catching up to do. In calling for engagement 
of all stakeholders, and integration with policy on 
climate change, development and risk financing, 
the Sendai Framework identifies that risk and disas-
ters are part of a complex set of human systems 
that operate at different scales and along differ-
ent time frames. Failure to manage these systems 
will reverse development gains for most people in 
the world, and place the functioning of our global 
society in jeopardy.
This GAR is about understanding better the sys-
temic nature of risk, how we are able to recognize, 
measure and model risk, and about strategies to 
enhance the scientific, social and political coopera-
tion needed to move towards systemic risk gover-
nance. It reinforces the message that we need to 
reduce vulnerability and build resilience if we are to 
reduce risk. It looks at what countries and regional 
and international organizations have been doing 
according to formal reporting under the Sendai 
Framework Monitor (SFM). It also considers country 
practices in developing national and local plans to 
enhance risk reduction capacity, to integrate disas-
ter risk reduction (DRR) with development planning 
and climate change adaptation (CCA), and to pay 
special attention to risk in rapidly growing cities and 
fragile/complex contexts.  
This GAR demonstrates the urgency of the action 
and ambition required, reinforced by current climate 
science. We can expect non-linear changes in the 
intensity and frequency of hazards. We know that 
many of the ways in which human activity will be 
affected are, as yet, unforeseeable, and that we are 
fast approaching the point where we may not be 
able to mitigate or repair impacts from cascading 
and systemic risk in our global systems. In propel-
ling systems-based thinking and approaches to the 
fore, this GAR adds to the call for urgent action to 
deal with simultaneous systemic change around 
land, ecosystems, energy, industrial and urban 
systems, and the social and economic transforma-
tions that these infer. 
• Risk is everyone’s business: “While the enabling, 
guiding and coordinating role of national and 
federal State Governments remain essential, 
it is necessary to empower local authorities 
and local communities to reduce disaster risk, 
including through resources, incentives and 
decision-making responsibilities, as appropri-
ate.” (Para. 19f) 
• Disasters are not natural: “The present Frame-
work will apply to the risk of small-scale and 
large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and 
slow-onset disasters caused by natural or man-
made hazards, as well as related environmental, 
technological and biological hazards and risks. 
It aims to guide the multi-hazard management 
of disaster risk in development at all levels as 
well as within and across all sectors.” (Para. 15)
• Risk is a function of the decisions we take and 
how we consume, which then shape the world 
around us: “Business, professional associations 
and private sector financial institutions, includ-
ing financial regulators and accounting bodies 
… to integrate disaster risk management, includ-
ing business continuity, into business models 
and practices through disaster-risk-informed 
investments.” (Para. 36c)
• Understanding and managing risk is everyone’s 
business and integral to the success of all 2015 
agendas: “Disaster risk reduction requires an 
all-of-society engagement and partnership” 
and “Civil society, volunteers, organized volun-
tary work organizations and community-based 
organizations to participate, in collaboration 
with public institutions, to, inter alia,….advocate 
for resilient communities and an inclusive and 
all-of-society disaster risk management that 
strengthen synergies across groups.” (Paras. 
19d and 36a) 
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Setting the scene
The introduction, Chapter 1: How we got to now, 
provides background on a decades-long shift 
that has brought us to the Sendai Framework. It 
traces how a shared global policy commitment 
has emerged from the idea of managing disasters 
and seeking to mainstream DRR, to an approach of 
managing the wider risks embedded in our social, 
economic and environmental activity. The Sendai 
Framework is about transitioning towards resilient 
and sustainable – even regenerative – societies in 
a way that is informed by a deeper understanding of 
risk and its drivers. 
Chapter 1 also introduces the wider context of the 
Sendai Framework as one of a group of key interna-
tional agreements adopted in 2015 and 2016 that 
look towards a better future for people and societ-
ies around the globe. These include:
These are reference points for implementation of 
the Sendai Framework’s concept of integrated risk 
governance, at all scales.
The substantive elements of this GAR begin with 
Chapter 2: Systemic risks, the Sendai Framework 
and the 2030 Agenda, which is an examination of 
the nature of systemic risk and the systems-based 
approaches that the Sendai Framework invokes. 
There are profound implications in making the shift 
from a hazard-by-hazard view of risk, to a holistic 
understanding of disaster risk as a dynamic three-
dimensional topography that changes through 
time. This chapter introduces and elaborates the 
concept of systemic risk. It delves into this field 
to explore what we need to understand, and how 
it might be possible to change the ways we think, 
learn and act. 
The chapter discusses how current approaches 
measure and model holistic representations of 
disaster risk in light of the concept of systemic 
risk. It describes different types of systemic risks 
that vary with respect to temporal patterns, the 
ways in which feedback works in systems and 
the ways in which the scales used to view the 
system are related. It then considers the issue of 
governance of systemic risks and how it might be 
possible to change the ways we think about risk 
and behaviour. It examines combinations of theory, 
human ingenuity and uses of technology that may 
help to tackle risk reduction in systems, and to 
interrogate the complicated and complex nature of 
the dynamic interactions of social, economic, politi-
cal and ecological dimensions. 
Chapter 2 also tackles the topic of collective intelli-
gence, the issue that data can change as a function 
of context, and considers the collaboration neces-
sary to advance our understanding of systemic 
risks. It introduces the Global Risk Assessment 
Framework, which is an open and collaborative 
initiative called for, designed and developed by 
experts and facilitated by the United Nations Office 
for Disaster Risk Reduction. This framework seeks 
to help the world deal with complexity, uncer-
tainty and inefficiencies in risk assessment and to 
provide decision makers at different scales with 
enhanced risk information and actionable insights, 
tools and demonstrations that are open, inclusive, 
collaborative and recognisant of the systemic 
nature of risk. 
• Transforming our World: 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development (2030 Agenda), which 
provides a plan of action for people, planet and 
prosperity that envisages a world free of poverty, 
hunger, disease and want, where all life can thrive
• Paris Agreement on climate change, which 
provides the foundation for sustainable, low-
carbon and resilient development in a changing 
climate
• Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which outlines fis-
cally sustainable and nationally appropriate mea-
sures to realign financial flows with public goals 
and reduce structural risks to inclusive growth
• New Urban Agenda, which introduces a new 
model of urban development that promotes 
equity, welfare and prosperity 
• Agenda for Humanity, which addresses conflict-
related risk drivers and seeks to reduce future 
vulnerability through investment in humanitarian 
response that builds local capacities
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The Sendai Framework’s 
broadened view of 
the world’s risk
Part I highlights how risk science is changing. 
Hazards interact with each other in increasingly 
complex ways, and our understanding of this is 
expanding. Vulnerability can have myriad dimen-
sions. Calculating the exposure to a virus is differ-
ent to calculating the exposure to a landslide. 
Representation of risk in this GAR is therefore not 
as elegant as it has been in the past. Risk is messy.
The production of calculations to represent the risk 
a country faces is a highly complicated task that 
relies on complex equations and the inputs of multi-
ple data sets. This produces an elegant series of 
metrics and graphics: multi-hazard average annual 
loss, probable maximum loss and hybrid loss 
exceedance curves. All are impressive scientific 
ways to inform a community about how to reduce 
risk. However, in practice, they do not actually do 
that. 
Such metrics may be multi-hazard, but they rely on 
hazards being probabilistically measurable. Some 
hazards can be measured this way, but with others, 
it is harder. Return periods for seismic risk are 
well understood, but flooding is more complicated 
because there are many more drivers of floods 
(coastal and riverine floods, human infrastructure 
and settlements, etc.). It is harder still for droughts 
and insect infestations. And when hazards are no 
longer natural hazards only, but include industrial 
accidents, epidemics or agricultural blights, those 
elegant calculations become untenable. 
The metrics usually rely on measuring exposure 
and vulnerability of the built environment. This is 
an important part of the cost of disasters and the 
nature of risk, but it does not take into account 
the human cost in terms of lives lost, health and 
livelihoods affected, or the differential impacts of 
hazards on vulnerable people.
With this recognition of uncertainty at the fore, 
Chapter 3: Risk, investigates how we currently 
monitor and model a range of hazards, includ-
ing tsunamis, landslides, floods and fires. Other 
hazards are less familiar as they were not part of 
the Hyogo Framework for Action. However, they 
are part of the Sendai Framework and include: 
biological, nuclear/radiological, chemical/industrial, 
NATECH (natural hazards triggering technological 
disasters) and environmental hazards. Chapter 3 
looks at our understanding of how these hazards 
interact with exposure and vulnerability. 
Chapter 4: Opportunities and enablers of change 
highlights that the technological, policy, regula-
tory and scientific context has changed to enable 
new kinds of analysis, new understanding and new 
ways of communicating risk. It also informs us that 
disaster risk science has new partners. Thousands 
of people have realized they have a role to play 
in reducing risk since the Sendai Framework was 
adopted. Epidemiologists, nuclear safety experts, 
climate researchers, utility companies, financial 
regulators, zoning officials and farmers can all see 
themselves reflected in the Sendai Framework. 
People interested in protecting life, assets and the 
environment have been interlinking their knowledge 
and energy.
However, new opportunities unveil new challenges. 
Chapter 5: Challenges to change outlines some 
issues such as changing our mindsets, political 
factors, and technological and resource challenges. 
To succeed, the technical enablers of improved 
data science, risk assessment and risk modelling 
rely on the willingness of people to work with other 
disciplines, across cultural, language and political 
boundaries, and to create the right regulatory envi-
ronment for new and urgent work to proceed.
Chapter 6: Special section on drought links all 
these themes. Drought risk contains elements of 
meteorology, climate change, agriculture, power 
politics, food security, commodity markets, soil 
science, hydrology, hydraulics, etc. Drought is 
highly destructive and is projected to become 
more frequent and more severe in many parts of 
the world due to climate change. This chapter lays 
 (Part I, Chapters 3–6)
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the groundwork for the GAR 2020 special report 
on drought, but in this GAR, it provides a detailed 
example of complex, systemic risk that can be 
reduced and managed only through a systems 
response. 
Implementation of the 
Sendai Framework 
and disaster risk-
informed sustainable 
development 
The United Nations General Assembly endorsed 
the 2017 recommendations of the Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on indi-
cators and terminology relating to DRR, which was 
established to develop indicators for monitoring 
implementation of the Sendai Framework. The 
reporting period for Member States has thus been 
short. Consequently, the data available for infer-
ring trends in terms of the targets is limited and 
does not yet offer statistical confidence. However, 
we can observe with confidence certain patterns 
in terms of the magnitude and the geographic and 
socioeconomic distribution of disaster impacts and 
abstract several points of departure for where and 
how countries have managed to reduce disaster 
risk. Nevertheless, we note that the observed period 
is still too short to reach definitive conclusions on a 
global scale.
Part II introduces the global disaster risk land-
scape with emphasis on the globally agreed goals 
and targets of the Sendai Framework and the 2030 
Agenda. It takes stock of experiences so far, with a 
comparative analysis of country-specific evidence 
on national reporting, including roll out of the new 
SFM. 
Chapter 7: Risk reduction across the 2030 Agenda 
sets out the targets and agreed indicators of the 
Sendai Framework and the disaster-related Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 
Agenda, now that integrated and common report-
ing by Member States has been established. Since 
2015, significant efforts have been made to imple-
ment the Sendai Framework, by an increasingly 
diverse spectrum of stakeholders, reaching across 
different geographies, sectors and scales. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the type 
of data needed for effective monitoring and also 
recognizes that the current gaps in data and knowl-
edge limit governments’ ability to act and effectively 
communicate with the public on reducing risk. 
Chapter 8: Progress in achieving the global targets 
of the Sendai Framework presents the latest data 
available – including those presented by the ninety-
six countries using SFM since it went live on 1 
March 2018 - and infers early lessons on the status 
of the global disaster risk landscape.  There has 
been growing awareness since 2015 of the need for 
better data. SFM represents a unique opportunity 
to streamline interoperable data on disaster losses. 
This chapter recognizes that national disaster loss 
databases may use different methodologies, and 
that reporting data in a comparable manner to the 
SFM system remains a challenge for many coun-
tries, not just developing countries. 
Chapter 8 also reviews the contribution of SFM 
to reporting on relevant SDGs, by underlining the 
cross benefits of integrated reporting across the 
global frameworks. Recognizing that extra efforts 
are required to optimize these interactions to the 
mutual benefit of different frameworks, Part II 
offers some insights on improved opportunities for 
cross reporting through different SDGs.
Chapter 9: Review of efforts made by Member 
States to implement the Sendai Framework looks 
at successes and challenges as they emerge from 
the first years of reporting, including in terms of 
data, statistics and monitoring capability, and 
provides recommendations for further improve-
ments. It also highlights best practices in capacity-
building, monitoring and reporting, and discusses 
engagement of a broad spectrum of State institu-
tions and non-State actors. 
(Part II, Chapters 7–9)
xvi GAR19 - A guided tour
Creating the national 
and local conditions 
to manage risk 
The Sendai Framework calls on governments to 
adopt and implement national and local DRR strate-
gies and plans that meet its essential elements and 
which are thereby aligned with its goal and princi-
ples (Target E). 
Fulfilment of Target E is a foundational step for 
governments to: (a) achieve the ultimate targets 
of the Sendai Framework by 2030 and (b) move 
towards risk governance that incorporates the 
broadened risk scope of the Sendai Framework in 
the context of the 2030 Agenda, and which incor-
porates systems-based approaches. It requires 
integration across different sectors and levels of 
government, engagement with civil society and the 
private sector, and contemplation of different time 
frames to address current and emerging risks. This 
is why Member States agreed that Target E should 
be achieved by 2020. National and local DRR strat-
egies and plans are a necessary foundation for 
broader implementation of the Sendai Framework 
and for risk-informed sustainable development.
Part III discusses the enabling environment for 
Member States to develop and effectively imple-
ment national and local plans and strategies, 
including the technical support systems and 
resources available around the Sendai Frame-
work and the other post-2015 agendas mentioned 
above. Chapter 10: Regional support and national 
enabling environments for integrated risk reduc-
tion discusses important aspects of the enabling 
environment, including the mutual support and 
resources that Member States access through 
their regional organizations and agreements. These 
can be formal intergovernmental mechanisms or 
innovative multi-stakeholder partnerships, and the 
governance framework of laws, policies, institutions 
and financing in place within Member States at 
national and local levels. 
Part III then moves onto the evidentiary chapters on 
national and local practices, extending the Sendai 
Framework Monitoring data reported in Part II 
with qualitative analysis. Chapters 11–13 provide 
research and analysis on current practices in devel-
oping national and local DRR strategies and plans 
that align with the Sendai Framework, integration 
of DRR into development planning, and integration 
of DRR with national climate adaptation strategies 
and plans. Taking Sendai Framework Target E as 
the starting point, these chapters aim to provide 
a picture of the challenges, good practices and 
lessons learned in using a systems-based approach 
to risk reduction at national and local levels when 
developing and implementing these types of 
government policy instruments. 
Chapter 11: National and local disaster risk reduc-
tion strategies and plans shows that while there 
are many examples of good practices around the 
world – with case studies highlighting how some 
countries have overcome resource and capac-
ity challenges – Member States cannot assume 
that existing arrangements are fit for purpose 
under the broadened hazard and risk scope of the 
Sendai Framework. Likewise, Chapter 12: Disas-
ter risk reduction integrated in development plan-
ning and budgeting examines the challenges and 
gathers examples of good practices, notably the 
opportunities provided during renewal of national 
socioeconomic development plans. Chapter 13: 
Integration between disaster risk reduction and 
national climate adaptation strategies and plans 
examines the degree of integration between DRR 
and CCA plans, including in the context of formal 
reporting to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change and the Paris Agree-
ment, and internationally financed CCA projects. 
The chapter is couched in terms of the existen-
tial threat posed by global warming if it exceeds a 
temperature of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, as 
presented in the 2018 report of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change. 
Part III concludes with two chapters on risk environ-
ments that are of concern due to their complexity 
and potential for risk creation, including cascad-
ing and compounding risks. Rapidly growing urban 
(Part III, Chapters 10–15) 
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environments and fragile or complex situations can 
create new risks as well as compound risks arising 
from natural hazards, armed conflict, poverty, 
malnutrition and disease outbreaks, thereby 
increasing the vulnerability of affected populations 
and reducing their coping capacity. They exemplify 
the imperative for systems-based approaches in 
risk governance, including addressing socioeco-
nomic vulnerability in government policy and the 
engagement of non-State actors in a wide concept 
of risk governance.
Chapter 14: Local disaster risk reduction strate-
gies and plans in urban areas considers urban 
Conclusions, recommendations and 
supporting material
Principal Conclusions and recommendations of this GAR19 are consolidated in the above Executive 
summary, as well as in the accompanying document, GAR19 Distilled. They are drawn from the conclusions 
and recommendations presented in each chapter and part.
As with previous GARs, this report is underpinned and informed by the extensive research, knowledge and 
expertise of experts and competent bodies. This GAR continues the tradition of sponsoring and presenting 
additional, innovative research and evidence to support our understanding of the creation and propagation of 
disaster risk, as well as the conducive conditions and impediments to its management. 
GAR19 introduces a more formal process of generating commissioned research. The online section GAR19 
contributing papers presents research selected following a call for papers and which successfully passed 
external, academic peer review. Additional material is also available in the online Bibliography.
This GAR, and the supporting material and data that informed its development, can be accessed online and 
downloaded from the GAR19 website (www.gar.unisdr.org/2019), which offers readers the opportunity to 
explore the report interactively.
environments, which are growing rapidly in develop-
ing countries around the globe and which present 
challenges for many local governments. These 
challenges are amplified where the development 
of urban environments is accompanied by the 
growth of informal settlements. Chapter 15: Disas-
ter risk reduction strategies in fragile and complex 
risk contexts tackles the critical and complicated 
aspects of risk reduction in fragile or complex situ-
ations – such as those created by population move-
ments due to armed conflict and famine, in which 
decision makers need to take account of known 
threats as well as new and emerging sources of risk 
that are difficult to foresee. 
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Chapter 1: 
How we got to now
1.1 
Figure 1.1. Risk reduction – a journey through time and space
(Source: UNDRR 2019) 1  (United Nations General Assembly 2015a)
The adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (Sendai Framework)1 at the 
third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) – and its subsequent endorsement by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations (Resolution A/RES/69/283) in June 2015 – marked the culmina-
tion of a process formally begun in the 1970s.
Evolution of the global policy agenda 
for disaster risk reduction
25
1970s
Having observed that actual and potential conse-
quences of natural hazards were becoming so 
severe, and were of such a scale, that much greater 
emphasis on pre-disaster planning and prevention 
was imperative, the United Nations Disaster Relief 
Coordinator convened an International Expert Group 
Meeting in July 1979 to review six years’ worth of 
work developing a methodology for risk and vulner-
ability analysis. 
1980s 
This work laid the foundations for the develop-
ment, 10 years later, of the International Frame-
work of Action for the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR)2,  beginning on 
1 January 1990.3 
1990s 
Supported by a Secretariat established at the United 
Nations Office in Geneva, IDNDR was intended to 
reduce – through concerted international action 
– loss of life, damage to property, and social and 
economic disruption caused by “natural disas-
ters”, especially in developing countries. With a 
strong emphasis on engaging and deploying exist-
ing scientific and technical knowledge, IDNDR 
succeeded in raising public awareness – notably 
of governments – to move away from fatalism and 
to reduce disaster losses and impacts. A pivotal 
moment in IDNDR was the adoption (in 1994) of the 
Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines 
for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and 
Mitigation, containing the Principles, the Strategy 
and the Plan of Action (Yokohama Strategy)4 at the 
World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction. 
1994
The Yokohama Strategy marked the beginning of 
a significant shift in the political and analytical 
context within which disaster reduction was being 
considered. While IDNDR was largely influenced by 
scientific and technical approaches, the Yokohama 
Strategy attributed great importance to socioeco-
nomic vulnerability in disaster risk analysis, empha-
sizing the crucial role of human actions in reducing 
the vulnerability of societies to natural hazards and 
disasters.
2000s
Having been so mobilized, at the conclusion of 
IDNDR, Member States determined in 1999 that 
IDNDR would be succeeded by the International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR).5 This would 
seek to: (a) enable communities to become resil-
ient to the effects of natural hazards, and related 
technological and environmental disasters, thus 
reducing the compound risk posed to social and 
economic vulnerabilities within modern societies, 
and (b) proceed from protection against hazards 
to the management of risk, by integrating risk 
prevention strategies into sustainable develop-
ment activities.
At the end of the period covered by the Yokohama 
Strategy, in 2004 and 2005, the United Nations 
Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disas-
ter Reduction carried out a review of the Yoko-
hama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer 
World. The Yokohama Review found evidence of 
greater official and public understanding of the 
effects of disasters on the economic, social and 
political fabric of societies, and stated that “signifi-
cantly greater commitment in practice is required”. 
It also identified challenges and gaps in five main 
areas: governance; risk identification, assessment, 
monitoring and early warning; knowledge manage-
ment and education; reducing underlying risk 
factors; and preparedness for effective response 
and recovery. 
2005–2015 
The Yokohama Review was submitted to the 
second WCDR in Kobe, Japan, in January 2005. 
It formed the basis for formulation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the 
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disas-
ters (HFA). The adoption and implementation of 
HFA following WCDR marked a milestone in cata-
lysing national and local efforts to reduce disaster 
risk and in strengthening international cooperation 
through the development of regional strategies, 
plans and policies, and the creation of global 
and regional platforms for disaster risk reduc-
tion (DRR), as well as the adoption by the United 
Nations of the United Nations Plan of Action on 
Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience. 
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Member States adopted a series of principles 
to support implementation of HFA including: the 
primary responsibility of States to prevent and 
reduce disaster risk together with empowered 
relevant national and local authorities, sectors 
and stakeholders; all-of-society, inclusive, engage-
ment; coordination within and across sectors and 
with relevant stakeholders at all scales; a multi-
hazard approach and inclusive, evidence-based risk-
informed decision-making; addressing underlying 
risk factors through public and private investments 
informed by disaster risk; strengthening interna-
tional cooperation; and emphasis on developing 
countries.
HFA provided detailed guidance and policy space 
to advance the management of underlying risks 
in countries’ growth and development – a space 
that the disaster risk management (DRM) commu-
nity mostly failed to fill. Nevertheless, in establish-
ing policy, legislative and planning frameworks, 
many countries laid the foundation for the shift 
from managing disasters to managing risk, which 
would eventually be enshrined in the Sendai 
Framework. HFA oversaw inter alia an increasing 
emphasis on multi-hazard, as opposed to single-
hazard, approaches to risk reduction, albeit in a 
context characterized by competition for political 
or economic priority, limitations in terms of capac-
ity, technical and financial resources across sectors 
and scales, and the subsequent application of risk 
information in decision-making.
Least progress was made in HFA Priority for Action 
4 (Reduce the underlying risk factors). In general, 
institutional, legislative and policy frameworks did 
not sufficiently facilitate the integration of disaster 
risk considerations into public and private invest-
ment, environmental and natural resource manage-
ment, social and economic development practices 
in all sectors, land-use planning and territorial 
development. 
Weak alignment and coherence in policies, finan-
cial instruments and institutions across sectors 
became a driver of risk. Few countries adopted 
frameworks of accountability, responsibility and 
enforcement and also appropriate political, legal 
and financial incentives to actively pursue risk 
reduction and prevention.
In addition, few countries addressed the often-
interdependent risks they faced in a holistic manner, 
with investments in key sectors such as health, agri-
culture and food security, education, infrastructure, 
tourism and water omitting disaster risk. Incentive 
structures were found to be in need of reinforcing, 
including the encoding of costs and benefits of DRR 
in economic valuations, competitiveness strategies 
and investment decisions, including in debt ratings, 
risk analysis and growth forecasts or the inaccurate 
pricing of risk in the global financial architecture.
Therefore, hazard exposure in both higher and lower 
income countries increased faster than vulner-
ability decreased, new risks were being generated 
faster than existing risks were being reduced. The 
value of lost and damaged housing, businesses, 
infrastructure, schools, health facilities and other 
assets increased relentlessly, leading to increases 
in contingent liability and sovereign risk for govern-
ments in many instances.
Underpinned by poorly planned and managed urban 
development, environmental degradation, poverty 
and inequality, and also weak risk governance, 
frequent and extensive low-severity disasters were 
found to increasingly affect the more vulnerable 
elements of society, thus challenging the achieve-
ment of social development goals. With the causes 
and consequences of risk being transmitted across 
geographic regions and income classes, between 
present and future generations and between 
social and economic sectors, HFA helped to iden-
tify disaster risk as a critical issue of global and 
regional governance, national safety and security, 
and a threat to the achievement of sustainable 
development. 
2  (United Nations General Assembly 1987)
3  (United Nations General Assembly 1989)
4  (United Nations General Assembly 1989)
5  (United Nations General Assembly 2000)
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At the end of implementation of HFA, Member 
States recognized that efforts had not led to 
reduced physical losses and economic impacts. 
They concluded that the focus of national and inter-
national attention must shift from protecting social 
and economic development against perceived 
external shocks, to transforming growth and devel-
opment to manage risks, in a holistic manner, in a 
way that promotes sustainable economic growth, 
social well-being and a healthy environment that 
strengthens resilience and stability.
This conclusion formed the basis for the develop-
ment of the Sendai Framework, and the subsequent 
increased emphasis on addressing the underlying 
drivers of risk, preventing the creation of new risk, 
reducing the existing stock of risk and strengthen-
ing the resilience of nations and communities.
1.2 
Sendai Framework 
and the pursuit of risk-
informed sustainable 
development
Soon after the Sendai Framework had been nego-
tiated at the third WCDR, Nepal was struck by the 
powerful Gorkha earthquake on 25 April 2015. 
Ravaged by the initial event, numerous after-
shocks and another quake 17 days later, 8,891 
people lost their lives, 22,303 were seriously 
injured and millions were made homeless. Nepal 
had to absorb damage and losses of an estimated 
$7 billion,6 a bill it could ill afford. It was a jarring 
reminder of the devastation wrought when the 
context of hazard, exposure and vulnerability is 
allowed to evolve without adequate attention to 
the corollary risk it is building. It demonstrated 
anew how apparently disparate decisions across 
sectors, geographies and scales – endogenous to 
development processes – are intrinsically braided 
together. 
Enhancing understanding and management of the 
threads of this collective, social construction of 
risk, as well as the impacts that impinge upon indi-
viduals, households, communities, cities, countries, 
economies or ecologies through time, is at the heart 
of the aspirations and goals of the Sendai Frame-
work, adopted by Member States at the United 
Nations General Assembly in June 2015. The prin-
ciples reflect the collective responsibility of people, 
governments, communities, the private sector, 
investors, media and civil society to effectively 
prevent and reduce disaster risks. They embody 
increased demands for accountability mechanisms 
to protect populations and ecosystems, while insti-
tuting risk-informed approaches to better manage 
current and emerging risks.
As with the Transforming our World: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 
Agenda),7 the outcome and goal of the Sendai 
Framework is underpinned by the principle of 
universality, recognizing that no society – regard-
less of income classification – is immune to the 
negative consequences of realized risk. Tradi-
tional event-based estimates of (predominantly 
direct) impact attribute most economic losses 
to high-income nations – a function of the higher 
monetary value of insured damaged assets – 
while the human cost of disasters is substantially 
higher in low- and lower middle-income countries. 
Such analyses correctly identify the most vulner-
able segments of the world’s population as consis-
tently suffering the most harmful effects – in many 
instances, reversing development gains, corroding 
resilience, undermining sustainability, eroding well-
being and diminishing socioeconomic growth. 
Recognizing the threat that risk poses to sustain-
able development – be it as a result of economic 
loss or the disruption to social and ecological 
systems8 – the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations noted (on the International Day for Disaster 
Reduction, 13 October 2017):
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6    (Nepal 2015)
7    (United Nations General Assembly 2015c)
8    (Benson 2016); (Hallegatte et al. 2017)
9    (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2019)
10  (Wallemacq, Below and McLean 2018)
11  (Benson 2016); (Hallegatte et al. 2017); (ESCAP 2017a)
12  (ESCAP 2017b)
13  (Benson 2016); (Kousky 2016)
14  (IFRC 2015); (IFRC 2017)
15  (ESCAP 2017a); (Hallegatte et al. 2017)
16  (UNFCCC 2016)
17  (United Nations General Assembly 2017b)
The challenge is to move from managing disas-
ters themselves to managing risk. Poverty, rapid 
urbanization, weak governance, the decline of 
ecosystems and climate change are driving 
disaster risk around the world. The Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction with its 
seven targets for the prevention of disasters and 
reducing disaster losses is essential to achiev-
ing the Sustainable Development Goals.
Unresolved vulnerabilities, rising exposure and 
proliferating, mutable hazard events continue to 
drive catastrophic loss of life, disrupt livelihoods 
and fuel new displacement – an additional 17.2 
million people were internally displaced in 2018 
alone as a result of climate-related disasters and 
natural hazards.9 It is estimated that people in least 
developed countries are, on average, six times more 
likely to be injured, lose their home, be displaced or 
evacuated, or require emergency assistance, than 
those in high-income countries.10
The impact is greatest on the most marginalized 
populations, exacerbating inequality and further 
entrenching poverty, where vulnerabilities trans-
late into reduced access to entitlements, impaired 
capabilities and opportunities.11 For instance, it is 
estimated that 35.6% of the population affected by 
floods in Pakistan in 2010 consequently slipped 
under the poverty line as a result.12 Beyond focused 
attribution to single events, when extending the 
spatio-temporal nature of consequence analy-
sis, impacts are often found to be a function of 
a series of associated shocks – famine, disease 
and displacement for instance – that collectively 
prompt disruptions in multiple dimensions (e.g. live-
lihoods, educational trajectories or labour-market 
opportunities). 
Such analyses remain a grossly under investigated 
domain. The longitudinal, indirect consequences 
of the realization of accumulated risks are likely to 
affect and potentially reverse development gains 
in affected areas for generations to come. These 
consequences may be in the form of deprivations 
in early childhood nutrition, disease, school inter-
ruption, ill-developed cognitive and social skills, or 
limited labour-market opportunities. Children are 
particularly affected by the disruption of education 
and health-care systems;13 women and girls suffer 
higher levels of violence and generally worse eco-
nomic outcomes following disasters;14,15 and the 
extent to which mental health, well-being and the 
ability to lead a dignified life are negatively affected 
is little understood.
Such are the current limitations in understanding of 
risk and the interdependencies and correlations that 
exist within and among social, ecological, economic 
and political systems, which, in turn, dimin-
ish the ability to predict or influence outcomes. 
However, the principles of integration and indivis-
ibility that underpin the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), and the related call in the Sendai 
Framework for the adoption of systems-based 
approaches and an improved understanding of the 
dynamic nature of systemic risk, are driving new 
lines of enquiry, model methodologies, and oppor-
tunities for data cultivation and exchange among 
communities. 
1.2.1 
Risk reduction post-2015
All post-2015 agreements – namely the 2030 
Agenda, the Paris Agreement on climate change,16 
the New Urban Agenda (NUA),17 the Addis Ababa 
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Action Agenda (AAAA)18 and the Agenda for 
Humanity19 – include elements of DRR and resil-
ience in their scope.20 They all point to the intercon-
nection of global challenges and risks.
The implementation of these agreements requires 
and provides the opportunity to address underlying 
risk drivers by fostering risk-informed investment 
and focusing on issues such as poorly planned 
urbanization, climate change, environmental degra-
dation and poverty.21 In so doing, common actions 
will simultaneously support the achievement of the 
goals and targets of all agreements, including the 
Sendai Framework. The relevance of DRR to the 
post-2015 development agreements and the links 
among them create opportunities to: build interna-
tional coherence and foster risk-informed policy 
and decision-making; promote multi-hazard and 
cross-sectoral approaches to assessing risk; and 
encourage a deeper understanding of socioeco-
nomic and environmental vulnerability across differ-
ent sectors and levels of government.22 
Figure 1.2. Risk-informed sustainable development
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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Though each agreement frames disaster risk and 
resilience from different perspectives, there is a 
common understanding that DRM is one of the 
prerequisites to building resilience. This is an imper-
ative to achieving sustainable development and a 
reminder of how integrated the responses ought to 
be.23 Reinforcing the point, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations emphasized that DRR must be 
at the core of sustainable development strategies 
and economic policies if countries are to fulfil the 
commitment in the 2030 Agenda and ensure that 
“no one will be left behind”.24
1.2.2 
2030 Agenda
Unlike HFA and the Millennium Development Goals, 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs 
have now been linked with the Sendai Framework. 
This was partly at the request of Member States to 
reduce the overlapping reporting burden by estab-
lishing common metrics and integrated reporting 
protocols (see Part II of this GAR), but also due to 
a wider shift in recognition that these agendas are 
mutually dependent in achieving their objectives 
(risk-informed sustainable development). 
The 2030 Agenda and its SDGs build on the 
achievements of the Millennium Development 
Goals, and aim to go further towards ending all 
forms of poverty and promoting prosperity, peace 
and partnerships, while protecting the planet.25 The 
2030 Agenda recognizes the core role that risk 
reduction and resilience play in sustainable devel-
opment policy, by making direct reference to the 
Sendai Framework, by adopting common indicators 
and by setting targets related to risk reduction in 
many SDGs.26 
The adoption of common metrics for measuring the 
goals and targets of the two agreements and the 
development of mutually reinforcing implementa-
tion architectures (including common data and inte-
grated monitoring and reporting protocols) support 
the prospect of a greatly enriched data environ-
ment. Disaggregated data sets and statistical data, 
hitherto scarce in the disaster risk realm, are now 
prerequisites for measuring risk-informed sustain-
able development. Consequently, the international 
statistical community has already been mobilized 
(see Chapters 7 and 9); improvements in data avail-
ability, quality and accessibility are anticipated as 
these capabilities are deployed and other resources 
(potentially through the global and national SDGs 
architecture) are made available to countries 
seeking to redress data and capacity gaps.
The expectation is that with an enriched data envi-
ronment and enhanced assessment capabilities, 
there will be an improved understanding of the 
forensics of the aforementioned multidimensional 
disruptions. This also applies to the systemic 
dimensions so essential for a better anticipation 
of future opportunities, shocks, risks, precursor 
signals, correlations and trends.
1.2.3 
Paris Agreement
Disaster risk and resilience are encoded within the 
Paris Agreement. At the twenty-first Conference of 
the Parties in Paris in 2015, Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) welcomed the adoption of the Sendai 
Framework. Articles 2, 7, 8 and 10 of the Paris 
Agreement call for actions that have direct impli-
cations for disaster risk. In particular, the Sendai 
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Framework notes that “disasters, many of which 
are exacerbated by climate change and which are 
increasing in frequency and intensity, significantly 
impede progress towards sustainable develop-
ment.” The aim of holding the global average 
temperature this century below an increase of 2oC 
above pre-industrial levels requires systemic risk 
management on a scale never seen before, neces-
sitating collective action to address the causal 
factors of natural and man-made hazards and 
risks. With countries’ nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs) of the Paris Agreement estimated 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) to be leading the climate system to temper-
ature increases of between 2.9oC and 3.4oC,27 this 
would result in future hydrometeorological hazard 
intensities that surpass known experience and 
which alter loss and damage equations and fragil-
ity curves of almost all human and natural systems 
at risk.
The Paris Agreement recognized the need to 
address loss and damage associated with the 
effects of climate change. The agreement iden-
tified areas of cooperation central to DRR and 
called for investments to address the underlying 
risk drivers associated with rising greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission levels and to inspire innovation 
and low-carbon growth.28 However, with non-linear 
change in hazard intensity and frequency a reality,29 
much greater ambition and accelerated action is 
required pre-2030, so as to converge with the goal, 
outcome and targets of the Sendai Framework.
Building coherence between the Paris Agree-
ment and the Sendai Framework is currently prin-
cipally framed around commonalities of DRR and 
climate change adaptation (CCA). The two frame-
works have the common objective of strengthen-
ing communities’ resilience across the full range 
of environmental, technological and biological 
hazards, so they build back better. Support for 
these objectives manifests through coordinated 
action between the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), the Adapta-
tion Committee of UNFCCC and the Least Devel-
oped Countries Expert Group, which is supporting 
mainstreaming DRR into national adaptation 
programmes of action (NAPAs). Much more must 
be done to understand and integrate the conse-
quences of simultaneous systemic change around 
energy, industrial, land, ecological and urban 
systems within ongoing vulnerability reduction 
measures of NAPAs, local adaptation programmes 
of action and DRR plans.
Adaptation has multiple connections with risk 
reduction processes at the local and regional 
levels, and will be most effectively pursued when 
integrated efforts reflect the important relation-
ship between climate mitigation (and its associ-
ated risks, including technological risk), adaptation, 
hazard modification and vulnerability reduction.
Key to successful integration of the two frame-
works will be the presence of clear governance 
arrangements and accountability mechanisms to 
ensure successful collective action and joined-up 
monitoring processes, thus minimizing the report-
ing burden on countries while learning from previ-
ous successes. 
1.2.4 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda
AAAA proposes a global framework for financ-
ing sustainable development efforts post-2015. In 
paragraph 34, it refers to the Sendai Framework in 
its commitment to develop and implement holistic 
DRM at all levels in line with the Sendai Framework. 
It also supports national and local capacities in the 
development of integrated strategies and plans 
towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change, and resilience 
to disasters. AAAA encourages the consideration 
of climate and disaster resilience in development 
financing (para. 62) and calls for innovative financ-
ing mechanisms that allow countries to better 
prevent and manage risks, and to strengthen the 
capacity of national and local actors to manage 
and finance DRR.30
AAAA highlights the importance of improving 
global economic governance to counter excessive 
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volatility and support sustainable development by 
underlining issues of coherence and consistency 
of international financial, monetary and trading 
systems. Commitments made by Member States 
primarily reflect challenges of systemic risk from 
regulatory monetary gaps and misaligned incen-
tives in the financial sector and allow countries 
to plan more efficient responses to shocks and 
disasters. More fundamentally, AAAA summa-
rized concerns over the sustainability of global 
economic growth in the face of increasing environ-
mental, social and financial challenges. It provides 
a comprehensive set of policy actions with over 
100 concrete measures to address the larger and 
more diverse financing needs associated with 
transforming the global economy and achieving 
SDGs.
AAAA calls on the international community to offer 
targeted support to countries whose domestic 
resources and debt sustainability are threatened 
by disasters, by encouraging tailor-made finan-
cial instruments.31 Relevant examples on disas-
ter risk include sovereign bonds linked to gross 
domestic product (GDP), the inclusion of “hurri-
cane” or “catastrophe” clauses in loan contracts, 
countercyclical loans and weather-related insur-
ance schemes. Member States also committed 
to intensify efforts towards domestic resource 
mobilization to develop fiscally sustainable social 
protection schemes by setting national spend-
ing targets for quality investment,32 to support 
the most vulnerable in the aftermath of a disaster 
and allow access to essential public services for 
all. This translates to a global financial infrastruc-
ture that supports the special needs of countries 
most in need, least developed countries and small 
island developing States (SIDS), through coordi-
nated polices aimed at fostering debt financing, 
debt restructuring, improved access to finance and 
domestic resource mobilization. AAAA made one 
message clear with regard to financing for risk-
informed development. While it remains important 
to address the short-term risks of today, decision 
makers must stay steadfast in promoting a long-
term financing strategy to meet the environmental, 
social and economic challenges of tomorrow. 
1.2.5 
New Urban Agenda
In its vision, principles and commitments NUA 
explicitly mentions DRR and resil ience, and 
promotes proactive risk-based, all-hazard and 
all-of-society approaches. It calls for sustain-
able management of natural resources in cities to 
promote DRR by developing DRR strategies and 
assessing disaster risk periodically (para. 65). 
Moreover, it expresses Member State commitments 
to improve cities’ resilience to disasters by adopt-
ing approaches in line with the Sendai Framework 
(paras. 67 and 77).33 
As NUA moves into an operational phase, signifi-
cant opportunities to link more coherently to other 
agendas are apparent.34 The synergies between 
NUA and the Sendai Framework provide the basis 
for expanded collaboration, including between the 
UNDRR-led Making Cities Resilient Campaign and 
the United Nations Human Settlements Programme 
(UN-Habitat). This pursues achievement of Target E 
of the Sendai Framework and the objectives of NUA, 
particularly on supporting cities in developing and 
integrating local DRR strategies into urban develop-
ment plans.
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1.2.6 
Agenda for Humanity
Reduction of risk and vulnerability on a global scale 
is a key message of the Agenda for Humanity, 
which calls for the anticipation and prevention of 
disaster and crises. It consists of five core respon-
sibilities that are essential to achieve progress to 
address and reduce humanitarian need, risk and 
vulnerability, namely: political leadership to prevent 
and end conflict, leave no one behind, uphold the 
norms that safeguard humanity, change people’s 
lives from delivering aid to ending need, and invest 
in humanity. 
The Agenda for Humanity aims to reduce risk by 
promoting different ways of working together so as 
to transcend the humanitarian-development divide, 
and to ensure that investments in sustainable devel-
opment are risk informed. These include: conduct-
ing risk and vulnerability analysis with development 
partners and local authorities, and strengthening 
existing coordination efforts to share analysis of 
needs and risks, and better align humanitarian and 
development planning tools and interventions.
Adopted in 2016, the Grand Bargain: A Shared 
Commitment to Better Serve People in Need35, 
recognizes that today’s humanitarian challenges 
require new and coherent approaches that address 
the economic, social and political root causes of 
crises, conflict and disaster.
Enshrined in each of the above 2015 agreements 
is recognition of the systemic nature of risk, and 
so the call for a paradigm shift to adopt systems-
based approaches and work in new ways to 
collaboratively reduce the creation of new risk and 
manage the existing stock of risk.
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The preamble to the 2030 Agenda states that SDGs 
are integrated and indivisible, balancing the three 
dimensions of sustainable development: economic, 
social and environmental. However, this century is 
likely to be dominated by the emergence of large-
scale dynamic risks that inherently cut across these 
dimensions. The Sendai Framework reflects the 
certainty that in an ever more populous, networked 
and globalizing society, the very nature and scale of 
risk has changed, to such a degree that it surpasses 
established risk management institutions and 
approaches. Recent events - such as large-scale 
prolonged droughts and heatwaves, financial and 
commodity market crashes, large scale and long 
term human migration, cybervulnerabilities and 
political upheavals - carry the potential to generate 
diverse types of damage and destruction simulta-
neously, to vital infrastructure and even to the life 
support systems of very large parts of societies and 
economies.
With non-linear change in hazard intensity and 
frequency a reality,36 and now threatening all three 
dimensions of sustainable development, the imper-
ative for greater ambition and accelerated systemic 
action pre-2030 to converge with the Sendai Frame-
work is clear. The Sendai Framework compels new 
conceptual and analytical approaches to improve 
understanding and management of risk dynamics 
and risk drivers at a range of spatial and temporal 
scales. It requires particular emphasis on the inter-
action among physical, technological, social and 
environmental hazards, and attention to “anthro-
pogenic metabolism”. (Anthropogenic metabolism 
means the systemic interaction between humans 
and the environment that consists of the inputs, 
outputs and stock of materials and energy required 
to sustain physiological needs for food, air, water 
and shelter, as well as the products, substances and 
services necessary to sustain modern human life.37 
It emerges from the application of systems thinking 
to industrial and other human-made activities, and 
is central to sustainable development.) 
Technical communities use models to better “see” 
risk in the present or near future, and so the view 
of risk is inherently shaped by the tools used to 
describe it. Most models have been based on 
historical data and observations, assuming that the 
past is a reasonable guide to the present and the 
future. That assumption is now rendered obsolete 
on almost every frontier: by the sheer number of 
human beings, never before seen on Earth; by the 
changing climate; and by the dynamic and global 
connectedness of biological and physical worlds, 
individuals and communities. 
Chapter 2: 
Systemic risks, the 
Sendai Framework 
and the 2030 Agenda
36  (IPCC et al. 2018)
37  (Brunner and Rechberger 2002)
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With the certainty of near-term non-linear changes, 
the critical assumption of the relationship between 
past and future risk must now be revisited. The 
Sendai Framework defines a new era for the classifi-
cation, description and management of risk. 
The Sendai Framework stipulates that the global 
community must come to terms with a new under-
standing of the dynamic nature of systemic risks, 
new structures to govern risk in complex, adaptive 
systems and develop new tools for risk-informed 
decision-making that allows human societies to 
live in and with uncertainty. Coming to terms with 
the limitations of a hazard-by-hazard view of risk 
management, the Sendai Framework spurs the 
dialogue and action necessary to refine, extend 
and enhance the ability to understand and manage 
systemic risks. 
Today’s environmental,  health and financial 
systems, supply chains, information and commu-
nication systems are clearly vulnerable. They also 
create vulnerability on multiple spatial scales (local 
to global) and across different timescales (from 
immediate to decadal and beyond). They are chal-
lenged by, and are causal drivers, of disruptive 
influences such as climate change, loss of biodiver-
sity and ecological systems degradation, disease 
outbreaks, food shortages, social unrest, politi-
cal instability and conflict, financial instability and 
inequality.
 
The eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland, the 
impacts of Hurricane Sandy in the United States 
of America, and the Great East Japan Earthquake, 
tsunami and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident 
are recent examples of complex risk events. They 
each encompass critical spatio-temporal contexts, 
including elements of surprise and non-linearity. All 
incurred immediate and prolonged impacts driven 
by significant underlying risk drivers that were 
underestimated, including background conditions 
related to critical infrastructure placement, vulner-
ability and lack of redundancy.38
In today’s globalized economic system, networks 
of communication and trade have generated highly 
interdependent social, technical and biological 
systems. These networks are built on, and have 
built-in, incentives to be highly efficient and to 
generate economic gains. This narrow focus means 
there are often undetected fragilities that produce 
an array of changing systemic risks. In effect, 
through global interconnectedness, human civili-
zation has become a “super-organism”, changing 
the environment from which it evolved, and induc-
ing new hazards with no analogue. Despite techni-
cal and analytical capabilities and the vast webs 
of information about social and Earth systems, 
human society is increasingly unable to understand 
or manage the risks they create. Humans have also 
been slow to realize that the degradation of the 
Earth’s natural systems is becoming a source of 
large-scale, even existential, threat affecting fragile 
social systems at local, national, regional and global 
scales. Far-reaching changes to the structure and 
function of the Earth’s natural systems represent 
a growing threat to human health.39 While global 
economic integration continues to strengthen 
resilience to smaller shocks through trade adjust-
ments, increasingly integrated network structures 
also create expanding vulnerabilities to traditionally 
recognized and novel systemic risks.40 
This chapter explores the systemic risks that are 
embedded in the complex networks of an increas-
ingly interconnected world. The behaviour of these 
networks defines quality of life and will shape the 
dynamic interactions among the Sendai Framework, 
the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, NUA and 
the Agenda for Humanity. Ultimately, the behaviour 
of these networks determines exposure and vulner-
ability at all scales. The regenerative potential of 
the social and natural systems envisaged in these 
aligned intergovernmental agendas will be better 
understood, and progress will be accelerated, by 
incorporating systemic risk and systemic oppor-
tunity into the design of policies and investments 
across all scales.
38  (Pescaroli and Alexander 2018)
39  (Whitmee et al. 2015)
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2.1 
Assessing and analysing systemic risks: 
mapping the topology of risk through time
It takes strong nerves to question the very fabric of society.41
A paradigm shift has occurred since the mid-twentieth century. Enabled by increases in computational power 
and the availability and mobilization of vast streams of data and observations, models and narratives, systems 
approaches increasingly help make sense of the failure of linear constructs in a world where everything is 
connected. (Linear constructs refer to the pervasive extraction–production–distribution–consumption–
disposal linear process of resource use in the current economic paradigm). Earth is one system – a system of 
systems. Systems thinking is obvious and essential to create the future enshrined in the 2030 Agenda.
Figure 2.1. Topology of risk
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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Traditional understanding of risk can be likened to 
a view of the Himalayan peaks from above, with a 
cloud cover that obscures the topography below. 
From above, humans have described and named 
these peaks of risk as if they are separate and inde-
pendent, when in fact, below the clouds, the connec-
tions are clear. Significant and influential peaks of 
risk occur that do not rise to the level of the clouds 
and currently remain obscured from view but are 
nonetheless highly relevant. This chapter examines 
several of these, including food system instability, 
cyberrisk and financial systems.
2.1.1 
Examples of systemic risks
By definition, systemic risks are emergent, and 
not necessarily obvious using contemporary 
hazard-plus-hazard approaches, until the disaster 
occurs. Disasters resulting from systemic risks 
also may not fall into a traditional disaster taxon-
omy of a sudden event or an event with a clear 
start date. Emergent risks are typically obvious 
in retrospect – a result of a series of events that 
cross human-imposed boundaries, whether insti-
tutional, geographic, disciplinary, conceptual or 
administrative. 
The term “emergent risk” is most commonly 
applied to financial systems (e.g. when one signifi-
cant financial institution fails and others collapse 
because of opaque, complex, coupled relationships 
that connect them). In banking, emergent risks may 
result as a consequence of large interbank depos-
its, net settlement payment systems, investor panic 
or counterparty risk on derivative transactions, 
such as credit default swaps. Just as the “disease-
fixing” medical establishment is not necessarily 
well suited for preventive, holistic approaches to 
achieving good health and happiness – and in many 
instances has inadvertently created new ills while 
curing old ones – traditional disaster response and 
mitigation capabilities are not the appropriate appa-
ratus to increase community resilience or under-
standing of systemic risks.
Multiple breadbasket failure
A projected increase in extreme climate events 
and an increasingly interdependent food supply 
system pose a threat to global food security. Conse-
quently, it is crucial that agricultural models take 
into account local parameters, as these represent 
binding constraints on global production resources. 
For instance, local shocks can have far-reaching 
effects on global agricultural markets. Conse-
quently, it is crucial that agricultural models take 
into account local parameters, as these are critical 
variables in global food production. Increasing trade 
flows and trade network complexity also make the 
system more vulnerable to systemic disruption.42 
For example, climate shocks and consequent crop 
failure in one of the global cereal breadbaskets 
might have knock-on effects on the global agricul-
tural market. The turbulences are exacerbated if 
more than one of the main crop-producing regions 
suffers from losses simultaneously – a scenario 
often described as multiple breadbasket failure 
(MBBF). 
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Figure 2.2. Multiple Breadbasket Failure
42  (Puma et al. 2015)
43  (Bailey et al. 2015)
44  (FAO 2017a)
45  (Hovland 2009)
46  (Gilbert 2010); (Baffes and Haniotis 2010)
47  (Nazlioglu and Soytas 2011)
48  (Saghaian 2010); (Frank et al. 2015)
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
Academics, industry and policy experts warn that 
a better understanding of the risks of MBBF, as 
well as improved modelling, are needed to manage 
climate risks and the increasing global demand 
for food.43 Of special interest are the effects of 
production shocks on crop prices and agricultural 
commodity markets. Due to increased demand 
and limited production capabilities, the volatility 
associated with agricultural prices is expected to 
rise in the coming decades.44 This trend is already 
apparent, notably in the 2007–2008 food price 
crisis.45 Energy shocks, increased energy demand 
and exchange rate fluctuations, as well as fiscal 
and monetary expansions, played a key role in this 
process, amplifying the impact of reduced produc-
tion resulting from severe drought and heat-wave 
conditions.46 
This experience suggests that the financial sector 
has a key role to play in agricultural markets.47 For 
example, a number of studies have found ethanol 
policies in the United States of America signifi-
cantly affect oil prices, as well as agricultural 
commodity prices.48 The linkage of energy prices 
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and agricultural markets is also documented in 
the reverse direction.49 These effects are expected 
to increase in the future as a result of climate 
change.50
Moreover, changes in financial markets can also 
prompt agricultural producers to increase their 
production, either through cropland intensification 
or through expansion. Both of these responses can 
have negative environmental impacts, which would 
eventually feed back into the financial markets 
(through increased climate variability). This also 
implies that financial markets are in the unique 
position to support preventive action, avoiding GHG 
emissions, and potentially prevent or reduce climate 
risks, by reallocating trillions of dollars of invest-
ments and assets under management so as to be 
compatible with a global warming target of less 
than 1.5°C. 
Paragraph 36(c) of the Sendai Framework explicitly 
includes the role of private sector financial institu-
tions to integrate DRM into their business models 
and practices through disaster risk-informed invest-
ments.51 The main challenge of implementing finan-
cial market policy and changing investor behaviour is 
the non-synchronous time horizons and spatial scope 
of the modelling instruments available to climate 
change researchers and financial policymakers and 
investors. Climate change models tend to focus on 
long-run horizon scenarios of development, typically 
until 2100, while financial market activity is evalu-
ated on annual or multi-annual time horizons, some-
thing that Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has 
referred to as “the tragedy of the horizon”.52
Scenario building in this context can help facili-
tate thinking and decision-making if those involved 
are able to consider local events, and regional and 
global drivers and trends. Exploratory scenarios 
start with the present situation in mind and explore 
the future impacts of various drivers, such as envi-
ronmental degradation or climate change, shocks 
such as disasters, and trends such as urbanization 
and migration. 
To fully understand the systemic risks of MBBFs, it 
is necessary to understand the gap between global, 
regional and local risks, risk perception, and risk 
prevention and mitigation strategies, and to evalu-
ate the potential impacts of financial market regu-
lations and possible innovative financial tools with 
regard to their impact on food security and the 
environment.
Societal resilience, cyberrisk and network 
hyper-risk
Interconnectedness is amplified by the connective 
tissue that runs through all of today’s systems – 
the digital infrastructure that is itself susceptible 
to breakdowns and attacks from malicious third 
parties. 
Understanding the degree of cascading risk and 
developing ways to isolate, measure and manage 
or prevent risk is a new challenge in today’s environ-
ment of computer systems and computer actions 
that dominate economic, social and even envi-
ronmental systems management. Consequently, 
our approaches to risk management and build-
ing our understanding of the interactive nature 
of the drivers of risk must focus on this emerg-
ing, massive threat and develop actions based on 
knowledge of systems and their interrelationships 
and interdependencies.
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Cyberattacks cascading into health systems 
and compromising patient lives through 
attacks on health-care monitoring devices 
(“medjacking”) emerged in 2015. Security 
researchers discovered security flaws in the 
Hospira infusion pump that could remotely 
force multiple pumps to dose patients with 
potentially lethal amounts of drugs. In addi-
tion to insulin pumps, deadly vulnerabilities 
were found in dozens of devices, including 
X-ray systems, computerized tomography 
scanners, medical refrigerators and implant-
able defibrillators. After the discovery, regula-
tors, including the United States Department 
of Homeland Security and Federal Drug Admin-
istration, began warning customers not to 
use the devices due to their vulnerability. The 
announcement was the first time the United 
States Government advised health-care provid-
ers to discontinue the use of a medical device. 
Box 2.1. Medjacking the infusion pump
51  (UNISDR 2015a)
52  (Carney 2015)
53  (Toregas and Santos 2019)
49  (Enders and Holt 2014); (Harri, Nalley and Hudson 2009); 
(Nazlioglu and Soytas 2011)
50  (Gilbert 2010)
(Source: World Economic Forum 2016)
Modern society has benefited from the addi-
tional efficiency achieved by improving coor-
dination across interdependent systems using 
information technology (IT) solutions. Nonetheless, 
this IT dependence has also exposed critical infra-
structure and industry systems to a myriad of cyber-
security risks, ranging from accidental causes, to 
technological glitches, to malevolent wilful attacks. 
The scale of systemic risk emanating from the 
increasing vulnerability to cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure systems at national or local levels 
is still not fully understood. The cascading effect 
beyond the system under attack into interconnected 
systems can be devastating, creating chaos across 
economic, food and health systems over potentially 
prolonged periods well beyond the initial timing of 
a cyberattack. Consequently, approaches to risk 
management and building understanding of the 
interactive nature of the drivers of risk must focus 
on the emerging, massive threats in this area, and 
develop actions based on knowledge of systems 
and their interrelationships and interdependencies.
Models that can describe single-system vulner-
abilities for cyberattack are not helpful for decision 
makers to understand and properly prepare for 
such systemic risks. By contrast, models that can 
describe the degree of risk expansion, as interre-
lated technological systems propagate the attack 
deep into the ecosystem of society, are now avail-
able.53 Such models can begin to provide risk 
information helpful to governments, the insurance 
industry and the corporate world, so that proper 
preparations to prevent cyberattacks or manage the 
system components that are potentially vulnerable 
to attack may be considered.
These models bring together work from two 
fields: conceptual models exploring the impact of 
cyberattacks on insurance rate setting and other 
risk measurement mechanisms, and detailed 
mathematical models that explore the impact of 
cyberattacks on interconnected economic and infra-
structure sectors. With the shift by Member States 
away from hazard-based disaster management 
to risk-based strategies enshrined in the Sendai 
Framework, these two streams of exploration are 
being united to highlight additional hazards, risks 
and dynamic interactions that need to be consid-
ered to understand the full impact of cyberattacks.
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54  (Lanier 2013)
55  (Firth 2017)
56  (Lucas et al. 2018)
The relevance of this methodology to decision 
makers grappling with cascading risk problems is 
shown in the domain of food security within the 
United States of America. The rapid evolution of 
American agriculture from analogue to “smart” 
farming, transportation and food processing 
systems is opening new and often unappreciated 
cyberattack vectors. The structure and operation 
of modern highly networked food systems (and 
the obvious requirement for functional energy, 
transportation and other systems) fundamentally 
depends on networked information systems, some 
of which may not be secured from cyberattacks. 
The combined complexities of these networked 
systems interacting together stands to amplify 
threats and vulnerabilities that exist in any of the 
major systems, as well as risk to other dependent 
systems. The result is uncharacterized risks that are 
highly relevant for food safety and supply, manufac-
turing, banking, commodities, insurance and other 
sectors. 
Among the salient large-scale features in contem-
porary, industrialized food systems that have poten-
tial to increase cyberrisk are: 
Just-in-time distribution further exacerbates 
potential fragility in food supply between farm and 
table. All of these changes cause, or are caused by, 
advances in information flows and interactive sys-
tems that support the food system. Wherever infor-
mation flows are crucial to the regular function of 
food systems, the potential for interruption or dis-
ruption via cyberattack exists.
2.1.2
Measuring and modelling systemic risks
Any information technology, from the most 
ancient money to the latest cloud computing, 
is based fundamentally on design judgments 
about what to remember and what to forget.54 
Established risk management techniques deal with 
threats generated by factors external, also termed 
“exogenous”, to the situation being assessed and 
managed. Typically, such situations allow a sepa-
ration between risk assessment and risk manage-
ment. Repetitive historical observations have been 
used to characterize risk by statements about the 
probability of certain interactions of hazards, vulner-
ability, exposure and capacity. However, the essen-
tial feature of the extreme, catastrophic, risk events 
actually witnessed in recent history, is the lack, or 
complete absence, of the patterns expected based 
on historical observations. 
a. Increasing farm consolidation with heavy 
and rapid reliance on smart technology with 
artificial intelligence (e.g. use of robotic milking 
machines). 
b. Vertical integration through the food supply 
chains in which agricultural producers may 
directly process agricultural commodities (e.g. 
milk processed into dairy products on farms 
to directly supply supermarkets and grocery 
stores).
c. Widespread lack of compliance with food safety, 
traceability and insurance requirements.
d. Rapidly advancing use of smart technology 
throughout supply chains and transportation 
systems. 
e. Increasing interdependency among food system 
components in smart markets resulting from 
new and often uncharacterized outsourcing 
relationships, service and highly coordinated 
supply arrangements, creating greater exposure 
to inter-organizational cascading defaults and 
failures. 
f. Lack of systematic surveillance of social 
media, markets and other dynamic real-time or 
near-real-time reflections of food systems in 
a defensive mode to quickly detect precursor 
signals or system anomalies (physical and 
digital issues) of substantial concern. 
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To characterize systemic risks, which neces-
sarily involves dealing with information gaps 
or ambiguity, it helps to capture the random 
patterns of possible disasters, including those 
arising from extensive and intensive risks, on 
maps of values describing the vulnerability of 
objects, infrastructure and activities. A result-
ing systemic risk model will then allow for a 
quantification of mutually dependent losses 
in space and time, allowing for the use of 
stochastic risk management models. Stochas-
tic systemic risk assessment tools recognize 
complexity and do not try to simplify things to 
make calculations easier. They need to repre-
sent how complex components are distributed 
across systems, and even if the probability is 
low, they need to encompass extreme events 
(distributional heterogeneity and additivity 
of extreme events). Such tools are therefore 
Box 2.2. For the curious – systemic risk modelling
difficult to establish, and the approach differs 
from that taken in multi-hazard modelling, 
which relies on “regularity assumptions” that 
attempt to make reality less complex and disor-
derly to facilitate calculation. 
Scenario analysis and stochastic simulation 
are used in many applications by the insurance 
industry. The purpose is to identify and evalu-
ate risks and examine possible interconnec-
tions among them. For example, in the area 
of natural hazards, earthquake strength and 
possible hurricane paths are simulated, impact 
scenarios defined and potential losses anal-
ysed. The findings are used for purposes such 
as pricing, internal guidelines and management 
of a portfolio of insured assets. The ability to 
assess risks quantitatively has a direct effect 
on the insurability of the hazards concerned. 
The complexity that underlies systemic risk may 
be sufficiently intricate that quantification and 
prediction of risk is not easy. In many instances, 
the capacity to make pertinent real-world obser-
vations is limited or absent, and yet an improved 
understanding of systems dynamics is required 
to elaborate estimates that are valid for improved 
decision-making. Systemic risk modelling may offer 
quantitative information to estimate spatio-tempo-
ral hazard exposures and potential catastrophic 
impacts. The design and computation of such 
models is typically a multidisciplinary endeavour 
with scientific challenges and important judgments 
as to what to include and what to exclude. 
To make these complex, interconnected systems 
more manageable, a new view of risk is needed. 
This is analogous to clearing away the cloud cover 
to reveal the three-dimensional shape of risk, with a 
topology that also shifts through time. The Sendai 
Framework impels a move away from an obses-
sion with prediction and control towards an ability 
to embrace multiplicity, ambiguity and uncertainty.55 
There has been important recent work predicated 
on these concepts that suggests that the shape of 
risk is similar in very different systems. This “homo-
morphism” of systemic risks in different domains 
suggests that as attempts are made to understand 
the effects of endogenous triggers and critical 
transitions, there will be more patterns apparent in 
different domains, which will allow the development 
of a consistent understanding of the fundamental 
characteristics of systemic risk.56 An apparently 
stable macroconfiguration of a complex system 
will break down, and will be re-shaped by amplifica-
tions of a series of microevents until a new macro-
configuration emerges. An example of this is the 
“invisible” asset price bubble in the housing sector, 
which remains unseen until the bubble bursts due 
to microscopic fluctuations in the system. To under-
stand these critical aspects and disseminate new 
approaches for decision makers at various scales 
(in a simple-to-understand format) will require a 
more comprehensive understanding of spatio-
temporal dimensions and the differentiated nature 
of complicated and complex systems.
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There are concepts that are often used interchange-
ably in the field of risk modelling and complex 
systems management, but which mean very differ-
ent things. A non-exhaustive collection of types of 
risk in the context of systems is provided in Box 2.3 
as guidance as to how these terms will be used in 
this GAR.
To focus the attention of analysts and decision 
makers on the indicators that most appropri-
ately capture the character of systemic risk, 
the impending phase transitions and regime 
changes of the underlying complex system, 
new approaches to modelling are required. 
Systemic risks might be easy to mitigate early 
on. However, failure or even intentional igno-
rance to capture the role of underlying drivers 
of systemic risk will allow small risks to grow 
into major problems, increasing the opportu-
nity costs of failed interventions and missed 
opportunities. Developing and implementing 
multidisciplinary approaches to identify and act 
on precursor signals and systems anomalies is 
critical to minimizing or avoiding discontinui-
ties in complex systems.
If appropriately co-produced, systemic risk 
modelling will uncover the incentives driving 
policymaker resistance to going beyond 
conventional views of risk, and which currently 
allow salient early warnings from systemic risk 
indicators to be ignored or rejected.
Assessment and management methodologies 
for systemic risks that have been conceived 
are still in early gestation, and are not yet part 
of the current operations of twenty-first century 
risk management institutions. Nonetheless, 
there is a growing sense of urgency for a para-
digm shift hitting every major twentieth century 
risk management institution, as the limitations 
of the linear constructs of that era are now 
acutely revealed by the occurrence and pros-
pect of massive failures and potential species-
limiting vulnerabilities.
Modelling systemic risks – multi-agent systems research
The adoption of a multi-agent system in assessments subject to systemic risk is an 
emerging approach that is growing in importance, as it represents network effects and 
allows the random nature of human behaviour and (emotional) decision-making to 
be considered. A multi-agent system is a loosely coupled network of software agents 
that interact to solve problems beyond the individual capacities or knowledge of each 
problem solver. When certain agents pose a deliberate or unintentional threat, systemic 
risk management requires the countermeasures taken by other agents to be configured 
across all interconnected subsystems to maintain the integrity of the entire system. 
The application of multi-agent systems research may be considered appropriate in 
approaches to online trading, disaster management or social structure modelling for 
example.
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The origins of modern investigation in systems and the development of systems-based approaches 
can be traced back to the late nineteenth century. These lines of inquiry flourished through the 
twentieth century, in the study of complexity science and adaptive systems, through Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy’s General System Theory in 1968, to cybernetics, catastrophe theory, complexity theory 
and complex adaptive systems.
And yet a commonly accepted vocabulary describing the manner in which risk features in systems 
is yet to be developed. The imperative to adopt systems-based approaches in understanding and 
managing risk that is enshrined in the Sendai Framework and the 2030 Agenda, has prompted 
UNDRR to propose the following definitions to guide the inquiry and the address of risk in systems, 
in this GAR, and potentially henceforth in implementation. Definitions may overlap each other.
Systemic risk – risk that is endogenous to, or embedded in, a system that is not itself considered 
to be a risk and is therefore not generally tracked or managed, but which is understood through 
systems analysis to have a latent or cumulative risk potential to negatively impact overall system 
performance when some characteristics of the system change. 
Femtorisk – a seemingly small-scale event that can trigger consequences at a much higher level of 
organization, often through complex chains of events (after Simon Levin 2011).
Systems risk – the inherent risk of a system when substantive elements of the system contribute to 
the entire system having a certain risk profile, which could be anywhere on the risk spectrum from 
very low risk, like an intact rainforest ecosystem, to very high risk, like a tar sands mining system.
Network hyper-risk (after Dirk Helbing 2013) or cascading multiple systems risk – the inherent 
risk across multiple systems when there are substantive elements contributing to the system of 
systems having a certain risk profile, which could be anywhere on the risk spectrum from very low 
risk to very high risk. An example of very high risk might be the network hyper-risk across the entire 
food system as described by the analysis in the MBBF programme of work.
Existential risk – the risk of a fundamental, irreversible change in the performance of all systems 
relative to a specific perspective; for example, the existential risk to the survival of humans on Earth 
that is posed by the collective of risks associated with climate breakdown.
Topological map of risk through time (after Molly Jahn 2015) – a dynamic temporal and geospa-
tial representation of risks at multiple scales including representation of the functioning of multiple 
complex, non-linear, interlocking systems across all scales and the interlinkages, dependencies, 
correlations and relationships among and across all types of risk (as broadly defined in the Sendai 
Framework, para. 15). The purpose is to provide an understanding of the current and future condi-
tions on Earth to manage uncertainty through the identification of precursor signals and anomalies, 
including sensitivities to change, system reverberations, bleed-over and feedback loops, by utilizing 
artificial intelligence and collective human intelligence. 
Box 2.3. Selected definitions relating to systemic risks
(Sources: von Bertalanffy 1968; Levin 2011; Helbing 2013a; Jahn 2015)
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Figure 2.3. Complicated and complex systems
2.1.3 
Complicated and complex systems
In discussing the different types of assessments of 
risk, it is important to clarify the distinction between 
a “complicated” system and a “complex” system. 
A complicated system can be (dis-)assembled and 
understood as the sum of its parts. Just as a car 
is assembled from thousands of well-understood 
parts, which combined allow for simpler and safer 
driving, multi-hazard risk models allow for the aggre-
gation of risks into well-behaved, manageable or 
insurable risk products. By contrast, a complex 
system exhibits emergent properties that arise from 
interactions among its constituent parts. Examples 
of a complex system include a traffic jam, regime 
change or social unrest triggered by natural hazards.
The priorities for action of the Sendai Framework 
spur a new understanding of risk, and the obvious 
value of discerning the true nature and behaviour 
of systems rather than a collection of discrete 
elements. This view allows the use of complexity 
theory for risk management problems in the context 
of the Sendai Framework and the wider 2030 
Agenda. Historically, risk management models, as 
well as economic models and related policymak-
ing, have tended to treat systems as complicated. 
Applying this method, simplified stylized models are 
often applied to single entities or particular chan-
nels of interaction, to first define and then label the 
risk phenomena. Methods are then negotiated by 
stakeholders to quantify, or otherwise objectively 
reflect, the risk in question, and then to generalize 
it again to make policy choices. Most prevailing risk 
management tools assume underlying systems are 
complicated, rather than complex. In fact, these 
tools are often deliberately designed to suppress 
complexity and uncertainty. This approach is 
increasingly out-dated and potentially harmful in a 
(Source: Gaupp 2019)
46 Chapter 2
globalizing and increasingly networked world, and 
is likely to produce results that simply fail to capture 
the rising complexity of the topology of risks. 
Risk and uncertainty are measures of deviation from 
“normal”. Risk is the portion of the unexpected that 
can be quantified by the calculation of probabilities. 
Uncertainty is the other portion of the unexpected, 
where information may exist but is not available, 
not recognized as relevant or simply unknowable. 
Therefore, probabilities for uncertainties cannot 
be reliably measured in a manner currently accept-
able to the global risk management community. 
Converting uncertainty into acceptable risk quanti-
ties that essentially emanate from complex system 
behaviour is currently very difficult, even impos-
sible. Some uncertainties in any complex system 
will always remain unmeasurable. The risks can be 
characterized and quantified, to some degree, by 
networks made up of individual agents whose inter-
actions exert macroscopic consequences feeding 
back to individual behaviour. Understanding sensi-
tivities to change and system reverberations is far 
more important and more challenging in the context 
of complex systems. Simulations of such systems 
show that small changes can produce initial ripples, 
which can be amplified by non-linear effects and 
associated path dependencies, causing changes 
that lead to significant, and potentially irreversible, 
consequences.
Increasing complexity in a networked world of 
anthropogenic systems within nature can be 
unstable and uncontrollable, and it may not be 
possible to understand them ex ante. This inabil-
ity to adequately understand and robustly manage 
systemic risk is an important challenge for risk 
assessment in the context of the Sendai Framework 
and achievement of the 2030 Agenda. 
To allow humankind to embark on a development 
trajectory that is at least manageable, and at best 
sustainable and regenerative consistent with the 
2030 Agenda, a fundamental rethink and rede-
sign of how to deal with systemic risk is essential. 
Improved understanding of system components, 
including precursor signals and anomalies, systems 
reverberations, feedback loops and sensitivities to 
change, will be imperative. Ultimately, the choices 
made in respect of risk and resilience will determine 
progress towards the goals of the 2030 Agenda.
2.2 
Spatio-temporal 
characteristics of 
systemic risks
Systemic risk events can be sudden and unex-
pected, or the likelihood of occurrence can build 
up through time in the absence of appropriate 
responses to precursor signals of change. An 
understanding of systemic risk requires a time-
dependent description of the interacting elements, 
the strength of interactions among elements, and 
the nature of trigger events. Modelling the systemic 
risk behaviour of complex systems is intrinsi-
cally difficult. The degree to which harm is caused 
depends on the temporal dependence of the under-
lying processes and the severity of the trigger event, 
which are usually studied through numerical simu-
lations. In other words, the impacts of realized 
systemic risk depend on the rapidity of interaction 
of different parts of systems and how extreme the 
event is that triggers the risk. 
Time and timing are critical parameters that deter-
mine the properties of the impacts of systemic 
risks when realized, or, in more familiar terminol-
ogy, when the consequences of hazard, vulnerability 
and exposure manifest. It is salient to mention here 
two aspects concerning timing in the context of 
systemic risk. The first issue is related to the poly-
synchronous time signature of dynamic systems 
and the occurrence of risks; the second refers to the 
temporal evolution of how systemic risks build up 
and unfold, involving feedback loops of asynchro-
nous operations of system components.
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2.2.1 
Polysynchronous time signatures of dynamic 
systems
Polysynchronous events refer to simultaneous 
disruptions (events) in a system or systems. If a 
single extreme event such as a drought occurs, 
the system is usually buffered, reducing the 
consequences. For example, trade mitigates price 
shocks resulting from crop losses in one of the 
world’s breadbaskets. However, if multiple extreme 
events happen simultaneously (see section 2.3.1), 
the system may cross a threshold where nega-
tive impacts increase in a non-linear fashion with 
every additional event. Studies have shown that 
disasters – such as floods – often exhibit a higher 
spatial correlation in the extremes, a so-called 
Further innovations in risk modelling are needed to better understand polysynchronous events.59  For 
example, the risks of current and future hazard events such as wildfires, droughts or extreme precipitation, 
as well as their knock-on effects on agricultural production, food prices and food security need to be under-
stood, especially in the context of rapid climatic change. See section 2.1.1 and the risks and consequences 
of MBBF.
2.2.2 
Feedback loops of asynchronous operations of system components
An adverse event affecting the functioning of an individual system component can cause reverberations or 
ripples within the larger system and lead to a breakdown of related system components and potentially the 
complete system. 
tail-dependency.57 In Central and Eastern Europe, 
for instance, river basins show strong positive 
cross-correlation in peak discharges owing to 
atmospheric circulation patterns. Those interde-
pendencies across regions are not yet sufficiently 
included in probabilistic risk modelling, which is 
crucial, for example, for the development of robust 
insurance schemes. Risks of extreme events in 
complex systems will be underestimated as long 
as risk projections ignore geographic risk patterns. 
One useful method to better account for inter-
dependencies in risk modelling is the copulas 
method.58 This is a statistical tool to account 
explicitly for non-linear dependencies in complex, 
multivariate models. It has been applied in the 
fields of finance, medicine and catastrophe model-
ling so far. 
In supply chains and traffic systems, applica-
tions using global navigation satellite systems 
– notably the global positioning system (GPS) 
– have been expanding exponentially, deliver-
ing innovative and efficiency-enhancing capa-
bilities, revolutionizing the operations across 
entire supply chains. Efficiency gains through 
just-in-time delivery systems have been 
Box 2.4. Systems reverberations – global navigation satellite system
remarkable in the logistics sector and also in 
related sectors such as financial services (e.g. 
settlement systems), food systems and health 
(e.g. manufacturing).* A failure in a GPS will 
cause deliveries to be delayed. Order and deliv-
ery jams could cause, through positive feed-
back loops, the simultaneous failure of many 
services that are likely otherwise assumed 
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Cascading hazard processes refer to a primary 
impact (trigger) such as heavy rainfall, seismic 
activity or unexpectedly rapid snow melt, 
followed by a chain of consequences that 
can cause secondary impacts. These result 
in a complex array of vulnerabilities that inter-
act in interdependent and unpredictable ways 
and can have tremendous impacts on popu-
lations downstream of the initial triggers. 
High-mountain Asia is highly vulnerable to 
cascading hazard processes given the tectonic, 
Box 2.5. High-mountain Asia geomorphologic and climatic setting of the 
region, particularly as it relates to glacial lake 
outburst floods.
It is expected that the occurrences of glacial 
lake outburst floods will increase in the future 
due to permafrost thaw and glacial retreat 
exposing mountain slopes and destabilizing 
the environment. This will increase the poten-
tial of landslides, avalanches and debris flow 
hazards, which can hit the glacial lake and 
trigger an outburst flood.
57  (Timonina et al. 2015)
58  (Aas 2004); (Aas et al. 2009)
59  (Golnaraghi et al. 2018)
60  (Masih 2018)
(Source: Nussbaumer et al. 2014)
The most prominent macroscopic example for 
asynchronous feedback is the disturbance of the 
climate system. The fast extraction of fossil fuels 
due to short-term economic incentives leads to 
a steadily increasing stock of GHGs in the atmo-
sphere. The unprecedented speed of the transfer 
of carbon from the ground to the atmosphere is 
not scaled to match with the regenerative dynam-
ics of the natural carbon cycle causing alterations 
in the functioning of the Earth system. These altera-
tions are predicted to cause new, more-frequent and 
intensive disasters ranging from drought and flood-
ing all the way to changes in seismic activity.60 
Some of these disturbances lead to feedback 
loops such as increased frequency of forest and 
savannah burning, and permafrost thawing, which 
further accelerate the build-up of carbon stocks 
in the atmosphere and cause increased warming, 
potentially triggering even more catastrophic abrupt 
climate change phenomena. Evidently, a synchroni-
zation of the rate of extraction of carbon from the 
ground with the rate of natural carbon sequestration 
would have been a more robust development strat-
egy for humankind and is currently envisaged as an 
element of a possible future emissions trajectory to 
be implemented under UNFCCC.
to be independent of each other. It is entirely 
plausible that the malfunctioning of a rela-
tively small service delivery system, originally 
designed to assure the synchronization of 
business operations reaping efficiency gains, 
could cause large-scale breakdown of food 
and health systems at local or even national or 
global scale.
* Beneficial efficiency gains must be measured against new risks posed; for example, the potential deleterious 
effect of just-in-time food delivery programmes on the resilience of communities.
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Figure 2.4. Systemic risk stressors and mitigating factors
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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62  (UNISDR 2009); (UNISDR 2011b); (UNISDR 2013b); (UNISDR 2015a)
Stochastic risk management models have been 
developed to help understand and quantify the 
dynamics of systemic risk in general and of 
asynchronous feedback events in particular. 
Numerical models can either be non-structural 
time-series models (e.g. vector autoregres-
sive models), structural models (e.g. system 
dynamics models) or combinations where 
scenarios are generated by a structural model 
to specify a non-structural emulator model. 
The latter approach then allows for the use of 
stochastic optimization models to calculate 
robust prevention or response strategies.
For assessment of the systemic risk dynam-
ics of large integrated systems, it is necessary 
Box 2.6. For the curious – modelling asynchronous feedback
that the resolution in timescales of the system 
components are matched with the relevant 
dynamics. Fine spatial scale processes might 
be measured in seconds while processes on 
planetary scales can be measured in decades 
or centuries. When the whole of the system 
endogenously adjusts itself or gets triggered 
through an exogenous shock to a transition to 
a new equilibrium by feedback loops, an asyn-
chronous operation of temporal scales might 
render the system unstable. In attempting to 
understand disruption and collapse of func-
tioning in natural and human systems, it is 
likely that such dynamic mismatches are core 
drivers. 
2.2.3 
Multiple spatial scales of systemic risks
HFA primarily focused on risk at the national scale, 
to inform public policy and provide guidance to 
national governments on DRR. However, risk is inter-
connected across larger and smaller geographic 
scales. One example of the smaller spatial scale is 
urban areas, which are central sites where people, 
economic activity and built assets are concentrated, 
and which are increasingly considered as being the 
front line for DRR.61 Disasters in urban areas affect 
local residents and livelihoods, and also trans-
fer shocks through supply chains and resource 
networks to other locations.
Primary risks to urban areas
Previous Global Assessment Reports (GARs) have 
divided risk into multiple classes: everyday risk 
(which includes food insecurity, disease, crime, 
accidents, pollution, and lack of sanitation and 
clean water), extensive risk (which includes death, 
injury, illness and impoverishment from smaller 
intensity hazards) and intensive risk (which includes 
major disasters causing death to 25 people or 600 
houses or more).62 By including these multiple 
classes of risk, the need for urban specialists to 
work alongside disaster specialists to understand 
how risk accumulates in urban areas had become 
abundantly apparent by 2015.
The Sendai Framework takes this further by estab-
lishing the need to understand and manage the 
interdependent, multidimensional variables of 
risk that are created by, and magnified among, 
different systems as they interact, across differ-
ent geographic or spatial scales. Considerations 
of urban risk must embody the multitude of deci-
sions that interact with the underlying hazards and 
conditions that are constantly present in an urban 
environment, such as infectious disease outbreaks, 
fires and crime. It must also consider risks that are 
occasional or exceptional, such as flooding, earth-
quakes, landslides, extreme weather events and 
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Box 2.7. Risk and interacting urban subsystems – Lagos, Nigeria
sea-level rise, to build a more representative under-
standing of systemic risks. 
While systemic risks also affect rural areas, they are 
particularly relevant to urban areas because of the 
unique characteristics of city regions as complex 
systems of systems. For example, sea-level rise 
and coastal flood risks are critical concerns for 
urban areas. Most of the world’s megacities are 
located within low-elevation coastal zones without 
adequate structural measures or behaviour adjust-
ments to avoid either the initial trigger events or 
the cascading hazard processes.63 Many small- and 
medium-sized urban areas are similarly situated 
and growing rapidly. The need to understand and 
manage systemic risk associated with infectious 
epidemics is multiplied in the urban context as a 
result of urban population densities. 
To reduce or prevent the creation of risk, a better 
understanding of the interactions and interde-
pendencies between urban and rural areas is 
essential. This requires a functioning urban/rural 
(city region) data metabolism to process infor-
mation at appropriate scales to understand the 
systems implications. City regions are collecting 
and processing progressively more sophisticated 
data – increasingly in systems models – includ-
ing through approaches already tested in urban 
health observatories.64 This serves to build collec-
tive urban intelligence (see section 2.4.1) among 
informed groups of people in city regions across 
sectors and disciplines, to make better decisions 
together.
Drivers of risk and change in the vulnerability 
of urban areas
The nature and scale of urban risks continue to 
increase due to the confluence of multiple contem-
porary trends, including rapid urbanization, climate 
change and rising inequalities. Increased urban 
development pressure can cause settlement growth 
in hazard-prone areas, such as the informal settle-
ments on the natural flood drainage areas of Cape 
Town, or the landslide-prone gullies and ridges 
around Guatemala City. Such settlements can also 
destroy natural protective ecosystems that have 
historically mitigated the risks of landslides, flood-
ing and storms, such as absorbent wetlands and 
binding vegetation cover on steep land. Often, the 
areas most affected by these hazards are infor-
mal settlements occupied by populations with 
the lowest adaptive capacity, including residents 
without land tenure, and recent migrants. 
In Lagos, Nigeria, between 1986 and 2002, 
urbanization resulted in a 13% increase in 
developed land, and an 11% decrease in 
mangrove, swamp thickets and other natural 
vegetation useful for buffering against coastal 
floods. Subsequent flooding affected several 
slum communities, which had developed on 
sand infill land that could not support solid 
structures, and that therefore had a low market 
value.
(Sources: Okude and Ademiluyi 2006; Adelekan 2010)
With the increased prevalence of hazardous events due to climate change, and dynamic and  evolving vulner-
ability and exposure, such corrosive impacts in urban areas are predicted to increase in coming decades.
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Box 2.8. Latent systemic risk – Puerto Rico
After Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico 
in 2017, a major wholesale medical supply 
company in San Juan was unable to maintain 
production. As a result, hospitals across the 
globe faced a critical shortage and a 600% 
increase in the cost of intravenous bags. More-
over, Puerto Rican pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers were unable to manufacture drugs needed 
to treat diabetes, cancer and heart conditions. 
This was not an isolated instance of significant 
63  (Brown et al. 2013)
64  (International Science Council 2018)
business interruption. The secretary of Puerto 
Rico’s Department of Economic Development 
and Commerce considered “the lack of power 
is the root of everything”, when referring to the 
chronic underinvestment in the electricity grid 
in the decades leading up to Hurricane Maria 
as a major driver of the prolonged and exten-
sive impacts of what was the largest blackout 
in the history of the United States of America.
(Sources: Alvarez 2017; Conrad 2018; Wong 2018)
Recent research has shown that the global urban-
industrial network is more vulnerable to multiple 
simultaneous hazards than to singular impacts in 
wealthy, large urban areas.65 Therefore, as climate 
Transfer of disaster impacts from urban areas to other distant locations
Disaster risk in urban areas has commonly been studied from the perspective of individual cities. However, 
as urban areas are part of a global social and economic network, impacts in one urban area can cascade to 
other distant regions. 
impacts become more prevalent, impacts capable 
of interrupting urban economic flows and creating 
social instability may become more severe.
65  (Shughrue and Seto 2018)
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2.3 
Systemic risk 
governance
Governance generally refers to actions, processes, 
traditions and institutions (formal and informal) by 
which collective decisions are reached and imple-
mented.66 Risk governance can be defined as “the 
totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes and 
mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk infor-
mation is collected, analysed and communicated 
and management decisions are taken.”67 It is usually 
associated with the question of how to enable soci-
eties to benefit from change, so-called “upside risk”, 
or opportunity, while minimizing downside risk, or 
losses. In contrast, systemic risk is usually seen as 
downside risk. The realization of systemic risk by 
definition leads to a breakdown, or at least a major 
dysfunction, of the system as a whole.68 Assessing, 
communicating and managing – in short, governing 
– systemic risk is compounded by the potential for 
losses to cascade across interconnected socioeco-
nomic systems, to cross political borders (including 
municipal and Member State boundaries or regional 
mandates), to irreversibly breach system bound-
aries and to impose intolerable burdens on entire 
countries. Risk governance is also confounded by 
almost intractable difficulties in identifying causal 
agents and assigning liability.
What needs to be set up so that institutions can 
govern systemic risk? Like any emerging phenom-
ena, systemic risk cannot be measured by sepa-
rately quantifying the contributing parts. This 
means that effective governance should consider 
the interconnected elements and interdependencies 
among individual risks. For this purpose, a network 
perspective, with attention to interconnected nodes 
or agents, can be useful, as well as greater account-
ability and responsibility on the part of individual 
and institutional decision makers, for example, 
through the establishment of the principle of collec-
tive responsibility.69 
Some of the characteristics of such institutions at 
the global scale can be explored through examples 
from the global financial system and international 
climate change institutions (see Chapter 13).
2.3.1 
Global financial crisis in 2008
Systemic risk governance requires new institutional 
structures, as was recognized after the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008. Before the crisis, early warning 
systems (EWSs) were in place to identify precursor 
signals and anomalies in the overall performance 
of the complex financial system. Yet they failed to 
detect what are now understood to be clear signals. 
The probability of a financial crisis occurring in the 
United States of America in 2007 was calculated to 
be between 0.6% and 1%. For the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the results 
were similar, with the probability of a financial 
crisis calculated at between 0.6% and 3.4% in 2007. 
Financial systems operated in a siloed fashion with 
constituents operating rationally from their perspec-
tive and within their mandates. However, such 
systems often become corrupted or behave in a way 
that is suboptimal or procyclical at a systems level 
– namely reinforcing of underlying dynamics. Few 
organizations have the wherewithal to investigate at 
a system level, let alone a system-of-systems level, 
and so ownership of the problem is often lost.70
The global financial crisis prompted the develop-
ment of new – or reshaping of old – institutions 
and mechanisms to identify, and ideally prevent, 
future systemic risks in the financial system. The 
inclusion of key developing economies (such as 
Brazil, China and India) in global economic decision-
making processes was a central development – 
notably through the G20 group of globally important 
industrialized and developing economies plus the 
European Union (EU). This was accompanied by a 
more important role of the International Monetary 
Fund in the surveillance of major economics.71 New 
financial mechanisms were also set in place; for 
example, the European Stability Mechanism is an 
international financial institution designed to help 
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66  (Renn 2008)
67  (IRGC 2018)
68  (Kovacevic, Pflug and Pichler 2015)
69  (Helbing 2013b)
70  (Agathangelou 2018)
71  (Kahler 2013)
72  (Bank for International Settlements 2018)
73  (Poledna and Thurner 2016)
74  (Agathangelou 2018)
75  (Goldin and Vogel 2010) 
76  (IPCC 2018)
Box 2.9. Systemic risk governance – global climate change governance
Initiated by the United Nations, global climate 
governance took the form of multilateral agree-
ments beginning with UNFCCC in 1992. The 
2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol 
extends UNFCCC until 2020. As of February 
2019, 126 of the 144 Member States required 
for the amendment to enter into force had 
deposited their instrument of acceptance. 
Negotiations held in the context of UNFCCC 
resulted in the adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment in 2015, which has been ratified by 185 
of the 197 Parties to the Convention. As a 
hybrid of legally binding and non-binding provi-
sions, under this agreement, 183 countries 
have outlined their post-2020 climate actions 
(through NDCs). Beyond the evolution in offi-
cial global climate governance, alternative 
political narratives have emerged that include 
market entrepreneurship and lifestyle changes 
that will encompass more flexible and partici-
patory approaches to addressing the multifari-
ous problems of climate change. These include 
adopting “climate-friendly food” or eco-driving 
and car-sharing.
(Sources: de Boer, de Witt and Aiking 2016; Barkenbus 2010)
the euro area countries in case of severe financial distress.72 A systemic risk tax has also been proposed to 
decrease the number of banks that are too central to fail.73 However, post-crisis governance structures are 
considered by many analysts to be insufficient to prevent a further financial crises.74,75 
2.3.2 
Climate change
While the global financial crisis focused attention on global interdependencies and cascading risks with 
potentially catastrophic consequences, there are a worrying number of other potential triggers. These 
include extreme climate events, armed conflict, forced migration, food and water shortages, unregulated 
digitalization, pandemics and loss of biodiversity. Climate change is increasingly recognized as a systemic 
risk with potentially catastrophic impacts cascading through financial, ecological and social systems. Climate 
change also perhaps has the most developed global governance regime. 
While neither the governance of the financial system 
nor the climate system can claim full success 
(note IPCC warnings that NDCs of the Paris Agree-
ment entail a potential global warming trajectory 
of between 2.9°C and 3.4°C above pre-industrial 
temperatures),76 both have raised awareness of 
the necessity, and spatio-temporal complexity, of 
governance regimes to address systemic risks at 
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the global scale. Moreover, the financial and climate 
governance regimes have brought attention to the 
complex web of challenges. One major challenge is 
establishing causal attribution of systemic losses as 
the basis for assigning accountabilities and respon-
sibilities so essential for risk governance. 
The attribution of climate change has been 
established by accounting for past GHG emis-
sions. Commitments and accountabilities could 
be tackled via GHG projections into the future.77 
However, attribution in other areas of systemic risk 
may be less clear, where large uncertainties exist 
in determining the causal effects across complex 
geospatial regions, across stakeholders and across 
sectors. For example, experts generally agree that 
the risk of extreme droughts and floods in some 
regions is increased by climate change,78 but attrib-
uting losses from any event to human-induced 
climate change is still unachievable. Attribution is 
complicated further as systemic risk can evolve 
up to the global macroscopic scale through disrup-
tions at the microscopic scale, so-called “scale-free 
properties”,79 or through behaviour that is indi-
rectly linked to the disruption it causes in a specific 
system. Consequently, the difficulty of attributing 
accountability bounds the solution space for the 
reduction of systemic risks; it also hampers the 
development of a joint vision defining clear targets 
for its management.
Another challenge, although not unique to systemic 
risk, is the often deep uncertainty surrounding the 
triggers, exposure and cascading consequences, 
which are all the nodes of the network. One way 
of tackling uncertainties, albeit not suggested for 
nodes with catastrophic potential, is trial and error 
through an iterative risk management approach.80 
Uncer tainties can be hedged by combining 
systemic risks with other types of risks so they can 
be tackled together.81 Taking a systems approach 
that takes account of network dynamics and social 
processes can form a basis for designing risk 
governance approaches. 
Beyond uncertainty, a more daunting challenge is 
a lack of understanding of the systemic nature of 
many risk contexts.82 One suggestion taken from 
the climate risk community is to use a triple-loop 
learning process, from reacting to reframing and 
finally to transformation.83 This is also in line with 
suggestions made towards an increasingly adaptive 
risk management framework with a focus on solu-
tions with multiple benefits.84 
At the core of any risk governance framework, 
including systemic risk, is the need for inclusive 
stakeholder expert processes for co-designing and 
co-generating solutions. While the importance of 
stakeholder buy-in has become increasingly appar-
ent, there are special challenges for systemic risks.85 
For one, the cascading and uncertain nature of the 
losses means that stakeholder communities are ill 
defined and often span political borders. Because 
of the uncertainty, the issues will likely be character-
ized by varied views on the nature of the problem 
and its solution, as well as different “risk constructs” 
on the part of the stakeholder communities.86 For 
the “realists” the risks can be objectively assessed 
in terms of their likelihood and impact, whereas for 
the “constructivists”, the existence and nature of 
risk derives from its political, historical and social 
context, that is, it is constructed. The two divergent 
views can have a significant impact with regard 
to policy implementation.87 Modernity reflexively 
relies on increasing complexity to manage the very 
risks it creates, which, in turn, causes disasters that 
are often embedded in the construction of social 
organizations and institutions.88 Consequently, 
iterative approaches are better able to determine 
potential conflicts and possible solutions by iden-
tifying precursor signals or anomalies in system 
performance at the earliest possible point in time.89 
Human agency may play a less-important role in 
some systemic risk considerations (e.g. in supply 
chain risks) than in others (e.g. political disruption), 
which is important for the corresponding gover-
nance approaches. The question is related to the 
optimal complexity to govern systemic risk, that is, 
how detailed the approach should be, given limited 
resources.
It can be argued that in the case of complex 
systems and systemic risks, current measures 
and approaches represent a collection of failed 
attempts.90 Nevertheless, the approaches are 
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raising awareness and addressing challenges that 
can shed light onto critical aspects of what is itself 
a complex issue – systemic risk governance. 
Emerging approaches (e.g. International Risk Gover-
nance Center (IRGC) systemic risk governance 
Successful implementation of such systemic risk 
governance approaches assumes flexibility and 
(continuous) adaptation to context (an iterative 
process in IPCC parlance). It is contingent upon 
strong leadership with mid- to long-term focus, 
the willingness to adapt or revise often non-linear, 
guidelines; see Figure 2.5) seek to address the diffi-
cult problem of assessing or measuring systemic 
risk, of modelling cascading consequences, of 
applying different management instruments,91 and 
of implementing participatory processes.92 
non-sequential processes, and the willingness to 
accept and resolve trade-offs.93 Insights from more 
conventional risk analysis,94 risk communication 
and risk management can be applied fruitfully to 
connect systemic risk with more traditional risk 
governance approaches.
Figure 2.5. Flexible elements of systemic risk governance
(Source: IRGC 2018)
77  (IPCC 2001)
78  (IPCC 2012)
79  (Poledna and Thurner 2016)
80  (Schinko and Mechler 2017)
81  (Timonina et al. 2015)
82  (IRGC 2018); (Timonina et al. 2015)
83  (Tosey, Visser and Saunders 2012)
84  (Frank et al. 2014); (Helbing 2013b) 
85  (IRGC 2018)
86  (Centeno et al. 2015)
87  (Yazdanpanah et al. 2016)
88  (Beck 1999)
89  (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2016) 
90  (Page 2015)
91  (Poledna and Thurner 2016)
92  (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2016) 
93  (IRGC 2018)
94  (Timonina et al. 2015)
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2.4 
Collective intelligence, 
contextual data and 
collaboration
Risk is ultimately a human construct, created in 
language and meaning to describe the felt or feared 
volatility and uncertainty of human life – in other 
words, the experience of complexity and of complex 
systemic effects. Humans in many societies have 
become accustomed and attached to the illusion of 
control that the construct of risk has given us. But 
as it becomes apparent that the effects of interde-
pendent, globally connected systems and vulner-
abilities may be beyond human measurement or 
management, the limits of that illusion must be 
acknowledged. So too must the limits of present 
systems of governance and organization of human 
knowledge. This requires a new paradigm for under-
standing and living with uncertainty and complex-
ity – one that activates the power of human social 
and contextual intelligence, and where possible, 
leverages it through appropriately designed artificial 
intelligence.
Developing the capability for contextual under-
standing and decision-making is a far more effec-
tive way of dealing with uncertainty and complexity 
than the present reliance on extrinsic frames of 
reference and categorical technical expertise, siloed 
into disciplines. In part, such capability can be built 
using a lifelong learning approach, so as to grow an 
aware, internalized ability to notice the relevance of 
context and the role of self; and in so doing, recog-
nize and anticipate interdependencies and non-
linear effects. 
Human decision-making is emotional, not ratio-
nal, and is therefore more successfully activated 
by mental models based on meaning attached to 
values and beliefs.95 Over time, use of narrative and 
meaning to negotiate the constantly changing rela-
tionship between identity and context has proven 
to be an effective mechanism to build resilience, 
to enable rapid sensing, understanding and sense-
making. In this way, collective intelligence becomes 
possible as an essential precondition for collec-
tive responsibility, which is at the core of systemic 
risk governance. Collaboration with and through 
that intelligence holds the key to building systemic 
resilience.
2.4.1 
Collective intelligence
“Collective intelligence” is the powerful combination 
of human intelligence, artificial or machine intelli-
gence and processing capacity.
Building resilience is necessary to adequately 
respond to, and reduce, risks and prevent disasters. 
Resilience requires: planning and preparation based 
on assessments to avoid or minimize risk creation 
and reduce the existing stock of risk; the develop-
ment of capacity to restore functions quickly and 
effectively in the face of disruptions; and the capac-
ity to adapt and change after a shock.
By addressing these complex systems challenges, 
every individual, organization or group involved in 
resilience building could thrive more successfully if 
they tapped into a “bigger mind” through collective 
intelligence. This could be by drawing on the brain 
power of other people with diverse cultural experi-
ence, chronological age, education or occupation 
and gender, combined with the processing power of 
machines.
While needed for processing big data about the 
functioning of complex systems, machine learn-
ing and artificial intelligence do not help people to 
solve more complex coordination and governance 
problems that require trust between people. They 
cannot decide on how people want to live human 
lives, for example in cities. Blockchain, a distrib-
uted network solution for coordinating interactions 
and exchanges, likewise cannot alone solve this 
complex human dynamic problem.
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95  (Gatzweiler et al. 2017)
96  (Whitmee et al. 2015)
97  (Whitmee et al. 2015)
98  (EU, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Direc-
torate I - Climate Action and Resource Efficiency 2018)
99  (Craglia et al. 2018)
Truly global collective intelligence is a long way 
short of being able to solve global problems. It is 
now important to assemble new combinations of 
tools that can help the world think and act at a pace, 
as well as at the scale commensurate with the 
complex problems we face. In too many fields, the 
most important data and knowledge remain flawed, 
fragmented or closed, lacking the context and orga-
nization required for them to be accessible and 
useful for decisions; as yet, no one has the means 
or capacity to bring them together.
The critical interdependence among human health 
and well-being, ecology and technology is highly 
complex – both in the nature of connections and 
in responses in time and space.96 Achievement of 
an improved understanding of human–ecologi-
cal–technological system interactions is essential, 
just as is starting to be achieved in climate science 
through the application of sophisticated computer 
modelling. 
This revolution in systems modelling has reached 
the point where it is now possible to begin model-
ling the interlinkages and interdependencies among 
the economic (values), societal (health, welfare 
and productivity) and environmental impacts 
of decisions and investments driven by the live 
interactions between weather, Earth crust shifts, 
soils, land, ocean ecology and human activity.97 
Geodata at multiple scales is available to support 
this approach to better understand the interactive 
nature of the drivers of risk and for long-term risk 
reduction.
In many cases, models of complex ecological 
systems used to make projections of future trends, 
use data derived statistically from putative causal 
associations, but these associations can change 
under novel conditions, and thus predictions might 
be questionable. Novel models that are based on 
an understanding of the underlying processes that 
cause a system to behave in particular ways are 
increasingly needed, spanning and interacting from 
global to local levels. They can be used to create a 
resilience compass to enable communities to steer 
towards a more resilient future.
Such novel models, supported by artificial intelli-
gence and machine learning, can then build collec-
tive intelligence among communities through 
independent regional or national transitional 
super-laboratories98 – or collaborative laborato-
ries (discussed further in section 2.4.2). These 
comprise leading experts from across sectors, 
including academic, government, private sector and 
community. 
Recent advances in computing power, availability of 
data and new algorithms have led to major break-
throughs in artificial intelligence and machine learn-
ing in the last six or seven years. Many applications 
are entering everyday lives, from machine transla-
tions, to voice and image recognition, to geospa-
tial optimizations, all of which are increasingly 
exploited in industry, government and commerce. 
Increasingly constructive deployment of artificial 
intelligence combined with developing collective 
intelligence in the field of DRR will have a positive 
impact on saving lives, reducing injuries, minimiz-
ing damage to property and improving economic 
systems. At all times, these promote social equality 
through enhanced decision-making capabilities. To 
do this successfully will require strong evaluation 
frameworks that can assess the performance and 
the quality of artificial intelligence, and build trust in 
this disruptive technology.99 
Further research is needed to understand fair-
ness in the context of automated decision-making. 
An algorithm or decision is fair when it does not 
discriminate against people because of their 
membership in a specific group (e.g. as gender, 
race or sexual orientation). In the emerging field of 
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explainable artificial intelligence (i.e. techniques in 
artificial intelligence that can be trusted and easily 
understood by humans, and which contrast with 
the concept of the black box in machine learning 
where it is often difficult to explain why the artifi-
cial intelligence arrived at a specific decision100), 
there is considerable work in progress to address 
these complex issues and replace the black-box 
approaches of conventional artificial intelligence, so 
as to reduce bias and increase the understandabil-
ity for decision makers.
When it comes to cybersecurity, artificial intelli-
gence is a double-edged sword. It can be greatly 
beneficial to increase the security of devices, 
systems and applications, but it can also empower 
those who seek to attack systems and networks 
and thus become an advanced tool in the arsenal 
for cyberattacks. The Sendai Framework takes into 
account the need to address risks that arise from 
technological innovations and their application (see 
Chapter 3 of this GAR). Moreover, the robustness 
of artificial intelligence against malicious action 
becomes an issue, posing the most immediate 
danger for the security of cyberphysical systems, 
in which artificial intelligence will be increasingly 
deployed.
Therefore, technology-based solutions to coordina-
tion problems need to be combined with human-
based solutions (solutions that are made by or 
involving humans for solutions at a human scale). 
Unlike machines, which need to operate with prob-
abilities, humans – within a social network of trust 
– can make decisions under radical uncertainty by 
attaching values to decisions. This ability in healthy 
human beings is due to emotional responses to 
highly complex decision situations to which there 
are no solutions from purely calculative and value-
free accounting of costs and benefits. 
Purely technological solutions that build on objec-
tivity and value-neutrality detach the human being 
from being intrinsically connected to the environ-
ment. Humans can (or should) decide on chang-
ing deeply embedded values that define higher 
level rules, and shape attitude, choices and behav-
iour. Otherwise, societies may continue to create 
wealth at the expense of declining ecological life 
support functions in a positive spiralling feedback 
loop, which creates systemic risks with cascading 
effects and makes overarching economic, ecologi-
cal and social systems increasingly susceptible to 
collapse.
2.4.2 
Contextual data, innovative collaboration and 
transdisciplinarity 
Complexity vexes the traditional problem-solv-
ing model of separating problems into singu-
larly defined parts and solving for the symptoms. 
None of the “wicked problems”,101 as described by 
IPCC102 and multiple other scientific bodies,103 that 
are currently pressuring policymakers to try new 
approaches to meet today’s challenges, can be 
understood with reductionist approaches. In other 
words, the deliberate simplification of a problem 
and its causes by removing it from its context 
renders the understanding and ensuing solution 
obsolete. The issues with which we are confronted 
are wrapped in contextual interdependencies that 
require an entirely different approach in assessment 
and action.
Most current scientific research tools and method-
ologies pull “subjects” from their contexts in order 
to derive detailed, specialized, quantifiable informa-
tion. A wider practice of science in the future may 
develop ways to fully use information derived from 
detail and interdependency. For now, the cultural 
habit of de-contextualizing information, or reduc-
tionism, is the standardized, authorized and empiri-
cal norm. To make more appropriate assessments 
of risks arising out of multi-causal circumstances, 
observations that can appropriately address this 
complexity are urgently needed. The decisions 
on what actions to take, by whom and with what 
resources, are decisions based upon information 
of the situation or event. If that information cannot 
hold the appropriate complexity, the decisions will 
be founded on inadequate knowledge.
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Transdisciplinary research and response
Risk creation and realization in complex systems 
do not remain in one sector at a time. Yet, current 
institutional structures mitigate these complex 
issues through the protocols of attending only to 
what is within their specific jurisdiction. Health 
crises remain in the realm of health ministries, while 
economic issues are under the separate attention 
of ministries of finance or employment. Likewise, 
ecological risks overlapping with cultural or political 
risks are still, in most cases, considered in parallel, 
but must be researched and understood better in 
terms of their relational interdependence.
Research bridges and increased communication 
across societal systems need to be developed. 
This is particularly true of public service systems. 
Lack of communication and contextual perspective 
among systems such as education, health, trans-
portation and communication can increase commu-
nity-level vulnerability. Connection and increased 
contact between such sectors will make commu-
nities more robust and resilient to long-term risks 
and sudden onset emergencies. The development 
of warm data approaches can cultivate the rela-
tionship among sectors to strengthen inter-system 
interaction and collaboration.  
Warm data and contextual information
“Warm data” is a specific kind of information about 
the way parts of a complex system (e.g. members 
of a family, organisms in the oceans, institutions in 
a society or departments of an organization) come 
together to give vitality to that system. 
By contrast, other data will describe only the parts, 
while warm data describes their interplay in context. 
Warm data illustrates vital relationships among 
many parts of a system. For example, to under-
stand a family, it is not enough to understand each 
family member, the relationships among them 
must also be understood – this is the warm data. 
This warm data is used to better understand inter-
dependencies and improve responses to issues 
that are located in relational ways. This includes 
understanding systemic risks in health, ecology, 
economic systems, education systems and many 
more. De-contextualizing gives specific infor-
mation that can generate mistakes, while warm 
data promotes coherent understanding of living 
systems.
Box 2.10. Warm data enquiry
Systemic consequences (and consequences of 
consequences) are easily disconnected from 
their networks of causation and the impor-
tance of the relationships among contexts can 
be lost. For example, the caravan of asylum 
seekers moving north through Central America 
in the latter part of 2018 was viewed by the 
media as fleeing either violence or poverty (the 
“obvious” drivers of such desperate behav-
iour). In fact, historic drought conditions over 
multiple years, exacerbated by climate-induced 
shifts in weather patterns without accompany-
ing shifts in human behaviour, policy or infra-
structure development, were an underlying risk 
driver. This would be the focus of a warm data 
approach to understanding the complex, inter-
dependent set of factors leading to large-scale 
migration. 
100  (Sample 2017)
101  (Rittel and Webber 1973)
102  (IPCC et al. 2018)
103  (Rockström et al. 2009); (Whitmee et al. 2015); (World Wide 
Fund for Nature 2018)
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Context includes the relational processes that come 
together to produce a given situation. In fact, most 
complex situations or systems are “trans-contex-
tual”, that is, there is more than one context in play. 
Trans-contextual information brings together multi-
ple forms of observation, from multiple perspec-
tives. In recognition that information comes in 
many forms, a warm data research team would 
look for on-the-ground “wisdom” of locals, art and 
culture, personal stories and the voices of many 
generations. The task of warm data is not only to 
incorporate details and data points, but the relation-
ship among details as well, at many scales. 
Contextual information in the form of warm data 
has begun to be used by researchers, governments, 
and public service professionals. They use it to 
assess complex situations and identify preventive 
approaches or responses to complex community 
(or ecological) crises, necessitating expertise that 
spans a breadth of contextual conditions.
When applied to specific local contexts and fields, 
scenarios using warm data can be useful to involve 
local stakeholders and decision makers in an trans-
disciplinary environment – a collaborative labo-
ratory or “collaboratory” – to produce alternative 
futures that are robust to the relevant uncertainties 
and complexities.104 A set of scenario exercises 
conducted within an agreed set of parameters 
across scales (from smallholder farmers to glob-
ally collaborative institutions) help to identify stake-
holder preferences, motivations, scale-specific 
trends and drivers, and most importantly, add the 
local contexts needed for the modelling exercises.
Changing patterns of interaction at local 
levels using trans-contextual knowledge 
processes
The natural extension of the above process is 
bridge-building across systems. This is a step 
towards forming collaborative decision-making 
bodies at local levels (“collaboratories”). In doing 
so, there is the possibility to bring together people 
from different, but interdependent fields, to explore 
and energize or regenerate local community vital-
ity. As these community groups form and exchange 
trans-contextual knowledge, new communication 
patterns begin to form, linking otherwise separated 
sectors of experience. The place-based solutions 
that emerge from the collaborative development of 
contextual warm data lend themselves to self-orga-
nizing around actions that are co-created, with local 
ownership of data, risks and solutions. By provid-
ing context, warm data is a metashift that gener-
ates connection, communication and action, which 
is able to address complexity in new ways. Local 
capacity can be increased significantly by drawing 
from collective intelligence and mutual learning, .
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104  (Vervoort et al. 2014)
Figure 2.6. Transdisciplinary knowledge generation
(Source: adapted from Brown et al. 2015)
When research is done in this way (i.e. across 
contexts), the interdependency becomes apparent. 
For example, food cannot be separated from the 
economic, nor even political, systems; neither can 
it be separated from culture nor medicine. Food is 
also an important catalyst for strong bonds among 
generations. In this sense the work of supporting 
food initiatives is not simply to distribute nutrition, 
but to also knit relationships among the diverse 
contexts into projects and actions that involve the 
whole community. The solutions lie in the recogni-
tion of collective response. No single response is 
enough to address a complex problem.
Warm data is the overlap across systems and is 
produced by teams whose enquiry is practised in 
crossing contextual frames, sense-making and 
finding patterns. The lens of contextual enquiry 
and trans-contextual research is one that not only 
brings disciplines together but many other forms 
of knowledge also, including the place-based 
wisdom of local practitioners, as well as cultural 
and indigenous sensitivities.
When superficial solutions are implemented to 
provide answers to problems in complex systems, 
the problems proliferate. Developing the capability 
for contextual understanding and decision-making 
is far more effective, and the benefits are felt across 
multiple sectors simultaneously. Structures and 
approaches are needed that can bring forward infor-
mation that presents the contextual interlinking of 
the potential systemic risk impacts as they are felt 
at the individual, microscopic level within larger 
global, macroscopic contexts.
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2.5 
Shifting the paradigm – 
introducing the Global 
Risk Assessment 
Framework 
Paradigms are not corr ig ible by normal 
science, paradigm change is a value change.105
Our global society has come to realize that the 
systemic risks we create can induce situations of 
large-scale instability and even uncontrollability.106 
There is therefore an urgent and growing need to 
better understand and manage uncertainties and to 
mobilize people, innovation and finance. The impera-
tive to extend standard risk management frame-
works or even to heed the call for a paradigm shift on 
Figure 2.7. From global risk assessment to GRAF
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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105  (Kuhn 1962)
106  (Helbing 2013b)
how to deal with both controllable and uncontrollable 
risks – the sort of change that the Sendai Frame-
work exhorts – is undeniable. A transition is needed 
from one paradigm to another – from managing 
disasters to managing risk – and from managing 
“conventional” hazards to engineering an improved 
understanding of the dynamic interactions with 
systemic risks. Exploring the facilitation of a “new 
system of relations” that allows future theories and 
solutions to emerge that are “wider in scope, more 
accurate in prediction, and solve more problems”.107 
Major renovations of approaches to risk assess-
ment and analysis are needed to fully realize the 
challenge and call of the Sendai Framework. As has 
been noted, methods today are tuned to the largest 
and most historically obvious and tractable “peaks” 
of risks for human beings rather than the interde-
pendencies among them.
In recent decades, we have both created and 
recognized many other types of risks of the great-
est consequences for humankind. Understanding 
107  (Butterfield 2007)
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Figure 2.8. GRAF 2020–2030
the systemic nature of risks, and the opportunities 
afforded by new approaches and new concepts of 
risk, will be the central challenge of the first half of 
the twenty-first century. 
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
If I had to select one sentence to describe the 
state of the world, I would say we are in a world 
in which global challenges are more and more 
integrated, and the responses are more and 
more fragmented, and if this is not reversed, 
it’s a recipe for disaster.108
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108  (António Gutteres, United Nations Secretary-General, Janu-
ary 2019)
109  (Butterfield 2007)
In response to this challenge, UNDRR – mandated 
to support the achievement of the outcome and 
goals of the Sendai Framework and the 2030 
Agenda – was called upon by experts to establish 
a process to co-design and develop a Global Risk 
Assessment Framework (GRAF) to inform decision-
making and transform behaviour, specifically with 
respect to systemic risks.
This will explicitly support national and subnational 
governments, as well as non-State actors including 
private sector businesses and financial institutions 
referred to in paragraph 36(c) of the Sendai Frame-
work, to recognize new patterns of vulnerability and 
risk formation within efforts to achieve the targets 
of all the 2015 intergovernmental agreements, and 
assist in measuring progress in reducing risk. GRAF 
is also intended to be a crucial component of a 
comprehensive United Nations risk assessment and 
analysis framework in support of the 2030 Agenda. It 
will contribute to the vision of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to support decision-making 
for an Integrated Platform on Prevention as well as 
within the United Nations Resilience Framework.
GRAF is designed to inform and focus action within 
and across sectors and geographies by decision 
makers at local, national, regional and global levels 
on the outcomes, goals and priorities for action set 
out in the Sendai Framework and the 2030 Agenda. 
It addresses multiple issues such as assessing 
systemic vulnerabilities of agricultural systems, or 
strengthening the resilience of electricity generation 
and distribution systems in hurricane-prone loca-
tions, or business continuity planning for public and 
private sector actors for basic service delivery in 
rapidly growing metropolitan areas. 
The goal for GRAF is to improve the understand-
ing and management of current and future risks, 
at all spatial and temporal scales. It aims to better 
manage uncertainties and mobilize people, inno-
vation and finance by fostering interdisciplinary 
systems thinking and enabling identification of 
anomalies and precursor signals. It seeks to reveal 
the interlinkages, relationships, correlations and 
dependencies of multiple risks and actors across 
systems to build a shared understanding and enable 
decision makers to act.The design and develop-
ment of GRAF is led by the GRAF Expert Group, 
GRAF Working Groups and UNDRR. Driven by a 
user-centric design process, GRAF will work with all 
stakeholders to create a framework and community 
of practice for the understanding and sharing of risk 
contexts, data, information, models, metrics, risk 
communication modalities and decision support. 
Paradigm change has been described as 
“handling the same bundle of data as before, 
but placing them in a new system of relations 
with one another by giving them a different 
framework”.109 
Through approaches such as ensemble model-
ling and intercomparison, GRAF will improve 
understanding of the multidimensional nature and 
dynamic interactions of risks, so as to prevent or 
adapt discontinuities in critical systems (includ-
ing human health, ecosystem functioning and 
economic development) and create the potential to 
transform behaviours. GRAF seeks to enable self-
organization and learning focused on local process-
ing of information by relevant stakeholders on the 
impacts and consequences of decisions. Recog-
nizing that major reductions in risk will be achieved 
through understanding and addressing patterns of 
vulnerability and exposure, and acknowledging that 
data on vulnerability (social and environmental) are 
severely underdeveloped, experts recommended 
this as a priority area for GRAF.
The GRAF Theory of Change sets out early think-
ing about the development and implementation of 
key elements of GRAF. It includes causal pathways 
(people, science and systems), which are intended 
to clearly and explicitly define questions to be 
addressed and elements to be tested and estab-
lished. The co-design and development of GRAF will 
continue in three broad phases of activity: Phase 1 
– design and set up; Phase 2 – building the frame-
work; and Phase 3 – scaling implementation. 
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Figure 2.9. Schematic representation of GRAF
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
By providing insights, tools and practical demon-
strations to decision makers at relevant scales 
through the development of multi-user, open and 
inclusive, collaborative and shared methodolo-
gies for stakeholders on a timely basis, GRAF can 
stimulate interdisciplinary systems behaviours 
that will support transformative action. This will 
enable warm data research, establishment of 
collaboratories and the accelerated development 
of collective intelligence about systemic risk to 
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create a culture of risk-informed decision-making, 
to transform behaviours and to ultimately increase 
the resilience of societies and systems.
69
DISASTER
DISASTER
RESPONSE
PREVENTION
DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
RISK 
LIVING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY
W
he
re 
we
 are
LIVING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY
DISASTER
DISASTER
RESPONSE
RISK 
PREVENTION
DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
Integrated
Enabling
Aligned
Efficient
Proactive
Effective
Reactive
Survival
Evolving
Containment Where we ne
ed 
to 
be
Risk-informed systems-based approaches and decision-making
De
st
ru
ct
ive
Compliant
Sustainable
Re
ge
ne
rat
ive
Chapter 2 
Conclusions and recommendations
The solutions lie in the recognition of collective response. No single response is enough to address a 
complex problem.110 
Conclusions
With the certainty of near-term non-linear changes, the critical assumption of the relationship between past 
and future risk must be revisited.
The regenerative potential of the social and natural systems envisaged in the aligned intergovernmental 
agendas will be better understood, and progress will be accelerated, by incorporating systemic risk and 
systemic opportunity into the design of policies and investments across all scales. Similarity of the char-
acteristics of systemic risks in different domains suggests that as attempts are made to understand the 
effects of endogenous triggers and critical transitions, there will be more patterns apparent in different 
domains, which will allow the development of a consistent understanding of the fundamental characteristics 
of systemic risks.
Figure 2.10. “Innovation curve” – from destructive to regenerative approaches
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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110  (Bateson 2018)
Systemic risks might be easy to mitigate early on. 
However, failure or even intentional ignorance to 
capture the role of underlying drivers of systemic 
risk will allow small risks to grow into major prob-
lems, increasing the opportunity costs of failed 
interventions and missed opportunities. Developing 
and implementing multidisciplinary approaches to 
identify and act on precursor signals and systems 
anomalies are critical to minimizing or avoiding 
discontinuities in complex systems.
Most prevailing risk management tools assume 
underlying systems are complicated, rather than 
complex. Understanding sensitivities to change 
and system reverberations is far more important 
and challenging in the context of complex systems. 
Simulations of such systems show that small 
changes can produce initial ripples, which can be 
amplified by non-linear effects and associated path 
dependencies, causing changes that lead to signifi-
cant and potentially irreversible consequences.
To allow humankind to embark on a development 
trajectory that is at least manageable, and at best 
sustainable and regenerative consistent with the 
2030 Agenda, a fundamental rethink and rede-
sign of how to deal with systemic risk is essential. 
Improved understanding of system components, 
including precursor signals and anomalies, systems 
reverberations, feedback loops and sensitivities to 
change, will be imperative.
The global urban–industrial network is more vulner-
able to multiple simultaneous hazards than to 
singular impacts in wealthy, large urban areas. 
Therefore, as climate impacts become more 
prevalent, impacts capable of interrupting urban 
economic flows and creating social instability may 
become more severe.
Systemic risk governance is confounded by diffi-
culties in identifying causal agents and assigning 
liability. While neither the governance of the finan-
cial system nor the climate system can claim full 
success, both have raised awareness of the neces-
sity and spatio-temporal complexity of governance 
regimes to address systemic risks at the global 
scale.
While needed for processing big data about the 
functioning of complex systems, machine learning 
and artificial intelligence are limited in their capabil-
ity to help people solve more complex coordination 
and governance problems that require trust among 
people. Unlike machines, which need to operate 
with probabilities, humans – within a social network 
of trust – can make decisions under radical uncer-
tainty by attaching values to decisions.
Complexity vexes the traditional problem-solv-
ing model of separating problems into singularly 
defined parts and solving for the symptoms. Such 
issues are wrapped in contextual interdependencies 
that require an entirely different approach in assess-
ment and action. Warm data is the overlap across 
systems. The lens of contextual enquiry and trans-
contextual research is one that brings together 
disciplines and many other forms of knowledge, 
including the place-based wisdom of local practitio-
ners and cultural and indigenous sensitivities.
Realizing the systemic nature of risks, and the 
opportunities afforded by new approaches and 
new concepts of risk will be the central challenge 
of the first half of the twenty-first century. GRAF 
seeks to improve understanding of the multidimen-
sional nature and dynamic interactions of risks, so 
as to prevent or adapt to discontinuities in critical 
systems and enable local processing of information 
by relevant stakeholders on the impacts and conse-
quences of decisions. GRAF can stimulate inter-
disciplinary systems behaviours that will support 
transformative action, enabling accelerated devel-
opment of collective intelligence about systemic 
risk to create a culture of risk-informed decision-
making, transform behaviours and ultimately 
increase resilience of societies and systems. It is 
intended to contribute to a comprehensive United 
Nations risk assessment and analysis framework 
in support of the 2030 Agenda and the Sendai 
Framework.
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Recommendations
• Accelerated action and ambition is needed to 
transition from one paradigm to another – from 
managing disasters to managing risk – and 
from managing “conventional” hazards to 
engineering an improved understanding of the 
dynamic interactions with systemic risks. 
• Humans can (or should) decide on changing 
deeply embedded values that define higher 
level rules of operation and interaction. If not, 
societies may continue to create wealth at the 
expense of declining ecological life support 
functions in a positive spiralling feedback loop 
that creates systemic risks with cascading 
effects and makes overarching economic, 
ecological and social systems increasingly 
susceptible to collapse.
• To fully realize the challenge and call of the 
Sendai Framework, major renovations of 
approaches to risk assessment and analysis 
are needed. Methods today are tuned to the 
largest and most historically obvious and 
tractable risks for human beings rather than on 
the full topography of risks.
• Scenario building and stochastic simulation 
need to be included in risk modelling to facil-
itate thinking and decision-making in complex 
systems.
• A new paradigm for understanding and living 
with uncertainty and complexity is required – 
one that activates the power of human social 
and contextual intelligence, and where possible, 
leverages it through appropriately designed 
artificial intelligence.
• Developing the capability for contextual under-
standing and decision-making can prove a 
more effective way of dealing with uncertainty 
and complexity than the present reliance on 
extrinsic frames of reference and categorical 
technical expertise, siloed into disciplines.
• Greater focus is required on place-based 
solutions that emerge from the collaborative 
development of contextual warm data based 
on self-organizing around actions that are 
co-created, with local ownership of data, risks and 
solutions. Local capacity can be significantly 
increased by drawing from collective intelli-
gence and mutual learning.
• A better understanding of the interactions and 
interdependencies between urban and rural 
areas is essential to reduce or prevent the 
creation of risk. This requires a functioning 
urban/rural (city region) data metabolism to 
process information at appropriate scales to 
understand the systems implications.
• Private sector financial institutions need to 
integrate DRM into their business models 
and practices through disaster risk-informed 
investments.
• Structures and approaches to bringing forward 
information are needed that present the 
contextual interlinking of the potential systemic 
risk impacts as they are felt at the individual, 
microscopic level within larger global, macro-
scopic contexts.
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Special
Case Study
How small and medium enterprise 
disaster resilience became 
everybody’s business in the 
Philippines – a story of “cascading 
risk reduction”
Impact of Super Typhoon Meranti in the province of Batanes, Philippines, 2016. Loss of communications in disasters can 
have a cascading effect, causing widespread business disruption.  
(Source: PDRF 2016)
74 Special Case Study
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), includ-
ing small-scale agriculture, are the backbone of 
many economies worldwide, and very much so 
in the Philippines and neighbouring South-East 
Asia.  SMEs range from micro-businesses such as 
sole retailers in street markets, to manufacturing 
plants with significant capital investments in equip-
ment and workforce training. They are recognized 
by the Asia-Pacific Economic Commission (APEC) 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as central to socioeconomic development 
in South-East Asia111, which is the global region most 
exposed to natural hazards. Their resilience to disas-
ters is therefore also central to sustainable develop-
ment. In the Philippines, 99.56% of businesses are 
micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and 
they provide 62.85% of all jobs.112 
When disasters occur, a common image of the 
private sector is of large corporations helping with 
equipment or relief supplies. However, SMEs rarely 
have significant resources to offer others in this way, 
and they are often not part of business networks 
such as chambers of commerce. SMEs are embed-
ded in their rural and urban communities, sharing 
the same risks from natural hazards as their neigh-
bours. They are also at risk from fires, and chemi-
cal, technological and environmental hazards (as 
well as potentially being a source of such hazards). 
They are set apart from their residential neighbours 
in that, in a globalized economy, SMEs are increas-
ingly susceptible to systemic risks related to supply 
chains and access to markets from events that may 
occur at a great distance away.
Previous GARs and a range of other reports have 
documented the systemic impacts of the 2011 
Bangkok floods on manufacturing supply chains 
in South-East and East Asia113. Flooding in and 
around Bangkok triggered a cascading regional 
111  (ASEAN 2015, 2016–25); (APEC 2013); (APEC 2014); (APEC 
2015a); (APEC 2015b) 
112  (Almeda and Baysic-Pobre 2012); (Philippine Department 
of Trade and Industry 2017)
113  (UNISDR 2013); (UNISDR 2015); 
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system. Most SMEs that the partnership works with 
have never done this kind of risk-informed planning 
in the past.
Soon after it began in 2009, PDRF was formally 
recognized as the private sector coordinator to 
work with the Government.116 A decade later, it has 
evolved into the major umbrella organization of 
the private sector for disaster preparedness, relief 
and recovery. PDRF gained new impetus to support 
SMEs from a 2015 regional project on strengthen-
ing disaster and climate resilience of SMEs in Asia, 
with the intergovernmental organization the Asian 
Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) and other 
partners.117 
  
As part of the SME resilience project, a survey of 
MSMEs in the Philippines indicated that, although 
owners were aware of risks from natural hazards, 
few MSMEs had contingency response plans, 
business continuity plans, insurance or financial 
resources that would see them through a major 
event such as a local destructive hurricane or 
earthquake.118 Systemic or cascading risk from 
hazard events occurring elsewhere was not part of 
their calculations. Most of them reported that they 
recovered from disasters by working longer and 
harder, and often using informal loans for recovery 
capital. Essentially, they were starting again each 
time a disaster hit, often with additional debt. In 
the hazard-prone territory of the Philippines, this 
meant they could not grow or build a secure busi-
ness. MSME owners epitomized, in their individual 
lives, the premise that disasters reverse develop-
ment gains.
In the same project, an analysis of the enabling 
environment made up of legislative and policy 
frameworks in the Philippines was conducted. It 
revealed that although there was a series of govern-
ment agencies responsible for MSME development, 
small business financing, DRR and CCA, there were 
no clear mechanisms to bring these together to 
support MSME resilience against natural and mixed 
hazards and systemic risk. In a sense, Philippine 
MSME resilience was “everybody’s business” and 
“nobody’s business”, and yet the situation clearly 
required a systems response.119 
impact because so many components essential 
to manufacturing in countries such as Japan were 
made there. The disruption of Bangkok manufac-
turing through loss of electricity supply, no access 
to their premises and flood damage blocked the 
supply chain. Most of the disrupted suppliers in 
Thailand were SMEs that lacked resilience to flood 
hazards. Few SMEs had contingency plans or alter-
native premises to relocate stock or plant, some 
had sensitive equipment and supplies at ground 
level and few had relevant insurance cover. Many 
that did not have access to capital or recovery 
loans never re-opened their doors.114 In the delta 
city of Bangkok, which is close to sea level, and 
in a country where SMEs are the majority employ-
ers, these flood impacts were the realization of a 
series of risks that, like many systemic risks, seem 
obvious in hindsight, but were not perceived fully 
until the impact occurred.
Despite the negative impact, the experience of 
the 2011 floods has also had a positive cascad-
ing effect in the region, generating new research 
and partnerships among the private sector, govern-
ment and civil society for private sector and SME 
resilience. These floods and other disasters in 
South-East Asia have shown that it is not only large 
multinational enterprises that face systemic risks 
in the global economy, but also much smaller and 
apparently local enterprises, and therefore the 
supply chains that operate among them. 
The Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation 
(PDRF) the country’s primary private sector coor-
dinator for disaster resilience – is working with 
the Government and other partners to offer train-
ing on business continuity planning and also other 
disaster resilience programmes for SMEs.115 In just 
a few years, this partnership has trained around 
7,000 enterprise owners throughout the Philippines. 
The training considers risks to business continu-
ity from the direct impacts of natural and techno-
logical hazards, the indirect or systemic impacts of 
hazards (e.g. power blackouts, loss of communica-
tions, breakdown in transport systems and supply 
chains) and the more traditionally recognized risks 
to business continuity such as economic reces-
sion and other shocks through the global financial 
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Presentation during the Train for Business Resilience Course, Tuguegarao, Philippines, 2018
(Source: PDRF 2018)
The Government of the Philippines promptly took 
up the challenge. Together with ADPC, it convened 
relevant government and private sector organiza-
tions to agree a road map intended to improve 
government and private sector collaboration across 
sectoral silos, to support Philippine MSMEs to move 
towards resilience to the range of shocks they are 
likely to experience.120 The MSME Resiliency Core 
Group was formalized in July 2016, made up of a 
diverse group of government and private sector 
agencies: the Bureau of Small and Medium Enter-
prise in Development of the Department of Trade 
and Industry; the Office of Civil Defense; the Phil-
ippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry; the 
Philippine Exporters Confederation; the Asia-Pacific 
Alliance for Disaster Management, Philippines; the 
Employers Confederation of the Philippines; the 
Department of Science and Technology; the Depart-
ment of Interior and Local Government; PDRF; and 
ADPC. The group is continuing its work and has 
114  (ADPC 2014); (ADPC 2017d); (Haraguchi and Lall 2015)
115  (PDRF 2019)
116  (Philippines 2010)
117  Supported by Asian Development Bank, Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH within the 
framework of the Global Initiative on Disaster Risk Manage-
ment, and Canada.
118  (ADPC 2017b)
119  (ADPC 2017a) 
120  (ADPC 2017c)
121  (ADPC 2017a)
assigned various organizations to lead implemen-
tation of different themes, nationally and in the 
regions.121 It is under this core group that PDRF 
plays a leading role in business continuity aware-
ness and capacity-building.  
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The idea of supporting individual SME resilience 
has also expanded to the regional level, with PDRF 
and others joining the Asian Preparedness Partner-
ship (APP), launched in 2017. Adopting a “network 
of networks” approach, APP aims to improve 
networking, strengthen interactions and partner-
ships, share knowledge and resources among 
governments, networks of local humanitarian orga-
nizations, and private sector networks.122 With 
ADPC as its Secretariat, APP has already formalized 
national preparedness partnerships in Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri 
Lanka.123
A positive cascade of risk reduction awareness trig-
gered by the Bangkok floods has thus permeated 
government policy and action and private sector 
engagement in other countries in the region. In the 
Philippines, it has energized new ways of working in 
“systemic risk reduction” to tackle a broad spectrum 
of local and regional disaster risks that affect SMEs’ 
business continuity and their contribution to socio-
economic development.
122  (ADPC 2018)
123  (ADPC 2018)
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Introduction
The basis for understanding risk the world will face 
in the coming century cannot rely on past informa-
tion to inform future states. The myriad effects of 
climate change, intentionally diverted or dammed 
river flows, new dynamics of human interaction, air 
quality, new industrial facilities, inevitable accidents, 
biodiversity loss, ocean acidification, increasing 
social and wealth inequality, and new wars all repre-
sent a context that can be estimated only. 
Some hazard effects can be modelled. Hydrody-
namic models can project what would happen in 
a given watershed given predefined conditions of 
volume, speed, depth and obstacles. Models can be 
used to indicate disease spread with a specified viru-
lence, mortality rate, vector type, etc. Their ability to 
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give an accurate sense of risk in the terms expected 
extends to a few years – in some cases decades. 
Seismic hazard is driven largely by factors well below 
the Earth’s surface, beyond the ability of humanity to 
affect them, without ignoring the unknown risk posed 
by induced seismicity caused by fracking. But to be 
understood in risk terms, seismic hazard research 
must forecast the effects of events on exposed 
assets, and there too it faces challenges.
The underlying fabric of exposure, vulnerability and 
interconnectedness is changing so quickly that the 
exposure model presented in the previous version 
of this publication (GAR15) has been overtaken by 
more accurate measurement tools, a world that 
has changed drastically in the last five years, and 
increased expectations of the understanding of the 
effects of hazards on communities, ecosystems 
and institutions.
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Figure: The Sendai Framework’s Broadened View of the World’s Risk
Out of necessity, the way risk is depicted in this GAR 
still makes reference to the way it was done in past 
GARs. It still seeks to measure, quantify and trans-
mit messaging about risk that can enable decision 
makers to take appropriate action, because these 
are the tools that are now available. In this part, 
Chapter 3 considers a range of hazards that will be 
familiar to readers of past GARs (seismic, tsunami, 
landslide, flooding and fire), as well as a range of 
other hazards incorporated into the broader risk 
scope of the Sendai Framework (biological, nuclear/
radiological, chemical, industrial, NATECH (natural 
hazards triggering technological disasters) and 
environmental) and the issues of exposure and 
vulnerability to these hazards. In doing so, it aims 
to provide an overview of the latest information, 
modelling and developments, to support decision 
makers in preparing for and reducing risk, based 
on what is known. But this part is also, profoundly, 
about change.
Chapter 4 explores the enablers of change in terms 
of the technology available and how it can be used 
(nature of knowledge, the potential of open data 
and software, interoperability of knowledge and 
data systems, and progress in data science), and 
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explores positive developments and opportunities 
for multidisciplinary and transboundary collabora-
tion. Chapter 5 recognizes that systemic change, 
even when necessary, is extremely challenging, 
due to the way people are accustomed to thinking 
about risk (mindset challenges) and how to better 
communicate it to them, the ever-present political 
challenges, and recognized limitations in technol-
ogy and resources.
The last chapter of this part, Chapter 6, is a special 
section on drought risk. The incidence of drought is 
projected to increase over the coming century. It is 
one of the most complex weather-related hazards 
due to its wide-ranging and cascading impacts 
that affect socioeconomic activity, social vulner-
ability and development. Yet proactive drought risk 
reduction is still a challenge in most parts of the 
world, as it is often underestimated as a source of 
risk, and its effects are compounded across human 
and environmental systems, across short and long 
timescales. The chapter highlights a type of risk 
that cannot be dealt with through a single-hazard 
approach and requires the systemic risk analysis 
and integrated risk governance emphasized in the 
Sendai Framework. 
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The term “risk” has different meanings: (a) as a 
synonym for probability of a harmful effect occur-
ring and (b) as a synonym for the mathematical 
expectation of the magnitude of the undesirable 
consequence (even as a quasi-synonym of conse-
quence, whereby risk has a similar meaning to 
undesirable outcome). 
Ten years from the publication of this GAR, the 
world population is projected to exceed 8 billion, 
and by 2055, more than 10 billion. This growth in 
population has resulted in an increase in economic 
losses due to natural hazards from $14 billion annu-
ally to more than $140 billion between 1985 and 
2014.1 
In the period since GAR15, the hazard community 
has shifted away from a focus on individual hazards 
and broadened its scope to examine more complex, 
real scenarios that acknowledge the likelihood of 
one hazard eventually leading to another (cascad-
ing hazard), or multiple hazards crossing in either 
time and/or space creating an even larger disaster. 
In addition, the Sendai Framework has expanded 
the range of hazards to be considered.
Most hazard sciences now use open source tools 
and are part of a larger movement promoting the 
widespread use of sharing open data. The democ-
ratization of risk information empowers individuals, 
Chapter 3:
Risk
communities and governments to draw conclusions 
and influence their own exposure and vulnerability. 
The shift towards open source and open data has 
provided a foundation for greater collaboration on a 
global scale within hazard communities and across 
hazard science.
The march towards openness, collaboration, inter-
change and cooperation has momentum. While 
there will be holdouts to this movement, trends in 
technology and data science suggest they will be 
increasingly in the minority. Openness solves many 
challenges, but there are still challenges to produc-
ing and communicating good risk information. 
This part will outline developments related to under-
standing of risk since the publication of GAR15. In 
addition to expanding the scope of hazards under 
consideration beyond natural hazards, the Sendai 
Framework has called for recognition of the impact 
on and role to play for local, regional, national and 
global actors, and for a richer understanding of 
exposure and vulnerability. Furthermore, it consid-
ers an expanded list of hazards including human-
made hazards and natural hazards that have been 
historically difficult to represent. In investigating 
the dynamic interconnected nature of risk, it calls 
for the imperative to develop new ways of think-
ing, living and working together that recognise the 
nature of systems.  
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New challenges call for novel solutions. While the 
GAR may never again produce individual risk metric 
figures for countries, this GAR is intended to give as 
true a picture of risk as possible. Facing that chal-
lenge, it must be acknowledged that: (a) the truth 
can be complicated and (b) some readers will be 
disappointed that the focus of this section is not 
on presenting probable maximum loss (PML) and 
average annual loss (AAL) figures. Furthermore, 
inasmuch as this GAR seeks to pay due respect 
to the expanded scope of hazards in the Sendai 
Framework there are hazards this report has previ-
ously covered that are not represented – notably, 
wind and storm. This GAR does include many 
hazards that have never been covered before, 
including biological risk, chemical and industrial, 
environmental, NATECH and nuclear/radiological. 
The GAR has never been exhaustive in its cover-
age of hazard and while GAR19 makes an effort 
to be comprehensive, there are and always will 
be sections that stand to be enriched in future 
iterations.
People and assets around the world are being 
exposed to a growing mixture of hazards and risks, 
in places and to an extent previously unrecorded. 
Heat-waves mixed with drought conditions can 
trigger intense wildfires that cause high levels of 
air pollution from burning forests and hazardous 
chemicals, such as the dioxins from burning plas-
tics, as well as water pollution from the flame retar-
dants used to fight the fires leaking into waterways, 
drinking water and marine systems. In other words, 
a perfect storm is created by the complex interlink-
ages of different natural and anthropogenic events 
and processes. 
This part concludes with an exploration of drought 
hazard from a multidimensional perspective. Past 
GARs did not present drought risk partly because it 
is a highly complicated risk. The drivers are mani-
fold, and the impact is felt more strongly in the 
secondary effects (lost livelihoods, forced migra-
tion, and top soil and nutrient erosion) than in 
primary effects. The chapter on drought will serve 
as an introduction to an off-cycle GAR special 
report on drought to be published in 2020.
3.1 
Hazards
The growth of accuracy and sophistication of risk 
assessment has been propelled by the hazard 
community. This is reflective of a past paradigm 
where disaster and hazard were used interchange-
ably. It also reflects the emphasis on empiricism 
in risk science. In many ways, that emphasis on 
scientific methods to understand hazards has led 
to a state in which disaster research is accorded a 
certain respect. Hazard research continues to domi-
nate global research related to understanding risk. 
The era of the Sendai Framework has opened the 
door for the inclusion of a broader community of 
research in understanding the true nature of risk. 
Social science researchers, economists, public 
policy specialists, epidemiologists and others who 
can contribute valuable information about the 
nature of vulnerability and exposure are finding a 
welcoming community whose main objective is to 
give increasingly clear and accurate risk informa-
tion. There is no doubt that the nature of risk infor-
mation is and will continue to be quantitative, but 
the focus on probabilistic modelling and homoge-
neous data sets is giving way to a future that is less 
definitive and more accurately representative of the 
world as it is.
In this section, there is still a focus on hazards first, 
but the interconnection among hazards and the 
connections of the hazard research community 
to other risk research is validation of the Sendai 
Framework. 
1  (UN DESA 2019) 
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3.1.1  
Seismic
This peril has been responsible for an average 
direct death toll of over 20,000 people per year 
in the last several decades and economic losses 
that can reach a significant fraction of a country’s 
wealth. On average, earthquakes constitute 20% 
of annual economic losses due to disasters, but 
in some years, this proportion has been as high as 
60% (e.g. in 2010 and 2011).2  In Central America 
and the Caribbean, the earthquakes of Guatemala 
(1976), Nicaragua (1972), El Salvador (1986) and 
Haiti (2010) caused direct economic losses of 
approximately 98%, 82%, 40% and 120% of the 
nominal GDP of each country, respectively.3  
While global earthquake models have not changed 
dramatically, many of the inputs have changed, 
as has the way in which earthquakes are being 
studied and understood. GAR15 focused on 
earthquakes as ground shaking and the impact 
of earthquakes as related to structural damage 
to buildings due to shaking. Nearly five years on, 
knowledge of earthquakes is being informed by 
new models, and by a better understanding of 
faults and thus movement within time and space. 
This has been facilitated by greater collaboration 
enabling local-level data to help inform the global 
level. 
In general, earthquake models are heavily based on 
data from past earthquakes: magnitude, frequency, 
ground shaking and damage. Thus, models at the 
global level have been created mainly through 
statistical analyses of past events and empirical 
data on damage and mortality. Models are improv-
ing in several ways: increased understanding of 
how active faults accumulate seismic energy; 
greater availability of ground shaking recordings 
from damaging earthquakes; better understanding 
of the vulnerability of structures from field observa-
tions as well as computer simulations; and better 
descriptions of the human and built environment 
from a wide range of sources, including satellite 
imagery and crowdsourcing. 
Global models now integrate local information 
about faults and microfaults as well as to reflect 
verified plate movement measurements. There is 
a growing emphasis on the use of geodesy (the 
branch of mathematics dealing with the shape 
and area of the Earth). Each factor affects ground 
shaking differently, thus the greater the level of 
detail, the more accurate forecasting can be.
A particularly interesting development is the 
use of information about the drivers of seismic 
risk from one location to inform risk scenarios 
and planning in other locations with similar 
dynamics. This enables experts to understand 
models by learning from the results of those 
run elsewhere. This technique is also in use 
by the volcanic research community. During 
volcanic crises, the most challenging task is to 
interpret the monitoring data to better antici-
pate the evolution of the unrest and react.4  
In other words, volcanologists need to make 
an informed decision about what is likely to 
happen next. Aside from real-time monitor-
ing data, volcanologists will rely on histori-
cal unrest and past episodes of the same 
volcano. Such analysis requires a standardized 
and organized database of past events of the 
same volcano. Moreover, if the volcano has not 
erupted frequently or is not well studied, the 
only recourse of the volcanologist is to consult 
what has happened at other volcanoes, for 
which the need of a robust monitoring data-
base is even more acute.
Box 3.1. Volcano Risk
(Source: (Costa et al. 2019); (Newhall et al. 2017)
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The Global Earthquake Model (GEM) now includes 
nearly 10,000 fault lines. This level of comprehen-
siveness is available only due to the confluence of 
improved satellite capability, expanded availability 
of computing power and the inputs of hundreds of 
national and local seismic specialists.
As the level of available detail varies by location 
(by region, by country and sometimes even within 
countries), to ensure the most up-to-date data is 
incorporated into a global model, it is necessary 
to apply consistent methodologies and tools at all 
levels of analysis, from local to global. This infor-
mation can then be combined into a homogeneous 
mosaic that allows comparisons of hazard among 
locations and regions.
In late 2018, GEM researchers released a mosaic-
style model that brought together various earth-
quake models to create global hazard and risk 
maps that included the most advanced information 
available at the national/regional levels for seismic 
risk. The mosaic element refers to the fact that 
Regionally, seismic models have extended such 
that there are now models for a larger part of the 
world at a better quality with improved catalogues 
and geological parameters than ever before. Risk 
modelling has progressed to include cascading 
hazards in the models. An example of this new 
capacity is the increasing focus on modelling 
contingent losses or indirect losses. Pilot efforts 
are showing that it could be possible to estimate 
the price increases for certain types of goods when 
disaster events of different scales occur in some 
contexts. For risk managers and planners, this will 
be useful in understanding the probable knock-on 
effects of the event, but also to inform emergency 
measures. 
Figure 3.1. Example earthquake mosaic map of part of Asia in 2018
(Source: GEM 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the desig-
nations used on these maps do not imply official endorse-
ment or acceptance by the United Nations.
2  (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2018)
3  (Silva et al. 2019)
4  (Sobradelo et al. 2015)
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this model stitches together regional and national 
models from around the world and overlays them as 
tiles, using local inputs to inform the global picture. 
The improved characterization of active faults 
and the ability to associate the locations of future 
earthquakes to active fault sources is an impor-
tant shift. The Global Seismic Hazard Assessment 
Program (GSHAP),5 launched in the mid-1990s, 
also promoted a regionally coordinated, homoge-
neous approach to seismic hazard evaluation. In 
a divergence from GSHAP, new assessments of 
risk for the largest earthquakes are now associ-
ated with specific fault sources, resulting gener-
ally in more refined and accurate estimates of the 
most significant earthquake risks. These advances 
contribute to a better understanding of the hazard. 
Local-level information on faults is changing how 
earthquakes are understood and how the move-
ment of the Earth’s plates and subplates (e.g. 
microfaults) accretes. The collaborative approach 
now includes locally generated information about 
faults that can be seen in the hazard map, driving 
the shift from a spatial pattern of past earthquakes 
to a detailed pattern of faults derived from local 
geologic and geodesic knowledge. This level of 
detail is available in a few places only, particularly 
in more developed countries and near major plate 
boundaries. Away from these boundaries, in stable 
continental regions, researchers rely on relatively 
simpler methods based on historical earthquakes 
and general knowledge of geologic conditions.
In the short term, the mosaic model accepts a 
degree of loss of guarantee about the pedigree 
of the inputs in favour of collaboration and buy-in 
while promoting the open data paradigm for risk 
assessment. This structure also provides incentives 
for national and local risk modellers to produce 
high-quality local perspectives of their own commu-
nities – the democratization of the data and the 
source material engenders long-term sustainability. 
The open source, collaborative approach appears to 
be helping increase standardization and permitting 
shared information. This is primarily because open 
source modelling engines like OpenQuake6  have 
provided a platform for experts to build consistent 
models using well-tested tools and to transpar-
ently compare and evaluate the results. Historically, 
public institutions, particularly in developing coun-
tries either did not have advanced analysis tools, 
or often relied on external consultants to model 
hazard and risk. The shift from reliance on private, 
black-box models to public, open source models 
enables public institutions to build their own view 
of hazard and risk. In turn, this provides open, trans-
parent and high-quality information to raise risk 
awareness with a broader range of stakeholders.
Models are generally becoming more complex, with 
increased volumes of data, and leading to more 
robust results. Though forecasts are still discussed 
in terms of decades (rather than years or months), 
it is now possible to project probabilities of results 
in some areas in 30-year time periods. Most global 
seismic models are based on the idea that in any 
given year, a location would have the same probabil-
ity of experiencing a 50- or 100- or 500-year event. 
And if one such event happened, the next year they 
would go back to having the same chance as the 
previous year of such an event occurring again. 
To understand this, imagine a 50-sided die that was 
rolled the first day of every year – this would deter-
mine whether a 50-year earthquake would occur in 
that year. Even if an earthquake was unluckily rolled 
in a particular year, the next year when the die was 
rolled, there would be precisely the same probability 
of experiencing an earthquake. 
There is research under way in Japan, New Zealand 
and the United States of America to produce fore-
casts that are time dependent. These sophisticated 
models can make statements like “the San Andreas 
Fault is now closer to failure than it was 20 years 
ago”. In this sense, if there is a 50-year probability, 
towards the end of the 50-year period, if nothing 
has happened, the event is more likely than it was 
at the beginning of that period. At the end of each 
scenario period, model likelihood can be adjusted. 
This is mathematically complicated and is even 
more complicated to explain to the public, but 
aligns well with public perceptions of the ripeness 
of events that have not happened in recent memory. 
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Time-dependent forecasting will not be applicable 
to most other hazards. It can work in seismic 
science – only with sufficiently detailed data – 
because most seismic events are the results of 
increasing pressure leading to a slip or rupture, and 
the probability does indeed increase.
Understanding the magnitude of losses from 
damaging events is fundamental to informing 
decision makers and disaster risk managers in 
the development of risk reduction measures. For 
example, in 2002, a catastrophe insurance pool 
for residential buildings was created in Turkey to 
transfer the risk from the public sector to the inter-
national reinsurance market.7 The establishment of 
this financial mechanism required an earthquake 
model to estimate the expected economic losses 
for each province. More recently, researchers 
demonstrated how a probabilistic loss model could 
prioritize which schools should be the target of a 
retrofitting intervention in Colombia.8 
The open source, active fault database is freely 
available to use and to contribute to, thus increas-
ingly improving forecasts about the time, location 
and characteristics of rupture. The comparison of 
scenarios with similar drivers is also being used 
by the volcano risk community. The objective is 
to include all processed data of historical unrest 
from all reliable sources, including that which led 
to eruption. The database contains volcano infor-
mation, monitoring data and supporting data such 
as images, maps and videos, as well as the alert 
levels where applicable.9  The data points are time 
stamped and georeferenced, so that they can be 
analysed in space and time.10
Other advanced tools are seeking to forecast 
seismic events from GPS measurements and 
land-based positioning of points that show how 
plates are moving. Since 2015, the Global Earth-
quake Activity Model has been estimating shallow 
earthquakes above magnitude 6 using this tech-
nique.11 The premise is that to blend data from a 
record of historical earthquake events in a given 
region with the global strain rate map where strain 
rate acts as a proxy for fault stress accumulation, 
and earthquakes are the release of that stress.
Groupings of earthquakes can have huge implica-
tions for insurance premiums, with companies 
often determining what they cover (only the main 
shock, or covering aftershocks within a predefined 
period). This makes it increasingly necessary to 
understand how earthquakes cluster and define 
foreshock versus main shock versus aftershock 
and then ensure that the appropriate considerations 
are used in planning and risk transfer. For example, 
in Christchurch (New Zealand) in 2011, a 6.2 magni-
tude earthquake caused significant damage. This 
damage is thought to have been especially severe 
because a 7.1 magnitude earthquake had occurred 
in the same area the previous year and had weak-
ened structures, although it caused relatively little 
damage. Was the Christchurch earthquake an after-
shock or a separate occurrence?
Seismic science is predicted to be affected by 
climate change and similar dynamics as they relate 
to exposure and vulnerability. Historically, earth-
quake risk models considered only built structures 
in assessing exposure and the type and height of 
those structures in assessing vulnerability. There 
can be little doubt, however, that a more holistic 
representation of the human, social, economic and 
ecological impact of seismic events must be part of 
future research. 
There is growing political interest in induced seis-
micity (earthquakes that are caused by human 
activity). Recent focus has been on fracking, but 
there were recorded earthquakes resulting from 
fluid being injected into an oilfield as far back as the 
1960s.12 Furthermore, there are several examples 
5  (GFZ Helmholtz-Zentrum Potsdam 2019) 
6  (GEM 2019)
7  (Bommer et al. 2002)
8  (Mora et al. 2015); (Silva et al. 2019)
9    (Winson et al. 2014); (Fearnley et al. 2017)
10  (Newhall et al. 2017)
11  (Bird et al. 2015)
12  (Raleigh, Healy and Bredehoeft 1976)
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of water dams inducing earthquakes (reservoir 
induced) such as the Aswan Reservoir in Egypt.13 
Though induced seismicity may not be a new occur-
rence, it is a new factor in hazard models, and in 
selected areas where fracking is common (western 
Canada and central United States of America), it is 
being factored in to hazard maps for updating build-
ing codes. 
Change exists in risk exposure and recorded 
losses. Most insurance companies predicting risk 
anticipate an escalation in losses because there 
is expected to be an increase in exposed assets 
as economies grow to meet growing populations. 
These losses must be put into context; many trends 
that have been identified in the developed world are 
not necessarily mirrored in their developing country 
counterparts. Insurance penetration and regulatory 
standards to reduce risk before it is constructed 
are vastly more prevalent in richer countries. In 
2017, compared with the average emerging market 
non-life insurance penetration rate of 1.5%, African 
premiums accounted for only 0.9% of GDP. Only 
Morocco, Namibia and South Africa exceed 2%,14 
compared to the average in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries of between 8.5% and 9.5% of GDP.15 Policy 
changes and a greater focus on risk reduction also 
help to decrease risk, but in places where economic 
growth outstrips investment in risk management 
and governance structures, risk will continue to 
grow.
3.1.2  
Tsunami
Tsunamis must be treated as a multidisciplinary 
hazard. They can be triggered by earthquakes, land-
slides, volcanoes or meteorological events, with 
large earthquakes being the most frequent trigger. 
Because their drivers require specific conditions 
to result in a tsunami, they are decidedly rarer than 
their triggering events. Tsunamis have a basis of 
historical evidence, but the data set is too sparse 
to characterize the tsunami risk on each specific 
coastline, especially in confined areas where there 
is a limited coastline section. Making this more 
challenging, over the last 100 years, only a handful 
of truly devastating tsunamis have occurred, 
contributing to most of the disaster tsunami 
losses across the globe. Large tsunamis occur 
with relatively low frequency but have potentially 
high impact. In the last two decades, this has been 
demonstrated, for instance, by the Indian Ocean 
(2004) and the Great East Japan (2011) tsunamis. 
The scale of these disasters far exceeded the previ-
ously perceived risk in these areas.
Assessing tsunami risk requires a comprehen-
sive and multidisciplinary approach. It is a topic 
that includes a wide range of disciplines, such as 
geophysics (e.g. seismology, geology and faulting), 
hydrodynamics and flow modelling (e.g. landslide 
dynamics, volcanology, coastal engineering and 
oceanography), vulnerability and risk assessment 
(e.g. geography, social sciences, economy, struc-
tural engineering, mathematical and statistical 
sciences), in addition to disaster risk management 
and mitigation.
The tsunami maximum wave heights in Figure 3.2 
do not correlate with their level of damage. The 
largest known tsunami occurred in Lituya Bay, 
Alaska, in the United States of America in 1958. 
The massive scale of the wave caused relatively 
little damage due to the limited exposed stock in 
the area at the time. The Great East Japan tsunami 
in 2011 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 were 
far smaller than the Lituya Bay tsunami, but they 
caused far more losses. 
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Figure 3.2. Selected tsunami wave heights (maximum wave heights recorded)
(Sources: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Geophysical Data Center/World Data Service Global 
Historical Tsunami Database 2019; National Centers for Environmental Information 2019)
Tsunami hazards are heterogeneous; smaller 
events can cause devastation, as evidenced by the 
events in Indonesia with the Palu tsunami in 2018 
and the Mentawai tsunami in 2010. These events 
exemplify cases where unconventional mecha-
nisms generate tsunamis that are unexpectedly 
large given the magnitude of the triggering event. 
Due to their infrequent nature, tsunamis often 
catch coastal communities off-guard. Perhaps the 
most pertinent example is the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami that hit a largely unprepared coastal popu-
lation in nearly a dozen countries and resulted in 
more than 230,000 fatalities. Due to the enormous 
consequences of that tsunami, the need for more 
sophisticated and comprehensive methodologies 
to understand and manage tsunami risk in a wider 
range of locations immediately became obvious. 
The most obvious interventions were in risk mitiga-
tion activities such as construction of wave-absorb-
ing sea walls, elevated facilities, evacuation routes 
and EWSs. After 2004, tsunami research and risk 
mitigation activities spread to many regions that 
previously had very little focus on tsunami risk – 
particularly South and South-East Asia.
Understanding the drivers of tsunami hazards
The use of probabilistic models for tsunami hazard 
analysis started in the early 2000s. A range of appli-
cations followed, from local to regional to global 
scales. A great deal of uncertainty is involved in 
tsunami hazard modelling, especially in the low-
probability region of hazard curves, which is where 
the most extreme consequences are expected. 
Traditionally, probabilistic tsunami hazard assess-
ments (PTHAs) have covered intermediate to 
13  (Gahalaut and Hassoup 2012) 
14  (African Insurance Organization 2018)
15  (OECD 2019)
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large regions, providing quantitative estimates 
of maximum tsunami elevation in deep coastal 
waters. However, as tsunami damage is caused by 
the flow onshore where assets and population are 
located, additional effort is needed to characterize 
tsunami hazard intensities in those areas. 
Several measures of tsunami intensity have been 
suggested:
While it may not provide optimal accuracy, flow 
depth is the quantity that is the most frequently 
used tsunami hazard intensity measure.16 The 
reason is that most building damage observations 
and probability assessments of tsunami mortality 
risk present vulnerability as a function of flow depth 
as the sole damage indicator. Flow depth is also the 
most readily observed intensity parameter (using 
water or debris marks) at multiple locations once 
tsunami water has receded.17  
Tsunami hazard is expressed in terms of different 
probabilities of exceeding a given tsunami intensity 
at a given location. This includes maximum values 
of the height of a tsunami in a given time frame. A 
tsunami with a maximum wave height of 20 m is 
much less likely than one with a maximum wave 
height of 5 m. This is because the drivers of tsuna-
mis of those scales are rarer – larger earthquakes, 
landslides or volcanic events are less common than 
smaller ones. To determine tsunami hazard, PTHA 
methods are used to quantifying the probability of 
tsunami losses at a global scale. To do this, tsunami 
propagation was modelled globally, and offshore 
wave amplitudes were converted into estimates of 
the onshore maximum inundation height by combin-
ing amplification factors with a statistical model. 
PTHA was used to quantify the tsunami hazard 
globally for GAR15. But because GAR15 was 
oriented to quantifying tsunami risk, official 
tsunami hazard maps were never issued. A set of 
upgraded global tsunami hazard maps was devel-
oped later, based on the GAR15 data and including 
epistemic uncertainty (uncertainty due to lack of 
knowledge) stemming from the probabilistic earth-
quake model.18 These global tsunami hazard maps 
presented maximum inundation heights at the 
shoreline due to earthquake sources for a large set 
of coastlines worldwide, using global tectonic infor-
mation from the earthquake model.19 
There are other generators of tsunamis that are 
more difficult to model. There are also tsunamis 
generated by landslides and meteo-tsunamis (rare 
events when specific meteorological conditions 
create a destructive tsunami). 
Risk and impact assessment require the integra-
tion of hazard estimates with exposure data and 
vulnerability functions (relationships describing the 
expected impact of several levels of hazard intensi-
ties on different types of exposure). This will estab-
lish the likelihood and severity of impacts in terms 
of casualties, cost of direct damage or number of 
damaged structures. Impact assessments esti-
mate the consequences of one or a few scenarios 
(i.e. using deterministic assessment, which estab-
lishes the potential impacts of tsunamis at one or 
more sites). Risk assessments include a frequency 
component, derived from the hazard frequency, to 
describe the expected severity of an event within 
a defined time frame (e.g. the amount of loss 
expected to be exceeded once on average in, say, a 
50-year period), or with a given annual probability of 
occurrence.
Due to the complexity of simulating onshore inun-
dation for the large numbers of events in a fully 
probabilistic event set, no studies have been carried 
out with a full range of probabilistic estimates of 
tsunami impact onshore, and only a few have done 
so for selected return periods.20 Frequently, these 
scenario-based risk assessments are motivated 
by the need for very detailed simulations for engi-
neering requirements; these should ideally happen 
• 	 Tsunami flow depth, i.e. the maximum height the 
water reaches above land 
• 	 Wave current speed 
• 	 Wave current acceleration 
• 	 Wave current inertia (product of wave accelera-
tion and flow depth) 
• 	 Wave current momentum flux (product of flow 
depth and square wave current speed)
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Evacuation route in Iquique, Chile  
(Source: Flickr.com user Francois Le Minh 2007)
16  (Behrens and Dias 2015)
17  (Suppasri et al. 2013)
18  (Davies et al. 2018)  
19  (Berryman et al. 2015) 
20  (Dominey-Howes et al. 2010)
21  (Shoji and Nakamura 2017)
22  (Suppasri et al. 2013)
due to disaggregation from probabilistic estimates, 
rather than using individual, detailed assessments 
to project a global understanding of risk. But they 
are indicative of an appetite for detailed and accu-
rate risk information for tsunamis to inform building 
codes, mitigation measures, insurance options and 
public safety measures.
Researchers have a growing understanding of 
vulnerability to tsunamis due to post facto analysis 
from recent tsunami events. A variety of new data 
has become available in recent years. For example, 
findings from the 2011 Great East Japan tsunami 
reveals that road bridges appear to be able to with-
stand 10 m flow depth with only 10% probability 
of being washed away.21 Further, at flow veloci-
ties of 1 m/s and 5 m/s, small fishing boats will 
be washed away with 60% and 90% probabilities, 
respectively.22 Aquaculture rafts and eelgrass will 
be washed away with 90% probability when the 
flow velocities are 1.3 m/s and 3 m/s, respectively. 
These details enrich the understanding of expo-
sure and its vulnerability to other effects of tsuna-
mis, and serves to refine the quality of the risk 
assessment.
In terms of global risk assessments, the proba-
bilistic tsunami risk assessment (PTRA) method 
provides PML estimates for direct economic loss 
due to building damage for coastal nations world-
wide. This is presently the most advanced global 
model on tsunami risk. In absolute values Japan 
by far exceeds other countries’ risk. However, 
normalizing PML to the total exposed value of 
each country, several SIDS face similar relative 
tsunami risk. 
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Countries in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin also 
ranked high in the above method. The global PTRA 
was one of the first applications of its kind, regard-
less of geographic scale. Consequently, there are 
large uncertainties in the different methods and 
data applied. For exposure estimation, there are 
also major challenges related to the availability of 
topographic data sets with sufficient resolution. 
Those provisions indicate that while this model 
provides some clues about trends in global tsunami 
risk, in coming years with refined methods and 
better data, future models will provide more refined 
estimates of global tsunami risk. 
Tsunami risk research has focused thus far on 
tsunamis triggered by earthquakes. Further work 
is required to characterize events triggered by 
landslides, volcanoes and meteorological loading, 
particularly in the frame of the current move 
towards understanding the systemic nature of 
risk, as outlined in this GAR. The understanding 
of tsunami risk is not yet at the same level as the 
understanding of the hazard. To bring tsunamis up 
to speed in the context of the first priority of the 
Sendai Framework “Understanding disaster risk”, 
more work is needed in enriching a sound PTRA 
methodological framework that accounts for expo-
sure and vulnerability in more dimensions.
3.1.3  
Landslide
The evaluation of landslide hazard should entail 
diagnosis of the geo-hydro-mechanical processes 
bringing about the landslides that eventually gener-
ate damage. 
The assessment of landslide hazard based upon 
geo-hydro-mechanical analysis of slopes is gener-
ally recognized to be the planning basis for coun-
tries experiencing high landslide susceptibility (e.g. 
in Afghanistan, in Himalaya belt slopes in Asia, in 
Bolivia, Brazil and the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela in South America, and in Italy and Spain in 
Europe). But the experienced losses from contem-
porary landslide events testify that these assess-
ments, or the mitigation measures they should have 
precipitated, are not appropriately developed. 
The Multiscalar Method for Landslide Mitigation 
is a new methodology for the assessment of land-
slide hazard at the local scale, based on geo-hydro-
mechanical analyses. This method seeks to identify 
the geo-hydro-mechanical contexts most common in 
the slopes of the region,23 and for the corresponding 
landslide mechanisms, which are then recognized as 
the mechanisms typical to the region.24 Having as a 
basis the set of representative landslide mechanisms 
can make landslide risk management at the local 
scale more sustainable, since it can guide the selec-
tion of the mitigation measures based on awareness 
of the typical landslide features and causes.
Urbanization frequently extends over unstable 
slopes and ancient landslides. This is particularly 
true for informal settlements. Therefore, landslides 
often affect the poorest parts of urban areas, 
whose expansion is restricted to land that would 
not withstand simple engineering tests. 
Diagnosis of the landslide mechanism
Landslides are the final process of a sequence of 
phenomena taking place in the slope that involve 
strain localization and progressive failure (overall 
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defined as the landslide mechanism).25 The landslide 
mechanism can be modelled through the math-
ematical reduction of a boundary value problem. 
This requires the simultaneous integration of several 
differential equations, representing the different 
processes influencing the equilibrium of the system, 
which is generally in a continuously transitional state. 
For the sake of efficiency, researchers usually simplify 
the modelling and simulate the most influential 
Landslides have diverse drivers, and a probabilistic 
global model is not practical. They can be induced 
by precipitation, change in air pressure or seismic 
activity, for example. It is similarly impractical to 
rely on a regional model; landslide hazard can be 
modelled given a sufficiently small target region but 
the level of detail required to capture all variables 
is impossible for larger scales. To respond to this, 
researchers rely on phenomenological study of 
the slope topography, lithology and hydrology, the 
tectonic structures, the land use and the slope–
structure interaction.26 These are the morphologi-
cal elements indicative of slope movement and 
failure. On a detailed level, they provide indications 
processes. The internal processes may include 
the features predisposing the slope to failure; the 
external ones are the actions that may trigger the 
slope failure. In the case of climate-driven land-
slides, the driving conditions are in continuous 
flux through processes such as rainfall infiltration, 
water evaporation from the soil and transpiration 
through vegetation. Changes to those conditions 
may bring about either the onset, or the progres-
sion, of slope failure. 
about the presence of pre-existing shear bands and 
guidance about the numerical strategy to be used 
in the definition of the initial slope conditions. The 
phenomenological study must also consider the 
hydro-mechanical properties of the slope soils, as 
obtained from laboratory tests and monitoring data.
Figure 3.3. Stage-wise methodology for diagnosis of the landslide mechanism
23  (Terzaghi 1950) 
24  (Cotecchia et al. 2016)
25  (Chandler 1974); (Chandler and Skempton 1974); (Potts, Kova-
cevic and Vaughan 1997)
26  (Cascini et al. 2013); (Palmisano 2011)
(Source: Cotecchia 2016)
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Though numerical modelling may be extremely 
advanced, a slope model implementing all the slope 
factors and processes is not feasible in most cases 
and could produce misleading results. Therefore, 
modelling alone is not sufficient for appropriate 
hazard diagnosis and must be paired with field 
studies.
The map database thus obtained then becomes a 
guideline in the assessment of the landslide hazard 
within the given area of interest. It will include data 
representing the landslide factors at the site of 
interest, with particular emphasis on those recog-
nized to be predisposed to landslides in the first 
phase, and data about the slope movements.
Multiscalar Method for Landslide Mitigation
All the knowledge acquired during Phase 1 in Figure 
3.5, along with the methodological steps to be 
applied for the assessment of the landslide hazard 
in a given specific territorial cell of interest for the 
region, should be reported in a landslide manual 
using a global information system platform.27 This 
gathers together the geo-hydro-mechanical knowl-
edge about the slopes across the region, of reference 
for land-use planning or in mitigation design for the 
unstable slopes of the region. The model should be 
continuously upgraded in any region. 
Once the active landslide mechanisms for the 
studied region are analysed, it becomes possible to 
focus on design of the measures for risk mitigation. 
These must be carefully tailored to the character-
istics of the landslide-prone area and can include 
the construction of drainage trenches and planting 
highly transpiring vegetation to stabilize the slope.
Figure 3.4. Sequence of actions required to derive landslide hazard assessments
(Source: Cotecchia 2016)
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27  (Mancini, Ceppi, and Ritrovato 2008); (Lollino et al. 2016); 
(Cotecchia et al. 2012); (Santaloia, Cotecchia and Vitone 2012) 
28  (Ikeuchi et al. 2017)
With current methods, assessment of landslide risk 
remains highly contextual and localized. At its most 
rigorous, it involves different stages of analysis, first 
phenomenological, thereafter mathematical/numer-
ical, to characterize the representative geo-hydro-
mechanical context and landslide mechanisms. 
In principle, with sufficiently detailed data sets, risk 
profiles could be created with input from the specific 
landslide hazard assessment mentioned above. This 
is simply not practical in most circumstances.
3.1.4  
Flooding
While seismic science has been able to move 
forward with a coordinated, collaborative approach 
to modelling the hazard, flood science faces several 
obstacles that make the process of reaching the 
same point more complicated. Floods are simply 
the presence of water on land that is usually dry. 
The causes of that flooding can be too much 
precipitation, snow melt that occurs too quickly, a 
dam break, a tsunami or storm surge, inadequate 
water management practices, etc. The dynamics 
that dictate flood risk are difficult to model – a 
key reason why not all flood causations can be 
modelled with contemporary resources. There are 
models for many different drivers of flooding, but 
not all, and the work of harmonizing the different 
drivers into a harmonized flood model remains a 
challenge for the flood community.
Several different flood models have been developed 
for riverine and coastal flooding. But the challenge 
in developing a more comprehensive global model is 
to combine these models together. A first step in this 
direction has been made by linking one hydrodynam-
ics model with downstream boundary conditions 
from a tide and storm-surge data set.28  In doing this, 
the linked effects of flooding at river water levels 
and in estuaries have been mapped globally. Other 
initiatives are developing methods to nest local flood 
models within global models, thereby increasing 
computational efficiency and enhancing localized 
accuracy in those areas where the local models exist 
When assessing flood risk, a key concern is related 
to triggering factors. There is no single source that 
causes a flood; it can arise from multiple drivers. 
Considering the challenges in accuracy related to 
short-term weather forecasts, where at least some 
of the dynamics can be modelled, the challenge of 
risk projection for precipitation drivers of flooding 
are orders of magnitude more complex. Precipi-
tation patterns must consider multiple dynamic 
sources. Even in the same catchment area, the 
same precipitation distributed in different ways can 
lead to vastly different results. Other conditions 
must be factored in, including the soil conditions 
(very dry, partial saturation, snow melt, etc.), and all 
those elements must then be linked to local factors 
that are not always possible to project at the global 
level. The primary difference between global and 
local models is not the processes – those are effec-
tively the same – but rather the ability to tailor them 
to a local context that can make the difference for 
producing a comprehensive understanding of risk.
Older hydrological models were focused on project-
ing probable discharge of rivers, creating a time 
series of the flow in the river and applying those 
discharge values to a hydraulics model that incor-
porated flood flow and depth. Now, with the ability 
to run calculations on far more powerful computers, 
the hydrological cycle can be resolved in a more 
accurate way, thus enabling improved simulation 
of hydrology and the production of more reliable 
values of discharge.
Using these tools, many probabilistic flood maps 
are now available. Recent work to combine them 
has highlighted the significant advances possible in 
recent years. Through the Global Flood Partnership 
(GFP), work is under way to compare the various 
existing models and identify gaps that will require 
further research and development. GFP is a multi-
disciplinary group of scientists, agencies and flood 
risk managers focused on developing efficient and 
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effective global flood tools. Its aim is to build coop-
eration for global flood forecasting, monitoring and 
impact assessment to strengthen preparedness 
and response and to reduce global disaster losses.29 
Much like seismic science, the ideal case is to use 
locally produced models, and a plan is required to 
collect these and figure out how to fill gaps. The 
result should provide a basis for other models and 
enable them to be mutually improved.
In the past, people working on flood mapping and 
flood forecasting were working independently, but 
they are now using the same base data and have 
slowly come together to use the same timescales. 
Since 2015, drought and flood communities have 
been working together on a common framework 
that provides a single model which indicates simply 
whether there is too much or too little water. One 
example that clearly shows the interplay between 
droughts and flooding is the border between India 
and Pakistan. This area experiences sequential 
flooding and drought, both of which provide a basis 
for agricultural production in the region (as flood-
ing increases the water table, the area absorbs that 
water during drought, and the water table is lowered 
before the next round of flooding). 
The key is to move away from a simple hydrological 
risk paradigm and instead focus on impact. If expo-
sure and vulnerability are incorporated into models, 
probabilistic modelling then becomes more impor-
tant to provide information on the potential impact, 
not just to understand a hazard. It can then inform 
decision makers so that they are able to issue 
detailed early warnings, or over a larger timescale, 
incorporate the information into decisions on land-
use planning, building approvals and infrastructure 
development.
Climatological models have also improved, in the 
analysis of the past and in their ability to forecast into 
the future. More detail is derived with the community 
working on high-resolution simulations of the climate. 
In 2015, the resolution of the climatological model 
was 80 km2; now, detailed models are a maximum 
of 40 km2, improving the overall global granularity. 
Unfortunately, capacity of simulating models at the 
global level is limited, but it is expected to improve 
in the coming years with even greater increases in 
resolution. Meteorological reanalysis has also been 
extended further into the past, with the twentieth 
century reanalysis providing global hindcasts of 
meteorological conditions back to 1851. GFP has 
been working to better represent the dynamics of the 
hydraulics by improving depth measures but doing 
this for total global coverage requires significant 
resources. Many researchers are working to improve 
the available instruments and build on current 
research allowing for an evaluation of the hydraulics 
hazards. At the local scale, further research is needed 
to go even further so that reliable hazard and damage 
computations can become a reality.
Data scarcity is a hurdle for global models and is 
fuelled by lack of resources for an area to produce 
such data and by concerns regarding the secu-
rity sensitivity of the data, which inhibits the free 
exchange on which such a model relies. The avail-
ability of detailed data from satellites is aiding the 
calibration and validation of hydrological models 
that can be used in parts of the world where local 
data are scarce. An example of work that is filling 
in the gaps is the Soil Moisture Active Passive sat-
ellite, which provides detailed information on soil 
moisture. although the resource has been avail-
able for some time, it is only the latest versions of 
models that can incorporate this data.30 Availability 
of high-quality and high-resolution digital elevation 
data remains a key challenge when undertaking 
global simulations of flooding. 
The inclusion of epistemic uncertainty represents 
another major shift in the way the risk is calculated. 
It is difficult to compute flood risk due to the wide 
range of variables that are required for model-
ling flood scenarios, as well as the computational 
resources that are required (with a single scenario 
taking up to a day to run). As a result, it has become 
necessary to sample scenarios. The collection of 
samples creates a portfolio that produces a mean 
result and standard deviation.
Shorter-term forecasts are time dependent (e.g. 
three to six hours for flash flooding, normal weather 
forecasts of one to three days, medium range being 
3 to 15 days and seasonal forecasts are longer 
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term). Longer-term forecasts for climate change 
are based on Poisson distributions (representing 
the probability of a given event independently of 
the time since the last event). They are normally 
depicted with three different horizons: short-, mid- 
and long-term futures. 
It is difficult to examine changes in flood risk at the 
global level. Temperatures are rising, and this will 
have drastic effects on how flood risks are studied 
and calculated and on the effects of floods in the 
world. Using this as a basis, various scenarios have 
been developed to examine how anticipated climato-
logical changes will affect flood risk. The challenge 
is that the effects of climate change will not increase 
the mean temperature in all parts of the world evenly. 
Mean temperature changes will vary significantly 
from one location to the next. While flooding is likely 
to increase overall, as increasing temperatures melt 
glaciers and increase water levels, in general, the 
warmer temperature is expected to amplify aridity 
and evaporation in some regions. There will be more 
droughts and more floods, but this balance will serve 
to highlight the differences between regions.
At the global level, the consensus is that changes 
in mean sea-level, storm-surge levels, the frequency 
of storm surges, wave action and water tempera-
ture/volume will have tremendous implications for 
the underlying assumptions of the long-term risk 
models currently in use. In all scenarios, there will 
be an increased risk of coastal flooding in many 
parts of the world. Coastal flooding is projected to 
have a more significant impact than even riverine 
flooding; the value of the infrastructure and assets 
that stand to be damaged is increasing.
Using models to predict the probability of suc-
cess and value of possible intervention methods is 
another important change in the scientific commu-
nity, and can be used to help inform decision makers.
Global flood risk modelling is now taking a step 
forward from simulating scenarios of flood risk, 
to developing methods to assess how adaptation 
strategies could reduce that risk. For example, the 
Global Flood Risk model was applied to examine 
the costs and benefits of adaptation through dikes 
and levees with scenarios of climate change and 
socioeconomic development until 2100.31 To make 
such research useful to decision makers, the tool 
Aqueduct Floods will be released in 2019 to allow 
anyone to assess these costs and benefits for any 
country, State or basin.
Recent years have seen a growing recognition in 
the flood risk community that many hydrological 
and meteorological risks (e.g. floods, wildfires, 
heat-waves or droughts) result from a combination 
of interacting physical processes having differ-
ent effects across different spatial and temporal 
scales, and that correctly assessing the risk there-
fore requires scientists and practitioners to include 
these interactions in their risk analyses.32  This can 
result in the disproportionate representation of the 
probability of extreme events, referred to as “com-
pound flood events”.33 These compound events 
have been identified as an important challenge 
by the World Climate Research Programme Grand 
Challenge on Weather and Climate Extremes. As a 
result, a new process has been initiated to: (a) iden-
tify key process and variable combinations under-
pinning compound events; (b) describe the available 
statistical methods for modelling dependence in 
time, space and between multiple variables; (c) 
identify data requirements needed to document, 
understand and simulate compound events; and 
(d) propose an analysis framework to improve the 
assessment of compound events.34 
Compound event analysis has been a rapidly 
growing field of analysis in large-scale flood risk 
analysis. Whereas flood risk studies traditionally 
examined floods from one driver (either river flood-
ing, pluvial flooding or coastal flooding), research 
is increasingly examining the impact of combina-
tions of these drivers. In 2017, the combination of 
unprecedented local rainfall intensities (pluvial flood 
29  (EC 2019)
30  (NASA 2019b)
31  (Winsemius et al. 2013)
32  (Zscheischler et al. 2018)
33  (Zscheischler et al. 2018)
34  (Zhang et al. 2017)
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driver) with storm surges (coastal flood driver) from 
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria led to major flood 
events and damage in Houston, Florida and numer-
ous islands in the Caribbean.35 Hurricane Harvey 
is now the second costliest natural hazard event 
in American history. Moreover, by not considering 
compound flooding, the risk Houston faced was, 
and continues to be, underestimated. Despite their 
potential for high impacts, compound events remain 
poorly understood and are typically ignored in disas-
ter management plans. This is an omission that 
fundamentally and seriously biases existing flood 
risk assessments. 
At local scale, several studies have found that there 
is a statistical dependence between the frequency 
or magnitude of coastal floods and river/pluvial 
floods in Australia, China, European countries and 
the United States of America.36 Interactions between 
storm surge and discharge can lead to elevated 
water levels in deltas and estuaries.37  To understand 
this, researchers coupled a state-of-the-art global 
river routing model with results from a global hydro-
dynamic model of storm surge and tides.38,39 Globally, 
there was an increase in the annual maximum water 
surface elevation of 0.1 m in deltas and estuaries 
when dynamic sea-surface levels are used as the 
downstream boundary compared to when they are 
not, with increases exceeding 0.5 m in many low-
lying flat areas such as the Amazon basin and many 
river basins in South-East and East Asia.
There have already been studies to investigate the 
effectiveness of various risk reduction measures 
as an aid to decision makers. These studies are 
based on hypothetical interventions, but they show 
that not all risk reduction measures are equal, and 
what fits for one scenario might not fit for another. 
For example, building up the levees of a river can 
protect from losses due to floods to a certain level, 
but the most certain measure is moving that popu-
lation to a safer location. However, this also brings 
into play the complexities of post facto develop-
ment planning and the myriad legal and social 
issues around resettlement.
Another trend has been the increased use of adap-
tive pathway approaches for managing flood risk. 
In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, the Environment Agency has established 
the Thames Estuary 2100 project, with the aim of 
developing a strategic flood risk management plan 
for London and the Thames Estuary through to the 
end of the century.40 This was instrumental in intro-
ducing a novel, cost-effective approach to manage 
growing flood risk by defining adaptation pathways 
that can manage a range of changes as needed. 
A possible path of cheaper flood defence options 
could be initially followed, but decision makers 
could switch to more expensive options if the 
drivers of the risk were not sufficiently addressed 
by the first pathway. For example, if mean sea level 
was found to be increasing faster than predicted 
due to accelerating effects of climate change, deci-
sion makers could pursue a different pathway with 
different costs and implications such as the instal-
lation of a new downstream barrage. The adaptive 
pathways approach is being developed into a tool 
for global application.41  
3.1.5  
Fire
The increased number of intense heat-waves and 
wildfires that has been recorded during recent years 
on a global basis has raised great concerns. It is 
apparent that projected climatic changes may signif-
icantly affect such phenomena in the future. Each 
year, wildfires result in high mortality rates and prop-
erty losses, especially in the wildland urban interface 
(WUI). These fires affect millions of people and 
have devastating global consequences for biodiver-
sity and ecosystems. Wildfire disasters can rapidly 
change their nature into technological disasters (e.g. 
in mixed areas of forest and residential, in heavy 
industrial or in recycling zones). In such cases, there 
is a global concern because toxic components such 
as dioxins are released, as well as fine and ultrafine 
particles with transboundary effects. Even though 
international policies and fire safety legislation have 
resulted in effective prevention mechanisms, envi-
ronmental and technological fire hazards continue 
to threaten the sustainability of local populations 
and the biodiversity of affected areas.42 
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The year 2018 was reported as one of the warmest, 
affecting European Mediterranean countries such 
as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and also the 
countries of Central and Northern Europe. For 
example, Austria’s June 2018 national tempera-
ture was 1.9°C above average and was one of the 
10 warmest Junes on record.43 Higher tempera-
tures have generally been correlated with extreme 
weather events such as prolonged droughts, 
heat-waves and flash floods. The short-term precipi-
tation period that is spatially intensive usually 
causes flash floods and hence it more often occurs 
in drier climates.44 Under such circumstances, 
fire incidents in dry climate zones can easily be 
converted to megafires such as the Greek fires of 
August 2007,45 which destroyed huge forest areas, 
and even within the Arctic Circle, as seen in the 
Swedish wildfires of July 2018.46 
35  (Dilling, Morss and Wilhelmi 2017)
36  (Loganathan, Kuo and Yannacconc 1987); (Pugh, Wiley and 
Chinchester 1987); (Samuels and Burt 2002); (Svensson and 
Jones 2002); (Svensson and Jones 2004); (van den Brink et 
al. 2005); (Hawkes 2008); (Kew et al. 2013); (Lian, Xu and Ma 
2013); (Zheng et al. 2014); (Klerk et al. 2015); (van den Hurk et 
al. 2015); (Bevacqua et al. 2017)
37  (Ikeuchi et al. 2017)
38  (Yamazaki et al. 2011)
39  (Muis et al. 2016)
40  (Environment Agency 2012)
41  (Ranger et al. 2010) 
42  (Karma et al. 2019)
43  (National Centers for Environmental Information 2018)
44  (Allan and Soden 2008)
45  (Gouveia et al. 2017)
46  (Anderson and Cowell 2018)
Wildfires in California in the United States of America in 2018
(Source: Joshua Stevens via the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observatory)
99
There is a general challenge surrounding the defini-
tion of fires. In the European Union (EU) the focus 
has been on forest fires. More frequent occur-
rences of wildfires have spurred an expanded defi-
nition into wildfire that does not require the fire at 
any point to affect a forest. A wildfire is a fire that 
is out of control. This excludes fires set for legiti-
mate purposes such as crop burning but would 
include the same fires if they spread outside of the 
intended area. 
A fire in WUI fire can generally be triggered either 
by natural (e.g. lightning strikes) or human-made 
causes (e.g. campfires or arson). As it spreads, it 
can draw fuel from all types of flammable sources, 
expand in size and impact, and, under specific 
conditions, may turn into a megafire.47 Mega-
fires near residential areas (WUI fires) can gener-
ally pose significant risks to populations, critical 
infrastructure and the environment. The dramatic 
and uncontrolled expansion of fire usually leads to 
human casualties and property losses as in Greece 
(2018), Portugal (2017) and the United States of 
America (2017).
For example, 2018 was the deadliest and most 
destructive fire season in California’s history. Fires 
burned 766,439 ha, and caused more than $3.5 
billion in damage. The Mendocino Complex Fire 
burned more than 186,000 ha, becoming the largest 
single fire in the California history.48,49,50 
Apart from the fire expansion impact, smoke 
produced by fire also poses significant risks to 
health because it is a chemical mixture of a variety 
of substances, such as particles or gaseous 
pollutants like carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, 
ammonia, dioxins and other highly toxic compounds 
Figure 3.5. Tracking aerosols from California’s fires
(Source: Copernicus Sentinel data 2017, processed by The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute 2017)
100 Chapter 3
that can be produced based on the types of materi-
als burned towards the fire-front expansion.51 The 
huge quantities of smoke produced in combina-
tion with the extreme thermal radiation emitted can 
cause suffocation and death for people who are 
directly exposed, even well after the fire has been 
controlled.52 
In the past, there was often no information on 
fires, even at the regional level. It was frequently 
not possible to compile the various information 
together at the national level because of differ-
ences in methodology, models and definitions. A 
first step has been to harmonize systems by collect-
ing fire information from countries and putting it 
into a common database, such as the European 
Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS). While this 
approach is a step in the right direction, it remains 
limited by the number of countries that have hetero-
geneous data-collection methods. In the EU, there 
are 22 countries providing information into EFFIS, 
but there are an additional 39 countries in the 
network that do not have a systematic data-collec-
tion method and thus cannot contribute data. This 
situation is not uncommon in other regions.
EFFIS has been in development for the last 20 
years. The purpose originally was to estimate 
potential fire risk. When a fire occurs, the objective 
is then to monitor its progress and burned areas 
in real time including land-cover damage assess-
ments, emissions assessments and potential soil 
erosion estimates, along with vegetation regen-
eration. The EU previously worked on comput-
ing various indexes from individual countries, but 
harmonization and standardization have led to 
countries using a standardized index. 
A global fire information system has been under 
development since 2015 – the Global Wildfire Infor-
mation System (GWIS). Its global group working on 
wildfire risk assessment is expected to produce a 
global level risk assessment by 2020. GWIS uses 
open source tools, is committed to open data and 
has records of 350 to 400 million ha of land burned 
every year. However, the base information used still 
does not include very small fires, so the total area 
burned is likely to be higher than these figures. In 
Europe alone, it is estimated that between 15% 
and 20% of fires are excluded from this data. This 
percentage is likely to be the same on the global 
level, putting the global estimate of burned hect-
ares at approximately 450 million. Verification of 
global data on the ground is expensive. In some 
regions, there is a move towards using remote-
sensing data to avoid the expense of data collec-
tion on the ground. Remote sensing works well 
for fires because the incidence and the impact are 
visually manifest; the combination of satellites and 
other sensors are useful for fire monitoring. These 
resources have been pooled into GWIS. 
New satellites with more sensitive instruments 
allow access to higher-resolution sensors and will 
soon allow for the inclusion of smaller fires. One of 
the largest steps made by GWIS is the analysis of a 
data set that was so large at the global level that it 
required massive computing capacity to analyse, 
which was previously not accessible. With this data 
now available, other sectors will be able to incor-
porate it for inclusion in academic research, global 
multi-hazard risk assessment and consideration of 
chained, or cascading, hazards.
Analysis can be conducted on single fires to under-
stand how they evolve. Twice-daily imagery is anal-
ysed to determine the speed of the fire and spread, 
which provides a view of the fire “climate” (if it is 
spreading and if the coverage is increasing). But 
the base requirement is a database of fires, and the 
GWIS database now covers the period from 2000 to 
the present. 
47  (Ronchi et al. 2017); (Intini et al. 2017)
48  (Geographic Area Coordination Centers 2019b)
49  (Berger and Elias 2018)
50  (Geographic Area Coordination Centers 2019a)
51  (Dokas, Statheropoulos and Karma 2007) 
52  (Karma et al. 2019)
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Not all fires picked up through remote sensing 
are wildfires. Every summer, researchers observe 
unusual fire activity in Ireland, but they have learned 
that throughout the summer, Ireland celebrates 
several bonfire festivals that give false-positive 
readings.
In 2017, the Canadian province of British Colum-
bia experienced its largest single fire in its history, 
with 1.3% area of its total territory burned. A total 
of 12,160.53 km2 of forest and residential areas 
was burned; almost 40,000 people were evacuated 
from their homes and more than 300 buildings were 
destroyed. 
With the effects of climate change warming the 
planet, the incidence of fires will increase, and fires 
will arise in areas that have not previously been fire 
prone. One significant shift will see increased atten-
tion on the study of fire seasons to determine how 
seasons are changing. In 2017 in Europe, the most 
damaging fires (in June and October) fell outside of 
the traditional fire season (July to September). Fire 
seasons are becoming longer with greater areas 
being affected each year. 
Figure 3.7 shows that peak season for fire occur-
rence and for average acres burned is between July 
and October in California. But 14 out of 20 of the 
most damaging fires have occurred in October or 
later, and all but three of the most damaging fires 
have occurred in the past 20 years
Another output of wildfires is emissions. The envi-
ronmental impact of large-scale wildfires, particu-
larly the huge quantities of carbon dioxide and 
water vapour produced, may have a significant 
greenhouse effect.53 Equally, flora and fauna are 
heavily damaged with major impacts on biodi-
versity.54 Wildfire impact on hydrology, soil prop-
erties and soil erosion by water are also of high 
importance,55 and physicochemical properties and 
microbial characteristics of burned soils due to 
wildfires are strongly disturbed. Moreover, some 
of the toxic compounds such as heavy metals that 
are produced by fires are absorbed into a larger 
affected area than that which was burned. Ashes 
can be deposited on soil and water,56 with conse-
quences for crop quality and food chain safety. 
According to a recent study, severe wildfires may 
also endanger the water supply in downwind 
communities.57 Particulate matter from wildfires is 
Figure 3.6. British Columbia, Canada, 2017 wildfire that burned an area the size of Lebanon
(Source: British Columbia Wildfire Service 2018)
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also a health risk (mostly the result of haze), as are 
dust-storms and sandstorms. While still difficult to 
quantify reliably, estimates indicate that 260,000 
deaths a year can be attributed to smoke from 
forest, peat and grassland fires.58
State-of-the-art dynamic fire simulation models 
have been tested in a wildfire-prone region in 
Australia.59 These have yielded a novel framework 
for modelling wildfire urban evacuation processes 
and calculating the safe escape time.60 Personal 
fire evacuation plans may prove vital for the 
communities near areas at risk of fire. Simplified 
family-level plans for coping with WUI fires have 
been established in some regions, providing fami-
lies with residential safety checklist and tips to 
improve family and property survival during a wild-
fire. However, these are available mostly in wealthy 
areas. 
All types of fires over 300,000 deaths annually, and 
they are the fourth largest cause of accidental injury 
globally and represented 5% of all injury deaths 
globally in 2014.61 Over 95% of fire deaths and burn 
injuries are in low- and middle-income countries. A 
high proportion of the urban populations in these 
countries are in low-income and informal settle-
ments, with poor-quality housing, limited supporting 
infrastructure and services, and high vulnerability 
to fires and other hazards. However, little is known 
about the incidence, impact and causes of urban 
fires in these settings.62 
Figure 3.7. California fire occurrence by month and acres burned by month, 1996–2017
53  (Kim and Sarkar 2017); (Kim et al. 2009)
54  (Boisramé et al. 2017)
55  (Shakesby 2011)
56  (Pereira et al. 2013)
57  (Robinne, Parisien and Flannigan 2016); (Hallema et al. 2018)
58  (Johnston et al. 2012)
59  (Beloglazov et al. 2015)
60  (Ronchi et al. 2017); (Kinateder et al. 2014)
61  (WHO 2014)
62  (Rush et al. 2019)
(Source:UNDRR with data from California Fire Service 2018 and State of California 2019)
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Box 3.2. Selected large informal settlement fires
3.1.6  
Biological
Biological hazards cover a category of hazards 
that are of organic origin or conveyed by biologi-
cal vectors, including pathogenic microorganisms, 
toxins and bioactive substances. Examples are 
bacteria, viruses or parasites, as well as venomous 
wildlife and insects, poisonous plants and mosqui-
toes carrying disease-causing agents.63 While 
biological hazards also cause diseases in plants 
and animals, this chapter focuses on those biologi-
cal hazards that affect human health. 
Like other hazards, biological hazards and their 
associated infectious diseases occur at differ-
ent scales with varying levels of consequence for 
public health. Diseases may be categorized by 
the way in which they are spread and people are 
infected, namely: water and food-borne diseases, 
where the pathogen can enter the body via contami-
nated food or water; vector-borne diseases, which 
involve mosquitoes, ticks and other arthropod 
species, or other animals that transmit the disease 
from animals to humans (zoonotic diseases) or 
among humans; air-borne or respiratory infections, 
which are spread between humans by the respira-
tory route; and other infectious diseases involving 
contact with bodily fluids such as blood.
Biological hazards affect people at all levels 
of society. At the extreme, epidemic infectious 
diseases affect millions of people every year, with 
potentially severe consequences for individuals, 
communities, health systems and economies, espe-
cially in fragile and vulnerable countries where they 
are most common. However, no country is immune 
to the risk. New pathogens continue to emerge by 
mutating, re-assorting and adapting. Previously 
well-understood infectious agents change their 
behaviour or scale of impact as the world is getting 
warmer and more populated, with associated 
animal husbandry strategies, and with ecosystem 
changes, increasing speed of transportation and 
mass distribution systems. 
As infectious diseases travel easily across adminis-
trative boundaries, the world’s defences are only as 
effective as the weakest link in any country’s efforts 
to anticipate and prevent emergence and outbreak 
at all scales. Biological hazards and their impact 
on global public health have brought to prominence 
the need for a collective and coordinated mecha-
nism involving all sectors to prevent new risks, 
reduce and mitigate existing risks, and strengthen 
resilience. This approach is being promoted and 
reinforced by the integration of biological hazards 
in whole-of-society and all-hazard approaches to 
the management of risks, as reflected in the Sendai 
Framework, SDGs and the Paris Agreement, which 
are complemented by the International Health Regu-
lations (2005) (IHR)64 and other relevant global, 
regional, national and subnational strategies and 
agreements. 
• In February 2011, a fire left 10,000 home-
less in three hours in Bahay Toro, Manila, 
Philippines.
• In May 2012, a fire affected approximately 
3,500 people in Old Fadama, the largest 
informal settlement in Accra, Ghana. 
• In April 2014 a ﬁre in Valparaiso, Chile, 
destroyed about 2,500 homes and forced 
12,500 people to evacuate. 
• In March 2017, a fire in Imizamo Yethu 
informal settlement in Cape Town, South 
Africa, destroyed over 2,100 homes and left 
9,700 people homeless.
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Trends in biological risk
The twenty-first century has already experienced 
major infectious disease epidemics. Old diseases 
such as cholera and plague have returned, and 
new ones like severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), 
and H1N1 pandemic influenza have emerged. 
Another Ebola epidemic or a new influenza 
pandemic are likely and almost certain. The only 
unknowns are when and where they, or a new but 
equally lethal threat, will emerge. 
63  (United Nations General Assembly 2016b)
64  (WHO 2016)
65  (WHO 2017)
Figure 3.8. Major infectious threats of the twenty-first century
Plague, for example, is commonly considered a 
scourge of a past age. However, a major outbreak 
in Madagascar in 2017 led to 2,417 cases and 209 
deaths, as well as alerts for several countries with 
links to the island nation.65 The outbreak was char-
acterized by pneumonic plague, a far more fatal 
and infectious form of the infection than bubonic 
plague. The outbreak was the result of a scenario 
of unfavourable factors occurring over an endemic-
ity in the country such as crowded living condition 
in the capital, increased mobility, lack of disease 
awareness, and poor infection prevention and 
control (IPC) measures. Nine countries and territo-
ries with trade and travel links to Madagascar were 
put on plague preparedness alert, highlighting the 
transboundary, multisectoral effect of biological 
hazards. 
A novel coronavirus emerged from China in 2002 
and swept the globe, causing an unheard-of deadly 
illness. More than 8,000 people fell ill with SARS, 
and 774 died. The illness spread to several coun-
tries, causing global panic and inflicting enormous 
economic damage across multiple sectors before 
it was finally contained about six months later. 
The estimated economic loss ranged from $30 
billion to $100 billion, depending on the methodol-
ogy for counting indirect costs. Following SARS 
was avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in 
humans. Once controlled in Hong Kong in 1997, by 
(Source: World Health Organization (WHO) 2018)
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effectively eliminating the transmission in poultry, 
the virus re-emerged from Quin Hai Lake of China, 
a crossroad of migratory birds and a huge water-
fowl reserve. The virus spread across Asia and 
Africa and resulted in a huge economic loss in 
the agricultural sector. In 2009, a novel influenza 
virus, H1N1, known to originate in swine, started to 
spread, creating the first influenza pandemic of the 
twenty-first century. Thankfully, it was not as severe 
as expected due to strengthened health monitor-
ing and prevention structures. But in 2012, a new 
coronavirus emerged, causing an illness similar to 
SARS. MERS is a viral respiratory disease caused 
by the coronavirus that was first identified in Saudi 
Arabia in 2012 and entered the human popula-
tion via contact with infected dromedary camels.66 
MERS cases remain active at the time of this publi-
cation, causing concerns that the virus could cause 
a catastrophic epidemic in the Middle East and 
beyond.
The 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa was another 
unexpectedly severe event (in Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone). Instead of being restricted geo-
graphically, Ebola affected three African countries, 
spread to several others and sparked global alarm. 
The 2018–2019 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, the country’s tenth outbreak 
in four decades, was officially declared on 1 August 
2018. The outbreak is centred in provinces where 
geographic challenges and security hazards have 
hindered containment and management of the 
outbreak.
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has become 
another health threat, compromising the medical 
community’s ability to treat infectious diseases.67 
Inappropriate use of antimicrobials in the medical 
field and unregulated use in animal husbandry and 
food products – added to the natural capacity of 
microbes to acquire resistance to antimicrobials – 
are contributing to and accelerating AMR risk glob-
ally. It is predicted that the AMR problem will claim 
more lives and provoke massive increases in costs 
of management.68 
One of the largest pandemic killers ever 
recorded, AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome) is an example of how rapidly a 
new infectious disease can take hold glob-
ally. Within a decade of its identification in 
1981, over 10 million people across the world 
had become infected. The cumulative total 
is 70 million, half of whom have died. Thirty-
seven million people worldwide now live with 
HIV (human immunodeficiency virus), 1.8 
million new infections occurred in 2017, and 
every country has been touched. Death rates 
have been dramatically slowed by combina-
tion antiretroviral therapy, now reaching nearly 
22 million people globally through massive 
mobilization of domestic and international 
resources, including in the poorest countries 
of the world.
Box 3.3. HIV/AIDS As was often observed at the height of the 
pandemic, AIDS exploits the fault lines of a 
society. Marginalization, disruption and conflict 
become conduits for the spread of HIV. Some 
53% of the global total number of people living 
with HIV is in Eastern and Southern Africa, 
where the epidemic’s spread was fuelled by 
the combined effects of poor access to diag-
nosis, scarce treatment of sexually transmitted 
infections, sexual mixing patterns dominated 
by labour migration, post-conflict demobiliza-
tion and effective response delayed by stigma, 
denial and resource scarcity. But in the past 
two decades, the region has shown the great-
est progress in curbing new infections and 
expanding treatment access and reducing 
deaths. 
However, a re-emergence is not inconceivable 
if the response is neglected in these high preva-
lence regions, or through the widening spread 
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Drivers of biological risk/causal factors
Unlike some other hazards (e.g. earthquakes 
or floods), biological hazards can be constantly 
present in the community – endemic – and usually 
pose low risk when the population is largely 
immune. Biological hazards, which are endemic 
in some communities, pose a risk of becoming 
epidemics when they are introduced to a new host 
community with no immunity. When people migrate 
from disease-free areas to endemic regions, they 
typically lack immunity, making them susceptible 
to infection and transmission of the disease, result-
ing in cases in excess of normal expectancy. These 
hazards have the potential to cause many cases 
and high rates of morbidity and mortality, and may 
spread to other areas of the country or across 
borders. The risk may also change when crises or 
emergencies such as droughts, floods, earthquakes 
and conflicts arise, exacerbating the conditions 
favourable for disease transmission and causing 
population displacement. 
The pattern is clear. Old diseases such as plague 
and cholera continue to reappear, and new ones 
invariably emerge to join them. This is driven by 
a complex and challenging interplay of factors, 
of the epidemic – the annual number of new 
HIV infections has doubled in less than 20 years 
in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East 
and North Africa. Disaster and related issues of 
treatment supply chain (e.g. in the post 2010 
earthquake in Haiti), war, or any major stresses 
or shocks to fragile national health systems 
could easily disrupt treatment regimes and give 
rise to a resurgence of the disease. 
The case of the global HIV pandemic is a 
systemic risk, with roots spread through socio-
economic, cultural and behavioural dimen-
sions. The high incidence of comorbidities 
such as tuberculosis (TB) and viral hepatitis 
in immunocompromised persons with HIV 
66  (Zaki et al. 2012)
67  (WHO 2015)
68  (WHO 2014)
69  (Jones et al. 2008)
infection calls for comprehensive and coordi-
nated responses to HIV, TB, viral hepatitis and 
other sexually transmitted infections. The wider 
approach to the disease requires population-
wide responses that transcend the diagnosis 
and treatment of individuals, looking for long-
term, collective and multidisciplinary measures 
that include education, behavioural change, 
social services, testing, care and programme 
evaluation. Addressing these challenges 
demands strengthening of health systems: 
communication, IT, logistics, drug and vaccine 
supplies, and, particularly, building the capa-
bilities of health personnel and community 
leaders and the platforms for them to work in 
synergy. 
reflecting the interaction between biological 
hazards, people’s exposure to hazards, their suscep-
tibility to becoming infected and the capacity of 
individuals, communities, countries and interna-
tional actors to reduce risks and manage the conse-
quences of outbreaks. 
Almost all the newly emerging or re-emerging viral 
infections have come from transmission from 
animals. Potentially hazardous changes in land use, 
agricultural practices, animal husbandry and food 
production have led to increased contact between 
people and animals, with little regard for the 
ecological and human consequences of connected 
systems. Key drivers from domesticated animals 
include contemporary farming and livestock 
production systems and live animal markets.69 
Wildlife zoonoses can arise from factors related 
to hunting practices, deforestation and ecosystem 
breakdown. 
(Sources: UNAIDS 2015, 2018; WHO 2019; Schneider 2011)
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The probability that a new disease threat will spread 
is influenced by pathogen- and population-specific 
factors.70 In the twenty-first century, ecological 
changes such as climate change and water scarcity 
have emerged as strong drivers of disease trans-
mission. In a growing number of countries, rapid 
and unplanned patterns of urban development are 
making rapidly growing cities focal points for many 
emerging environmental and health hazards. Zika 
virus outbreaks are a case in point; the larvae of the 
Aedes mosquitoes thrive in stagnant water, which 
is abundant, for example, in slum areas where open 
containers, tyres, barrels and drums are used for 
gathering rainwater for household and garden use. 
Improving the human environment can therefore 
reduce exposure to the vector mosquitoes.71 
War, civil unrest and political violence and their 
repercussions, such as refugee populations, 
displaced people and food insecurity, can result 
in a resurgence of previously controlled infectious 
diseases such as cholera, measles and diphtheria.72 
The movement of large numbers of people creates 
new opportunities for the spread and establish-
ment of common or novel infectious diseases. 
For example, one of the worst cholera outbreaks 
in recent history is occurring in Yemen. Since April 
2017, more than 1.3 million suspected cases of 
cholera and 2,641 deaths have been reported.73 The 
catastrophic spread of disease is a consequence 
of two years of conflict and the resulting decima-
tion of the country’s health, water and sanitation 
systems and facilities, coupled with widespread 
internal displacement and alarmingly high rates of 
malnutrition. 
One intention of this GAR is to help understand 
how the true nature of risk mirrors the systemic 
risk approach practised in public health services 
for several decades. The systemic approach for 
assessing biological risks affecting human health 
begins with the characterization of biological 
hazards. These include aspects such as infectivity, 
pathogenicity and virulence, infectious dose and 
survival outside the host. Next, exposure is defined 
by criteria such as host factors, environmental 
factors, transmission, reservoirs and vectors. 
Finally, vulnerability, a field exhaustively explored 
in public health, is characterized by factors such 
as population characteristics and population infra-
structure. These factors are further disaggregated 
into the so-called social determinants of health: 
(a) social and economic environment: education, 
health services, social support networks – greater 
support from families, friends and communities, 
culture, customs, traditions, beliefs, income and 
social status; (b) physical environment: clean water 
and air, healthy workplaces, safe houses, communi-
ties and roads all contribute to good health; employ-
ment and working conditions; and (c) person’s 
individual characteristics: behaviours, genetics and 
coping skills.74 The intricacy of the measurement 
and interaction of the three risk factors – threats, 
exposure and vulnerability – are reflected in the 
complexity of the modelling used to assess the 
systemic health risk for biological hazards.75  
Biological risk management and international 
instruments
With regard to biological risk, the health and epide-
miology fields rely on a rich network of partnerships 
that span the health sector link with social and 
development partners. For non-influenza patho-
gens, sharing takes various forms: ad hoc, routine 
surveillance set up internationally, nationally or 
locally for the Extended Program on Immunization 
or through existing networks of institutions and 
researchers. 
To respond to the emergence and spread of 
zoonotic pathogens, WHO has strengthened collab-
oration with the Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Orga-
nization for Animal Health by forming a tripartite 
agreement for sharing responsibilities and coordi-
nating global activities to address health risks at 
the animal–human–ecosystem interfaces.76 In the 
context of influenza, risk monitoring, preparedness 
and response are continuous processes, requiring 
constant access to circulating viruses. This involves 
sharing viruses every year from as many countries 
as possible with the Global Influenza Surveillance 
and Response System (GISRS), a WHO-coordinated 
global network of laboratories. Based on these 
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samples, WHO and GISRS can conduct risk assess-
ments, monitor the evolution of seasonal influenza 
virus and the disease activity. Vaccine manufactur-
ers use materials and information generated by 
GISRS to produce influenza vaccines. In return, the 
manufacturers contribute financially and by in-kind 
committments for pandemic preparedness and 
response (PIP Framework). GISRS also serves as a 
global alert mechanism for the emergence of influ-
enza viruses with pandemic potential.
Disease risks can often be prevented or mitigated, 
and their harm reduced through vigilance coupled 
with a rapid response at all levels.77 The basis of 
effective and efficient, well-targeted risk manage-
ment measures is provided by different forms of 
risk assessment.
Strategic risk assessment is used for planning for 
risk management with a focus on prevention and 
preparedness measures, capacity development, and 
medium- to longer-term risk monitoring and evalu-
ation, including tracking changes in risk over time. 
Strategic risk assessments enable the analysis of 
risks through a combination of hazard, exposure, 
vulnerability and capacity analyses, so that action 
can be taken to reduce the level of risk and conse-
quences for health. Several common risk factors 
are addressed in risk assessments for biological 
and other hazards, such as population demograph-
ics (age or gender), health service availability and 
the capacity of the health and other systems in 
society. In addition, some more specific risk factors 
or sources of vulnerability apply to populations who 
are exposed to biological hazards, overcrowded 
living conditions, population displacement and 
the environmental factors in which the disease or 
vector may survive or grow. 
It is also important to assess the risk of biologi-
cal hazards after natural or human-induced events, 
including diseases. For example, the functioning of 
health facilities including diagnostic function and 
the vaccine cold chain can be affected by damage 
and interruption of services such as water and 
power. Disaster impacts on safe water, sanita-
tion facilities and hygiene conditions may result in 
water-related communicable diseases or vector-
borne diseases.
Risk management measures
Risk assessments inform policymakers to act to 
prevent, detect, prepare for and respond to biologi-
cal hazards. This includes measures to reduce 
exposure of groups at increased risk of infection 
due to biological hazards, containing the spread 
of the risk, and eventually stopping it. Community-
based actions and primary health care are at the 
core of strengthening community and individual 
resilience to all types of emergencies, by boost-
ing the heath, immunization and nutritional status 
of individuals to reduce their susceptibility to 
diseases. The provision of primary care in epidemic, 
disaster and post-conflict situations is critical for 
prevention, early diagnosis and treatment of a wide 
range of diseases.
Effective water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) 
planning can prevent or mitigate the risk of severe 
diarrheal diseases. The health sector must work 
with planners and engineers to ensure safe water 
and sanitation infrastructure. Chlorine is widely 
available, inexpensive, easily used and effective 
against most important waterborne pathogens. 
Some specific preventive interventions will reduce 
risks of vector-borne diseases such as malaria. 
Disease-specific strategies such as bed-nets, 
improving drainage to reduce vector breeding sites 
or insecticide spraying can help reduce these risks. 
National disease surveillance and an EWS that 
extends to the community level is essential for 
70  (Sands et al. 2016)
71  (WHO 2019)
72  (Blumberg et al. 2018)
73  (WHO 2018b)
74  (Sarmiento 2015)
75  (Sarmiento 2015)
76  (WHO 2010)
77  (Morse et al. 2012)
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the rapid detection of cases of epidemic-prone 
diseases and rapid control. Surveillance and EWSs 
to detect outbreaks should be established, and 
cases reported through national systems to WHO 
when meeting the criteria for reporting under the 
IHR. Further risk management measures include 
protective equipment, IPC, behaviour-change prac-
tices by raising awareness and education of the 
public through risk communication, and effective 
treatments and/or routine and emergency vacci-
nations. Risk information is also used to inform 
response planning at various levels and capacity-
development measures for health systems, includ-
ing the training of health workers and key personnel 
from other sectors, such as logisticians, water and 
sanitation engineers, and the media.
Biological risk can often be prevented and harm 
can be reduced through vigilance coupled with a 
clear regulatory framework.78 In 2005, all countries 
agreed to the revised IHR, which are designed to 
assist the global community in preventing and 
responding to acute public health risks that have 
potential to cross borders. The IHR were originally 
developed for only three diseases – smallpox, 
cholera and yellow fever – and were focused on 
arresting the spread of disease at borders and other 
points of entry. However, smallpox was eradicated 
in the 1970s, cholera reporting was disfavoured 
by countries because of negative effects on travel 
and trade, and yellow fever control has become 
easier thanks to an effective vaccine. But the value 
of an internationally recognized regulatory struc-
ture was not lost. A warning episode of H5N1 in 
Hong Kong in 1997 and the international spread 
of SARS in 2003 showed that an update to the IHR 
was required to deal with globalization and the 
interconnectivity of systems to forestall yet-unfore-
seeable microbial threats that have since become 
a reality. The IHR (2005) that came into force in 
2007 are more flexible and future-oriented, requir-
ing countries to consider the possible impact of 
all biological hazards, whether they occur naturally, 
accidentally or intentionally. 
3.1.7  
Nuclear/radiological
Radioactivity and the radiation it produces existed 
on Earth long before life emerged. In fact, they have 
been present in space since the beginning of the 
Universe, and radioactive material was part of the 
Earth at its very formation. But humanity first discov-
ered this elemental, universal phenomenon only in 
the last years of the nineteenth century. Most people 
are aware of the use of radiation in the nuclear 
power production of electricity or in medical applica-
tions, yet many other uses of nuclear technologies 
in industry, agriculture, construction, research and 
other areas are hardly known at all. The sources of 
radiation causing the greatest risk to the public are 
not necessarily those that attract the most atten-
tion (Figure 3.10). In fact, everyday experience such 
as air travel and living in well-insulated homes in 
certain parts of the world can substantially increase 
exposure to radiation.79  
There is no formal distinction between nuclear and 
radiological risks and thus between associated 
safety arrangements. However, it is a well-estab-
lished practice to distinguish exposures related 
to nuclear power generation from other radiation 
Figure 3.9. Sources of radiation
(Source: World Nuclear Association 2018)
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exposures. From the physical point of view, both 
situations may result in the same kind of radiation 
exposure, so this distinction considers the different 
characteristics of the source of the risk. This GAR 
assumes that nuclear risks arise (or may potentially 
arise) from the uncertainties in the management of 
a nuclear chain reaction or the decay of the prod-
ucts of a chain reaction. Consequently, the radio-
logical risks arise from uncertainties related to any 
other activities involving ionizing radiation.
Figure 3.10. Potential biological impacts of radiation damaging a cell
(Source:UNDRR)
79  (UNEP 2016)
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The starkest manifestation of physical risk associ-
ated with nuclear power is when it affects living 
things. Cellular damage caused by ionizing radia-
tion can do one of three things: 
Outcomes (b) and (c) have very different implica-
tions for the organism as a whole.
Very high doses of radiation can cause serious 
damage to the blood-forming organs, stomach, 
intestinal tract and central nervous system, which 
can lead to death. Doses at this level will normally 
In addition to health effects such as acute radia-
tion syndrome and increased incidence of cancer, 
adverse effects on mental health are observed. 
Mental health was the biggest long-term public 
health problem that ensued from the nuclear acci-
dents of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The 
only occur because of very serious accidents, and 
only in case of exposures very close to the source 
of radiation.
Lower doses of ionizing radiation can cause leukae-
mia and cancer, appearing even many years after 
exposure, and can have effects that are manifest 
in future generations. High doses of radiation can 
cause other health problems, such as heart disease, 
strokes and cataracts.
Even though there is no clear scientific proof that 
cancer is caused by low doses of radiation, to be 
conservative, regulatory authorities around the 
world assume that any dose, no matter how small, 
is a risk and could be dangerous. It is assumed that 
the risk is in linear proportion to the dose.
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects 
of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) found that in the 
case of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the most 
important consequences on health were mental 
health and social well-being. Existing international 
safety standards include generic requirements for 
Figure 3.11. Relationship of radiation doses and health effects
(Source: Data adapted from UN Environment 2016) 
a. Repair itself successfully
b. Fail to repair itself and die
c. Fail to repair itself but survive
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81  IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles are jointly sponsored 
by multiple organizations: European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (Euratom), FAO, the International Labour Organization, 
the International Maritime Organization, OECD NEA, the Pan 
American Health Organization, the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP) and WHO; (IAEA 2006).
82  (NEA 2016)
other safety related risks, including those to ecosys-
tems in the environment). The fundamental safety 
objective in these standards is to protect people – 
individually and collectively – (and, in addition, the 
environment) from the harmful effects of ionizing 
radiation. The standards recognize that the effects 
of radiation on human health involve uncertainties; 
in particular, “assumptions have to be made owing 
to uncertainties concerning the health effects of 
radiation exposure at low doses and low dose 
rates.”
The most harmful consequences arising from 
nuclear facilities and activities have come from the 
loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear 
chain reaction, radioactive source or other source 
of radiation.
To reduce the likelihood of an accident having 
harmful consequences, several design principles, 
concepts and tools for optimizing nuclear safety, 
as well as the defence in depth (DiD) concept, 
have been developed. DiD is based on the military 
philosophy of providing multiple barriers of defence 
and may be summarized as a sequence of preven-
tive, control (protective) and mitigative measures 
in performance of three basic safety functions: (a) 
controlling the power, (b) cooling the fuel and (c) 
confining the radioactive material. It comprises five 
levels, as shown in Table 3.1.82 
The effectiveness of protection is established using 
the principles of, inter alia, redundancy, diversity, 
segregation, physical separation and single-point 
failure protection. The protective layers comprise 
the physical barriers and also the administrative 
procedures and other related arrangements. 
provisions that are necessary to consider mitiga-
tion of the psychosocial and mental health impacts 
of nuclear accidents. However, they do not offer 
explicit descriptions of the required tools. A recent 
joint initiative by WHO and the OECD Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA) aims at proposing practi-
cal solutions/tools for support of the decision-
making process while planning for and responding 
to nuclear and radiological emergencies. These 
actions are based on the development of a policy 
framework that adopts existing WHO guidelines on 
mental health and psychological support in nuclear 
and radiological emergencies.
The burden of nuclear accidents on mental health, 
while specific, is not unique to the nuclear field. 
The inclusion of mental health in the Sendai Frame-
work marks a pivotal point in the recognition of the 
impact of disasters – of both natural and anthropo-
genic – on mental health, and a global commitment 
to its reduction.
The United Nations General Assembly acted to 
resolve the question of how objectively adverse 
health effects can be attributed to radiation as 
compared to the subjective inference of potential 
radiation risks. 
The UNSCEAR report:80 
For the safety standards outlined in the report it is 
assumed that there is no threshold level of radiation 
dose below which there are no associated radiation 
risks.81 The term “radiation risks” is used in these 
standards in a general sense to refer to detrimen-
tal health effects of radiation exposure, including 
the likelihood of such effects occurring (and to any 
• Distinguishes the objective attribution of health 
effects to retrospective exposure situations 
from the subjective inference of potential risks 
from prospective exposure situations.
• Concludes that increases in the incidence 
of health effects in populations cannot be 
attributed to low doses, but risk from planned 
situations may be prospectively inferred for 
purposes of radiation protection and allocation 
of resources.
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Both nuclear risk analysis methods (deterministic 
and probabilistic) use “postulated initiating events”. 
These are “all foreseeable events with the poten-
tial for serious consequences and all foreseeable 
events with a significant frequency of occurrence 
are anticipated and are considered in design.”83 
Examples include: loss of coolant accident (break in 
the cooling system), loss of off-site power (station 
blackout), reactivity-initiated accident (boron 
dilution, pump flow increase, etc.) or external events 
such as earthquakes or fires. The principal deter-
ministic approaches seek to verify if the frequency 
of the postulated initiating events stays within 
acceptable criteria.84 
In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
NEA jointly developed an International Nuclear 
Table 3.1. DiD levels
(Source: IAEA 1996)
Figure 3.12. International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
 (Source: IAEA 2019)
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Trust in processes that authorize, verify and confirm 
safety of domestic and international consumer 
markets is central to maintaining viable agricultural 
production in radiologically contaminated areas. This 
suggests the need for a coordinated communica-
tions strategy involving farmers, fishers, distributors, 
consumers, experts (including universities), and local 
and central governments to bring stakeholders in 
closer contact with the efforts being made and the 
results being achieved. Independent, international 
validation and inviting co-expertise, for example 
through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
could be considered as trust-building approaches. 
Of the many important lessons learned about nuclear 
safety over years, the one that has been most diffi-
cult to communicate and difficult to address is 
that human aspects of nuclear safety may be as 
important as any technical issue that arises during 
nuclear operations. Nuclear power is a highly tech-
nical undertaking and those who design, build and 
operate nuclear plants are highly qualified special-
ists in a wide range of engineering and scientific 
fields. However, technical aspects cannot be the 
only area of focus to ensure safety: attention to the 
safety culture that exists in the work environment is 
also required. Organizations need to consider how 
people interact and communicate with each other, 
when issues are raised and how are they addressed, 
what priority is given to safety – especially when 
presented with competing priorities.88 
The ethical and social dimensions are important, 
and radiological protection and social sciences 
should work together. A better understanding of 
the radiation protection system, involving the social 
sciences, could facilitate incorporation of new find-
ings, and make the system more flexible.
The effects of climate change might have an impact 
on the risk related to nuclear power plants in two 
ways.89 The gradual change in climate slowly affects 
and Radiological Event Scale (INES). This is a tool 
for promptly and consistently communicating 
the safety significance of events associated with 
sources of radiation.85 
Initially developed for nuclear events, INES now 
explains the significance of events from a range of 
activities, including industrial and medical use of 
radiation sources, operations at nuclear facilities 
and transport of radioactive material. The scale is 
based on a numerical rating including seven levels 
(each increase in level implies 10× greater severity). 
Evaluation of the level is made on the basis of the 
impact on three areas:
The evaluation of economic impacts of a nuclear 
accident is controversial and strongly dependent 
on subjective assumptions about the types of 
losses included in the analysis, the resilience of the 
economy to the event, and the behaviour of authori-
ties and population after the accident.86 
One of the factors evoked by an NEA report 
concerns the damage to agriculture.87 Many of 
the world’s nuclear installations are surrounded, 
at least in part, by agricultural lands. These areas 
are usually lightly populated, and small farms and 
gardens are not uncommon. In such situations, 
dealing with post-accident contamination of agricul-
tural areas, while very personal, can also be impor-
tant from economic and social standpoints. These 
issues need to be addressed in the context of active 
involvement by affected individuals in planning and 
decision-making processes. 
Moreover, the importance of trust has been high-
lighted in recent lessons learned through analysis. 
83  (IAEA 2016)
84  (IAEA 2010)
85  (IAEA 2013); (IAEA 2014)
86  (NEA 2018a)
87  (NEA 2018a)
88  (NEA 2018b)
89  (IAEA 2018)
a. People and the environment
b. Radiological barriers and control
c. DiD
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a plant’s operational environment. The main poten-
tial threats are: sea-level rise, which could result in 
inundation of coastal sites; the increase of ambient 
temperature decreasing a nuclear power plant’s 
thermal efficiency; lower mean precipitation reduc-
ing the cooling effectiveness; and higher average 
wind speeds affecting the construction of a plant. 
Another category arises from the fact that nuclear 
power plants, like any other construction, are prone 
to the effects of extreme weather events. Notably, 
existing site selection and design criteria anticipate 
a variety of extreme weather events. Examples of 
such events include extreme heat and drought, 
which could decrease the cooling efficiency, floods 
resulting in inundation or fires affecting plant 
construction. Like any other complex technology, 
nuclear power generation brings benefits and risks. 
Continuous development of more efficient nuclear 
risk management brings to the fore a discussion 
of value of nuclear power generation as a poten-
tial element in zero-emission energy generation 
worldwide. With low GHG emissions over a plant’s 
lifetime, nuclear energy is an alternative to the high-
emission fossil fuel technologies that dominate 
electricity generation worldwide. A system-wide 
shift to a combination of renewable energy sources 
and nuclear would contribute to reductions of 
carbon dioxide emissions and help to limit global 
temperature rise. 
No industry is immune from accidents, but all 
industries learn from them. There have been three 
major reactor accidents in the history of civil 
nuclear power: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and 
Fukushima Daiichi. All three have had a significant 
impact on nuclear risk management and public 
perceptions of the risks of nuclear energy. The 
lessons learned have been carefully identified and 
are incorporated worldwide. They have contributed 
to a level of excellence in risk management in the 
nuclear field.
The root causes of nuclear accident have been 
found to be cultural and institutional.90 A follow-up 
of the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) 
emphasizes that “to achieve high levels of safety 
in all circumstances and against all challenges, 
the nuclear safety system in its entirety must be 
robust.”91 It identified three stakeholder groups 
to be engaged in building a robust and effective 
nuclear safety system:
In its recommendations for the protection of 
people from exposure to radiation, the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection empha-
sizes the effectiveness of directly involving the 
affected population and local professionals in the 
management of post-accident situations, and the 
responsibility of authorities at national and local 
levels to create conditions and provide means 
favouring the involvement and empowerment of the 
population in the aftermath of a radiological event. 
Lessons learned from accident recovery manage-
ment include the following:
For all types of hazards, societal understanding and 
acceptance of risk depend on scientific knowledge 
• Regulator – responsible for independent safety 
oversight
• Industry – including the licensee who holds the 
prime responsibility for safety of nuclear power 
plant
• Stakeholders – primarily members of the public.
• Trust needs to be built before accidents occur 
• A flexible regulatory framework is needed to 
best address the accident conditions that occur
• Medical community networks should be 
identified around known hazardous installa-
tions, and relevant plain-language radiological 
information should be ready to send so that 
they can address affected stakeholder concerns
• Governmental  decisions should actively 
reflect that stakeholder concerns have been 
considered
• Expert resources needed to address affected 
stakeholder concerns can be extensive, and 
should be planned in an all-hazards framework
• Personal dosimetry and area monitoring 
equipment should be available
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and evaluations, and also on perceptions of risk 
and benefit. Radiological hazards are among the 
most studied risks in modern society. While the risk 
of death from exposure to the annual public dose 
limit (1 mSv) is small – approximately 0.00005% – 
and certainly much lower than other cancer risks 
(e.g. age, alcohol, diet, obesity, immunosuppres-
sion, sunlight, tobacco and asbestos), evidence 
for any effects on individuals at low doses is still 
very limited. This inability to satisfactorily describe 
effects at the exposure levels commonly encoun-
tered in most exposure situations can lead to 
misunderstanding, mischaracterization of the risk 
and disproportionate responses.
The radiation protection and nuclear community 
has continued to encounter difficulties in effectively 
communicating risk and uncertainty – whether 
in respect of siting new nuclear plants or waste 
disposal facilities, selecting endpoints for decom-
missioning or legacy-management operations, or 
managing emergency or post-accident recovery 
operations. However, awareness of the negative 
effects on health has evolved over the last decade, 
leading to the development of new approaches to 
radiation risk communication.
3.1.8  
Chemical/industrial
Industrial production is a central characteristic of 
the modern world economy. Industry creates jobs 
and provides a wide range of essential materials, 
products and services. However, authorities, in 
cooperation with industry, must ensure that indus-
trial facilities producing, handling or storing hazard-
ous substances such as tailings management 
facilities (TMFs), pipelines, oil terminals and chemi-
cal installations are safely located and operated, as 
accidents can have far-reaching and severe effects 
on people, environments and economies. 
Industrial hazards originate from technological or 
industrial conditions, dangerous procedures, infra-
structure failures or specific human activities.92 
These include toxic releases, explosions, fires and 
chemical spills into the air, adjacent water courses 
and land. In many countries, industrial hazards are 
exacerbated by ageing, abandoned or idle installa-
tions. These problems are amplified by insufficient 
institutional and legal capacities to deal with techno-
logical risk reduction. Natural hazards – for example, 
storms, landslides, floods or earthquakes – can also 
cause industrial accidents by triggering the release 
of hazardous substances from industrial facilities 
that are located within their path of destruction (see 
section 3.1.9). The impact associated with industrial 
accidents relate to loss of life, injury, or destruction 
or damage of assets that could occur to a system, 
society or a community.93 Effective management 
of risks requires cooperation within and across 
systems, sectors, countries and scales. 
Most industrial accidents entail the release of 
hazardous substances into water bodies with grave 
impacts on water resources, threatening the avail-
ability of safe water for drinking, household use and 
agriculture, as well as human safety.
90  (IAEA 2015); (IAEA 2017) 
91  (IAEA 2017) 
92  (United Nations General Assembly 2016b)
93  (United Nations General Assembly 2016b)
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For many decades, the issue of industrial accident 
prevention, preparedness and response has been 
of concern to governments, as well as industry. 
In the mid-1980s, the issue took on a new level of 
urgency and political importance in response to the 
Bhopal accident in India, which resulted in more 
than 15,000 deaths and more than 100,000 people 
affected. While regulation and new standards have 
driven significant progress in industrial safety in 
the past 40 years, major accidents still occur as 
countries face new challenges and emerging risks. 
In recent years, extreme weather-related events trig-
gered industrial accidents with severe environmen-
tal and economic consequences, such as Hurricane 
Harvey in the United States of America.
A multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral approach to 
addressing industrial accident risk is required. The 
Sendai Framework promotes this across its four 
priorities in the systems-based approaches to risk 
management. 
This section explores the trends in industrial risks 
and the underlying drivers of these risks (identify-
ing the casual factors). It examines how progress in 
managing risks is measured, introduces industrial 
accident risk reduction approaches, and explores 
challenges and opportunities for effective risk 
management in the future. 
Trends in industrial hazards and risks
Industrial accident risk is highly dependent on the 
activity of the site, the processes it operates and 
the types of dangerous substances it uses. There 
are hundreds of processes in oil and gas or chemi-
cals processing industries. They may be present in 
land-based facilities (also known as “fixed facilities” 
such as chemical establishments, oil terminals and 
TMFs), pipelines, transport by rail, road and water, 
and offshore oil exploration platforms. Explosives 
industries, involving manufacture and/ or storage of 
explosives, fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles, 
are also prominent sources of industrial accident 
risk. Widespread use of dangerous substances, such 
as cyanide and arsenic, in metals processing means 
that the mining industry also represents a high risk.
In addition, numerous other industries can be 
sources of industrial risk. Sometimes known as 
“downstream users”, these include industries such 
as food production, power plants and metal plating; 
these use dangerous substances in large quantities 
for refrigeration, fuel, metal treatment and various 
other specialized uses. The latter are particularly 
challenging in risk management because aware-
ness about these materials may be lower than in 
those industries whose core business involves 
exploitation, manufacture, storage or handling of 
highly regulated substances.
Figure 3.14 shows information in media reports 
worldwide on chemical accidents over a one-year 
period, demonstrating that hundreds of people die 
every year and at higher rates in some areas of 
the world than others. Media reporting does not 
represent a complete picture of all incidents that 
have occurred, but it does tend to be consistent 
and reasonably reliable when citing major impacts, 
especially for deaths, injuries, evacuations and 
environmental contamination. Of these incidents, 
12% (77) involved at least one death, 25% (163) 
involved death and/or injury, and evacuations and 
Figure 3.13. Distribution of high hazard, fixed facility sites 
(Seveso Directive) in EU and European Economic Area coun-
tries in 2014
(Source: Wood and Fabbri 2019) 
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environmental impacts were involved in an addi-
tional 4% (26) of cases. 
There is limited data collected for assessing the 
status of industrial accident risk globally. There 
are some sources of data on industrial accidents 
in government and industry that can be used to 
quantify the frequency and severity of some types 
of events, but they fall short of providing a complete 
perspective that covers all accidents occurring in 
industry and commerce globally. Systematic identi-
fication and recording of causal trends and impacts 
is largely driven by government requirements (this 
excludes “incident notification” databases) and 
industry initiatives, so that existing data is frag-
mented and disjointed in nature.94 
While industrial accidents are deterministic events 
that cannot be fully evaluated with a simple measure 
of counting the occurrences or trends of a particular 
scale, an industrial accident is still clear evidence 
of a failure to control risk. Past accidents can also 
provide diagnostic information, particularly if some 
accidents have common features (e.g. location, or 
type of industry, equipment, substance or cause).
Major accidents are generally rarer events. The 
average frequency of events in any one country 
across a period of even 10 years will tend to be 
extremely low, especially in small countries and 
those with a low level of industrialization. However, 
many emerging economies have experienced rapid 
growth in hazardous operations from expansion of 
particular segments of oil and gas, chemical and 
petrochemical and mining industries, driven by a 
combination of factors including increased demand 
in emerging economies, access to raw materials 
and the need to lower production costs, facilitated 
by a decline in trade barriers and government incen-
tives to attract foreign investors. 
Tailings management facilities
The consequences of failure in the design, construc-
tion, operation or management of TMFs – essentially 
large dams storing chemical waste at oil terminals 
and mining facilities – can release contained hazard-
ous waste products that pose grave risks to human 
health, infrastructure and environmental resources. 
No publicly accessible inventory of TMFs or data 
on the global volume of stored tailings exists. 
Howev er, the scale of accidents of this nature can 
94  (Wood and Fabbri 2019)
Figure 3.14. Chemical incidents in the media by continent, 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017 
(Source: Wood and Fabbri 2019)
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be seen in recent disasters. The Mount Polley spill 
in Canada in 2014 and the Bento Rodrigues acci-
dent in Brazil in 2015 each released more than 25 
million m3 of hazardous substances, which, when 
combined, represent the volume of 20,000 Olympic 
swimming pools.95
The collapse of two TMFs of an iron ore mine 
located in Bento Rodrigues, Brazil, resulted in 
one of the worst human and environmental 
disasters in Brazil’s history. Some 40 million 
m3 of waste laden with heavy metals flooded 
villages downstream, causing 19 deaths and 
contamination of the Doce River basin, with 
huge damage to biodiversity and drinking 
water supplies. The toxic slick flowed 650 km 
down river, contaminating 2,200 ha of land and 
affecting about 40 municipalities. The disas-
ter revealed critical gaps in regulation, moni-
toring, enforcement, information flow, early 
warning, response and coordination mecha-
nisms between the operator and authorities 
at all scales. Three years later, remediation 
measures had still not been effectively imple-
mented, and affected populations continued to 
endure the environmental and socioeconomic 
repercussions of the failure. At the time of 
writing, Brazilian state prosecutors are bring-
ing a case against the mine and dam opera-
tors, alleging that as early as 2011, the board 
was apprised of seepage in the dam, advised to 
consider suspending operations, relocating the 
town of Bento Rodrigues and installing early 
warning sirens, but had failed to act. 
In early January 2019, another dam failure in 
Brumadinho, Brazil, collapsed, causing the 
Box 3.4. Bento Rodrigues TMF accident, Brazil, 2015 and Brumadinho, Brazil, 2019
Debris and damage at a school in Bento Rodrigues, Brazil from the upstream dam failure 
(Source: Rogério Alves/TV Senado 2017)
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death of 186 people and a further 122 missing. 
The TMF in Brumadinho, owned by one of the 
two parent companies who owned the Bento 
Rodrigues dam released 12 million m3 of 
tailings. The spilled chemicals have been incor-
porated into river soil and affect the region’s 
ecosystem permanently. 
95  (Roche, Thygesen and Baker 2017)
96  (Roche, Thygesen and Baker 2017)
Box 3.5. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) accidents in Ghana
Figure 3.15. Fatalities in Ghana related to LPG accidents since 2007
In October 2017, seven people were killed at 
an LPG distribution point, taking the number 
of deaths from LPG accidents at industrial and 
commercial sites in Ghana to 286 since 2007. 
An analysis of TMF failures worldwide over the last 
decade indicates that while the overall number of 
failures has decreased, the number of serious fail-
ures has increased.96 Despite the many advances 
in the mining sector, TMF failures still occur. In the 
past six years, there have been eight major TMF 
failures in Brazil (three times), Canada, China, Israel, 
Mexico and the United States of America. Identifying 
TMFs and their hazard potential (including the risk of 
failure) is important to target intervention measures 
and adjust the legal and policy framework.
(Source:UNDRR with data from Citimfonline 2016)
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Box 3.6. Daugava pipeline spill in Belarus, 2007
The rupture, due to ageing infrastructure, 
of a pipeline on 23 March 2007 in Belarus 
resulted in a spill of approximately 120 
tonnes of diesel fuel into the Ulla River, a 
tributary of the Daugava River. The slick 
extended over 100 km downstream through 
Daugavpils and Riga to reach the Gulf of Riga 
in the Baltic Sea. Long-term damage from 
the spill was averted by coordinated inter-
national emergency action and coordinated 
assessment methodology (Bonn Agreement 
Oil Appearance Code) applied by Belarus-
sian and Latvian experts, which resulted in 
payments by the company commensurate to 
assessed environmental damage.
Figure 3.16. Path of the spill in the Ulla River
(Source:UNDRR 2019) 
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorse-
ment or acceptance by the United Nations
Petrochemical facilities
Petrochemical plants, oil terminals and wells store 
and process large amounts of hazardous substances. 
In the event of improper design, construction, 
management, operation or maintenance, this can 
provoke uncontrolled spills, fires and explosions, 
with potentially catastrophic consequences in terms 
of loss of life or environmental damage. The effec-
tive and safe extraction, storage and distribution of 
oil products present technical and environmental 
challenges, while remaining essential for economic 
activity. As each facility is unique, a tailor-made and 
comprehensive approach is needed to ensure that 
these facilities are operated in a safe, environmen-
tally sound and economic manner.
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On 11 December 2005, overfilling of a petro-
leum storage tank at a fuel storage depot led 
to several explosions and a fire that burned for 
five days, with no loss of life and relatively few 
injuries. It caused the evacuation of approxi-
mately 2,000 people, destroyed 20 homes and 
caused damage to 60 businesses, incurring an 
estimated total cost of over 750 million euros. 
Pollutants contaminated soil and groundwa-
ter and toxic plume dispersed over southern 
England to northern coastal regions of France 
and Spain. The Major Incident Investigation 
Board established in the aftermath provided 
recommendations for industry, regulators 
and the emergency services related to safety 
and environmental standards for fuel storage 
terminals and emergency response measures. 
Following the accident, inspections were also 
conducted inside fuel storage terminals in 
France and other European countries.
Box 3.7. Buncefield accident, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2005
While data on industrial accidents is often insuf-
ficient to assess the full range of potential 
impacts and is difficult to quantify in any stan-
dardized manner, it does exist. Table 3.2 explores 
the strengths and limitations of various impact 
Toxic plume emanating from the explosion at the Buncefield fuel storage depot, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, 2005  
(Source: Flickr.com user Ken Douglas 2005)
data available in public databases of chemical 
incidents.
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Table 3.2. Strengths and limitations of different sources of impact data to measure industrial risk
(Source: Wood and Fabbri 2019)
Complex nature of industrial accident risk and 
risk management processes
The heterogeneous nature of chemicals, the infinite 
ways in which chemical engineering transforms 
chemicals into products, and the vast infrastructure 
of road, pipelines, ships and railways, facilitating 
product distribution, are intrinsic to the challenge 
of assessing global industrial accident risk and 
predicting the next catastrophe. The likelihood of 
an incident occurring depends significantly on how 
well the risks are managed (the safety management 
system) and by decisions of the organization(s) 
that affect the functional effectiveness of the safety 
management system.97
At all types of industrial facilities, continuous efforts 
by experts and authorities, on site and off site, are 
required to avoid accidents. The safety of industrial 
facilities and the effectiveness of risk management 
is contingent on the quality and implementation of 
planning, analysis, design, construction, operational 
diligence, monitoring and regulatory actions at 
every level. 
With the advent of the Sendai Framework has come 
a suite of regulation process and initiatives. Govern-
ment and industry seeking to understand industrial 
accident risk began data collection and analysis 
in the 1980s, and by the 1990s, collected data on 
accidents and near misses was widely accepted as 
inputs to understand and correct weaknesses in the 
risk control system. 
The primary purpose of the databases that ensued 
was to foster learning from accidents, but many 
of the databases were not publicly accessible. By 
contrast, collecting data to assess performance 
in controlling industrial accident risk is driven by 
lessons learned from disasters as well as contem-
porary developments in national and international 
law that unequivocally assign responsibility for 
chemical accident risk reduction to site operators.
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can be generalized in regard to a specific industry 
or geographic location. 
The nature of industrial accidents however poses 
significant challenges to measuring progress in 
reducing this type of risk, as shown in Box 3.8. 
Obtaining sufficient incident frequency and severity 
data to calculate chemical accident risk metrics is 
not practical. Chemical accident statistics measure 
only disastrous failures that became accidents; they 
cannot measure the disastrous failures that could 
happen but have not happened yet. 
Box 3.8. Industrial accident risk reduction is difficult to measure using accident data
The variables that influence the probability of a 
chemical accident are unstable so that the risk 
figure associated with any one hazard source is 
surrounded by uncertainty and can change dramati-
cally in a short period of time. For every chemical 
process, there are some conditions that must be 
maintained to prevent a release. Any modification 
in those conditions changes the risk. Some leading 
industries and authorities have developed diagnos-
tic tools that can suggest elevated risks for specific 
types of activities and geographic regions. A rela-
tively new practice, the use of safety performance 
indicators to diagnose potential risk, may eventually 
be an option for industry-wide self-assessment or 
for inspection authorities to assess risks across 
specific types of sites and problem areas.98  
Methods have also been developed by government 
and international organizations to measure the 
strength of management systems in industry or 
government for controlling industrial accident risk. 
However, measuring performance in reducing acci-
dent risk is complicated. The use of frequency and 
severity of past accident as a risk measure is not 
a solution for global assessment of industrial acci-
dent risk. National governments require more infor-
mation to understand their industrial risk and target 
their interventions to reduce them.
97  (Wood and Fabbri 2019)
98  (Wood and Fabbri 2019)
Frequency and severity of past accidents can 
provide no indication as to where the next accident 
could occur and how severe it might be. For this 
reason, additional data and analysis are necessary 
to provide insight on causal trends, typical failure 
mechanisms and other signs of elevated risk, to 
guide strategies that can help reduce accidents 
occurring in future. This type of information gener-
ally includes causal patterns emerging from past 
accidents and near misses, evidence of the pres-
ence of potential accident precursors, and other 
circumstantial data about a particular site, or that 
• Industrial accident risk is not a stable 
figure. Numerous variables that influence 
industrial accident risk make it more likely 
that actual risk levels fluctuate significantly 
over time.
• High-severity industrial accidents are 
low-frequency, high-probability events. 
Accident data can greatly underestimate 
actual risk.
• Industrial accident risk sources are distrib-
uted over many industries and geographic 
areas. It is challenging to have a complete 
picture.
• Data on industrial accident causality mainly 
belongs to companies. Data on what 
caused the accident is usually not in the 
hands of government. 
• Loss data obtained following an accident is 
due to many actors, and is difficult to col-
lect and quantify.
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Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents 
The Industrial Accidents Convention is a multilat-
eral legal instrument that supports countries in 
establishing and enhancing governance, policymak-
ing and transboundary cooperation on industrial 
accident prevention, preparedness and response. 
Developed initially for the European region follow-
ing the Sandoz accident in 1986, the approaches 
and experience offer insights to countries pursuing 
Sendai Framework commitments in technological 
risk management. 
The convention’s legal provisions, policy forum, 
guidelines and capacity-development activities 
support countries in preventing accidents from 
occurring, reducing their frequency and severity and 
mitigating their effects at the local, national and 
cross-border levels. The scope of the convention 
also applies to industrial accidents that are trig-
gered by the impacts of natural hazards. 
3.1.9  
NATECH 
Many of the goods and services upon which soci-
eties depend are provided by industrial activities. 
From refining, oil and gas production and transport, 
to nuclear power generation or the preparation 
of specialty chemicals, many of these activities 
have constructed inherent susceptibility to shocks, 
including those provoked by natural hazards.
Natural hazards have the potential to surpass safe-
guards, triggering negative impacts that may entail 
hazardous substance release, fire, explosion or 
indirect effects with wider repercussions than those 
felt in the immediate proximity. The cascading tech-
nological side effects of natural hazards are called 
NATECH accidents.99  
NATECH events are a recurring but often overlooked 
feature in many disaster situations. They can add 
significantly to the burden of a population already 
struggling to cope with the effects of the triggering 
There is activity seeking to enhance national and 
global assessment of industrial accident risk. Three 
main data sources are being cultivated to correlate 
causal factors and other information in association 
with specific hazard sources. 
Strengthening land-use planning policies 
Land-use planning is central to reducing industrial 
risk. Decisions on the siting of industrial facilities 
and the planning of surrounding land use are criti-
cal in protecting and minimizing the effects of acci-
dents on the surrounding populations, environment 
and property. The enhancement of land-use plan-
ning schemes and zoning mechanisms to enhance 
the level of safety and reduce risk to industrial 
facilities has been observed in several countries, 
primarily by: 
a. Incident data together with causal and failure 
trends drawn from analysis of near misses
b. Safety performance indicator programmes 
identifying safety-relevant weaknesses
c. Hazard ranking systems geared to forecast the 
likelihood that certain weaknesses are present
• Developing risk-informed land-use policies 
and plans and establishing land-use zoning 
schemes that set requirements on the use of 
land, siting and development proposals
• Updating land-use planning and industrial safety 
procedures to require formal consultations 
among the relevant authorities, experts and the 
public at an early stage in the planning process
• Ensuring that risk assessments and other 
industrial safety aspects are incorporated into 
decision-making procedures
• Creating tools to simplify the identification 
and communication of risk assessments to 
planners, decision makers and other experts for 
a common understanding of the risks
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natural event. NATECH event consequences 
can range from health impacts and environmen-
tal degradation (e.g. during the 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquake)100 to major economic losses at local 
or regional levels due to damage to assets and 
business interruption (e.g. due to the 2011 Thai 
floods).101 In some cases, ripple effects across 
sectors can reach global proportions, resulting in a 
shortage of raw materials and finished products (as 
was the case following the 2011 Great East Japan 
earthquake and tsunami)102 and price hikes (e.g. 
the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the 
offshore infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico).103
This section introduces the concept of NATECH 
risk and the challenges associated with its 
management, with particular emphasis on industrial 
facilities and critical infrastructure that process, 
store and transport hazardous substances. It pres-
ents the principal factors that influence the risk, and 
proposes proxies of how progress in NATECH risk 
reduction can be measured.
NATECH risks exist anywhere where hazardous 
industry and critical infrastructure are located in 
natural hazard-prone areas, which is the case in 
many parts of the world. While NATECH events can, 
in principle, be triggered by any natural hazard type, 
they are not contingent upon catastrophic events. 
Many NATECH events with major consequences 
have been triggered by natural hazards that were 
considered of minor importance, such as lightning, 
Figure 3.17. Hurricane Harvey caused several oil spills and chemical releases in Texas, 2017  
(Source: Union of Concerned Scientists 2019) 
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
99    (Krausmann, Cruz and Salzano 2017)
100  (Krausmann, Cruz and Affeltranger 2010)
101  (Aon Benfield Corporation and Impact Forecasting 2012)
102  (Fearnley et al. 2017)
103  (Pan and Karp 2005); (Grunewald 2005) 
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low temperature or rain.104 In the Baia Mare acci-
dent in Romania in 2000, heavy rain and unexpected 
levels of snowmelt coupled with design deficiencies 
led to the failure of a tailings dam, releasing large 
amounts of cyanide-laced wastewater into the river 
system, polluting some 2,000 km of the Danube 
River’s catchment area.105
No single registry of the location of industrial facili-
ties in natural hazard zones exists, nor are NATECH 
events systematically tracked over time. Hence 
there is no baseline available to compare risk 
trends. Few statistical analyses exploring NATECH 
trends exist. An analysis of NATECH events in the 
onshore hazardous liquid pipeline network of the 
United States of America for the period 1986–2012 
using the official database of the United States 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Adminis-
tration concluded that NATECH accidents experi-
enced increases in impact while the relative number 
of NATECH events remained stable and the abso-
lute number of pipeline accidents from all causes 
decreased.106
Where legal obligations for reporting incidents 
do not exist, relevant information is lost from the 
lesson-learning process. However, even where acci-
dent reporting is mandatory, it usually applies only to 
incidents where the impact exceeds a defined sever-
ity threshold. This is also seen in public records, 
where media rarely report on low-impact events and 
near misses are seldom captured. Underreporting 
is further exacerbated as the attribution of NATECH 
triggers to a natural hazard is often difficult. Natural 
hazard information is often absent in industrial acci-
dent databases; vice versa, information on NATECH 
events is often missing in disaster loss databases. 
Quantitative NATECH event trend analysis is there-
fore difficult, and proxies are needed for measuring 
progress in NATECH risk reduction. 
Radiation warning sign in Kashiwa, Japan, 2012 
(Source: Abasaa 2012)
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104  (Krausmann and Baranzini 2012)
105  (UNEP and OCHA 2000); (EC 2000)
106  (Girgin and Krausmann 2016)
107  (Hudec and Lukš 2004)
108  (Krausmann, Cruz and Salzano 2017)
109  (Krausmann, Girgin and Necci 2019)
110  (Krausmann, Cruz and Salzano 2017)
111  (Cruz, Kajitani and Tatano 2015)
The positive news is that awareness of NATECH 
risk and the need for management has increased 
over the past decade, not least due to some land-
mark events. In Europe for example, the overwhelm-
ing of protection barriers of a chemical facility in 
Czechia – that had been designed for floods with 
a 100-year return period – caused the release of 
chlorine and other hazardous substances into the 
River Elbe.107 This and other accidents prompted 
the EU to initiate action to combat NATECH events. 
The Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami and 
subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident 
in 2011 put NATECH risks on the global agenda. 
With growing industrialization (notably in emerg-
ing economies), rising vulnerability (e.g. due to 
community encroachment and often unplanned 
urban development), as well as changing hazard 
frequency and occurrence (including as a result of 
a changing climate), NATECH risk is expected to 
trend upwards.108
Drivers of NATECH risk
Different factors determine NATECH risk. Some are 
of a technical nature and linked with the character-
istics inherent to NATECH events; other underly-
ing causes are a consequence of risk governance 
challenges and socioeconomic context. The 
boundaries between these risk factors are often 
blurred with links between the various causes.109 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) frameworks have not 
fully addressed the issue of technological hazards 
in general, and NATECH hazards in particular, 
although they usually highlight it as an example of 
a cascading multi-hazard risk. Furthermore, instru-
ments for reducing technological risks, such as 
chemical accident prevention and preparedness 
programmes, often tend to overlook the specific 
drivers of NATECH events, leaving an important gap 
in managing this type of risk.110
NATECH risk is a multi-hazard risk that cuts across 
different domains and stakeholder communities 
that traditionally have not interacted much with 
each other (technological risk, natural risk, indus-
try, civil protection, etc.). For governing such a 
cascading risk, a paradigm change is required that 
acknowledges the diverse and interdisciplinary 
nature of the risk and the challenges associated 
with it. What is also crucial is a departure from the 
“act of God” mentality, which has often kept stake-
holders from taking responsibility for NATECH risks 
and protecting against them. While in the past, 
this mindset may have been partly justified by the 
unavailability of reliable natural hazard forecast-
ing, lack of knowledge no longer justifies inac-
tion thanks to readily available modern prediction 
systems for many triggering natural hazards.
The risk management of an industrial installation 
cannot be viewed in isolation from its surroundings, 
but should take account of potential interactions 
with other industry, lifelines and nearby communi-
ties to capture the potential for cascading events. 
Since natural hazards often affect large areas, this 
is even more relevant for NATECH risks. A systemic 
view is required for the effective management of 
NATECH risks, requiring a territorial approach to risk 
governance and incorporating physical (e.g. indus-
trial facilities, lifelines and building stock), organiza-
tional and socioeconomic factors into the analysis 
of natural hazard risks.111  In some regions, rules for 
land-use planning around high-risk chemical facili-
ties aim to ensure the protection of the surrounding 
communities by compelling risk management anal-
ysis to consider domino effects on nearby industrial 
installations.
While NATECH accidents in non-nuclear industrial 
activities have been happening regularly, it was 
only after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster that the 
public truly started to take notice of the potential 
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magnitude of the consequences. Following the 
sudden media visibility and public interest, regula-
tors stress-tested nuclear power plants around 
the world, updated nuclear emergency-response 
plans, and research programmes were launched in 
many countries to improve NATECH risk manage-
ment. This is an example of how the risk perception 
and risk tolerance of society can shape decisions 
on protection against safety risks. However, risk 
perception is highly subjective, and overreactions 
can lead to unsustainable responses. For instance, 
a recent study showed how the perceived NATECH 
risk in the EU from high winds and earthquakes as 
compared to the natural hazards that triggered a 
NATECH accident was overemphasized, while the 
risk of accidents due to lightning and low tempera-
ture was significantly underestimated.112
Instruments for NATECH risk management 
Mechanisms for the management of NATECH risks 
can take different shapes, ranging from legal frame-
works, research programmes and development 
of risk assessment tools to capacity-building and 
other initiatives, all with the aim to better identify 
and control the risk. 
Following several major NATECH accidents, and 
with climate change raising the profile of the risk, 
several countries have taken measures to enhance 
risk control. In the EU, major chemical accident 
risks are regulated by the provisions of the Seveso 
Directive on the control of major-accident hazards, 
and its amendments.113 The directive requires strin-
gent safety measures to be implemented to prevent 
major accidents from occurring, and in case they 
cannot be prevented, to effectively mitigate their 
consequences for human health and the environ-
ment. From a NATECH perspective, the Seveso 
Directive is the most important legal act at EU level. 
Thirty years after its inception, it now explicitly 
requires that environmental hazards, such as floods 
and earthquakes, be routinely identified and evalu-
ated in an industrial establishment’s safety docu-
ment. There are other legal instruments in the EU 
that indirectly address NATECH risks (e.g. the Water 
Framework Directive or the Floods Directive), as 
well as the Union Civil Protection Mechanism with 
a requirement for EU member states to prepare a 
national disaster risk assessment.114
In the global arena, several international bodies 
have picked up on NATECH risk management. For 
example, recognizing the potential for severe health 
impacts, WHO has recently issued information for 
public health authorities in the wake of chemical 
releases caused by natural events.115 The document 
focuses on earthquakes, floods and cyclones and 
aims to provide brief information to planners in the 
health sector and to public health authorities who 
wish to learn more about chemical releases result-
ing from natural events. In support of implementing 
the Sendai Framework,UNDRR has gathered a team 
of experts who prepared Words into Action Guide-
lines for National Disaster Risk Assessment and for 
Man-made/Technological Hazards, which contain 
chapters that discuss actions and guidance for 
NATECH risk reduction.116 OECD issued a NATECH 
Addendum to its Guiding Principles on Chemical 
Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response, 
to provide guidance to all stakeholders on how to 
better manage NATECH risk.117
Research initiatives aim to better understand 
NATECH risk from a scientific perspective and to 
develop the much-needed methodologies and tools 
to assess and control the risk. For example, follow-
ing calls by governments, the European Commis-
sion (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC) developed 
the Rapid NATECH Assessment Tool system, 
which helps industry and authorities to identify and 
reduce NATECH risks by supporting the detection of 
NATECH risk hot spots.118 It supports land-use and 
emergency planning, rapid NATECH damage and 
consequence assessment to inform emergency-
response decisions before dispatching rescue 
teams or issuing public alerts. The current version 
of the system analyses and maps earthquake and 
flood-triggered NATECH risks for fixed chemical 
installations and onshore pipeline networks, and is 
available at http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu. 
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Measuring progress in NATECH risk reduction
Traditionally, it is very difficult to measure prog-
ress in reducing NATECH (and technological) risks. 
There are no universal performance measures, 
and there is no reliable point of reference that can 
be used for comparison. To provide a measure 
of progress, qualitative indicators can be used as 
proxies for the status of NATECH risk reduction. 
The nature, complexity and scale of such indica-
tors can vary (e.g. at facility, community or national 
levels), and they may differ across countries and 
implemented legislative regimes, and according 
to country priorities. For example, indicators for 
112  (Krausmann and Baranzini 2012)
113  (EU 2012) 
114  (Girgin, Necci and Krausmann 2019)
115  (WHO 2018a)
116  (UNISDR 2018e)
117  (OECD 2003b); (OECD 2015)
118  (Girgin and Krausmann 2012)
Table.3.3. Examples of qualitative criteria for measuring NATECH risk reduction in a country
(Source: Krausmann, Girgin and Necci 2019)
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countries in which legal frameworks cover NATECH 
risk might differ from those used where no such 
instruments exist. Some indicators might be 
considered more appropriate than others depend-
ing on the scope of the analysis. Similarly, some 
indicators may address only government resources 
and systems, while others evaluate industry infra-
structure and competence, or social norms and risk 
perception.119 
Proxies for measuring progress in NATECH risk 
reduction should relate to human, financial and 
physical resources, as well as the legal and admin-
istrative infrastructure in a country. Table 3.3 gives 
examples of qualitative performance indicators on 
a four-level scale, which assumes as a minimum 
level the complete absence of tools for reduc-
ing NATECH risk. The choice of these indicators 
is based on expert judgment and assumes that 
basic information on technological and natural 
hazards already exists (e.g. industrial facility regis-
ters including type of activity, type and amount of 
hazardous substances present, industry location; 
and natural hazard information including maps). 
The indicators proposed are markers that can 
consist of one or more subindices. For example, 
the indicator on a legal framework for the control 
of NATECH accident risk can include subindicators 
such as land-use planning, safety cases and emer-
gency planning. 
Work is under way to develop a method for the 
compilation of the individual indicators into a 
composite indicator that reflects the many dimen-
sions of the measured risk. This also includes 
weighting of the single indicators according to 
their importance for reducing NATECH risks. In 
the absence of such a composite indicator, indi-
vidual performance measures from Table 3.3 can 
be compared separately or all measures can be 
visualized by using radar charts as in Figure 3.19, 
comparing two hypothetical country examples with 
low and high levels of NATECH risk measures.
Figure 3.18. Example visualization of comparative NATECH risk reduction measures proposed in Table 3.3 for two hypotheti-
cal countries
(Source: Krausmann, Girgin and Necci 2019)
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121  (IPBES 2018)
122  (Rockström et al. 2009)
123  (Schippmann 2006)
124  (European Environment Agency 2013)
119  (Baranzini et al. 2018)
120  (IPBES 2018); (United Nations 2017); (IPCC et al. 2018); 
(OECD and OCDE 2018); (FAO 2018); (International Resource 
Panel 2017)
3.1.10 
Environmental 
Evidence from the latest intergovernmental and 
global assessments shows that the planet is 
overheating and becoming increasingly densely 
populated. Climate change, food insecurity, rapid 
urbanization and growing levels of pollution are 
damaging human and ecosystem health. Growing 
inequalities in wealth and access to technology and 
resources are leading to malnutrition, conflicts and 
the displacement of millions of people.120
Understanding of environmental hazards and 
associated risks and distributional impacts 
caused by these pressures has been enhanced 
through the assessments of various key interna-
tional scientific bodies.121 The concept of inter-
linkages among environmental risks lies at the 
heart of the concept of planetary boundaries and 
dynamic systems. Four out of the nine planetary 
boundaries (climate change, loss of biosphere 
integrity, land-system change, altered biogeo-
chemical cycles (phosphorus and nitrogen)) have 
now been crossed.122 Fifteen out of 24 catego-
ries of ecosystem services are in decline due to 
overuse of resources. The spread of zoonoses 
and invasive alien species is being exacerbated 
by climate change and global trade, and is already 
posing direct threats to native and endemic 
species and ecosystem functioning. Overharvest-
ing, land-use change, unsustainable use of – and 
lack of fair access to – genetic resources, and 
climate change are key drivers of the decline 
in wild plant resources, including those used 
commercially for food and medicinal purposes. 
Approximately 15,000 species or 21% of global 
medicinal plant species are now endangered due 
to overharvesting and habitat loss.123
Intense heat-waves, wildfires and storms occurred 
in 2018. The 20 warmest years on record have all 
occurred in the last 22 years. Meanwhile, GHG emis-
sions keep rising (another 2.7% increase in 2018) 
and extreme weather-related events continue to 
spread and intensify globally.
By 2050, the median projected population is 
expected to rise to 10 billion, and to grow to nearly 
12 billion by 2100. These figures are based on 
current declines in infant mortality coupled with 
female education, improvements in health care 
and increases in life expectancy. When linked with 
rising levels of consumption, the pressures on 
global resources will be greater than at any other 
time in human history, creating competition for 
resources and overstretching the planet’s regenera-
tive capacity.
To fully understand the nature of environmental 
risks, it is important to understand their sources. 
This means understanding the dynamics of the 
hazards themselves, the exposure of human popu-
lations and ecosystems to these hazards, the 
vulnerability of the affected people and ecosystems 
and their resilience to change.124 This section exam-
ines some of the principal threats that we face, now 
and in the future, emerging from a combination of 
natural and anthropogenic factors. 
These must be considered when determining how 
best to deliver frameworks and intergovernmen-
tal agreements such as the 2030 Agenda, the 
Sendai Framework, the Paris Agreement and NUA 
in a coherent way. In adopting the Sendai Frame-
work, Member States identified as prerequisite 
the need to understand the dynamic interactions 
among economic, ecological, social, political, 
health and infrastructure systems when consider-
ing risk-informed decision-making across sectors, 
geographies and scales. In so doing, the Sendai 
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Framework provides the frame for the application 
of systems-based approaches in pursuing the goals 
and targets of other 2015 agendas.
Given the intensification of many environmental 
hazards and their complex interactions, risk reduc-
tion strategies and risk informed decision-making 
cannot afford to ignore the integrated, multiscalar, 
multiplier effects of environmental hazards.
Climate change
Climate change is a hazard and threat multiplier. 
It is an aggressive driver of environmental change, 
affecting human and ecosystem health, and chang-
ing the complex interrelationships among living 
organisms and ecosystems. Climate change is 
having a detrimental effect on the environmental 
and social determinants of health, from the avail-
ability of clean air and water, to heat shocks, food 
security and shelter, and has the potential for wide-
ranging systemic impacts on food availability and 
large-scale disasters. In this century, it has been 
identified as the defining issue for public health125 
and also the biggest global health threat.126
 
Ongoing increases in GHG emissions have put the 
world on an extended warming trajectory. Without 
rapid decarbonization,127 this will lead to further 
sea-level rise, ocean warming and acidification, and 
more extreme weather that will amplify existing and 
emerging risks, such as the spread of zoonoses 
and infectious diseases, especially for the poor and 
vulnerable. Cautious estimates from WHO under 
a medium-high emissions scenario indicate that 
250,000 additional deaths could potentially occur 
each year between 2030 and 2050 because of 
climate change.128
Air quality and pollution
As one of the most significant environmental 
hazards after climate change, air pollution contrib-
utes to the global burden of disease (GBD) through 
atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions 
and their precursors, particulate matter, heavy 
metals, ozone and associated heat-waves, leading 
to approximately 7 million premature deaths and 
economic losses of $5 trillion annually.129 The most 
susceptible are the elderly, children and poor, with 
air pollution exposure highest for urban residents 
compared with rural communities.
Transboundary flows of air pollution are also a 
matter of serious concern, hindering countries as 
they attempt to meet their own goals on ambient 
environmental quality and public health. Studies 
suggest that the sum of the health impacts of 
transported pollution in foreign nations downwind 
of a source can sometimes be larger than the 
health impacts of emissions in the source region.130 
Making matters more complicated, reducing some 
air pollutants (e.g. sulfates), which would be in line 
with air quality remediation guidelines, is likely to 
reduce cloud cover and increase incoming solar 
radiation, leading to further global warming.
Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and 
other long‐lived GHGs continue to increase. This is 
driven primarily by fossil fuel energy, industry, trans-
portation, land-use change and deforestation, and 
making significant, adverse, irreversible changes in 
climate and sea levels inevitable. Decreasing emis-
sions of short‐lived climate pollutants such as black 
carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone and hydro-
fluorocarbons, can help to limit warming in the near 
term, but are no substitutes for mitigating long‐lived 
GHGs. 
Some of these biodiversity-related environmental 
hazards and associated risks are being addressed 
through multilateral environmental agreements 
and their protocols (e.g. United Nations Conven-
tions on Biological Diversity, Climate Change and 
Combating Desertification). However, the complex-
ity of the feedbacks and dynamics of ecosystems 
and biodiversity means that safeguarding species 
and ecosystems requires more than conservation 
and protection of natural habitats. It also requires 
risk-based decision-making to be represented in 
sectoral policies and agreements such as in agricul-
ture, fisheries and forestry.
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Land
Agriculture is the single, largest use of land, 
accounting for more than one third of the world’s 
land surface, excluding Antarctica and Greenland. 
Deep tilling, and overuse of pesticides, fertilizers and 
antibiotics in agriculture, has led to significant levels 
of soil erosion, pollution of surface waters and the 
spread of AMR, with very real risks to human and 
wildlife health.131 Rising global temperatures and 
changing rainfall patterns are having a detrimental 
effect on crop yields, especially in tropical regions, 
where the effects of higher temperatures are greater 
than in temperate zones. As the growing seasons 
change, yield growth has also slowed down. Shifting 
rainfall patterns and greater variability in precipita-
tion poses a risk to the 70% of global agriculture 
that is rain-fed.132 It is estimated that over 1.3 billion 
people are now trapped on degrading agricultural 
land.133 Farmers and pastoralists on marginal lands, 
especially in semi-arid and dryland areas, have 
limited options for alternative livelihoods. 
The environmental impact of industrialized farming 
practices cost the environment $3 trillion per year,134 
and contributes up to one third of global GHG emis-
sions.135 Livestock takes up 75% of agricultural 
land for feed production, pasture and grazing, yet 
it only generates 16% of dietary energy and 32% of 
dietary protein demands.136 Approximately one third 
of global edible food is being lost or wasted before 
getting to market.137
Deforestation is creating a wide range of impacts 
in the biophysical world, from feedbacks to the 
climate system itself, loss of biodiversity and soil 
erosion. It is leading to a significant reduction in the 
resilience of local communities. 
Coasts and oceans
The marine environment provides multiple ecosys-
tem services, and is therefore key to any consider-
ation of environmental hazards, climate regulation, 
resource extraction and food production. Storms 
and ocean weather events are the most prominent 
of the environmental hazards, but there is also 
ocean warming and acidification, and waste and 
chemicals pollution. The degradation of coastal 
zones and watersheds exacerbates the effects of 
natural hazards such as floods and storms, while 
land degradation severely exacerbates the effects 
of drought and causes an increase in flash floods.138
The cumulative pressures and multiple stress-
ors on the marine environment are affecting the 
health of oceans and their ability to support human 
populations. The major risks come from the high 
dependency of humans on the oceans for food 
and livelihoods. More than 3 billion people rely on 
the marine environment for 20% of their dietary 
protein.139 The annual value of fisheries and aqua-
culture is more than $250 billion, and up to 120 
million people rely on the sea for their livelihood.140 
But overfishing, illegal and unregulated fishing, 
and damaging fishing practices are placing many 
fish stocks at risk. Marine pollution, litter and plas-
tics expose marine ecosystems and marine life 
to a wide array of chemicals, including microplas-
tics, and heavy metals, which are accumulated 
throughout the marine trophic food chains leading 
to human exposures when they eat marine food 
species. Approximately 8 tonnes of plastics enter 
the oceans from land-based sources annually.141 
The hazards from eating contaminated marine 
sources of food have been well documented and do 
not yet have a simple mitigation solution.
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Ocean warming and acidification have stressed 
some mar ine  ecosystems to  the  po int  of 
collapse.142 Chronic bleaching has led to the death 
of many tropical coral reefs, to a point where they 
will not have sufficient time to recover between 
bleaching events that occur every 6 to 10 years.143 
Ocean acidification is also becoming a significant 
environmental hazard, affecting plankton popula-
tions in various oceans, causing unpredictable 
and potentially irreversible losses across the wider 
marine ecosystem.
Waste and chemical pollution
It is estimated that poor environmental conditions 
are the cause of about 25% of GBD and mortality.144 
Environmental hazards arising from inadequate 
waste management, including food waste, elec-
tronic waste and plastics, is a global concern. Many 
countries still face basic waste management chal-
lenges with uncontrolled dumping, open burning 
and inadequate access to waste services. Globally, 
two out of five people lack access to controlled 
waste disposal facilities.145 Synthetic chemicals and 
toxic compounds eventually leak into lakes, rivers, 
wetlands, groundwater, oceans and other receiv-
ing water systems, as well as aerosolizing into the 
atmosphere.146  
Emerging chemical hazards include: (a) endocrine 
disruption, which is likely to have a multigenera-
tional effect on human and wildlife health, (b) anti-
biotic resistance, which will create a new family of 
hazards within public health systems and (c) bioac-
cumulation of chemicals in the tissues of crops and 
livestock. 
Poisoned chalice: toxic crops 
Over 80 important plant species and crops are 
known to cause poisoning when environmental 
conditions trigger nitrate accumulation at the plant 
cellular level. Droughts are exacerbating this in key 
staple crops such as the pea because they trigger a 
defence mechanism at the cellular level, which has 
the side effect of producing prussic acid and other 
toxins. Even after a drought, the growth in water-
stressed crops can result in accumulation of these 
toxins, making some plants poisonous to humans 
and livestock. Over 100,000 people suffered paraly-
sis caused by oxalyldiaminopropionic acid147 accu-
mulation due to water stress in certain legumes 
during the drought in Ethiopia in 1995–1997.148
There are some interesting innovations in the 
environmental policy space, where it is not uncom-
mon to see efficacy dividends from the integra-
tion of different policies. Policy developments in 
water resources management, and specifically 
drought and flood risk management, are increas-
ingly situated at the nexus of water, food, energy, 
climate change and human health. Blending policy 
approaches allows decision makers to extend 
beyond technical fixes and adopt truly multisectoral 
risk management approaches to transdisciplinary 
challenges. 
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3.2  
Exposure
In past GARs, the production of the Global Risk 
Model and standard risk metrics (AAL, PML and 
hybrid loss exceedance curves) relied on a global 
data set of standardized and homogeneous expo-
sure data. Due to the heterogeneity of national 
reporting and the availability of data, model-based 
exposure calculations relied on an understand-
ing of the constructed environment and used data 
from satellite observations. These satellite-based 
exposure layers were often validated locally through 
ground truthing. A team of on-the-ground analysts 
would visit a satellite-modelled site and verify if 
the model layer accurately depicted the extent 
of construction, building use, construction type, 
density, floors, materials, etc. The advantage of 
this approach was that the loss and replacement 
value of construction materials is relatively easy to 
describe country by country, even considering local 
market variability. A second advantage was that 
the use of built assets meant that in the cases of 
disaster events that affected areas that were more 
often insured, modelling data could be validated 
and corrected based on loss claims. Third, many 
of the hazards that were modelled were major 
natural hazards for which extensive engineering 
tests had been done to better understand their 
robustness faced with certain natural phenomena. 
For example, extensive testing has been done to 
understand the maximum ground acceleration due 
to earthquakes that the different types of building 
materials can withstand or the scales of modelled 
flooding a typical family home would be expected 
to experience.
3.2.1  
Structural exposure
There are several difficulties in relying on struc-
tural exposure. Huge regions of the world rarely 
experience seismic hazards. For example, much 
of Africa is at relatively low risk from a seismic 
perspective. Furthermore, the nature of construc-
tion materials, population densities and other 
elements of structural exposure as modelled for 
Africa dictate that the true risk of many African 
countries was not fully revealed. As past GARs 
have noted, the prevalence of extensive risk in 
many parts of the world have been historically 
underrepresented. When the predominantly exten-
sive risk profile is coupled with relatively low 
rates of insurance penetration and very diverse 
construction types, it becomes evident how diffi-
cult it has historically been to reveal the true cost 
of risk in many countries. Droughts, epidemics, 
epizootics, agricultural infestations, etc., imply 
effectively no damage to structures, but their 
economic cost in direct and indirect terms could 
be devastating.
The Ebola virus outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone in 2014–2015, which killed more than 
11,000 people, is estimated to have cost 9.4% of 
GDP in Guinea, 8.5% in Liberia and 4.8% in Sierra 
Leone.149 Liberia lost more than 8% of its health-
care workers. Surveillance, treatment and care of 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB were set back, and the 
entire region suffered economic effects of the 
stigma.150 An exposure model predicated on count-
ing and categorizing buildings would have captured 
effectively none of the above exposed elements 
and thus failed to show the true risk faced by those 
countries. 
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None of the above should detract from the contin-
ued development and refinement of understanding 
of structural exposure. It represents an important 
part of the equation. While it is the best-developed 
description of exposure in contemporary use, it 
benefits from continual improvements. 
The increased availability of high-resolution satel-
lite data and crowdsourcing are fostering a capacity 
to develop better building profiles, which is impor-
tant for modelling risk for some hazard types. It is 
possible to use remote sensing and crowdsourc-
ing to characterize a building’s physical exposure. 
The development of building portfolios through a 
combination of high-resolution satellite imagery 
and crowdsourcing has helped to improve the base 
understanding of structural exposure. Knowing the 
size and structure of a building can make models 
far more accurate and enables better risk assess-
ment in its ability to describe the likelihood of 
damage. The damage caused by an event can also 
be better and more quickly understood using satel-
lite imagery by comparing before and after photo-
graphs to see if the height of a given building had 
changed (indicating damage or destruction). Using 
this information, simulations can identify to what 
degree changes in adherence to various building 
codes would affect outcomes in other areas.
There are challenges with using satellite data to 
impute even structural exposure. For example, 
some administrative districts cover very large areas 
within which the hazard effects can vary consider-
ably. For this reason, an additional step is needed 
to spatially redistribute assets within each area, 
based on other sources of information. To identify 
where buildings are expected to exist, several auxil-
iary data sets are considered, such as night-time 
lights,151 population maps, the location of smaller 
roads and public infrastructure information from 
open source mapping resources. The evenly spaced 
exposure data set can be aggregated following 
different approaches to illustrate the distribution 
of the building stock at the national, regional or 
global scales. The estimated number of buildings 
at the global scale is depicted at 0.5 × 0.5 decimal 
degrees. Unsurprisingly, the resulting global expo-
sure database indicates a large concentration 
of buildings in South-East Asia, Western Latin 
America, Central and South Europe, and Eastern 
sub-Saharan Africa.
It is technically possible to validate country-level 
data by collaborating with local experts and insti-
tutions. Bringing the local level into understanding 
exposure is necessary, and there is a clear appetite 
among underrepresented governments and citizen 
groups, but a more enabling environment is required 
Figure 3.19. Projected economic losses due to Ebola in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, 2010–2016
(Source: World Bank 2016)
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to encourage people to contribute and share data 
about their communities. 
At the time of writing, GEM results indicate an 
average global loss of $63.47 billion per year due 
specifically to earthquakes. Residential building 
stocks contribute 64% of the total annual modelled 
loss, while commercial and industrial stocks 
represent 22% and 14%, respectively. In terms of 
the total absolute losses per country; Japan, the 
United States of America, Indonesia and China lead 
the ranking, mostly due to the considerably high 
The existing exposure information used in 
the global human settlements layer was built 
using data from the European Space Agency 
(ESA) satellite Sentinel-1. With the launch 
of Sentinel-2 researchers expect to be able 
to provide much more detail, with smaller 
communities being captured that might have 
been missed under Sentinel-1. Information 
can then also be informed through other 
sources such as social networks.
Box 3.9. Global human settlements layer
(Source: ESA 2019: 1 February 2019 10:00 a.m. Contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data, processed by ESA, CC 
BY-SA 3.0 IGO)
Figure 3.20. Iraq flooding revealed by high-resolution satellite imagery, 2019
Detailed satellite imagery is providing a richer picture of the impact of hazards. This image combines two acquisi-
tions over the same area of eastern Iraq, one from 14 November 2018 before heavy rains and one from 26 November 
2018, after the storms. The image reveals the extent of flooding in (false colour) red, near the town of Kut.  
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Figure 3.21. Highest average annual economic losses due to earthquake risk (in billion $)
(Source: GEM 2018)
Figure 3.22. Earthquake AAL as a percentage of GDP
economic value of the building stock, as presented 
in Figure 3.21.152
The evaluation of risk in terms of absolute economic 
losses can be misleading, as poor or lesser popu-
lated countries with vulnerable structures will have 
annual losses several orders of magnitude below 
nations such as China, Japan or the United States of 
America. It is thus useful to normalize AALs based 
on the total exposed value. Unsurprisingly, the high 
range of Figure 3.22 is dominated by countries 
with a history of high-impact disastrous events (in 
2001, a magnitude 7.7 event in El Salvador, in 2007 
a magnitude 8.0 event in Peru, and in 2015 a magni-
tude 7.8 event in Nepal). 
The development of the global residential expo-
sure model relied predominantly on data from the 
national housing census of each country. These 
surveys are performed at different timescales 
(Source: GEM 2018)
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around the world, occasionally at the lowest admin-
istrative level. In the best cases, the survey data 
comprises information concerning the number of 
buildings, type of structures (e.g. individual houses 
For many nations, the survey data provides informa-
tion only about the type of dwelling and the main 
material of the structure. In these cases, a system 
is applied using alternative sources of information 
and the judgment of local experts. For some coun-
tries, the mapping schemes must be derived using 
different techniques within the same region (urban 
versus rural areas).
However, there are some challenges with this 
approach, such as different definitions of the distinc-
tion between urban and rural (in Japan, areas with 
more than 20,000 people are urban; in Australia, 
or collective accommodation), main material of 
construction, material of the roofs, material of the 
floors, number of storeys, year of construction and 
sometimes the state of the building. 
Figure 3.23. Degree of urbanization: red = urban centre; yellow = urban cluster; transparent = rural grid cell
(Source: EC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
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areas above 1,000 people are urban). To solve 
this, global human settlements researchers have 
created three artificial but homogeneous catego-
ries: urban centres, urban clusters and rural areas. 
Urban centres are assumed to have contiguous 
grid cells of 1 km2 with a density of at least 1,500 
inhabitants per km2 and a minimum total population 
of 50,000. Urban clusters are contiguous grid cells 
of 1 km2 with a density of at least 300 inhabitants 
per km2 and a minimum total population of 5,000. 
Rural areas are grid cells of 1 km2 with a density 
below 300 inhabitants per km2 and other grid cells 
outside urban clusters or centres.153 At the time 
of writing, the data layer that contains information 
about human settlement is being updated with data 
from 2018. 
For a few countries there are highly reliable data sets 
available. This applies to the Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand154 and the United States of America.155 On 
the other end of the spectrum, there are also coun-
tries that have no housing information available or 
have been so heavily affected by disasters that after 
completion of the national census, the information 
is no longer accurate (e.g. Haiti or Nepal). In these 
cases, an alternative approach must be adopted that 
capitalizes on population data sets, satellite imagery 
and open source mapping data. 
Figure 3.24. Distribution of number of residential buildings at the smallest available administrative subdivision for 12 coun-
tries in the Middle East as of 2018 
(Source: GEM 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
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Exposure information regarding non-residential 
buildings is rarely compiled systematically at a 
regional or national scale. In most cases, secondary 
sources of data such as economic census surveys 
provide data regarding the number of employees 
and various other indicators that are related to 
commercial and industrial structures. As a result, 
the development of the exposure sources for non-
residential occupancy types relies on three main 
sources of data sets: (a) demographic data concern-
ing the workforce across different sectors; (b) data 
concerning the number of permits, which may also 
specify the date, type of business, size of the facility 
and number of workers; and (c) large-scale data sets 
that identify regions according to occupancy.156 The 
combination of these data sets permits an estimate 
of the average number of facilities per occupancy, 
which is then distributed across several classes. 
The combination of various sources of exposure 
information will inevitably lead to a global exposure 
data set that is not uniform in resolution, quality or 
vintage. And by integrating alternative data sources 
to validate information for structural exposure, for 
example, a collection of other exposure data is 
becoming enriched and validated. And by integrat-
ing data about roads, infrastructure installations, 
use of water, distance to food sources, electricity 
demand, availability of primary health care, educa-
tion attainment, etc., the global understanding of 
exposure beyond the structural level will grow. In 
this way, challenges related to the heterogeneity in 
data availability and scale will eventually become 
obviated as availability of open exposure data grow.
3.2.2  
Exposure related to growth
Leaving aside the above-mentioned challenges of 
keeping pace with the exposure drivers for the built 
environment, the exposure for people, infrastructure 
and systems implied in those growth rates repre-
sents an astronomically complicated computation.
Exposure is not static, risk can increase with 
changes in exposure (e.g. a three-storey build-
ing can become five storeys over the course of a 
few weeks, populations can displace en masse 
very quickly or border crossings can be closed). In 
Africa, average GDP growth for 2018 was above 
4%, with one third of African countries experiencing 
real GDP growth of more than 5% year on year.157 
In developing countries and countries in transition, 
growing middle classes and expanded access to 
the global market are fuelling growth of exposed 
assets while regulatory structures and risk manage-
ment capacity struggle to keep pace. The result 
is a compounded risk, as the scale of exposed 
assets and lower likelihoods of careful application 
of safety standards overtake public investment in 
risk management strategies. This applies equally 
to construction regulation as to food safety inspec-
tion, industrial facilities verification, disease surveil-
lance, biodiversity preservation, etc.
Urbanization is one of the twenty-first century’s most 
transformative trends, posing challenges in terms 
of exposure and vulnerability, with implications 
in housing, infrastructure and basic services. The 
developing world is experiencing 90% of this urban 
growth, and it is estimated that 70 million new resi-
dents are added to urban areas in developing coun-
tries each year;158 infrastructure development cannot 
keep pace with growth.159 Africa is the fastest urban-
izing continent; between 1990 and 2015, the popu-
lation in urban clusters increased by 484 million, 
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while Asia has 89% of its population living in urban 
clusters.160 Low-income countries have seen a 300% 
increase in built-up areas and an 176% increase in 
population over the past 40 years.161 For example, 
the number of fire incidents in formal and informal 
dwellings per year are similar, but with approximately 
18% of the population living in informal settlements, 
the informal settlement dweller is 4.8 times more 
likely to be affected by fire than someone residing in 
a formal dwelling. The propensity of informal settle-
ments to fire indicates that the burden of fire disas-
ters is often borne by the poor.162
Historically, many megacities such as Chicago, 
London and Tokyo have experienced major urban 
fires,163 but have been able to progressively improve 
infrastructure and build structures that take into con-
sideration the hazard. Similar intervention is needed 
in new megacities and other growing urban areas to 
protect urban communities from preventable risk.
Informal settlements present an increasing chal-
lenge for municipalities. In such areas, as many 
as 10,000 people can be left homeless in a single 
event like a fire. The urban morphology of informal 
settlements contributes to disasters propagating 
rapidly, resulting in loss of life, homes and belong-
ings, devastating already-vulnerable communities. 
In this way, structural exposure drives other aspects 
of exposure to risk. 
Fire has as many political, social and economic 
properties as physical ones. Fire is a material 
condition dependent on ignition, combustion and 
fuel. It is also embedded in the history of a loca-
tion, its governance and class structures, and its 
specific cultural attitudes towards risk and under-
standings of exposure. Poverty and other forms of 
marginalization generate conditions of vulnerability, 
contributing to poor housing quality, overcrowding 
and failure to invest in protective measures.164 Of 
course, this profile of the multiple dimensions of 
intertwined exposure is not unique to fire.
Figure 3.25. Growth in formal and informal urban dwellings in South Africa
(Sources: Fire Protection Association South Africa 2018)
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Though flooding is relatively common, damage data 
is incomplete because there are so many kinds 
of floods that affect so many different forms of 
exposed assets. Floods often do not cause struc-
tural damage so there is not the same focus on 
data collection that there would be in the wake of 
an earthquake. 
The exposure calculation for wildfires does not 
include human settlement; it includes only the 
value of the natural area that was lost (meaning 
the cost of wood stocks and the time to replace). 
For the EU in 2017, economic losses due to fires 
were $11.2 billion, but this did not include the cost 
of built assets. Housing has not been traditionally 
relevant for fire risk, but is increasingly important to 
consider as the economic impact of fires on human 
settlements is growing. In densely populated areas, 
fires are often started in proximity to human settle-
ments, and the economic cost and mortality is 
increasing. 
Despite what may seem to be the dehumanization 
of disaster impact, it is important for some users of 
risk information to measure losses and, by conse-
quence, exposure in monetary terms. This is partic-
ularly important in making the case for effective 
mitigation methods like risk-transfer services such 
as insurance. The fact is that the return on invest-
ment of risk reduction initiatives is positive (usually 
several times over) compared to projected losses; 
but not all risk reduction is equal. Public policy plan-
ners are better equipped to make good decisions 
when the economic case is made clear. In many 
cases, risk reduction initiatives, on their own, are 
not politically popular. A politician in a poor jurisdic-
tion may struggle to justify to their constituents an 
investment in a warning system that may not sound 
the alarm about a hazard for years when there are 
children not in school or people who are hungry.
3.2.3  
Environmental exposure
Exposure in a global environmental sense takes 
into consideration systems for which individual 
quantitative figures do not exist. Over the last two 
decades, approximately 20% of the productivity of 
the Earth’s vegetated surface has shown a persis-
tent downward trend, due to climate change, biodi-
versity loss and poor management practices. With 
overharvesting of resources and land-use change 
remaining as key pressures, more than half of the 
world’s ecosystems services are in decline.
The widespread loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
health is evidence of a failure to account for and 
manage the breadth of exposed global assets. That 
loss also has a major effect on risk reduction and 
the mitigation of environmental hazards.165  This 
is because ecosystem services help to regulate 
climate, filter air and water, and mitigate the impact 
of natural hazards. There are other direct benefits 
such as availability of timber, fish, crops and medi-
cines, all of which support human health. These are 
often lost in the immediate aftermath of a disaster 
and can take many years to restore. Freshwater 
biodiversity and ecosystem services are threatened 
more than any others. Rivers and wetlands the 
world over are distorted, dried and overwhelmed 
with waste, toxic pollution, invasive species, and are 
damaged by overfishing and overuse of irrigation 
water. Two thirds of all rivers are highly degraded,166 
along with the freshwater habitat they support. This 
problem affects nearly 5 billion people living in high-
water-threat areas.167
Marine biodiversity is at risk from overfishing, ocean 
warming and acidification, melting of sea-ice with 
the loss of under-ice biota, oil and gas development, 
shipping, coastal habitat destruction, loss of coral 
reefs, eutrophication and pollution (including marine 
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plastics, toxic algal blooms and invasive species). 
Terrestrial biodiversity is at risk from rising tempera-
tures, loss of grasslands to deserts and drylands 
making them unsuitable for wildlife or agriculture, 
deforestation and degradation of tropical forests, 
and melting of glaciers in high mountain ecosys-
tems and polar regions. 
Exposure to unsafe drinking water and poor sani-
tation already results in 2 million preventable 
deaths per year from waterborne infections.168 With 
droughts on the increase in many parts of the devel-
oping world, water-based sanitation will become 
even more difficult to implement and sustain, with 
the result that the occurrence and extent of hazards 
and risk will rise.
Overall, the pressures on exposed biodiversity and 
ecosystems (caused by climate change, habitat de-
struction and transformation, as well as land‐use 
change) mean an irreversible and continuing decline 
of genetic and species diversity, and ecosystem deg-
radation at all scales.169 When ecosystems decline 
or disappear, important ecosystem services such as 
pollination are lost, and so are natural resilience build-
ers such as carbon sinks, natural pest control, and 
access to herbal and traditional medicines, which are 
important for the health of much of the world’s popu-
lation.170 In the loss of ecosystem biodiversity, there 
is the near-certain prospect of more-frequent hazard 
events occurring, in addition to sacrificing one of the 
remaining resources to mitigate the risk.
In summary, there are different dimensions of expo-
sure beyond what any individual stakeholder is 
interested in. This is not an indictment of the analy-
sis of past versions of this GAR, but is reflective of 
the new paradigm that the Sendai Framework has 
elucidated. Risk is a function of natural and anthro-
pogenic hazards and is a question of management 
for all levels of governance, all sectors and all 
dimensions of society. A robust health system and 
a well-managed road system and network of well-
trained monitors are all mutually building resilience. 
For this reason, throughout the Sendai Framework’s 
applicability until 2030, it is important that research 
and science seek to better understand and repre-
sent as many dimensions of exposure as possible. 
3.3 
 
Vulnerability
The impact of disasters encompasses more than 
just affected people or economic losses. While 
every society is vulnerable to risk, some suffer 
significantly more and recover more slowly than 
others when adversity strikes. Much of the existing 
literature on risk remains sector specific and treats 
vulnerability as people’s exposure to risk. This 
section, building on the analysis offered in previ-
ous GARs and empirical evidence on the multi-
dimensional aspects of risk exposure, reiterates 
the need for a more holistic and people-centred 
approach to vulnerability. It asks why some people 
do better in overcoming adversity than others by 
assessing the main obstacles that individuals, 
households and societies may face in managing 
risk, including challenges in terms of information, 
resources and incentives to build back faster and 
better.
Vulnerability is defined as the “conditions deter-
mined by physical, social, economic and environ-
mental factors or processes which increase the 
susceptibility of an individual, community, assets 
or systems to the impacts of hazards.”171 It occurs 
in connection with the incidence of disasters 
of varying magnitudes, which negatively affect 
the economic, social environmental/ecological 
profiles of countries over time. Implicit here is the 
notion of “differential vulnerability”, referring to the 
different facets and variant levels of risk, to which 
populations are exposed, accounting for differenti-
ated impacts and outcomes in disasters.172
Hazard identification is only an initial step within 
a risk management strategy. While the intensity 
remains important, of greater importance is the 
profile of a population whose economic, demo-
graphic, environmental, institutional and social 
characteristics may place its members at greater 
risk before, during and after a disaster. Whereas 
evidence suggests that wealthier countries with 
more developed institutions or governance are 
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better able to reduce disaster risk,173 several coun-
tries have witnessed rapid economic growth in the 
last few decades without a commensurable rate of 
vulnerability reduction. 
The Sendai Framework was conceived as the 
world was witnessing impressive reductions 
in extreme poverty, major progress in improv-
ing access to schooling and health care, and the 
promotion of the empowerment of women, youth, 
persons with disabilities and older persons. Yet, 
four years later, despite such achievements, 
poverty reduction remains uneven across regions, 
within countries and among various population 
groups. While more than 1 billion people have risen 
above the $1.90-a-day line since 1990, millions fall 
back into poverty annually due to shocks.174 
Across the globe, in developing and developed 
economies alike, those left behind (e.g. people 
living in poverty, unemployed and underem-
ployed, persons with disabilities, women and 
girls, displaced populations and migrants, youth, 
indigenous groups and older people) are often 
considered to be stuck in cycles of compound-
ing vulnerability. People living in poverty may be 
caught in protracted cycles of unemployment and 
underemployment, low productivity and low wages, 
and are particularly vulnerable to extreme weather. 
Disenfranchised minorities, displaced populations 
and migrants are often exposed to discriminatory 
practices, have interrupted or no access to formal 
justice systems and health services. For those 
households, vulnerabilities may have evolved and 
persisted over long periods leading to dispari-
ties in income, gender, ethnicity, household and 
social status, and job type, which are difficult to 
overcome.175 The governmental challenges of how 
to adapt and implement DRR plans in fragile and 
complex contexts such as conflict, famine and 
other situations where people are displaced or 
migrating in large numbers are discussed further in 
Chapter 15.
3.3.1 
Measuring vulnerability
Disasters significantly interfere with daily life. They 
disrupt livelihoods, family and social networks, 
and interrupt schooling trajectories, access to 
health services, infrastructure networks, supply 
chains and connections of essential services, all of 
which are critical for people’s well-being. Concep-
tually, the quantification of vulnerability has been 
surrounded by debate in recent decades about 
appropriate methodologies, metrics and indicators 
applied within quantitative, survey-based methods 
(single cross sections, panel surveys and commu-
nity surveys) and qualitative ones. Empirical 
literature on risk and vulnerability is extensive. It is 
therefore inevitable that there would be differences 
in how analysts/organizations define and measure 
vulnerability in relation to disasters. However, 
considering the increasingly damaging impact of 
disasters, an improved ability to measure vulner-
ability – albeit incomplete and imperfect – should 
be a welcome step towards the promotion of a 
disaster-resilient culture.176  
Vulnerability and risk
Vulnerability must be defined in terms of what it is 
that a population is vulnerable; its measurement 
therefore requires precise characteristics. Expo-
sure to risk should be analysed as one of the many 
dimensions of vulnerability. For instance, vulner-
able households are typically more exposed to risk 
168  (WHO 2018c)
169  (Heywood 2017) 
170  (United Nations 2016a)
171  (OEIWG 2016)
172  (Shupp and Arlington 2008)
173  (UNISDR 2009); (UNISDR 2011b); (UNISDR 2013b); (UNISDR 
2015b)
174  (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2018b)
175  (UNDP 2014)
176  (Wei et al. 2017)
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and less protected from it.177 Such exposure has 
a direct effect on their socioeconomic status and 
welfare. Equally important is how risk exposure 
causes vulnerability or increases its profundity.178 
For instance, households, in their efforts to avoid 
risk exposure, may be forced to take costly preven-
tive measures, which increases the likelihood of 
falling into poverty. Consequently, the decision not 
to invest in a high-risk but high-return activity means 
foregone income and also a higher likelihood that 
a household remains or becomes poor.179 For 
example, a disaster can push an already income-
poor household further into poverty or drive a non-
poor household below the income poverty line.180 A 
shock may account for the decision to take children 
out of school, affect people’s health permanently, 
the ability to obtain sufficient nutrition, a reduction 
in life expectancy or access to remedies for treat-
able diseases. 
The direction of causality between vulnerability 
and risk should also be assessed in reverse order. 
Hoogeveen and colleagues offered useful concep-
tual insights on reverse causalities while incorporat-
ing vulnerability in poverty analysis.181 For example, 
to avoid deprivation or food insecurity, a household 
may choose low-value crops or may be forced to 
cultivate in insecure areas (e.g. landmine-contami-
nated land or areas in conflict) or to live in a hazard-
prone environment (e.g. landslides, flood plains 
or along railway lines). It is thus not only exposure 
that may lead to detrimental welfare outcomes. 
The manifestation of risk (as a shock) also leads to 
undesirable welfare outcomes. 
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability assessments can be sectoral or multi-
dimensional, demonstrating the distribution of the 
vulnerability indicators used and disaggregating by 
sex, family size, location, etc. While several meth-
odologies exist, they are often ex ante and limited 
to specific sectors. In addition, many vulnerability 
measurements focus on hazards and risks while 
overlooking information on capacities to address 
them, hence solving only one piece of the vulner-
ability puzzle. They are initiated at the request 
of a specific policy question for a specific group 
or area (e.g. vulnerability profiles of displaced 
population due to disasters in an area), and their 
importance is largely overseen for other policy 
planning purposes. Lastly, such assessments are 
often conducted by international organizations, 
NGOs and the private sector within a project life 
cycle, compromising opportunities for systemati-
cally integrating their findings into the overall risk 
management process and often making supposi-
tions about categories that are influenced more 
by stereotypes of vulnerability than measured 
vulnerability.
Vulnerability profiling is used to identify groups 
that are “liable to serious hardship” – a term coined 
by economist and Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen. 
Typical examples include to children and orphans, 
pregnant women or girls, nursing mothers, sole 
or primary carers (of dependent children, elderly 
people or people living with disabilities), people 
at risk of sexual or gender-based violence (GBV), 
adults or children experiencing family violence, 
exploitation or abuse, people living with HIV, 
elderly, ethnic minorities, certain castes, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), and households headed 
by single women or children. These groups are 
often described as vulnerable in the common usage 
of the term. However, one point that merits specific 
attention is that even though these groups are 
characterized as vulnerable, risk is not a core char-
acteristic of their problems, even if in some cases, 
risks may have contributed to their destitution as 
their opportunities to cope with those risks are 
limited.182 In other words, personal characteristics 
can be linked to vulnerability, but not define it, and 
it is precisely the correlations between vulnerability 
profiles and risks that vulnerability assessments 
can help determine.
Risks vary by their frequency, intensity and welfare 
impact.183 Although the sources of vulnerability are 
multiple and diverse, some of the most important 
factors that are recurrent in vulnerability assess-
ment revolve around poverty, inequality, gender,184 
education and health status, disability and environ-
mental concerns. A few examples are presented 
in Table 3.4. These outline the risk categories and 
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possible indicators that measure vulnerability in 
disaster contexts.
There is no perfect answer to the question of which 
indicators are most appropriate, as each context 
dictates a different approach. However, a common 
denominator is that indicators should be selected 
based on: (a) their validity to represent their under-
lying concepts appropriately and (b) their ability to 
inform action and policy planning. 
177  (Hoogeveen et al. 2003)
178  (Bergstrand et al. 2015)
179  (Bergstrand et al. 2015)
180  (UNISDR 2013b); (Sen 2000); (Narayan et al. 2000); (UNDP 
2014); (World Bank 2013) 
Haitian woman takes refuge from Tropical Storm Hanna, 2008
A woman stands in the entrance of the cathedral in Gonaives, Haiti, where up to 400 people took refuge after Tropical Storm 
Hanna flooded the region, stranding thousands and killing more than 160 people. 
(Source: United Nations 2008; Logan Abassi)
181  (Hoogeveen et al. 2003)
182  (Hoogeveen et al. 2003)
183  (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000) 
184  (Nelson 2015)
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Table 3.4. Selected risk categories and indicators in vulnerability assessments
150 Chapter 3
The feasibility of applying one methodology over another is often dictated by data considerations. While risk analysts for the 
past decade have increasingly recognized the importance of assessing the differentiated impacts of disasters through vulner-
ability assessments, a cross-sectional household survey is usually the minimum available for most countries. Identifying data 
sources, assessing their suitability for measurement and proposing suggestions for complementary measures are crucial in 
developing a vulnerability assessment methodology.185
Data sources for vulnerability assessments
In a vulnerability survey context (single cross 
sections, panel surveys or community surveys), 
quantitative indicators measure the degree to which 
a characteristic is present, while qualitative data 
comprises numeric observations that point to the 
presence or absence of a characteristic to a single 
category. Qualitative data may also include textual 
or visual data stemming from interviews, observa-
tions, project data, administrative data or records 
and can support inferences. A qualitative mapping 
of the strategies that individuals, households and 
communities choose to use to anticipate, mitigate 
and cope with these disaster risks is also helpful, 
not least in terms of broadening the policy options 
available.
In the absence of large household surveys, a 
small panel component may also serve to under-
stand dynamic issues of vulnerability as related 
to systemic risks. As they only cover a certain 
year range, retrospective models can assist in 
bridging the gap between survey years. In the 
(fortunate) event where panel data was collected 
before and after a disaster, analysts can examine 
variables across the disaster continuum (before, 
during and after) by assessing earlier periods 
for ex ante mechanisms and later periods for ex 
post response.186 For instance, information on 
displacement, migration, income diversification 
and livelihood opportunities are useful for ex ante 
mechanisms, while variations on employment and 
underemployment, remittances and informal trans-
fers are ex post mechanisms.187
Secondary data
Secondary data sources may include administra-
tive data, geographic information system (GIS) data, 
development/resilience/ livelihoods project data, 
census and demographic data, and demographic 
and health surveys. Information from such sources 
can complement vulnerability analysis given their 
ability to capture intertemporal dimensions of risk, 
particularly when risk analysts have a single cross-
section survey to base their assessment on.
185  (UNDP 2016a)
186  (UNISDR 2013b); (UNISDR 2015b)
187  (Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2003b)
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GIS data is also an extremely useful source of infor-
mation, as it allows analysts to map and spatially 
reference units of vulnerability information, hence 
exploring relationships among natural hazard 
and vulnerability variables. It allows improved 
Qualitative, interview and focus group data at the 
community level will be valuable sources in under-
standing how people react and are thus projected 
to react in the future, in the wake of a disaster. 
During the 2017 Hurricane Harvey in the United 
States of America, more women than men decided 
to not evacuate despite alarming messages from 
EWSs. Across the world, women and girls are over-
whelmingly tasked, personally and professionally, 
with caring for children, housework, the elderly and 
people with disabilities. They are often the last to 
leave. So, simple life-saving decisions, like decid-
ing when and whether to evacuate a disaster area, 
become a difficult choice.189 
visualization of the spatial distribution of data, 
stratification of sampling, identification of spatial 
correlates of vulnerability, geographic targeting, and 
assessment of the local and non-local (externality) 
impacts of some types of shocks.188
Translating the above into action for vulnerability 
assessments dictates that questions on disasters 
preparedness and response should be asked at 
the household and community levels for cross-
validation. In cases where shocks are multiple and 
covariant, community information can provide the 
context for individual responses to be analysed and 
go beyond the obvious yes or no answers. The use 
of proxy questions to ascertain the probability of 
certain groups benefiting or, conversely, of being 
excluded from risk management plans is also 
critical. Vulnerability assessments have repeatedly 
proven that disasters discriminate on the same divi-
sions that societies discriminate against people.190
Enumerator in Bamyan district, Afghanistan, 2010
(Source: United Nations 2010)
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Lastly, census data and demographic surveys 
(e.g. demographic and health surveys) are espe-
cially valuable for mapping and analysing life-cycle 
risks.191 Census data can improve understanding of 
the size of age cohorts as well as the geographic 
distribution. Matching the geographic distribution of 
the population to, for example, rainfall and seismic 
hazard data could prioritize population groups that 
are most vulnerable to weather and earthquake 
shocks. Furthermore, nutrition and health surveys 
can also provide information on issues related to 
health and diet, food components, food production, 
food safety, food insecurity and highlight regions 
with higher likelihood of malnutrition prevalence, as 
well as high incidence of contagious diseases.
3.3.2 
Life-cycle vulnerability
Risks and capacities to cope accumulate over life-
times. The life-cycle approach has been commonly 
used to cluster different vulnerable groups and 
prioritize action among them.192 It is founded on a 
multidimensional concept of vulnerability, initially 
conceived by the World Bank, which allows the iden-
tification of risk factors for each group and thereaf-
ter forecasts the long-term consequences of those 
risks into next stages in life.193 Life trajectories are 
the result of investments made in preceding stages 
as the consequences of shocks may cascade into 
long-term consequences. A setback in early child-
hood has compounding effects throughout the rest 
of a person’s life, in terms of growth, job and social 
status and the uncertainties involved with growing 
older and the transmission of vulnerability to the 
next generation.194 This GAR argues that the cumu-
lative and cascading nature of vulnerability requires 
timely and continuous investment to effectively 
protect those groups whose vulnerability profiles 
– many structural and many tied to the life cycle – 
make them more susceptible to risks. 
Once metrics for observation have been selected, 
the life-cycle approach can be used to rank various 
groups, by degree of destitution, by their numbers 
or a combination of both. As vulnerable groups 
are clustered according to their specific character-
istics, poverty data can be extremely useful as a 
touchstone because it is well measured and relates 
to most of the other characteristics (age, gender, 
health and asset ownership).195 If such basic data 
is not available, the survey-based approach is 
preceded by a qualitative analysis to cluster popula-
tion groups.196
The advantages of a life-cycle approach to vulnera-
bility is that it can forecast socioeconomic impacts 
for different population groups and thus prioritize 
risk-coping mechanisms but also develop policies 
to prevent these risks from cascading into the next 
stages in life. In other words, the analysis is not 
static; rather it adapts based on learning from the 
dynamic processes that perpetuate vulnerabilities 
over time.
In practical terms, when it comes to assessing such 
vulnerabilities this means that if a vulnerable group 
is identified at an early stage of analysis, analysts 
can better measure the elements of such vulnerabil-
ities over time by tracking those indicators through 
longitudinal surveys. This type of information does 
not need to be collected in isolation. Rather, vulner-
ability analysis can inform the development of 
existing and future surveys and census data devel-
oped by national statistical offices (NSOs). In ideal 
cases, the inclusion of disaster-sensitive indicators 
offers improved measurements of disaster inci-
dences, identifies linkages with other aspects of 
welfare and integrates those with risk management 
instruments. 
188  (Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2003a)
189  (Vidili 2018) 
190  (Hallegatte et al. 2016)
191  (Hallegatte et al. 2016)
192  (Bonilla Garcia and Gruat 2003)
193  (Irving 1996)
194  (Morrissey and Vinopal 2018)
195  (Hoogeveen et al. 2003)
196  (Lokshin and Mroz 2013)
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3.3.3 
Socioeconomic vulnerability
An overreliance on asset losses to explain vulner-
ability obscures the relationship between risk and 
poverty. By definition, wealthy individuals have more 
assets to lose; therefore, their interests dominate in 
risk assessments that are limited to asset losses. 
But measuring asset losses misses a major dimen-
sion, particularly in the developing world; the poor 
are less likely to have assets to lose. Just as highly 
developed countries are more exposed to risk (by 
virtue of having more to lose), so too are wealthy 
people. But the losses felt by less-wealthy countries 
and less-wealthy people are not less important. In 
fact, they also lack the means and opportunity to 
smooth the impact of shocks while maintaining 
their consumption, and to recover and rebuild their 
assets.
To compensate for the bias towards asset losses 
as the key metric of vulnerability, the Unbreakable: 
Building the Resilience of the Poor in the Face of 
Natural Disasters report introduced the concept of 
well-being losses. In addition to traditional asset 
losses, well-being losses account for people’s 
socioeconomic resilience, including:197
Traditional risk assessments evaluate asset expo-
sure and vulnerability to hazards to determine 
expected asset losses. The Unbreakable model 
additionally incorporates the socioeconomic resil-
ience of the communities to predict well-being 
losses.
There has been progress towards understanding 
and representing socioeconomic vulnerability in a 
systematic way. Multi-partner projects like INFORM, 
led by the United Nations Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), have identi-
fied several structural vulnerability indicators that 
are tracked globally. These include static measures 
of socioeconomic vulnerability such as the Gini 
coefficient and aid dependency and more dynamic 
data such as the number of IDPs, prevalence of 
certain diseases and malnutrition rates. These are 
useful as a starting point but are limited to usually 
years-old static data, national-level resolutions and 
certain kinds of vulnerability. Still, the information 
is standardized and validated by many contributing 
partners.
New metrics of disaster impacts – including 
poverty headcount, poverty gap and well-being 
losses – can be used to quantify the value of inter-
ventions outside the traditional risk management 
toolbox. Asset-informed risk management strate-
gies primarily focus on protection infrastructure, 
such as dikes, and the position and condition of 
assets, for instance with land-use plans or building 
norms.198 
Strategies informed by well-being information can 
utilize a wider set of available measures, such as 
financial inclusion, private and public insurance, 
disaster-responsive social safety nets, macrofiscal 
policies, and disaster preparedness and contin-
gency planning. Even if they do not reduce asset 
losses, these measures can bolster communities’ 
socioeconomic resilience, or their capacity to cope 
with and recover from asset losses and reduce the 
well-being impact of disasters.
Social vulnerability accounts for the inability of 
people and society to withstand the effects of the 
multiple stresses they are exposed to. In contrast to 
physical vulnerability, social vulnerability is indepen-
dent of hazard intensity. Methodologies for measur-
ing components of social vulnerability vary greatly, 
but can be broadly grouped into quantitative, index-
based assessments and qualitative, community 
participatory ones.
a. Their ability to maintain their consumption for 
the duration of their recovery 
b. Their ability to save or borrow to rebuild their 
asset stock
c. The decreasing returns in consumption – that 
is, poorer people are more affected by a $1 
reduction in consumption than richer individuals
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Index-based assessments
A vulnerability index is built by a combination of 
vulnerability indicators. In turn, the vulnerability 
indicators are a direct measure of, or a proxy for 
vulnerability characteristics. Vulnerability char-
acteristics can then be grouped into vulnerability 
categories. For example, a building has multiple 
physical vulnerability categories, such as a roof 
and number of storeys, and each category has one 
or more characteristics, such as roof shape and 
covering and number of storeys above ground and 
below ground. For social vulnerability, examples 
of vulnerability categories are education and food 
security. These categories have a variety of vulner-
ability characteristics such as education level and 
access to education, and food availability, accessi-
bility and stability.199
By analysing different clusters of variables to 
determine the level of vulnerability and resilience 
of target populations, it is possible to begin to 
quantify social vulnerability.200 The target variables 
are divided into two groups. The first includes vari-
ables about individuals (e.g. education, age and 
gender) that are aggregated to produce community-
level results. The second group covers variables 
about the community as a whole, such as popula-
tion growth, infrastructure quality and urban/rural 
division that need not be disaggregated. Eleven 
Tent city, Vancouver, Canada 
(Source: flickr.com user Sally T. Buck 2010)
197  (Hallegatte et al. 2017) 
198  (Walsh and Hallegatte 2019)
199  (Murnane et al. 2019)
200  (Cutter, Boruff and Shirley 2003)
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composite factors can be extracted to formulate a 
social vulnerability index.
This method was used in 2015 to calculate the 
social vulnerability to floods in the city of Vancou-
ver, taking into account the:201
Another initiative built a socioeconomic vulnerabil-
ity index specific to landslide hazards, by looking 
into the three subindices relating to different issues 
of vulnerability/disaster risk:202
Qualitative approaches
Through a vulnerability and capacity assessment 
(VCA),203 the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) employs various 
participatory tools to gauge people’s exposure 
to and capacity to resist natural hazards. It is an 
integral part of disaster preparedness and contrib-
utes to the creation of community-based disaster 
preparedness programmes at the rural and urban 
grass-roots level. VCA enables local priorities to be 
identified and appropriate action taken to reduce 
disaster risk, and assists in the design and develop-
ment of programmes that are mutually supportive 
and responsive to the needs of the people most 
closely concerned.
VCA is complementary to national and subnational 
risk, hazard, vulnerability and capacity-mapping 
exercises that identify communities most at risk. 
VCA is undertaken in these communities to diag-
nose the specific areas of risk and vulnerability 
and determine what action can be taken to address 
them. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund (UNICEF) broadly use participatory 
tools for VCAs that enable communities to identify 
their own capacities and vulnerabilities in rela-
tion to disaster management, developing mitiga-
tion strategies and building resilience to cope 
with future hazards. Data collected through these 
exercises can and should become more compa-
rable, adding to a greater store of understanding 
and analysis of vulnerable populations. Through 
sustainably pooling assessments by different orga-
nizations, vulnerability analysis can expand opera-
tional response and coverage for those left behind 
as coordinated data collection and communication 
of findings among different actors on the ground 
becomes more integrated into DRR strategies and 
provides a more coherent picture and finer detail 
into vulnerability assessments. 
• Ability to cope (age, gender), ethnicity (minority 
status, immigration)
• Access to resources (income, property value, 
percentage of renters, education, unemploy-
ment, income from government transfers)
• Household arrangement (single-parent house-
holds, single-member households)
• Public transport (as the main family transpor-
tation mode)
• Built environment (quality of housing, age of 
construction, population density, dwelling in five 
or more storey apartments) 
• Demographic and social index (age distribution, 
number of workers who may be exposed to 
disasters, population density, foreigner ratio, 
education level and housing type)
• Secondary damage triggering index (number 
of public offices, road area ratio, number of 
electronic supply facilities, school area ratio, 
and commercial and industrial area ratio) 
• Preparation and response index (disaster 
frequency, Internet penetration rate, number 
of disaster prevention facilities, perceived 
safety, number of medical doctors and financial 
independence of the borough) 
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Conclusions
Vulnerability assessments have repeatedly proven 
that disasters discriminate on the same lines that 
societies discriminate against people. Just as risk 
is generally systemic and interconnected, so too 
are the drivers of risk. This is also true when it 
comes to vulnerability. Even children can recognize 
the interlinked effects of poverty, ill-health, poor 
employment prospects and social exclusion, but 
the ability to quantify and measure that multidi-
mensional vulnerability is still immature. The use of 
quantitative markers, proxy indicators and extrapo-
lated data shows the way forward. 
“Vulnerable populations” are often identified with 
high risk. However, risk is not a defining character-
istic of the situation. The simple characteristic of 
being a child or disabled or of a particular caste or 
economic group does not define the vulnerability. 
Vulnerability must be thought of in terms of vulner-
ability to something. It is true that in many cases, 
realized risks may have contributed to their destitu-
tion as their opportunities to cope with those risks 
were limited. In other words, personal characteris-
tics can be linked to vulnerability, but not define it; 
it is precisely the correlations among vulnerability 
profiles and risks that vulnerability assessments 
can help determine. 
Vulnerability assessments are conducted in an 
isolated manner, usually with the objective of 
supporting the targeting of a specific policy ques-
tion or beneficiary population in development 
planning and in emergency contexts. Through 
pooling assessments by different organizations/
actors, vulnerability analysis can enrich operational 
response and coverage for those left behind as 
coordinated data collection and communication 
of findings among different actors becomes more 
integrated into DRR strategies and provides a more 
coherent picture of the entire society in finer detail. 
Systematic collection of rich survey and census 
data at a global level would propel the accuracy 
of targeting social safety net projects and emer-
gency measures ahead by decades, in pursuit of 
SDGs and with the objective of enabling better 
interventions to build social and economic resil-
ience. Having good data on the coping mecha-
nisms at the disposition of different classes of 
vulnerable people can help governments to better 
arrange for a more equitable repartition of public 
resources for social safety programming or to 
target development partner programming. The 
mutual and compounding value of fulfilling this 
simple act of governance in a systematic and thor-
ough way unlocks resilience.
201  (Oulahen et al. 2015)
202  (Park et al. 2016) 
203  (IFRC 2018b)
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4.1  
Changes in technology 
and data sharing
Knowing where people and things are, and their 
relationship to each other, is essential for informed 
decision-making. Real-time information is useful 
to prepare for and respond to disasters. Location-
based services are helping governments to develop 
strategic priorities, make decisions, and measure 
and monitor outcomes. 
As identified by the Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR),204 for communi-
ties and governments to build resilience to hazards, 
they must have access to information about disas-
ter risk that is understandable and actionable. 
Advances in science, technology and innovation can 
further the understanding of disaster risk and help 
achieve this goal. Especially when a wide variety of 
stakeholders across the public, private, academic 
and NGO sectors form partnerships and work 
together. 
Improvements in technology have been exponential 
since the publication of GAR15. This, coupled with 
the increased awareness and willingness to share 
data, information and data processing capabilities, 
has enabled a greater understanding of global 
change and the ability to forecast how natural 
systems will respond to human activity and political 
decisions. 
Ongoing efforts to engage the science and technol-
ogy community in developing, implementing and 
providing data and services to the risk management 
community are being strengthened. This ensures 
that the DRR community benefits from the best 
possible scientific and technological advances 
and advice. One of the greatest areas of techno-
logical enhancement has been in the availability of, 
and access to, computational processing power. 
This can be seen through the greater availability 
of supercomputers and virtual servers, which have 
increased the overall availability of cloud-based 
computing capabilities for hazard modelling. In 
turn, the data available has also improved. As an 
example, the ESA Copernicus satellite marks a 
significant improvement in globally available, open, 
high-resolution satellite imagery.
4.1.1  
Hazard knowledge 
Data collected on the Earth systems (climate, 
oceans, land and weather), as well as the societal 
systems (population location, density and vulner-
ability), is a fundamental input for many of the 
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calculations to permit a better understanding of the 
nature and drivers of risk. 
The science and technology community have 
an essential role in the continual advancement 
of the understanding of hazards, exposure and 
vulnerability and its effect on reducing the risks to 
people, infrastructure and society. Satellites have 
a unique vantage point for monitoring many kinds 
of large-scale processes, from forest fires to over-
flowing rivers, to earthquake-prone zones as well 
as patterns of human settlement, herd migration 
trends and degradation of coral reefs. Remotely 
sensed data can be provided in near real time. This 
can include maps, optical images or radar images 
that accurately measure the affected areas. 
4.1.2  
Open data
Open data can have many different interpretations 
and meanings. Here, open data is described as 
“data that can be freely used, re-used and redis-
tributed by anyone – subject only, at most, to the 
requirements to attribute and share alike.”205  
Open data policies have been shown to be an 
economic force enhancer for nations, with value 
created many times over and providing greater 
returns on investment through increased tax reve-
nues on the products and services created with 
the data. Open data also meets society’s needs for 
Figure 4.1. FAIR data is findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable
204  (GFDRR 2018a)
205  (Open Data Handbook 2019)
ethical principles for accessing and using public 
data. Within the research and innovation sectors, 
open data can facilitate interdisciplinary, inter-
institutional and international research. It also 
enables data mining for automated knowledge 
discovery among the growing amount of big data 
available to researchers and policymakers. Finally, 
open public data supports improved decision-
making and enhances transparency in government 
and society. 
An open science approach, complementing open 
data principles, is often followed by research and 
academic institutions. This works on the basis 
that data is as open as possible but recognizes 
that it can be closed if necessary. The findable, 
accessible, interoperable and reusable (FAIR) 
(Source: UNDRR 2019: https://www.nature.com/articles/sdata201618)
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data principles are also a core facet of open and 
exchangeable knowledge. 
For data created with public funds or where there 
is a strong demonstrable public interest, open data 
should be the default. There are, of course, several 
reasons for keeping some data more proprietary or 
secret, and these need to be balanced against the 
benefits of openness outlined above. For example, 
proportionate exceptions include restrictions based 
on national security, law enforcement, personal pri-
vacy and commercial proprietary concerns. Less well 
known and sometimes more relevant include the pro-
tection of indigenous people’s rights, and the exact lo-
cation of cultural artefacts or endangered species.206  
There are movements advocating for open data. For 
example the Open Data for Resilience Initiative is 
designed to support teams of regional risk manage-
ment specialists to build capacity and long-term 
ownership of open data projects. The creation of 
the global open data index also helps by ranking, at 
the State level, the various degrees to which data is 
openly available with a view to encouraging use of 
data from more open jurisdictions. 
Some countries have open data policies, while 
others may have open policies but derive their 
funding through consulting, which places limita-
tions on how open they can be. Protectionism 
remains a barrier to open sharing of tools, data 
and knowledge as people are naturally concerned 
for the long-term viability of their livelihoods and 
believe their competitive advantage is rooted in 
their access to the exclusivity of their knowledge.
There are some cases where the best available 
data is produced and owned by private companies. 
Private risk modelling in the private sector is also 
not open and is dominated by a few big companies 
that supply “black-box” models. These are models 
that – whether they are available for public use 
or not – do not divulge the nature of the calcula-
tion used in the model. When data is made publicly 
available, it is often at least one version behind the 
most current; in some cases, it is simply not avail-
able for free. This can then lead to the challenge of 
clear data accountability. If data is being used for 
risk and hazard modelling, it needs to be accurate, 
trusted and reliable, leading to important questions 
about the provenance and refresh rates of data. 
Without clear information about the provenance, 
history and processing of a given data set, it is diffi-
cult to determine how reliable it might be.
Advancements in open data provided from satel-
lites have made more advanced models possible. 
Landsat and Copernicus are the two contemporary 
examples by the United States Geological Survey/
NASA and ESA, respectively. Landsat provides 
the longest temporal records of moderate resolu-
tion multispectral data of the Earth’s surface, while 
Copernicus is providing the highest-resolution 
imagery available openly and globally. In 2014, the 
Sentinel-1 mission provided a polar-orbiting, all-
weather, day and night radar imaging mission for 
land and ocean services. In 2015, Sentinel-2A was 
launched followed by Sentinel-2B in 2017, provid-
ing spatial resolutions of 10, 20 and 60 m. This 
has improved the resolution previously available 
and provides high-resolution imagery to be used 
in various hazard models. The fact that the data is 
open has resulted in a boom in scientific research 
based on satellite data.
The initial two Sentinel missions have since been 
joined by Sentinel-3 (which measures sea-surface 
topography, sea- and land-surface temperature, 
ocean colour and land colour) with high-end reli-
ability that helps inform ocean forecasting systems 
and environmental and climate monitoring. Senti-
nel-5P was launched in 2017 and provides data on 
air quality and climate. The variety of data avail-
able from Copernicus through the Sentinel missions 
has revolutionized the scale of open source data 
available. 
It is recognized that while open and available data 
is useful for many applications within disaster 
risk management, during an extreme event there 
is often the need for higher-resolution imagery. In 
this regard and with the sharing of relevant data 
enshrined in the International Charter on Space and 
Major Disasters, private sector providers can work 
with space agencies to provide timely and accurate 
data for disaster recovery. 
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4.1.3  
Open source software 
Open source software can be described as the 
provision of source code that is available at no cost 
and for use by anyone for any purpose. The oppo-
site of open source software is proprietary soft-
ware, where a user normally must pay to access the 
software and abide by several restrictions in its use 
and distribution. 
Open source software was rare 10 years ago, but it 
is now commonplace. Perhaps the greatest benefit 
of open source tools is their flexibility and evolv-
ing capacity that develops as more people use 
and adapt the software for their specific needs. 
Shared software helps promote greater levels 
of understanding of hazards rooted in the same 
methodology.
Community-driven open source software is increas-
ingly being used in government organizations, and 
there is a growing number of private sector compa-
nies focused on providing technical support to open 
source software. This movement by governments to 
use open source software has gone a long way in 
overcoming barriers to adoption. As with any tech-
nology, significant assessments need to be made 
on the total cost of ownership of open source soft-
ware. While there may be an initial economic benefit 
from using open source software, it can be expen-
sive to customize and maintain, as this is depen-
dent on the community developing the software, 
and the knowledge of the user. 
Future-proofing is also a consideration. With open 
source software, the software itself is less likely 
to be affected if the company behind its design 
closes. As other developers can simply pick up 
where the original ones left off, its sustainability is 
better ensured. The vision of future-proofing under-
pins this philosophy. If the base information is avail-
able and comprehensible broadly, the likelihood of 
continued interest in and research about the topic 
is more likely to continue. These systems empha-
size testing and continuous integration where every 
change in the engine is reviewed by someone else 
and can include a scientific review and publica-
tion. When a change goes into the system, all tests 
are re-run. Having the whole processes visible and 
transparent ensures that if a bug is fixed, it will 
often result in improvements to the tests.
Open software and tools are becoming the software 
of choice within research institutions. In the early 
stages, open source implied a free but often primi-
tive version of the commercial software. However, 
in the last few years, open source software has 
progressed exponentially and often represents best-
in-class versions of scientific modelling tools. With 
the science rooted in open source tools, more users 
have access to them, enabling greater contributions 
and allowing their knowledge and research to feed 
back into improved development of the tool itself. 
Not all software is open source, and their remains 
reliance on some proprietary software. Propri-
etary software can have its benefits for organiza-
tions using their own data and information for risk 
modelling, especially if it has been produced by a 
commercial enterprise and is for commercial use. 
One area where open data and open source cross 
paths is in crowdsourcing. Growing interest in the 
use of crowdsourced data to solve certain kinds 
of data problems has led to the development of 
a number of layers in use within risk science. A 
notable example is the use of OpenStreetMap, 
which is foundational to almost all risk sciences. 
The Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team has 
worked on several projects that use community 
volunteers to produce locally sourced context infor-
mation. It is training volunteers to collect and code 
messages in a quality-controlled manner, feeding 
data to centres that can use it for better under-
standing of a multitude of hazards. Because there 
is still some reluctance to rely on crowds to answer 
important contextual information about risk, expo-
sure and vulnerability, these systems are supple-
mented in some cases with “expert opinion” to 
reinforce the pedigree of the data.
206  (GEO 2015)
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4.1.4  
Interoperability
Interoperability may be defined as “the ability of a 
computer system of software to work with other 
systems or products without special effort on the 
part of the user.”207 The interoperability of data has 
technical, semantic and legal dimensions. From 
a technical standpoint, the data needs to have 
compatible formats and well-known quantities that 
make diverse data possible to integrate to form new 
data and products.208
From the semantic point of view, one of the main 
challenges to interoperability is contained within 
the metadata used to describe any given data set. 
When trying to combine data, challenges can be as 
simple as the native language of the data creator 
being different from the data user, meaning that 
it can be difficult to combine. Another semantic 
challenge can be with the naming conventions and 
descriptive terms used in different disciplines (or 
even subdisciplines). These issues of nomenclature 
are very important, especially for identifying and 
measuring risks and hazards. 
Legal interoperability can be described as having 
occurred when multiple data sets from different 
sources have been merged, and users are able 
to access and use each of the different data sets 
without having to seek explicit authorization from 
each creator of the data. 
It is not only the interoperability of data and 
systems that is important for disaster risk manage-
ment. DRR is inherently interdisciplinary, and this is 
reflected in the discussions around cascading risks 
and hazards. Researchers and professionals often 
work in silos within their own disciplines. Improving 
the availability of knowledge and data can encour-
age practitioners to think about the wider implica-
tions of risk-informed decisions. 
In terms of interoperability of model components, 
one suggestion is to bridge the gap between differ-
ent hazards models using machine learning, leading 
to a harmonized model across hazards creating 
a whole simulation model that produces global 
Earth simulations systems. This is a goal in the 
future, and could be a very useful policy and advo-
cacy tool. However, it cannot be done at a scale 
that would make any sense beyond the global level 
at this stage. For models to inform risk reduction, 
preparedness and response efforts, they need to be 
at the local level. Machine learning may be able to 
assist in this, but it requires a lot of effort to ensure 
data is fed into the system in the right way. This is 
an area that is likely to expand in the future as multi-
hazard risk continues to be considered.
For data to be used for disaster risk management, 
it must be discoverable, available, accessible and 
usable.209 Initiatives such as the United Nations 
Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial Infor-
mation Management work on Geospatial Infor-
mation and Services for Disasters highlight that 
during a crisis, the sharing of data about citizens 
and infrastructure among international organi-
zation, NGOs and governments can be critically 
important. 
In recent years, the impacts from natural hazards 
such as typhoons and hurricanes, as well as 
epidemics such as the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa, have heightened the gaps in availability and 
access of data. The increasing need for data to be 
used in DRR and management has also highlighted 
challenges in coordination and collaboration 
among stakeholders. This led the United Nations 
Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial Infor-
mation Management to create a Strategic Frame-
work for Geospatial Information and Services for 
Disasters. 
Successful implementation of the strategic frame-
work will lead to an outcome where “the human, 
socioeconomic and environmental risks and 
impacts of disasters are prevented or reduced 
through the use of geospatial information and 
services.”210 
The strategic framework builds on key documents 
such as the Sendai Framework and United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 59/12, and calls 
for all Member States and other stakeholders to 
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institutionalize good governance practices and 
science-based policies, supported by improved 
capacities on human resource, infrastructure 
and geospatial data management. By supporting 
countries in addressing the challenges and social, 
economic and environmental impacts of disasters, 
it contributes to sustainable development efforts.
4.1.5  
Data science
The ability to create data is still ahead of the ability 
to solve complex problems by using the data. There 
is no doubt that there is a huge amount of value yet 
to be gained from the information contained within 
the data generated. The growth in the amount of 
data collected brings with it a growing requirement 
to be able to find the right information at the right 
time, and challenges of how to store, maintain and 
use the data collected. 
The concept of using computer science and compu-
tational processing in science and technology is 
not new. For nearly two decades, there have been 
evolving practices and processes in the use of data 
science. What is becoming more mainstream is the 
shift to a context where there is no longer a reli-
ance on costly supercomputers to host and process 
data. The growth of cloud computing, using a 
distributed network of computing where processes 
can run parallel on many machines, is lowering the 
cost of entry for many users. This means that there 
is now greater uptake and use of cloud computing 
for risk management. Coupling this with the devel-
opments in machine learning and artificial intelli-
gence allows greater interactions within disparate 
data sets and enables more granular modelling of 
the drivers of risk. 
The cloud computing model is becoming the 
prevailing mode of work for most medium- and 
large-scale global data sets, including Earth obser-
vation (EO) applications. This is due to the ability of 
cloud services to archive large satellite-generated 
data sets and provide the computing facilities to 
process them. 
As cloud computing services are being more widely 
used, the technology is maturing rapidly. Taking the 
example of EO analysis as a use case, there are 
many different platforms and applications avail-
able for the risk community to use. These include 
the Open Data Cube,211 Copernicus Data and Infor-
mation Access Services,212 Earth on Amazon Web 
Services,213 Google Earth Engine,214 the JRC Earth 
Observation Data and Processing Platform,215 NASA 
Earth Exchange,216 and the European Centre for 
Medium-Range Weather Forecasts Climate Data 
Store.217
Each of these cloud computing services has differ-
ent benefits. These range from the way the data 
is ingested (some include pre-loaded data, which 
reduces the effort on the part of the user) to script-
ing language (which is used for the processing). 
One of the main disadvantages of using cloud 
services is their lack of interoperability. This means 
that for users, there must be a trade-off between 
flexibility and ease of use. For example, Amazon 
Web Services are flexible, but they require users 
to be capable of developing applications using 
basic content libraries. This flexibility comes at the 
cost of needing to have a steep learning curve. By 
contrast, Google Earth Engine provides immediate 
access to functions and data, reducing the barrier 
to entry. 
Set against the benefits of cloud computing, there 
are some issues that need to be considered in its 
207  (Belmont Forum 2015)
208  (GEO 2015)
209  (Murnane et al. 2019)
210  (United Nations Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial 
Information Management 2017)
211  (Open Data Cube 2019)
212  (EU 2019)
213  (Amazon 2019)
214  (Google 2019)
215  (Soille et al. 2018)
216  (NASA 2019a)
217  (EU 2019)
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use. These include the recognition that the distribu-
tion of available technology is rarely even, and that 
many areas still have challenges meeting the needs 
of basic electricity let alone the high-speed Internet 
connectivity required for accessing, sharing and 
processing large quantities of data. For this reason, 
it is often necessary for software developers to 
factor in the ability to function offline along with the 
capacity for downloading the required data sets, so 
models can be run locally. Access to electricity is 
a particular concern in an active disaster scenario, 
so the capacity to work offline is essential. Some 
models can take multiple days to run, and if power 
is cut or technology fails during that period, the 
model must be re-run, which costs valuable time 
and computing resources.
Large amounts of data (from traditional in situ 
sources as well as satellite sensors) are now being 
exchanged rapidly and across the globe by research-
ers and practitioners in many different fields. The 
growing interdependence among traditional scien-
tific disciplines leads to the practice that data 
collected in one discipline is likely to be used in 
other disciplines. This leads to the greater need of 
sharing of data for the advancement of science.218 
One of the main benefits from the large amount 
of data that has been created from EO sensors 
and many other sources has been developments 
in automated knowledge discovery. The ease of 
access to computational processing power, as well 
as better access to data, has led to the develop-
ment of machine learning techniques. As identified 
by GFDRR, with any new and emerging technolo-
gies, there are many ambiguous and overlap-
ping terminologies such as artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, big data and deep learning.219 
For this purpose, it is accepted that the terms are 
interchangeable. 
Risk management is no exception to the use of 
machine learning, and there are new applications 
and uses continually being developed. Many of 
the uses of machine learning within disaster risk 
management focus on the improvement of the 
different components of risk modelling, such as 
exposure, vulnerability, hazard and risk. 
Machine learning is moving beyond hard-coded 
algorithms to algorithms that continually learn 
and update themselves. This is facilitated by the 
development of methods where a machine may be 
instructed to seek information within large quanti-
ties of apparently unstructured data.220 Although 
recent developments are delivering very power-
ful machine learning algorithms, it is important to 
remember that a model is only as good as the data 
used within it. 
4.2 
Conclusions
It is clear from recent developments that open data 
and analysis, shared and interoperable software, 
computing power and other technology, are the 
technical enablers of improved data science, risk 
assessment and risk modelling. For their success, 
they also rely on the willingness of people to work 
with other disciplines, across cultural, language 
and political boundaries, and to create the right 
regulatory environment for new and urgent work to 
proceed.
218  (Kunisawa 2006)
219  (GFDRR 2018b)
220  (UN-GGIM 2015)
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Overwhelmingly, the shift to the Sendai Framework 
has ushered in a period of methodologically compli-
cated but ultimately accurate thinking and working 
about reducing risk. Examples of extraordinary 
advances in technological ability, openness, integra-
tion and mutual support inspire hope for the future. 
However, significant challenges remain. 
There are still mainstream journals and newspa-
pers that publish articles about natural disasters 
(a term long-abandoned by the risk community 
– with emphasis on the tagline “disasters are not 
natural”). There are still those who would prefer to 
think of risk as a function only of hazard, with very 
limited perspectives on exposure and vulnerability. 
There are those who would prefer to see familiar 
risk metrics like PML attributed to each country, and 
are not bothered at how limited a picture of risk that 
presents. 
There are still serious challenges related to how 
to calculate, characterize or depict certain kinds 
of data. The most obvious is the challenge with 
presenting probability of non-probabilistic hazards 
–many of which have already been outlined in 
this GAR – or of characterizing the vulnerability of 
people or assets to different hazards. 
There are still challenges related to prioritization of 
risk reduction in the grand scheme of public invest-
ment and development planning. There are chal-
lenges related to the politicization of certain kinds 
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of risk and risk-reducing actions, and there are chal-
lenges related to the resources required to face risk 
in a meaningful way.
5.1 
Mindset challenges
There is growing interest to show the links among 
hazards, particularly hazards affected by climate 
change and their threat to human security through 
impacts on economies and livelihoods. However, 
the connection is complex. While water scarcity 
and food insecurity have been shown to play roles 
in displacement and unstable livelihood conditions, 
little is known about the strength of those relation-
ships. Researchers are still grappling with how to 
ascertain specific drivers in ways that inform delib-
erate action. 
The highly varied and complex nature of hazards 
dictates the need for continuous efforts by experts 
and authorities to reduce the risks of disaster that 
can affect human health, infrastructure and envi-
ronmental resources. Ageing infrastructure and 
weak institutional and infrastructural capacities 
pose a challenge to risk management in many 
regions of the world. Industrial safety is not always 
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high on political agendas, and human error comes 
into play when companies and authorities become 
complacent. Multidisciplinary cooperation across 
authorities is key to strengthening industrial safety 
governance with prevention at the forefront. Some 
countries, including large industrialized ones, are 
yet to establish dedicated disaster prevention and 
preparedness programmes and protocols. In the 
case of industrial safety, the number of Parties to 
the Industrial Accidents Convention has risen to 
41 and the National Implementation Reports show 
progress over time. Past accidents have highlighted 
that transboundary cooperation on accident preven-
tion and transboundary water pollution require 
greater attention. 
The recommendation of the OECD Council on the 
governance of critical risks, adopted by Ministers 
in May 2014, recommends that “Members estab-
lish and promote a comprehensive, all-hazards and 
transboundary approach to country risk governance 
to serve as the foundation for enhancing national 
resilience and responsiveness.”221 Every disaster 
has had an enormous impact on enhancing aware-
ness and safety. Lessons learned have been care-
fully identified and are incorporated in the regimes 
worldwide. However, it is important to keep in mind 
the overarching conclusion of the root causes of the 
disasters as being cultural and institutional.222 The 
follow-up of INSAG emphasizes that “to achieve 
high levels of safety in all circumstances and 
against all challenges, the nuclear safety system 
in its entirety must be robust.”223 But if catastrophic 
failure is the most reliable driver of change, it is 
clearly not a sufficiently proactive mindset. 
Building a comprehensive, all-hazards and trans-
boundary approach to risk governance is not an 
easy endeavour. There is an increased aware-
ness of the importance of establishing such an 
approach, with Japan being one of the leading 
examples. At the international level, this GAR repre-
sents a milestone in the efforts to develop global 
overview of risk trends and risk management. 
Finally, the NEA report represents a major mile-
stone for the nuclear sector in contributing to the 
all-hazards mindset.224  
The Sendai Framework is a first step to fostering 
increased awareness of all risk and multi-stake-
holder collaboration to better manage risk. Inte-
gration of anthropogenic risks in the GAR and the 
GRAF will bring international attention to this topic 
and will change public perspectives on reducing 
these kinds of risks.
5.2 
Political challenges
The rapid rate of urbanization happening world-
wide poses a wide range of challenges for 
governments, industry and other stakeholders in 
preventing and managing the risks and impacts 
associated with hazardous industrial facilities. 
Socioeconomic pressures to develop land for 
housing or other uses in hazard-prone areas is 
increasing. Some major incidents such as that at 
the port of Tianjin in China (2015) are a reminder 
that the effects can often be rendered more 
severe due to the absence of appropriate safety 
measures. It is a delicate challenge to balance the 
needs and demands of society and make best use 
of available tools to address risks. 
The reduction of risk rarely features high on national 
political agendas. On the one hand, the risk of 
complacency in countries with a seemingly high 
level of safety standards may hamper the priority of 
this policy area. On the other hand, a predominant 
focus on economic development in other countries 
contributes to the lack of political visibility given 
to hazard or risk prevention and preparedness poli-
cies. The Sendai Framework presents an opportu-
nity in this respect – to raise the profile of all risk 
reduction and convince policymakers of the need to 
continue and step up investments in prevention – 
rather than bearing the cost of inaction.
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The Macondo blowout and explosion of an 
offshore oil drilling well in the Gulf of Mexico 
caused 11 deaths and 16 critical injuries. It 
dumped approximately 5 million barrels of 
oil into the Gulf of Mexico. In its study of the 
Macondo accident, the Deepwater Horizon 
Study Group noted that it was marked by orga-
nizational failures including: 
Box 5.1. Macondo, United States of America, 2010
Figure 5.1. Envisat image of oil spilling into the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of the United States of America, on 22 
April 2010; the oil spill is visible as a dark purple whirl at centre bottom
221  (OECD 2014b)
222  (IAEA 2015b); (IAEA 2017a) 
223  (IAEA 2017)
224  (NEA 2018b)
(Source: ESA 2010 and Nadeau, P H. (2015). 
a. Multiple system operator malfunctions 
during a critical period in operations
b. Not following required or accepted opera-
tions guidelines (“casual compliance”) 
c. Neglected maintenance
d. Instrumentation that either did not work 
properly or whose data interpretation gave 
false positives
e. Inappropriate assessment and management 
of operations risks
f. Multiple operations conducted at critical 
times with unanticipated interactions 
g. Inadequate communications between 
members of the operations groups
h. Lack of awareness of risks
i. Diversion of attention at critical times 
j. Culture with incentives that provided 
increases in productivity without commen-
surate increases in protection
k. Inappropriate cost and corner cutting 
l. Lack of appropriate selection and training 
of personnel 
m. Improper management of change
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5.3 
Technological 
challenges
While probabilistic models have been in develop-
ment for decades, there is a lack of consolidated 
risk analysis methodologies and tools. Extensions 
to traditional industrial risk analysis are needed to 
consider the characteristics of anthropogenic and 
other non-probabilistic events. The risks are there-
fore not adequately considered in deterministic risk 
assessment. As a clear understanding of the full 
nature of risk is suboptimal, preparedness levels 
are low, even in countries generally considered well 
prepared for disasters.
Data availability is the bottleneck in understanding 
many hazards. Data is the basis for gaining knowl-
edge on the dynamics of risk, and is crucial for risk 
assessment, scenario planning and risk reduction 
practice. Data (un) availability is driven by a variety 
of factors. In natural-disaster situations, chained 
events like NATECH disasters are often overlooked, 
and their importance is recognized only when the 
full brunt of their impact becomes visible in terms 
of medium- to long-term health effects, persistent 
water and soil pollution, and major economic losses 
due to clean-up and recovery. An additional reason 
for data unavailability is that information on tech-
nological risks is often considered confidential and 
is closely held by industry or as a matter of national 
security. In many countries, there is no register of 
disaster impact, and often regulators do not even 
know the number, activity type and location of 
hazardous installations in a country’s territory. Also, 
there is a tendency among operators of hazardous 
installations to avoid voluntarily disclosing informa-
tion about accidents or near misses in their estab-
lishments to avoid negative repercussions on their 
activity.225 
Another contributing factor to the scarcity of data 
is the loss of stakeholder interest in the risk once 
media attention abates. This usually goes together 
with a redefinition of priorities and a subsequent 
drop in resources available for mitigating a specific 
risk. Economic pressures are a powerful factor in 
decision-making, especially for activities and loca-
tions where profit margins are poor or in coun-
tries suffering from other governance challenges. 
Economic constraints can lead to intentional or 
unintentional bad decision-making where, for 
example, productivity gains or the optimization of 
operational efficiency are prioritized over possible 
safety concerns.226 In some cases, the failure to 
implement adequate risk management solutions 
can also be attributed to economic drivers, for 
example when resources are stretched, and other 
risks are perceived as more critical. The quality of 
information in loss databases is not uniform, and 
exhibits different levels of detail and accuracy. 
The level of detail is particularly heterogeneous for 
anthropogenic hazards. 
Vulnerability remains a weak component in hazard 
models. As noted in previous chapters, with few 
exceptions, vulnerability has – until recently – 
been examined largely in terms of physical vulner-
ability only. Socioeconomic vulnerability is much 
more complicated, and its inclusion in models will 
require clearer definitions, different kinds of data 
and a series of delicate decisions about what can 
be modelled. It is also a dynamic variable depend-
ing on the scenario; for example, in epidemics, 
any given disease is usually identified as affect-
ing certain groups faster and more severely than 
others. Validation of models is also a technical 
challenge. Satellites can provide a great deal of 
information for certain kinds of risk information, 
but the models need to be validated with ground-
based evidence, which requires resources. Finding 
answers at one scale by extracting them from a 
much larger scale risks the validity of the conclu-
sions if not done very carefully. The use of proxies 
– imperfect functions to characterize elements for 
which no accurate measurement is possible – is 
a popular way of enriching risk models, but this 
practice risks the credibility and defensibility of 
the results. Ground-truth exercises are becoming a 
standard requirement, as are requests for validation 
of climate change impact at the local level. 
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5.4 
Resource challenges
Foreseeable disasters continue to happen in coun-
tries with generally high levels of risk awareness 
and advanced risk management capacities. The 
situation is even more challenging in the develop-
ing world where the foundational facilities, techni-
cal competencies and computing capacity are often 
lacking, leaving decision makers ill-prepared to 
understand risk on their own terms. Moreover, low-
income countries often struggle to access financial 
support, particularly as risk reduction often falls 
outside the humanitarian funding stream.
In the case of an active disaster situation, manag-
ing impact on the population and built environ-
ment while having to respond to a chained hazard 
event precipitated by the first event inevitably leads 
to competition for scarce response resources.227 
For example, after the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake in 
Turkey, about half of Izmit fire department’s human 
resources were sent to fight the fire at a burning oil 
refinery instead of being available to support search 
and rescue for earthquake victims.228 This becomes 
complicated because the consequences of the 
secondary event could include the risk of toxic 
releases, fires or explosions that would hamper 
emergency-response activities and exacerbate 
impact by endangering the first responders.229
5.5 
Conclusions 
An important paradigm shift has been taking place 
in risk communication towards integrated and 
participatory processes, which are often challeng-
ing to manage in practice. Risk communication 
cannot be viewed as an afterthought to risk assess-
ment and decision-making. Risk information and 
warnings are likely to be questioned by populations 
who are anxious about the decisions they are being 
asked to make related to the risk. If people are 
asked to evacuate to uncomfortable shelters, they 
will want good reasons for this. Their criteria may 
not emphasize accurate scientific evidence or may 
they interpret it differently to risk researchers. The 
involvement of a wider community in risk assess-
ment, management and mitigation would improve 
risk literacy, benefiting authors and readers, there-
fore ensuring that risk communication is more 
effective, and that people’s questions about risk are 
addressed.
The following challenges require direct attention 
and action:
225  (Krausmann, Cruz and Salzano 2017)
226  (Wood et al. 2017)
227  (Necci et al. 2018)
228  (Cruz et al. 2004)  
229  (Girgin 2011)
230  (IRGC 2015)
• Awareness: Further educational and awareness-
raising campaigns are needed to help stake-
holders recognize vulnerability to hazards. 
• Risk governance: Risk governance should be 
approached in a holistic way. Also, private 
sector and government need to have the incen-
tives and modes that facilitate sharing the 
responsibility and cost of risk. IRGC proposes 
an innovative risk governance framework and 
guidelines on how to address emerging risks.230
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• Legal infrastructure: As experience shows that 
risk reduction works best if required by law, 
specific legislation for risk reduction should 
be enacted and enforced. This needs to be 
accompanied by guidance on how to achieve 
the goals set out in the legal framework to help 
industry be compliant and to support authorities 
in assessing if undertaking has met the associ-
ated safety objectives. A liability and compensa-
tion framework is also required. 
• Risk communication: Communication at all 
levels should be improved to ensure that infor-
mation on risks flows freely and effectively 
across all of society. Better exchange of and 
access to risk management resources should 
also be guaranteed. 
• Risk assessment: Research should focus on the 
development of methodologies and tools for 
risk assessment and mapping. For this purpose, 
better loss and damage functions are needed 
for all hazards. Human, environmental and eco-
nomic impacts should also be assessed, with 
the latter two often being neglected. 
• Data collection: The easy and free sharing of 
relevant data on all risks, disaster events and 
even near misses should be promoted and 
facilitated to support learning from past events 
for prevention and mitigation. Data exchange 
should ideally also happen among sectors and 
countries. 
• Cooperation and partnerships: Cooperation 
among all stakeholders, particularly at the local 
level, is essential for reducing risks. Public–pri-
vate partnerships, and regional and international 
networks should be fostered that facilitate col-
laboration for effective risk management.
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231  (UNISDR 2011a)
232  (UNISDR 2011a)
233  (van Lanen et al. 2017); (UNESCO 2016)
234  (Spinoni et al. 2018); (IPCC 2014)
235  (Wilhite 2014); (Wilhite, Sivakumar and Pulwarty 2014)
236  (Wilhite 2014); (Global Water Partnership Central and Eastern 
Europe 2015)
Among the weather-related natural hazards, drought 
is probably the most complex and severe due to its 
intrinsic nature and wide-ranging and cascading 
impacts. It affects agricultural production, public 
water supply, energy production, transportation, 
tourism, human health, biodiversity, natural ecosys-
tems, etc. Droughts are recurrent; they can last 
from a few weeks to several years, and can affect 
large areas and populations. The related impacts 
develop slowly, are often indirect and can linger 
for long times after the end of the drought. While 
the impacts result in severe economic losses, envi-
ronmental damage and human suffering, they are 
generally less visible than the impacts of other 
natural hazards (e.g. floods and storms) that 
cause immediate and structural damages, which 
are clearly linked to the hazard and quantifiable 
in economic terms.231 Therefore, the drought risk 
is often underestimated and remains a “hidden” 
hazard.232 Proactive drought risk management is 
still not a reality in most parts of the world.
Drought-related fatalities mainly occur in poor coun-
tries. However, in wealthy countries, people suffer 
from indirect effects such as heat stress or dust, 
leading to a variety of health impacts.233 Examples 
are persistent unemployment, migration and social 
instability related to failures in public water supply, 
food insecurity and potential conflict.
Drought is likely to become more frequent and 
severe in the twenty-first century in many regions of 
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the world.234 A better understanding of the physical 
processes leading to drought, its propagation, the 
societal and environmental vulnerability to drought 
and its impacts are more important than ever. The 
key challenge is to move to the widespread adop-
tion of proactive risk management strategies.235 
This includes the analysis of past trends and future 
projections of drought, as well as analysis of the 
societal and environmenttal exposure and vulner-
ability. All determine drought risk, which can be 
managed by developing policies and management 
plans that are adapted to the local context.236 
Droughts are a recurring feature and are defined 
with respect to the long-term average climate 
of a given region. They should be distinguished 
from aridity, a seasonally or fully dry climate (e.g. 
desert) and from water scarcity, a situation where 
the climatologically available water resources are 
insufficient to satisfy long-term average water 
requirements. A megadrought is a very lengthy and 
pervasive drought, lasting much longer than normal, 
usually a decade or more. 
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Depending on the effect in the hydrological 
cycle and the impact on society and environ-
ment, different drought types can commonly 
be distinguished: 
1. Meteorological drought is a period of 
months to years with a deficit in precipitation 
or climatological water balance (i.e. precipi-
tation minus potential evapotranspiration) 
in a given region. The deficit is defined with 
respect to the long-term climatology. These 
droughts are often accompanied by above-
normal temperatures and precede and cause 
other types of droughts. Meteorological 
drought is caused by persistent anomalies in 
large-scale atmospheric circulation patterns, 
which are often triggered by anomalous 
tropical sea-surface temperatures or other 
remote conditions.
2. Soil moisture (agricultural) drought is a 
period with reduced soil moisture that results 
from below-average precipi tation. This 
impinges on crop production, causes land 
degradation and affects ecosystem function 
in general. 
3. Hydrological drought occurs when river 
stream flow and water storage in aquifers, 
lakes or reservoirs fall below long-term mean 
levels. Hydrological drought develops slowly 
because it involves stored water that is 
depleted but not replenished. Time series of 
these variables are used to analyse the occur-
rence, duration and severity of hydrological 
droughts. 
Box 6.1. Drought types 
While a lack of precipitation often triggers drought, 
other factors, including more-intense but less-
frequent precipitation, soil moisture conditions, 
poor water management and soil erosion, can also 
cause or enhance these droughts. Overgrazing, for 
example, led to elevated erosion and dust-storms 
that amplified the “Dust Bowl” drought of the 
1930s over the Great Plains in North America.237 
Droughts threaten human security because they 
undermine livelihoods, compromise culture and 
individual identity, and increase migration. As they 
can also undermine the ability of States to provide 
the conditions necessary for human security. 
Droughts may influence some or all the factors 
at the same time. Situations of acute insecu-
rity, such as famine and sociopolitical instability, 
usually emerge from the interaction of multiple 
factors. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic 
is a clear example of how drought could acceler-
ate instability.238,239 For many populations that are 
already socially marginalized, resource dependent 
and have limited capital assets, human security 
will be progressively undermined. In such cases, 
sequences of smaller magnitude droughts can 
have disproportionate impacts.
6.1 
Drought indicators
Different drought types require different indicators 
for their characterization. The World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the Global Water Partner-
ship (GWP) published an overview on widely used 
drought indicators.240 The standardized precipita-
tion index (SPI) and the standardized precipitation-
evapotranspiration index (SPEI),241,242 for example, 
are well known for meteorological drought analy-
sis. Indicators related to soil moisture such as the 
drought severity index243 or the Palmer drought 
severity index244 aim to characterize drought 
impact in terms of plant water stress. Hydrologi-
cal indicators such as flow percentiles are used to 
quantify the volume of water deficit in rivers and 
reservoirs.245 Finally, indicators based on remote 
sensing, such as the normalized-difference vegeta-
tion index or the fraction of absorbed photosyntheti-
cally active radiation, are used to monitor drought 
effects on vegetation. 
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Combined indicators that blend several physical 
indicators into a single indicator have recently been 
developed. The European Drought Observatory, for 
instance, uses the combined drought indicator246 to 
monitor drought impacts on agricultural and natural 
ecosystems. 
To obtain an overview of the potential impacts of 
droughts, a core set of variables is needed to repre-
sent different aspects related to the water deficit. 
Frequency, intensity and duration are some of the 
key drought variables. Severity describes the accu-
mulated deficit over the entire duration of an event, 
while intensity describes the average degree of the 
precipitation, soil moisture or water storage deficit 
during a drought. Both may determine the degree of 
associated impact. 
For instance, the duration and area affected are 
linked to the propagation in time and space of the 
water deficit. Longer and more widespread events 
might trigger cascading effects, the magnitude of 
which is directly related to the water deficit. The 
timing of the onset, cessation and end of a drought 
are particularly relevant information during the 
growing season. The impacts of a drought may be 
felt after the drought has ended. 
An emerging consideration in drought analysis is 
the occurrence of subseasonal (less than three 
months) drought events that can intensify or extend 
longer-term drought or background aridity. These 
“flash droughts” refer to relatively short periods 
of warm surface temperature and anomalously 
low soil moisture. Based on the physical mecha-
nisms associated with flash droughts, these events 
are classified into two categories: heat-wave and 
precipitation deficits.247 
Understanding the mechanisms behind low-
frequency climate features like the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation is key to seasonal prediction of drought 
events. Though it is still incipient, reliable seasonal 
prediction with a reliable monitoring network and an 
appropriate risk assessment will allow for the devel-
opment of EWSs.248
6.2 
Climate change and 
future droughts
Improvements in knowledge have reinforced the 
findings of the Fourth Assessment Report of 
IPCC,249 especially with respect to an increasing risk 
of rapid, abrupt and irreversible change with high 
levels of warming. These risks include increasing 
aridity, drought and extreme temperatures in many 
regions of the world.250 Despite the uncertainty in 
climate projections, several regions of the globe are 
likely to experience increased drought frequencies 
and/or intensities in the twenty-first century. These 
include countries in the Mediterranean, Southern 
Africa, South-Western North America and Central 
America.251
A reduction in precipitation or changing precipita-
tion patterns and greater evaporative demands 
related to higher temperatures are the underly-
ing processes driving such changes. A tempera-
ture increase of 3°C is estimated to bring current 
100-year droughts (severe droughts that occur once 
237  (Cook, Miller and Seager 2009)
238  (Erian, Katlan and Babah 2011)
239  (Erian et al. 2014)
240  (Svoboda and Fuchs 2016)
241  (Mckee, Doesken and Kleist 1993)
242  (Vicente-Serrano, Beguería and López-Moreno 2009)
243  (Cammalleri, Micale and Vogt 2015)
244  (Palmer 1965)
245  (Hisdal et al. 2004); (Cammalleri, Vogt and Salamon 2017)
246  (Sepulcre-Canto et al. 2012)
247  (Otkin et al. 2018)
248  (Dutra et al. 2015); (Naumann et al. 2014)
249  (IPCC 2007)
250  (World Bank 2012)
251  (Orlowsky and Seneviratne 2012)
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every 100 years) to around 30% of the emerged 
lands on a 10-year basis.252
These scenarios suggest that drought risk will 
increase for many economic sectors and vulnerable 
regions unless appropriate climate change miti-
gation and adaptation measures are taken. Many 
regions in the world with high population densities 
and vulnerable societies that rely on local agricul-
tural production could experience significant losses 
because of droughts. 
Studies after the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
indicate that there is medium confidence in a 
projected increase in duration and intensity of 
droughts in some regions of the world, including 
Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region, 
Central Europe, Central North America, Central 
America and Mexico, North-East Brazil and South-
ern Africa. Decreases in soil moisture are likely in 
several regions, particularly in Central and South-
ern Europe, and Southern Africa. For a range of 
scenarios, soil moisture droughts lasting four to 
six months double in extent and frequency, and 
droughts longer than 12 months become three 
times more common, between the mid-twentieth 
century and the end of the twenty-first century.253 
A decrease in soil moisture can increase the risk of 
extreme hot days and heat-waves.254
Figure 6.1. Drought severity according to SPI-12 (left) and SPEI-12 (right). Top panels show the cumulative severity for the 
period 1981–2010, bottom panels show the difference between the periods 1951–1980 and 1981–2010. Grey zones represent 
masked cold and desert areas. 
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
(Source: JRC 2018)
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Compared to the analysis of past trends, the effect 
of temperature becomes more evident in drought 
projections. Drought projections use two IPCC 
representative concentration pathways (RCPs). 
RCP4.5 projects a future scencario characterized by 
strong reforestation programmes, decreasing use 
of croplands and grasslands, stringent climate poli-
cies, CO2 emissions increasing only slightly before 
soon declining. RCP8.5 projects a scenario in 
which CO2 emissions rise continuously, there is an 
increased use of croplands and grassland, a popu-
lation of 12 billion by 2100, heavy reliance on fossil 
fuels and no implementation of climate policies.255 
According to model outputs using SPI, drought 
severity is likely to increase in some areas by the 
end of the twenty-first century: Argentina and Chile, 
the Mediterranean and large parts of Southern 
Africa, under both RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 climate 
scenarios. Areas in South-Eastern China and South-
ern Australia are likely to experience an increase 
in drought severity only under the more extreme 
climate scenario, the RCP8.5. As expected, almost 
the entire globe, excluding northern North America, 
northern latitudes in Eurasia, and maritime South-
East Asia, show a tendency towards an increase in 
drought severity, which is even stronger based on 
RCP8.5. SPEI model outputs suggests that many 
more regions will likely experience more-frequent 
and more-severe drought events.
Combining the information derived from Figures 
6.1 and 6.2, most of the drought hot spots of the 
last decades are projected to see a further increase 
in DS, thus becoming the areas at highest risk of 
impacts, including irreversible land degradation. 
252  (Naumann et al. 2018)
253  (Sheffield and Wood 2008)
254  (Seneviratne et al. 2006)
255  (IPCC 2019)
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Figure 6.2. Drought severity (DS) to SPI-12 (left) and SPEI-12 (right). All panels show the difference in percentage between 
1981–2010 and 2071–2100 under RCP4.5 (top) and RCP8.5 (bottom) scenarios. Light grey zones represent areas in which less 
than two thirds of the simulations agree on the sign of change. Dark grey zones represent the cold and desert masked areas.
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
The regions where a continuous increase in DS is 
projected, according to moderate and high-emis-
sion scenarios (RCP4.5 and 8.5) are Argentina and 
Southern Chile, the Mediterranean region and large 
parts of Southern Africa. Higher temperatures are 
likely to exacerbate droughts in these areas.
6.3 
Assessing global 
drought risk
The term “risk” and the related terms of “hazard”, 
“exposure” and “vulnerability” have been used 
and defined in different ways within the scientific 
community, with notable differences between the 
DRR and the climate change adaptation (CCA) 
communities.256 They base their analysis on two 
theoretical frameworks, commonly referred to as 
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the outcome or impact approach (CCA commu-
nity) and the contextual or factor approach (DRR 
community).257 
The outcome or impact approach is based on the 
relationships between stressor and response. Here, 
the endpoint of the analysis is the vulnerability (the 
more damage a society suffers, the more vulnerable 
it is). This approach relies on the use of quantita-
tive measures of historical impacts as proxies for 
the vulnerability estimation.258 However, relying on 
historical impacts has several limitations, mainly 
because impacts are often available for short times-
cales only, or even unavailable, which inhibits the 
derivation of homogeneous global risk maps using 
this process. In addition, the number of affected 
people and the types of impact vary by region, thus 
hindering consistent broad-scale analyses.
The contextual or factor approach is based on 
intrinsic social or economic factors or dimensions 
that define the vulnerability. Here, the vulnerability is 
the starting point, allowing understanding why the 
exposed population or assets are susceptible to the 
damaging effects of a drought. It is more suitable 
for setting targets for risk reduction. This approach 
generally relies on combined risk determinants 
that have no common unit of measurement.259 
256  (Brooks 2003); (Field et al. 2012); (Wisner et al. 1994)
257  (Tánago et al. 2016)
258  (Brooks, Adger and Kelly 2005); (Peduzzi et al. 2009)
259  (OECD, JRC and EC 2008)
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261  (Carrão, Naumann and Barbosa 2016)
The resulting values are not an absolute measure 
of economic loss or damage to the society or the 
environment, but a relative statistic that provides 
a regional ranking of potential impacts, which can 
serve to prioritize actions for reinforcing disaster 
management and adaptation plans.
Both approaches represent alternative but comple-
mentary ways for drought risk estimation at differ-
ent scales. As drought impacts are context specific 
and vary geographically, regression models (i.e. the 
outcome approach) are important for developing 
preparedness plans and mitigation activities from 
local to national scales, while composite indicators 
(i.e. the contextual approach) can identify generic 
leverage points for reducing impacts at the regional 
to global scales.
For a global assessment, a contextual approach 
is adopted. This defines risk as a function of the 
natural hazard, the exposed assets and the inher-
ent vulnerability of the exposed social or natural 
system. Following this definition, the risk of incur-
ring losses from a drought depends on the combi-
nation of DS and the probability of occurrence, the 
exposed assets and/or people, and their vulnerabil-
ity or capacity to cope with the hazard. 
End users, water managers and policymakers rely 
on drought risk assessments to better protect popu-
lations from shocks and to develop management 
plans to reduce impacts. Therefore, drought risk 
assessments should include information tailored to 
the needs of specific users. This information should 
answer questions about where and which entities 
are more likely to be affected. As exposure and 
vulnerability vary between economic sectors (e.g. 
agriculture, public water supply, energy production, 
inland water transport, tourism and public health) 
and different ecosystems, drought risk assess-
ments need to be sector specific.
6.4
 
Assessing the risk for 
agriculture and other 
primary sectors 
This section presents an example of a global 
drought risk assessment with emphasis on agricul-
tural and primary sector impacts, which are relevant 
at the global scale. The assessment is based on 
the conceptual approach proposed by UNDP.260,261 
It includes the assessment of the hazard, the expo-
sure and the societal vulnerability, which are then 
combined to arrive at an assessment of the risk for 
significant impacts due to droughts. The individual 
steps are explained in the following subsections. 
6.4.1 
Assessing the hazard
Precipitation can be used as a proxy indicator of 
the water available to the coupled human–envi-
ronment system.262 The frequency and intensity of 
precipitation deficits, therefore, can represent the 
drought hazard for a given area. However, increas-
ing temperatures and evaporative demand is now 
better understood to affect available water supplies. 
262  (Svoboda et al. 2002)
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Figure 6.3. Global drought hazard according to the weighted anomaly of standardized precipitation (WASP) index: (a) hazard, 
(b) exposure and (c) vulnerability
(a)
(Source: JRC 2018)
(b)
(Source: JRC 2018)
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(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
In the present assessment, drought hazard was 
estimated as the probability of exceedance of the 
median of global severe precipitation deficits for 
a historical reference period (1901–2010) (Figure 
6.3(a)). The severity of the precipitation deficit is 
computed by means of the WASP index.263 The 
WASP index was selected because it: is standard-
ized in time and space; allows confining the influ-
ence of large standardized anomalies that result 
from small precipitation amounts occurring near 
the beginning or end of dry seasons; and empha-
sizes anomalies during the rainy season when 
crops are more sensitive to water fluctuations.
6.4.2 
Assessing the exposure
Meaningful information about the exposure is 
related to the entities, assets, infrastructures, agri-
cultural land and people located in a drought-prone 
area. The model of drought exposure as applied 
for this GAR is computed and validated based on 
spatially explicit geographic layers. This approach 
to drought exposure is comprehensive and consid-
ers the spatial distribution of several physical 
elements (proxy indicators) characterizing agricul-
ture and primary sector activities,264 namely: crop 
areas (agricultural drought), livestock (agricultural 
drought), industrial/domestic water stress (hydro-
logical drought) and human population (socioeco-
nomic drought).
This approach proposes a non-compensatory 
model to combine the different proxy indicators 
of drought exposure. Using this methodology, 
superiority in one indicator cannot be offset by 
an inferiority in another indicator. Thus, a region 
is highly exposed to drought if at least one type 
of asset is abundant there. For example, a region 
that is completely covered by rain-fed crops is fully 
exposed to drought, independent of the presence of 
other elements at risk. 
(c)
180 Chapter 6
(Source: JRC 2018)
(a)
Figure 6.4. (a) Global distribution of livestock in number per grid cell, (b) global agricultural lands, in per cent croplands per grid 
cell, (c) Global human settlement population estimates for 2015. Distribution and density of population, in number of people per 
grid cell, and (d) baseline water stress: total annual water withdrawals (municipal, industrial and agricultural), as a percentage of 
the total annual available flow.
263  (Lyon and Barnston 2005) 264  (Carrão, Naumann and Barbosa 2016)
(b)
(Source: JRC 2018)
181
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
(d)
(Source: JRC 2018)
(c)
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6.4.3 
Assessing the vulnerability 
Vulnerability assessments are a key component 
of any drought risk estimation as they support the 
design of mid- and long-term preparedness actions 
to target sectors or more sensitive populations. 
Particularly, interventions to reduce drought impact 
should be oriented towards mitigating the vulner-
ability of human and natural systems.
In the present framework, vulnerability to drought 
is represented by a multidimensional model 
composed of social, economic and infrastructural 
factors. Social vulnerability is linked to the level of 
well-being of individuals, communities and society. 
Economic vulnerability is highly dependent upon the 
economic status of individuals, communities and 
nations. Infrastructural vulnerability is comprised 
of the basic infrastructures needed to support the 
production of goods and sustainability of liveli-
hoods. This definition of vulnerability is in line with 
the framework proposed by UNDRR,265 where vulner-
ability is defined as a reflection of the state of the 
individual and collective social, economic and infra-
structural factors of a specific region. Such factors 
may be viewed as the foundation on which local 
plans for reducing vulnerability and facilitating 
adaptation are built.266
According to this theoretical framework, each factor 
is characterized by generic proxies that reflect 
the level of quality of different constituents of a 
society and its economy. This follows the concept 
that individuals and populations require a range 
of independent factors or capacities to achieve 
positive resilience to impacts and that no single 
factor is sufficient to describe the varied livelihood 
outcomes that societies need to cope with such 
disasters.
As represented in Figure 6.3(c), the most vulner-
able regions to drought are in Central America, 
North-West South America, Central and South Asia, 
South-Western North America and almost the entire 
African continent, except for some areas in South-
ern Africa. These results match the outcomes of 
265  (UNISDR 2004)
266  (Naumann et al. 2014)
267  (Brooks, Adger and Kelly 2005)
268  (Carrão, Naumann and Barbosa 2016)
other authors,267 which classified nearly all nations 
situated in sub-Saharan Africa among the most 
vulnerable to climate disasters. 
6.4.4 
Assessing the drought risk
Figure 6.3 presents the three components of 
drought risk as well as their combination, which 
results in the global drought risk map. The three 
components of risk were aggregated following a 
multivariate and non-parametric linear program-
ming algorithm (Data Envelopment Analysis).268 
The values for each component are not an abso-
lute measure, but a relative statistic that provides 
a regional ranking of potential impacts (hot spots) 
with which to prioritize actions to reinforce adap-
tation plans and mitigation activities. Figure 6.5 
shows that drought risk is generally higher for highly 
exposed regions – mainly heavily populated areas 
and regions extensively exploited for agriculture – 
such as South-Central Asia, the southeast South 
American plains, Southern and Central Europe and 
the midwestern United States of America.
6.5 
Considerations for 
other sectors
The assessment presented above is targeted to 
the agricultural sector and other primary activities. 
However, the methodology can be implemented and 
re-calibrated for analysing the risk in other sectors, 
such as energy production (hydropower generation, 
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Figure 6.5. Drought risk based on the risk components shown in Figure 6.3
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
and cooling of thermal and nuclear plants), naviga-
tion and transportation (waterways), public water 
supply or recreation, which should be part of any 
comprehensive drought risk management plan.
6.5.1 
Uncertainty
Several factors of uncertainty must be consid-
ered in such analysis, as the metrics involved are 
Though it is possible to observe analogues in the 
patterns between the drought hazard map in Figure 
6.3a and the one in Figure 6.5, different conclusions 
at local scale can be obtained by using one indica-
tor or the other.
partially subjective and conditioned by the data 
availability at a global scale. Agricultural drought 
can be quantified by several different indica-
tors, each one able to provide a valid estimate of 
the different components of drought risk. As an 
example, Figure 6.6 depicts the drought hazard 
map according to the soil moisture-based yearly 
drought severity index (YDSI). This indicator quan-
tifies the simultaneous occurrence of soil water 
deficit and extremely rare dry conditions,269 and 
could replace or be combined with the WASP index 
used above.
In the case of other sectors and related drought 
types, such as hydrological drought, the divergence 
can be more dramatic when adopting a more suit-
able indicator. Indicators related to stream flow and 
river discharge rather than soil moisture and precipi-
tation better capture the drought hazard for energy 
production and navigation. An example of such an 
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269  (Cammalleri, Micale and Vogt 2015)
270  (Cammalleri, Vogt and Salamon 2017)
271  (Bauer 2014)
Figure 6.6. Drought hazard according to YDSI, 1980-2013
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
indicator is the one reported in Figure 6.7, where the 
hazard is represented by the number of hydrologi-
cal drought events observed in a fixed time window 
(1980–2013) according to the low-flow index.270 
This indicator detects unbroken sequences of river 
The foregoing exemplifies how the maps reported 
in Figures 6.3(a), 6.6 and 6.7 are just a few of 
the possible depictions of drought hazard. This 
highlights the complexity in providing a definitive 
measure of drought hazard. Similar arguments can 
be made for drought vulnerability and exposure, 
whose characterization is even more fundamentally 
related to the factors considered relevant for the 
analysis. Factors relevant for assessing agricultural 
exposure and vulnerability may be irrelevant for 
energy production and vice versa, for example. 
Even within a specific economic sector, the options 
for representation and quantification of risk and 
discharge below a daily low-flow threshold. The 
number of events is just one of the possible metrics 
to be used to quantify the “average” hazard of a 
region to drought.
its components are multifaceted. As an example, 
power plants may depend on water directly (hydro-
power) and indirectly (cooling systems of genera-
tors). In both cases, insufficient water implies a 
reduction or a halt in energy production. Power 
plants typically use surface water;271 therefore, they 
are affected by hydrological droughts and conse-
quent low stream flows. 
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Figure 6.7. Drought hazard according to the number of events detected by the low-flow index
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
This translates into the likelihood of reduced water 
intake at the installation. An indicator such as the 
low-flow index of Figure 6.7 may provide a good 
indicator for the drought hazard for energy produc-
tion. While the use of meteorological drought 
With regard to exposure, as electricity can be 
transported long distances from the source and 
across national boundaries, identifying people 
and assets potentially affected by reductions 
in power output is a challenging task. However, 
installed power capacity is a proxy for exposure 
(Figure 6.8): the higher the capacity, the higher 
the exposure, as presumably more electricity 
users are relying on it. This assumes that, even 
if power plants are not operated at full power, 
when energy demand is high, their full capac-
ity is critical, especially when this occurs during 
warmer and drier periods.273 An advantage of 
using power capacity is that thorough data is 
indices such as SPI has been tested for limited 
geographic scales,272 a general correlation with 
hydrological droughts could not be established at 
the global scale.
available for individual installations at the global 
level.274
Actual energy demand in a given time interval may 
provide a more accurate estimate of exposure. 
Such specific information is available only for a 
limited number of power plants, while the only 
consistent data is found at the national scale, such 
as yearly electricity consumption per capita. This 
data can be downscaled through population data 
(Figure 6.9), but with some caveats. First, the per 
capita consumption refers to the whole consump-
tion, regardless of the use. For instance, indus-
trial sites in sparsely populated areas will strongly 
186 Chapter 6
272  (Barker 2016); (Bayissa et al. 2018)
273  (van Vliet et al. 2016)
274  (Global Energy Observatory et al. 2018); (S and P Global 
Platts 2015)
Figure 6.8. Map of installed power capacity whose facilities depend on water directly or indirectly (cooling)
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
influence the per capita consumption in the related 
mapping unit. Second, it assumes that electric-
ity consumption and generation are located close 
together; therefore, a drought occurring at an impor-
tant but remote power plant will not be accurately 
represented. Third, demand is equated to consump-
tion (i.e. all demand is met).
Finally, vulnerability to droughts refers to the means 
available to mitigate the lack of water. Conceptu-
ally, this may have several definitions depending on 
the context. At the power plant level, it essentially 
relates to the amount of water required to produce 
a unit of energy. 
From a broader perspective, country statistics on 
the energy sector can provide a wide range of indi-
cators that are helpful to understand and model 
overall vulnerability to droughts. Examples are 
the ratio between energy sources dependent and 
non-dependent on fresh water, the diversifica-
tion of fuel types (which usually entails different 
capacity factors), the percentage of electricity 
imports against total use, the amount of freshwa-
ter resources per capita, the ratio of water use for 
energy production against the total, the electricity 
prices evolution, etc. Each of these descriptors may 
be combined to show specific aspects of vulnerabil-
ity at the country scale. 
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Figure 6.9. Map of total electricity demand by population, as the yearly national electricity consumption per capita times 
population in 2015; note that all non-domestic uses are included
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
Box 6.2. European drought, 2003
At the end of August 2003, due to the 
ongoing drought, several power plants in 
Europe were exposed to low-flow condi-
tions. The three dimensions of risk for power 
generation can be represented as in Figure 
6.10. The circle size is proportional to the 
gross power capacity of the station, as a 
proxy for exposure (circles from smaller to 
bigger correspond to about 500 to 4,000 
MW); the hazard is represented by the low-
f low anomalies over the rivers affected 
(yellow, orange and red streams) and the river 
intake (circle colour); the transparency level 
of circles highlights the level of vulnerability 
Ideally, with specific information on power plant 
features, it would be possible to represent and 
upscale vulnerability from the individual power 
plant to the global scale. Data on the power sector 
is dispersed, uneven and sometimes inaccessible, 
but harmonized data sources are constantly evolv-
ing and improving.275 As an example of dynamic risk 
assessment at the power plant level, Figure 6.10 
shows the situation in Europe during the abnormally 
hot and dry summer of 2003, when several power 
plants had to reduce their output because they 
could not divert enough cooling water either physi-
cally or legally from the rivers.276 The map highlights 
the rivers most affected by low flows across Europe 
during the end of August 2003, by means of the low-
flow index,277 and the nuclear power plants down-
stream at risk of power reductions. Several of those 
depicted had to reduce operations due to low water 
intakes or high-water temperature.
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(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorse-
ment or acceptance by the United Nations.
Figure 6.10. Major European rivers feeding hydroelectric power generation facilities, 2003
276  (Fink et al. 2004)
277  (Cammalleri, Vogt and Salamon 2017)
associated with the cooling system, with the 
more intense colours related to the more 
vulnerable (i.e. a higher amount of water 
required per unity of energy output).
6.5.2 
Scale considerations
Besides the highlighted differences in hazard, expo-
sure and vulnerability among sectors, risk assess-
ment is also dependent on the scale of analysis. 
This is due to the generally increasing detail of input 
data when moving to smaller spatial domains. As 
such, the presented methodology allows rescal-
ing the analysis over different spatial domains and 
therefore obtaining adequate (useful) results at 
different scales of analysis. These can range from 
the farm level to the continent and the global levels 
as demonstrated above, thus allowing analysis of 
the spatial distribution of the drought risk within 
a given area of interest (e.g. farm, country, region, 
continent or global levels). 
As this framework is data driven, more socioeco-
nomic data at local levels is required to obtain 
reliable estimates. Wherever this information 
is available, it allows tailoring the analysis and 
setting adaptation strategies fitted to local require-
ments and specific sectors that might be adversely 
affected by droughts. 
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Figure 6.11. Drought hazard, exposure, vulnerability and overall drought risk for Argentina in 2018
(Source: JRC 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
Figure 6.11 shows the same analysis as shown in 
Figures 6.3 and 6.5 for the global level, based on 
the same data re-scaled for the domain of Argen-
tina. The country analysis shows that vulnerability 
in Argentina is higher in the northern part of the 
country due to weaker infrastructure and other 
drivers. 
Combining the vulnerability with the hazard and the 
exposure shows that the drought risk is lower for 
remote regions, and higher for populated areas and 
regions extensively exploited for crop production 
and livestock farming, such as the Buenos Aires, 
Córdoba and Santa Fe provinces. Regions charac-
terized by a lower or almost null exposure experi-
ence a lower drought risk. As the remaining regions 
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are still subject to severe drought events, their risk 
increases as a function of the total exposed entities 
(mainly croplands) and their local coping capacity.
6.6 
Drought impact
Drought conditions frequently remain unnoticed 
until water shortages become severe and adverse 
impacts on environment and society become 
evident. Drought impacts may be influenced by 
adaptive buffers (e.g. water storage, purchase of 
livestock feed, land and ecological conditions) or 
can continue long after precipitation has returned 
to normal (e.g. owing to groundwater, soil moisture 
or reservoir deficits). The slowly developing nature 
and long duration of drought, together with a large 
variety of impacts beyond direct and visible agricul-
tural losses, typically make the task of quantifying 
drought impact difficult.278 
Impact of droughts can be classified as direct or 
indirect.279 Examples of direct impacts include 
limited public water supplies, crop loss and damage 
to buildings due to terrain subsidence and reduced 
energy production. Because of the dependence of 
livelihoods and economic sectors on water, most 
drought impacts are indirect. These indirect effects 
can propagate quickly through the economic 
system, including trade, affecting regions far from 
where the drought originates. Indirect impacts may 
affect ecosystems and biodiversity, human health, 
commercial shipping and forestry. In extreme 
cases, drought may result in temporary or perma-
nent unemployment or even business interruption, 
and lead to malnutrition and disease in more vulner-
able countries. Drought-related damage may further 
be classified as tangible (market related) or intan-
gible (non-market related). The latter is particularly 
difficult to quantify, including, for example, ecosys-
tem degradation or the costs of long-term adapta-
tion measures.
In the few disaster databases that are publicly avail-
able, drought disasters are particularly poorly esti-
mated or are underreported.280 The general lack of 
tangible damages combined with a prolonged dura-
tion make it extremely difficult to retrieve correct or 
attributable loss estimates. Given these data gaps, 
droughts are estimated at less than 7% of total 
losses from natural hazards since 1960.281 However, 
it should be noted that there is a significant gap 
between the reported and real drought impacts, 
which hinders their systematic quantification. 
Developed and larger economies like Austra-
lia, Brazil, China or the United States of America 
suffer from economic and environmental conse-
quences of droughts. Less developed countries 
face more direct or indirect impacts on the popu-
lation. Economic damage from single drought 
events can be catastrophic, with a single event 
capable of causing billions of dollars of damage. In 
term of losses, the most severe events can affect 
the economy of an entire region or country. For 
instance, according to NatCatSERVICE data, the 
severe drought in California in 2006 caused losses 
of $4.4 billion, and during the 2013–2015 drought in 
midwestern United States of America, the reported 
losses were $3.6 billion. Estimates of impacts are 
however thought to be much higher than these 
numbers as they primarily reflect direct agricultural 
damage. The 2013–2015 drought that affected 
central eastern Brazil (mainly São Paulo, Minas 
Gerais and Rio de Janeiro) was linked to reported 
losses of about $5 billion. The 2010–2011 drought 
in the Horn of Africa is estimated to have caused up 
to a quarter of a million deaths, and to have left over 
13 million people dependent on humwanitarian aid. 
278  (Wilhite 2005)
279  (UNISDR 2011a); (Tallaksen and van Lanen 2004); (Meyer 
et al. 2013); (Spinoni et al. 2016)
280  (Svoboda et al. 2002)
281  (Gall, Borden and Cutter 2009)
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Approximately $1.3 billion was spent on drought-
relief measures.282
Among all economic activities, the agriculture 
sector has been one of the sectors most directly 
affected by drought. Impacts on health and water 
resources for non-agricultural uses are increas-
ingly better understood. To identify trends in the 
economic impact of disasters on crops, livestock, 
fisheries and forestry, a review was conducted 
of 78 post-disaster needs assessments (PDNAs) 
undertaken in the aftermath of medium- to large-
scale disasters in 48 developing countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America between 2003 and 
2013.283 According to this GAR, agriculture absorbs 
on average about 84% of all the economic impact 
in these countries. Livestock is the second most 
affected subsector after crops, accounting for $11 
billion, or 36% of all damage and losses reported 
in PDNAs, where almost 86% of these losses were 
caused by drought events. Missing from these esti-
mates are losses due to livelihood disruption, migra-
tion and insecurity. Environmental conditions affect 
plants and their productivity during all phases of 
growth and development. Studies show that mois-
ture stress in all growth stages reduced the grain 
yield significantly.284 Severe droughts are linked with 
significant reduction in yields of the main cereals 
and most other crops throughout the most drought-
prone regions.285 
The health of human populations is sensitive to 
shifts in weather patterns and other aspects of 
climate change. These effects occur directly, due 
to changes in temperature and precipitation and in 
the occurrence of heat-waves and droughts. Human 
health may be affected indirectly by ecological 
disruptions related to climate change (e.g. crop fail-
ures or shifting patterns of disease vectors) or by 
social responses to climate change (e.g. displace-
ment of following prolonged drought) and the elderly 
face disproportional physical harm from heat stress 
and drought.286
Climate change is likely to increase the frequency 
and severity of meteorological and agricultural 
Figure 6.12. Expected annual damage due to droughts in billion $, 2015
(Source: JRC with data from NatCatSERVICE, Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) and DesInventar 2018)
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
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droughts in presently dry regions by the end of the 
twenty-first century. Particularly vulnerable are 
countries located in arid and semi-arid regions 
where water stress will be further exacerbated due 
to strain from overexploitation and degradation 
already tangible under the present conditions.287 
Consequently, many other economic sectors and 
ecosystems are likely to be adversely affected by 
climate change. For instance, freshwater-depen-
dent biota will suffer directly from changes in flow 
conditions and also from drought-induced river 
temperature increases linked to discharge reduc-
tions.288 Decreases in soil moisture and increased 
risk of agricultural drought are likely in drylands, 
and the agricultural risk in these areas is projected 
to increase by the end of this century.289 This is 
likely to lead to an increased risk of food insecu-
rity, which is particularly relevant for poorer popula-
tions. In many countries, increased fire risk, longer 
fire season and more-frequent large, severe fires 
are expected because of increasing heat-waves in 
combination with drought.290
6.7 
Recognizing drought  
as a complex  
hazard
Drought is a slow-onset hazard, often referred to as 
a creeping phenomenon. The absence of a precise, 
universally accepted definition of drought adds to 
the confusion. Definitions must be region specific 
because each climate regime has distinctive 
climatic characteristics. Drought impacts are non-
structural and are spread over larger geographic 
areas and temporal scales than damage that results 
from other natural hazards such as floods, tropi-
cal storms and earthquakes. Drought risk drivers 
include non-meteorological factors, and are often 
spatially or temporally removed from drought 
impacts These characteristics of drought have 
hindered: development of accurate, reliable and 
timely forecasts; estimates of severity and impacts; 
and, ultimately, the formulation of drought manage-
ment plans and implementation of appropriate risk 
reduction strategies. Similarly, local communities 
struggle to deal with the large temporal and spatial 
coverage usually associated with drought, resulting 
in secondary and tertiary impacts that may remain 
invisible to traditional risk assessments.
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Theewaterskloof Reservoir at 12% capacity near Cape Town, South Africa, 10 February 2018  
(Source: Antti Lipponen CC 2.0 2018)
Box 6.3. Multiple droughts in South Africa
Since 2015, the South African province of 
Western Cape has experienced a sustained 
chain of very low and below-average precipita-
tion periods, resulting in a hydrological drought 
that further intensified between April and Sep-
tember 2017. The precipitation deficit became, 
in early 2018, the worst drought recorded in 
the region in a century, and a true emergency 
for the city of Cape Town. This is one of the 
biggest urban areas of the country with an 
exposed population of over four million people.
During this multi-annual drought, the water 
deficit propagated through the hydrological 
cycle, and most affected were the water reser-
voirs that supply Cape Town with drinking 
water.
Figure 6.13. Long-term SPI with a cumulative period of 12 months reaches extremely low values for many months, 
indicating a prolonged and severe hydrological drought in Cape Town, South Africa 
(Source: JRC 2018)
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Short-term meteorological indicators (e.g. 
SPI-3) did not detect any particularly harsh 
conditions at the peak of the drought, as 
precipitation in the previous quarter was close 
to normal, suggesting a mild drought at the 
most. However, longer rainfall accumulation 
periods (e.g. SPI-12, Figure 6.13) show the 
serious lack of precipitation during the previ-
ous two years, with SPI values dropping to 
the “extreme drought” level. This entails a 
constant undersupply of water to reservoirs 
since at least early 2015.
Figure 6.14. Cumulative precipitation in Western Cape, South Africa, 2015–2017
(Source: JRC 2018)
Figure 6.14 indicates the cumulative deficit 
compared to the cumulated monthly long-
term average (solid line), for the same times-
pan and location. There is a steady increment 
of the deficit in time, as result of the constant 
underperforming rainfall levels, compared to 
the normal.
During this event, city authorities restricted 
tap water allowance for any use to 50 litres 
per person per day. Due to the relatively dry 
climate of the region, several reservoirs are 
dedicated to water storage in Western Cape 
to cope with the periodical lack of precipita-
tion. However, the situation was extraordi-
nary, and critically low water levels put the 
water supply chain in serious distress. The 
Theewaterskloof Reservoir, the largest in the 
Western Cape water supply system, holding 
41% of the water storage capacity available to 
Cape Town went to critically low levels in early 
2018 (about 11% of the 480 million m3 total 
capacity). In addition, due to the fast demo-
graphic growth of the city in recent years, the 
water infrastructure has not kept pace with 
demand. Thanks to water rationing and collec-
tive water-saving efforts, as well as some 
precipitation events, the so-called “day zero” 
was avoided for 2018. However, the complete 
recovery from this water crisis depends on 
the replenishment of reservoirs and the opera-
tional availability of alternative sources. 
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Figure 6.15. Three pillars of integrated drought management
 (Source: UNDRR, after Pischke and Stefanski 2018)
Portion of Theewaterskloof Reservoir, close to empty in 2018, showing tree stumps and sand that are usually 
covered by water 
(Source: Zaian 2018)
6.8 
Drought risk management
While it is impossible to control the occurrence of 
droughts, the resulting impacts may be mitigated 
through appropriate surveillance and management 
strategies in a drought management plan.
The proactive approach is based on short- and 
long-term measures and includes monitoring 
systems for a timely warning of drought condi-
tions, the identification of the most vulnerable part 
of the population and tailored measures to miti-
gate drought risk and improve preparedness. The 
proactive approach entails planning necessary 
measures to prevent or minimize drought impact 
in advance. 
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Drought monitoring and early warning (Pillar 1) is 
the foundation of effective proactive drought poli-
cies to warn about impending drought conditions. 
It identifies climate and water resources trends and 
detects the emergence or probability of occurrence 
and the likely severity of drought and its impact. 
Reliable information must be communicated in a 
timely manner to water and land managers, policy-
makers and the public through appropriate commu-
nication channels to trigger actions described in a 
drought plan. That information, if used effectively, 
can be the basis for reducing vulnerability and 
improving mitigation and response capacities of 
people and systems at risk. 
Vulnerability and impact assessment (Pillar 2) aims 
to determine the historical, current and likely future 
impacts associated with drought and to assess 
the vulnerability. Drought impact and vulnerability 
assessment aims to improve the understanding 
of the natural and human processes associated 
with drought and the impacts that can occur. The 
outcome of the vulnerability and impact assessment 
is a depiction of who and what is at risk and why.
The work related to drought mitigation, prepared-
ness and response (Pillar 3) determines appropri-
ate mitigation and response actions aimed at risk 
reduction, identification of appropriate triggers to 
phase in and phase out mitigation actions, particu-
larly short-term actions, during drought onset and 
termination and, finally, identification of organiza-
tions to develop and implement mitigation actions. 
Triggers are defined as specific values of an indica-
tor or index that initiate and/or terminate responses 
or management actions by decision makers based 
upon existing guidelines or preparedness plans.291 
Triggers should link indices or indicators to impact.
To move from a reactive to a proactive approach, 
local or regional conditions must be taken into 
consideration, including the legislative and admin-
istrative framework as well as the local drought 
drivers. An effective drought management plan 
should provide a dynamic framework for an 
ongoing set of actions to prepare for, and effectively 
respond to drought, including: periodic reviews of 
the achievements and priorities; readjustment of 
goals, means and resources; and strengthening 
institutional arrangements, planning and policymak-
ing mechanisms for drought mitigation.292
A key decision support tool for crisis mitigation 
is embedded within the concept of early warning 
information systems across timescales. Efforts in 
drought early warning continue in countries such 
as Brazil, China, Hungary, India, Nigeria, South 
Africa and the United States of America.293 Regional 
drought monitoring activities exist or are also being 
developed in Eastern and Southern Africa and 
efforts are ongoing in West Asia and North Africa. 
Research and experience in several watersheds 
show that several paradoxes in multistate water 
management and governance across borders can 
militate against the accurate assessment of socio-
economic impacts and the effective use of scien-
tific information for meeting short-term needs in 
reducing longer-term vulnerabilities. 
These lessons include an expanded use of incen-
tives for improving collaboration, water-use effi-
ciency, demand management and development of 
climate services to inform water-related manage-
ment as new threats arise. 
Several cases show that changes in the manage-
ment of climate-related risks (in this case, drought) 
may be most readily accomplished when: (a) a 
focusing event (climatic, legal or social) occurs, 
creating widespread public awareness and oppor-
tunities for action; (b) leadership and the public, the 
so-called “policy entrepreneurs”, are engaged; and 
(c) a basis for integrating research and manage-
ment is established.294 This latter dimension empha-
sizes the structure for developing the capacity to 
apply knowledge and to evaluate the consequences 
of actions among partners, to ensure the reliability 
and credibility of the projections of changes in the 
291  (Svoboda and Fuchs 2016)
292  (EC 2007)
293  (Pulwarty and Sivakumar 2014); (Wilhite and Pulwarty 2017)
294  (Pulwarty and Maia 2015); (Wilhite and Pulwarty 2017); 
(Gleick S2018)
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system outputs and to enable acceptable revisions 
on management practices in light of new informa-
tion. Examples of end-to-end information systems 
in which monitoring and forecasting, risk assess-
ment and engagement of communities and sectors 
are aligned across the weather-climate continuum 
are exemplified by the National Integrated Drought 
Information System (NIDIS) and the Famine Early 
Warning System Network (FEWSNet), which provide 
coordination of diverse regional, national and local 
data and information for supporting planning and 
preparedness.295 Owing to FEWSNet, there have 
been successful cases of drought risk interventions 
to prevent humanitarian crises, including the severe 
drought in Ethiopia in 2015–2016. 
However, drought remains a “hidden risk”.296 The 
microlevel actions involving households, commu-
nities and individual businesses are often under-
appreciated but are arguably the most important 
elements of drought risk mitigation. This is summa-
rized as follows:297 
Although drought insurance is an effective and 
proactive measure, the development of formal 
drought insurance mechanisms is hindered in many 
developing countries by obstacles such as high 
transaction costs, asymmetric information and 
adverse selection.298
The experience of JRC, the Integrated Drought 
Management Programme, NIDIS, FEWSNet and 
other information and risk management systems 
illustrates that early warning represents a proac-
tive social process whereby networks of orga-
nizations conduct collaborative analyses and 
coordination.299 In this context, indicators help to 
identify when and where policy interventions are 
most needed, and historical and institutional analy-
ses help to identify the processes and entry points 
that need to be understood if vulnerability is to be 
reduced. Taking local knowledge and practices 
into account promotes mutual trust, acceptability, 
common understanding, and community sense of 
ownership and self-confidence.300 As important as 
indicators are to such systems, it is also the gover-
nance context in which EWSs are embedded that 
needs further attention. A mix of centralized and 
decentralized activities is required, particularly for 
people-centred strategies at the so-called “last 
mile”.
EWSs are more than scientific and technical instru-
ments for forecasting hazards and issuing alerts. 
They should be understood as sources of scien-
tifically credible, authoritative and accessible 
knowledge. These integrate information about and 
from areas of risk that facilitate decision-making 
(formal and informal) in a way that empower 
vulnerable sectors and social groups to mitigate 
potential losses and damage from impending 
hazard events.
• More secure land tenure and better access to 
electricity and agricultural extension were found 
to facilitate the adoption of drought risk mitiga-
tion practices among agricultural households 
in Bangladesh. Similarly, access to secure land 
tenure, markets and credit played a major role in 
helping farmers cope with droughts in Morocco.
• Improved access to credit helped farming 
households in Ethiopia to cope better with 
drought impacts since they no longer needed 
to divest their productive assets. Moreover, 
as many rural households in Ethiopia tend to 
channel their savings into livestock, which 
may be wiped out during droughts, developing 
access to financial services and alternative sav-
ings mechanisms could also help to mitigate 
drought risk.
• Land-use change and modification of cropping 
patterns are frequently cited as ways to build 
resilience against droughts. 
• Improved diversification of livelihoods by adopt-
ing off-farm activities and divesting of livestock 
assets. 
• A strong asset base and diversified risk man-
agement options are among the key character-
istics of drought-resilient households in Kenya 
and Uganda. These aspects were due primarily 
to the households having better education and 
greater knowledge of coping actions against 
various hazards. This allowed them to diversify 
their income sources.
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The costs of proactive drought management 
are usually lower than the costs of inaction, and 
can generate significant economic benefits. For 
example, one study estimated that every dollar 
spent by the United States Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) on drought risk miti-
gation,301,302 the country would save at least $2 
on future disaster costs. Related actions to miti-
gate drought impacts include more secure tenure, 
better access to electricity, improved access to 
credits, land-use change and modification of crop-
ping patterns, better use of groundwater resources 
and adoption of off-farm activities to diversify 
livelihoods.303 
Drought risk management can have substantial 
socioeconomic co-benefits, as some of the related 
actions build resilience against droughts and also 
against additional socioeconomic and environmen-
tal shocks. Regional and local networks that provide 
agricultural extension, precision farming, off-farm 
activities and higher education, for example, which 
are associated with stronger resilience to drought 
shocks, were identified as factors that also help 
address land degradation, facilitate poverty reduc-
tion and improve household food security.304
6.9 
Way forward 
Assessing the risk for drought-related impacts to 
society and environment is a difficult task. It is 
complicated by the creeping nature of the phenom-
enon, its often-large spatial extent and temporal 
duration, leading to cascading impacts that may 
affect areas distant from the drought and it may 
last long after the drought has ceased. Missing 
standardized data on past impacts (damage and 
loss) is a further complication. Finally, the interlink-
ages with other hazards such as wildfires, heat-
waves and even floods and the combined risks 
need to be explored. These risk assessments need 
to be sector specific, requiring an adequate set of 
environmental and socioeconomic data related to 
the respective sectors. 
Many hot spots that show fragility in the face of 
climate change also exhibit soil moisture and 
soil quality reduction combined with reduced 
adaptive capacity. Scenario planning (based on 
past, present, and projected events) may provide 
better understanding of whether and how best 
to use probabilistic information with past data 
and cumulative risks across climate timescales. 
There is a strong need to approach climate model 
outputs far more critically than at present, espe-
cially for impact assessment to support adapta-
tion at the local level. Central to all of the above 
is a sustained network of high-quality monitoring 
systems.
The major assumption behind proactive action 
around drought is that present or upfront actions 
and investments can produce significant future 
300 (Dekens and International Centre for Integrated Moun-
tain Development 2007)
301  (Multihazard Mitigation Council 2005)
302  (Logar and van den Bergh 2013)
303  (Gerber and Mirzabaev 2017a)
304  (Gerber and Mirzabaev 2017a)
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benefits. No comprehensive study exists for 
drought. Some have outlined the advances to date 
in assessing benefits of action and the costs of 
inaction.305 In drought and other hazards, much 
more work needs to be done to realize what has 
been called the “triple dividend of resilience”.306
The benefits include:
The need to explicitly acknowledge differing social 
values, to strengthen institutional mechanisms for 
collaboration, and to collect standardized data on 
drought impacts as a basis for reducing vulnerabil-
ity and enhancing resilience needs to be acknowl-
edged. How drought and climate change may play 
into future fragility will be an area of increasing 
research and security interest.
6.10 
Emerging issues: setting 
the context for the 2020 
special report on drought
Despite the significant advances of the past century 
of drought research, in an increasingly intercon-
nected world, several areas of concern for drought 
risk management are emerging:
• 
In the light of these challenges, UNDRR will publish 
a special report on drought risk in 2020. The fore-
going discussion highlighted some of the key 
aspects and challenges to be discussed and further 
explored in this special report.
a. Avoiding losses when disasters strike
b. Stimulating economic activity from reduced 
disaster risk
c. Developing co-benefits, or uses, of a specific 
disaster risk management investment
a. Uncertainties associated with climate change 
and its manifestation at all levels including cas-
cading risks. 
b. Understanding the increasingly complex path-
ways through which drought affects filter (e.g. 
the water–energy–food nexus, socioecological 
buffers and thresholds).
c. Assessing the costs of drought impacts, and 
the benefits of action and costs of inaction.
d. Enhancing the role of technology, efficiency and 
community-based knowledge.
e. Links to human security, globally networked 
risks and conflict that affect resilience.
f. Emphasizing the role of governance, financing 
and decision-making in anticipating, assess-
ing and acting on reducing and managing the 
impacts of complex risks. 
g. The need to explicitly acknowledge various 
social values and strengthening institutional 
mechanisms for collaboration, including data 
collection. How drought and climate change 
may play into future fragility will be an area of 
increasing research and security interest.
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306  (Tanner et al. 2015)
Part I  
Conclusions and 
recommendations
Conclusions
This part has endeavoured to demonstrate the 
scope of current knowledge on risk management 
across a range of hazards. It has also outlined that 
measurement, quantification and proportionate 
responses are almost certainly inadequate to meet 
the challenges of the multifaceted interconnect-
edness of hazard, the barely understood richness 
of exposure and the profound detail of vulnerabil-
ity that it will take to ever do more than treat the 
symptoms. Risk really is systemic, and it requires 
a concerted and urgent effort to work in integrated, 
systemics and innovative ways.
Recommendations
“Millions don’t rally to the banner of
uncertainty”
- George Packer
• Connect and collaborate: This work is already 
under way and was before the Sendai Frame-
work came into effect. But the ambition, 
richness and expansive spirit of cooperation 
required to meet systemic challenges will 
require levels of selfless humanism that match 
the scale of the challenge. In particular, integra-
tion with social science research is important.
• Invest: Resource challenges are always the 
first-cited obstacle to better risk management. 
EO, computing power, mitigation measures, 
regulatory enforcement and safety nets should 
be invested in, as should reducing inequality and 
improving participation, access and education. 
• Leverage: The movement towards open data, 
collaborative science and cloud computing is 
in a golden age. The value of information is 
such that impulses towards hoarding, insular-
ity, competition and protection could come to 
dominate an increasingly unequal world. This is 
the moment to capitalize, entrench and fortify 
the values of mutual support and humanity. 
• Relish uncertainty: Past GARs have avoided 
including drought as fulsomely as other haz-
ards, particularly due to intractability. It has so 
many drivers and so many effects, which are 
often indirect. This should not be a reason to 
avoid talking about them as damaging hazards 
that affect hundreds of millions of people a 
year and exact an untold economic toll. Risk 
will never be simple again. That is difficult and 
important to accept for risk scientists, for poli-
cymakers and for anyone faced with the task of 
communicating risk. 
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Special
Case Study
Local collection of disaster loss data 
in national risk management systems  
– from Ethiopia to The Gambia
Many rural communities in Ethiopia rely on traditional shallow wells such as this one in Gumsalasa. When drought lowers 
groundwater levels they can become dry, leading to local stock losses, food shortages and  health impacts.  
(Source: Jean-Yves Jamin, https://flic.kr/p/Gsj85C)
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This case study relates to the imperative to link risk 
management systems, seek local-level input and 
reinforce growing systems with policy, structure, 
governance and patience.
In 2014, Ethiopia began to undertake the challeng-
ing job of recording losses due to disaster events. 
This process is supported by UNDRR, based on a 
tool developed specifically to collect, validate and 
aggregate data at the lowest possible administra-
tive unit. 
In the case of Ethiopia, this means that data is 
being collected at the wereda level (the third-level 
administrative division). The country has nearly 
700 weredas. Their data is then aggregated into 
one of around 70 zones, and the zone data is 
aggregated into one of 11 regions.
 
In collecting disaster event data and related losses 
at the local level, Ethiopia has joined a group of 
about 100 countries that are systematically record-
ing disaster losses using the disaster loss account-
ing tool DesInventar.307 More importantly, Ethiopia 
has committed to a data-collection undertaking 
that would challenge the administrative gover-
nance capacities of any country. But it has done so 
knowing that, as well as being seismically active, 
its territory is exposed to hitherto uncounted 
small-scale, extensive disasters that sap develop-
ment resources and undermine opportunities for 
the poorest people in the country to thrive. As Ethi-
opia has a large population (100+ million) and a 
GDP per capita in the lowest quintile of any global 
index,308,309,310 having an accurate understanding 
of the nature of these myriad localized losses 
will permit development decisions to better target 
resilience building. 
307  (UNISDR 2019)
308  (International Monetary Fund 2019)
309  (World Bank 2019)
310  (United Nations Statistics Division 2019)
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Ethiopia’s disaster loss database record of hazard event types, 2018
At the time of writing, Ethiopia has around 15,000 
records in its public database of disaster-related 
losses. It has another 10,000 records awaiting veri-
fication. This scale of data collection is exceptional 
and is indicative of the commitment of Ethiopia to: 
knowing its profile of disaster impacts; communi-
cating to its population that every farm damaged, 
every localized flood or epizootic outbreak matters 
and will be counted; and sharing its experience in 
the interests of a better global understanding of 
risk. 
Loss figures from Ethiopia’s database are among 
those that populate the loss figures in Part II of 
this GAR. Without Ethiopia’s immense effort, those 
figures would be less accurate and thus less valid. 
Ethiopia’s model has inspired other countries in 
the region to begin accounting systematically for 
disaster losses. Since 2014, 19 more countries in 
Africa have begun the process of recording their 
losses using the same method. 
One of the later countries to join this movement 
is The Gambia. Its process will be the same. The 
objective is to develop a system that facilitates 
the incorporation of risk information into public 
investment planning and decision-making. This 
will be done by first establishing a national disas-
ter loss database to account for past losses, then 
assessing experienced losses against a handful 
of modelled risks, and then assessing budgetary 
spending against forecast losses to determine 
whether budgeting has been sufficient and appro-
priately targeted. This process is going on in 18 
other countries around Africa as part of the same 
project.
The Gambia’s database is much newer than Ethio-
pia’s and therefore contains far fewer records. 
This is also a reflection of the size of the country, 
the exposure profile it faces and the reporting 
structures in place to gather information. But even 
though The Gambia has a smaller population, a 
Source: (UNDRR 2019)
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Sea storms cause losses to the fishing economy in Gambia and are likely to increase in intensity due to climate change
(Source: Vila, R. (2015))
more limited scope of hazards and fewer exposed 
assets than Ethiopia, its losses are just as impor-
tant. The Gambia’s National Disaster Management 
Agency knows that to manage losses, it needs to 
understand them and account for them. Through 
a series of platforms, data-collection conferences, 
and new regulations and plans, it has also commit-
ted to supporting institutionalization of data collec-
tion, to ensure that data collection continues as a 
parallel process even as the other elements of the 
project get under way.
Data collection of past losses is a necessary but 
not sufficient measure. Ethiopia and The Gambia 
have invested heavily in data collection and reflec-
tive processes of understanding what worked well 
in past circumstances and what could be improved 
in future. They are thinking about the regulatory, 
systemic and interconnected nature of managing 
their risks. Though the effects of climate change 
portend serious challenges for large parts of Africa, 
the countries that start today and plan for the long 
term are positioning themselves for resilience.
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Introduction
As the complexity and range of risks evolve, the 
Sendai Framework represents a shift from main-
streaming disaster risk to an approach of manag-
ing the risks inherent in social, economic and 
environmental activity for sustainable development. 
It includes seven global targets, accompanied by a 
comprehensive set of guiding principles that give 
direction to reduce the impact of disasters, while 
also addressing the underlying drivers of disaster 
risk and safeguarding development gains for current 
and future generations. Transitioning towards resil-
ient and sustainable societies hinges on responsible 
management of disaster risks. Member States have 
taken bold steps in developing and incorporating the 
goals, targets and indicators – and associated data 
– within national reporting systems. 
This part introduces the global disaster risk land-
scape and takes stock of experience so far with a 
comparative analysis of country-specific evidence 
on national reporting, informed by the latest disas-
ter data available. It sheds light on successes and 
challenges as they emerge from the first years of 
reporting and provides early lessons for further 
improvements. While the observed period is still 
too short to reach definitive conclusions on a global 
scale, we can observe certain patterns in terms of 
magnitude, geographic and socioeconomic distri-
bution of disaster impacts and several departure 
points of where and how countries have managed 
to do better in reducing disaster risk. 
By the time Member States agreed on the Sendai 
Framework, disaster risks compounded by climate 
change, environmental degradation, poverty and 
inequality were evolving rapidly, with cascading 
Part II:
Implementation of the 
Sendai Framework 
and Disaster Risk-
informed Sustainable 
Development
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HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES
More than 90% of mortality attributed to 
internationally reported disaster events has 
occurred in low and middle income countries
Disasters associated to 
hydro-meteorological hazards 
account for about 2/3 of housing 
damages
Member States reporting on the status of their 
national and local disaster risk reduction 
strategies (Target E) are gradually increasing 
but are still in the minority. 
LOW AND MIDDLE 
INCOME 
COUNTRIES
REPORTS
HYDRO-
METEOROLOGICAL
HAZARDS
1  (United Nations General Assembly 2015c)
2  (United Nations 2015c) 
3  (United Nations 2015a)
4  (United Nations 2016b)
effects across geographic and income-level regions. 
The analysis in this part concludes with a review of 
the contribution of the UNDRR Sendai Framework 
Monitor (SFM) by underlining the cross-benefits 
of integrated reporting across the different global 
frameworks. Recognizing that extra efforts are 
required to manage these interactions, so that they 
become synergies, the analysis offers an overview 
of international and national developments in build-
ing coherence among the Sendai Framework and 
other post-2015 agreements.
The Sendai Framework is not alone in pursuing an 
integrated approach to risk reduction and develop-
ment. Rather, it is an indivisible part of a series of 
international negotiated agreements made during 
2015–2016: the 2030 Agenda,1 the Paris Agree-
ment on climate change (providing the foundation 
for sustainable, low-carbon and resilient develop-
ment under a changing climate),2 AAAA3 adopted at 
the Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development (outlining a series of fiscally sustain-
able and nationally appropriate measures to realign 
financial flows with public goals and reduce struc-
tural risks to inclusive growth) and NUA adopted 
at the 2016 United Nations Conference on Housing 
and Sustainable Urban Development (introducing 
a new model of urban development that promotes 
equity, welfare and prosperity).4 
 (Source: UNDRR)
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Chapter 7: 
Risk reduction across 
the 2030 Agenda
7.1 
Sendai Framework 
targets and monitoring: 
a snapshot
The Sendai Framework’s intended outcome is a 
“substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses 
in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, 
physical, social, cultural and environmental assets 
of persons, businesses, communities and coun-
tries” by 2030. The goal towards this, described in 
paragraph 17, is:
Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk 
through the implementation of integrated and 
inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, 
health, cultural, educational, environmen-
tal, technological, political and institutional 
measures that prevent and reduce hazard 
exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase 
preparedness for response and recovery, and 
thus strengthen resilience.
The Sendai Framework outlines seven targets and 
four priority areas for action to strengthen resil-
ience by preventing new and reducing existing 
disaster risks. The four priority areas are: (1) under-
standing disaster risk, (2) strengthening disas-
ter risk governance to manage disaster risk, (3) 
investing in DRR for resilience and (4) enhancing 
disaster preparedness for effective response and 
“build back better” in recovery, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction.5
An increasingly diverse spectrum of stakeholders 
has made significant efforts since 2015 to imple-
ment the Sendai Framework, reaching across differ-
ent geographies, sectors, jurisdictions and scales. 
These efforts are organized to pursue the realiza-
tion of one key outcome and goal, and seven global 
targets (A–G), as set out in Table 7.1.
5  (United Nations 2015b)
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Table 7.1. Seven global targets of the Sendai Framework
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Realization of the outcome, goal and targets is 
made possible thanks to the significant efforts of 
Member States under the Hyogo Framework for 
Action (HFA) 2005–2015. While HFA focused on 
DRR as an evolution from disaster response and 
management,6 the Sendai Framework supports 
a shift in paradigm. It focuses on a much wider 
hazard and risk scope, to include natural and man-
made, environmental, technological, and biologi-
cal hazards and risks. It emphasizes the reduction 
of existing risk and underscores that prevention of 
new risks is essential to sustainable development 
(without which development gains will be reversed). 
During the HFA period, the monitoring system 
consisted of biennial self-assessment reporting 
by Member States and regional intergovernmen-
tal organizations. This identified trends, areas of 
progress and challenges, based on 22 core, princi-
pally policy, indicators, according to the five priori-
ties for action. Many Member States participated, 
with approximately 80% providing national reports 
at least once over four biennial monitoring cycles 
since 2007. Sixty-one countries developed reports 
for 2007–2009, 105 for 2009–2011, 101 for 2011–
2013 and 95 for 2013–2015.
The HFA core indicators focused on inputs rather 
than outputs or outcomes. However, the Sendai 
Framework has seven global targets, four of which 
are outcome focused. Consistent with the shift 
to managing risk, the four targets from A to D are 
objective and measurable, with the reduction of 
disaster losses to be assessed relative to the size 
of national population and economy. Targets A and 
B explicitly allow international benchmarking of 
progress relative to the quantitative baseline data of 
2005–2015.
Although the Sendai Framework was agreed prior to 
SDGs, negotiations for the post-2015 agreements 
occurred in parallel and were mutually supportive. 
Accordingly, the Sendai Framework anticipates 
the review of the United Nations General Assem-
bly of “global progress in the implementation of 
the Sendai Framework as part of its integrated 
and coordinated follow-up processes to United 
Nations conferences and summits, aligned with the 
Economic and Social Council, the High-level Politi-
cal Forum on Sustainable Development and the 
quadrennial comprehensive policy review cycles, 
as appropriate, …” (para. 49). Similarly, the Sendai 
Framework recommended that indicators should be 
developed through an intergovernmental process by 
establishment of an Open-ended Intergovernmental 
Expert Working Group (OEIWG) on indicators and 
terminology relating to DRR. The work of this group 
took place in conjunction with the work of the Inter-
agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) (para. 50). From 
the second half of 2015, both intergovernmen-
tal groups and respective Secretariats – UNDRR 
and the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (UN DESA) – have collaborated 
closely to develop the global indicators and moni-
toring frameworks for the Sendai Framework and 
the 2030 Agenda.
Comprising experts nominated by Member States 
and relevant stakeholders, OEIWG developed the 
terminology relating to DRR and a set of 38 indica-
tors of progress for the seven global targets. The 
recommendations for the indicators and the termi-
nology were captured in the OEIWG report and 
were subsequently endorsed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in February 2017.7 
OEIWG recommended that UNDRR takes forward 
the following work:
(a) Develop minimum standards and metadata 
for disaster-related data, statistics and 
analysis with the engagement of national 
government focal points, national disaster 
risk reduction offices, national statistical 
offices, the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs and other relevant partners; 
(b) Develop methodologies for the measure-
ment of indicators and the processing 
of statistical data with relevant technical 
partners;
6  (United Nations 2007) 
7  (United Nations General Assembly 2016b)
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In parallel, Member States in IAEG-SDGs identified 
the explicit relationship between several targets of 
SDGs and DRR, namely SDGs 1, 11 and 13: eradica-
tion of poverty, resilient and sustainable cities, and 
action to climate change. IAEG-SDGs subsequently 
recognized the indicators recommended by OEIWG 
in measuring progress against the targets under 
these goals. This OEIWG report was endorsed by 
the United Nations Statistical Commission, at its 
To support the monitoring of the Sendai Frame-
work and related elements of the 2030 Agenda, 
UNDRR was requested to develop an online SFM as 
the reporting mechanism for all Member States to 
report on their progress. UNDRR led a comprehen-
sive process that included:8
 
forty-eighth session in March 2017. Common indi-
cators, for which UNDRR was nominated as a custo-
dian agency, are now in use for measuring progress 
in achieving the global Targets A–E of the Sendai 
Framework as well as the disaster-related targets 
of SDGs 1, 11 and 13. Monitoring between the two 
frameworks was therefore made a reality, reducing 
duplication of data-collection efforts and the report-
ing burden for countries.
Figure 7.1. Sendai Framework and the 2030 Agenda – multipurpose data, integrated monitoring and reporting  
 (Source: UNDRR)
• The Sendai Framework Data Readiness Review, 
which was conducted by Member States to 
assess capacity and ability to report against the 
38 global indicators of the seven global targets 
of the Sendai Framework. This revealed gaps 
in data requirements of the Sendai Framework 
and data availability and monitoring capacity; 
no country reported that data was available or 
possible for all indicators.
• User-driven development of a prototype of the 
online SFM based on consultation with Member 
States and other partners. SFM was developed 
in partnership with the Enterprise Application 
Centre and went live on 1 March 2018.
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The first cycle of reporting using SFM and its disas-
ter loss database subsystem began in March 2018 
for Targets A–E and informed the deliberations 
of the 2018 HLPF on sustainable development.11 
Rporting on the period 2015–2017 for Targets A–G 
took place in October 2018 and forms the basis of 
the analysis presented in Chapter 8 of this GAR. 
7.2  
Data required to 
monitor the targets
This section describes the types of country data 
required for monitoring the seven Sendai Frame-
work targets. Such an overview will assist under-
standing of how the monitoring system gathers and 
uses data.
The global targets listed in Table 7.1 require measure-
ment of three separate but interconnected types of 
indicator:
8    (United Nations 2017)
9    (United Nations 2017a); (UNISDR 2018b)
10  (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2017)
11  (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2018)
• Development of technical guidance notes on 
the agreed global indicators covering minimum 
standards of data and metadata for disaster-
related data and statistics, and methodologies 
for the measurement of indicators.9 These 
were made available in January 2018 to assist 
Member States in the compilation of data 
for reporting using SFM. Initiated in OEIWG, 
when developing the technical guidance 
notes, UNDRR worked closely with NSOs of 
some Member States, as well as the statis-
tical divisions of UN DESA and the United 
Nations Regional Economic Commissions 
(RECs) – in particular the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
and the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) – 
to support standard setting related to disaster 
statistics. 
• Information reported in the monitor has been 
included in the 2017 and 2018 SDG reports of 
the 2018 High-level Political Forum (HLPF) on 
sustainable development. All indicators common 
to the targets of the Sendai Framework and 
SDGs are ranked as Tier I or Tier II in the SDG 
classification.10 
• Comprehensive capacity-development exercises 
with national government institutions, to 
support Member States in systematic reporting 
using SFM. Designed to enable participation 
of a wide spectrum of stakeholders in the 
monitoring and reporting of progress – as 
effective risk reduction requires – national 
governments can select as many reporting insti-
tutions across different government and admin-
istrative levels as appropriate.
• Development of nationally determined custom 
targets and indicators – as per the recommen-
dation of OEIWG – to support the monitoring 
of context-specific national strategies for DRR 
(Target E due to be achieved in 2020). 
• Contributions from regional intergovernmental 
organizations to monitor and report progress of 
implementation in their regions using SFM.
• The first type measures the concrete outcomes 
at the national level of implementing risk 
reduction in accordance with the Sendai 
Framework, in terms of a reduction in losses 
and disaster impacts. This includes reduc-
tions in mortality (Target A),  number of 
people affected (Target B), direct economic 
loss (Target C) and damage to critical infra-
structure and disruption to basic services 
(Target D). These targets measure some of the 
main benefits that implementing the Sendai 
Framework will bring for countries.
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7.2.1 
Targets A to D – disaster losses
Targets A, B, C and D are targets to reduce the 
losses attributed to disasters relating to mortality 
(A), number of people affected (B), economic loss 
relative to GDP (C) and damage to critical infra-
structure and disruption of basic services (D). Each 
of these targets has several indicators of loss and 
damage. For example, Target A seeks a reduction 
in mortality caused by disasters and is measured 
by two indicators: number of deaths and number of 
missing people.
Each of these indicators may be presented in a 
more detailed way by disaggregating in relation 
to specific criteria/variables. For example, both of 
Target A’s loss indicators (dead or missing) can be 
disaggregated by age, sex, income level, disabil-
ity, hazard and location. As a consequence, what 
appears as one number will, in reality, be many 
numbers that describe the different facets of the 
main indicator. 
The purpose of disaggregated data is to add value 
and analytical power to the information. Data disag-
gregated by age or sex, for example, will assist 
evidence-based understanding of how disasters 
differently affect children, youth, people with disabil-
ities, older people or women in different stages of 
their life cycle. Disaggregation by hazard supports a 
heightened understanding of the impact of specific 
hazards and risks on a given community.
Given the complexity of this process, paragraph 
24(d) of the Sendai Framework recommends that 
countries “systematically evaluate, record, share 
and publicly account for disaster losses and under-
stand the economic, social, health, education, 
environmental and cultural heritage impacts, as 
appropriate, in the context of event-specific hazard-
exposure and vulnerability information.” 
The best way to collect this data is by building, 
maintaining and systematically improving disaster 
loss databases. More countries around the world 
are using DesInventar Sendai, which is a simple 
and homogeneous methodology to collect, store, 
analyse and display data on losses caused by disas-
ters. It uses definitions of hazards and impacts that 
are compliant with the Sendai Framework while 
employing indicators (including all 38 recom-
mended by OEIWG) with possible disaggregation.12  
Due to the level of detail at which this kind of data is 
captured, it is also possible to record losses associ-
ated with a range of small- and medium-scale recur-
ring events that cause and accumulate damage, 
allowing the estimation of what is known as “exten-
sive risk”.13 These small- and medium-scale disas-
ters are frequently absent from global disaster 
databases but can have a corrosive effect on lives 
and livelihoods, especially in poor and vulnerable 
communities and households.
The data of SFM represents annual aggregates of 
the impacts of a myriad of small-, medium- and 
large-scale disasters. disaster loss databases allow 
consolidation of the annual data reported via SFM. 
DesInventar Sendai can generate these figures or 
provide for the automated electronic transfer of 
information to the global targets area of SFM.
One of the subsystems of SFM is a multi-country 
disaster loss database where information from 
multiple country-based, independent databases 
is collated, harmonized and integrated. From this 
system, consolidated loss data is automatically 
• The second type relates to Targets E and G and 
is a qualitative measure of how Member States 
have established the political and institutional 
mechanisms to enable them to reduce risk in 
line with the Sendai Framework, namely the 
development of DRR strategies and progress in 
the areas of multi-hazard early warning systems 
(MHEWSs) and risk information.
• The third type measures enhancements in 
international cooperation in line with Target F, 
which is not a measure of a concrete outcome 
or national implementation, but of the level and 
type of support for DRR from within the interna-
tional community. 
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14  (UNISDR 2018b)12  (UNISDR 2019a)
13  (UNISDR 2013b)
transferred to the corresponding targets and indica-
tors from the SFM main system.
This large database (approximately 700,000 records 
at the time of writing) is made public along with 
GARs and is built using DesInventar Sendai. It is 
important to note that DesInventar Sendai is not 
used by all countries, although those Member 
States that build their own loss databases comply-
ing with the specifications in the technical guid-
ance notes may use one of several alternatives for 
detailed loss data transfer to the Sendai Framework 
loss database. 
Effective monitoring is ultimately in the hands of 
Member States, necessitating their active and 
sustained participation. A first review demonstrated 
the need for more detailed, well-structured disaster 
loss databases at national level, to enable measure-
ment of outcomes under Targets A–D. This will be an 
area for focus on capacity-building and institutional 
coordination at national level in coming years. Such 
systems are valuable tools and data sets, which will 
contribute to a better understanding of risks and 
disaster impacts globally and at national level.
7.2.2  
Target E – risk reduction strategies
Targets E and G differ from Targets A–D and F, in 
that they are qualitative in nature. Consequently, the 
nature of the data and thus the processes required 
to collect the data are distinct. Instead of taking 
numbers from a data source such as loss reports 
or national budget figures, those who report on 
Targets E and G must be familiar with the policy 
framework for DRR in their countries.
Target E, whose deadline for achievement is 2020, 
has two global indicators: (a) the number of coun-
tries that adopt and implement national DRR 
strategies in line with the Sendai Framework and 
(b) the percentage of local governments that adopt 
and implement local strategies in line with national 
strategies. 
When reporting, Member States need to first iden-
tify the existence of national and local strategies, 
then apply 10 evaluative criteria of alignment of the 
national disaster strategy with the Sendai Frame-
work. In this way, an indicative total “score” of the 
strategy’s alignment is possible from a series of 
qualitative judgments.14 Evaluators of the criteria 
will need expertise in DRR as well as familiarity 
with the strategies and relevant institutional archi-
tecture, legislation, availability of information, and 
programmes and processes associated with DRR 
in their country. There is a subjective element, as 
intermediate scores can be assigned optimisti-
cally or pessimistically with the corollary impact on 
the assessment score. But for as long as they are 
consistent over time and recognized as a qualita-
tive measure of a different type than data such as 
disaster loss statistics, the criteria provide a useful 
methodology to assess national risk reduction 
strategies.
7.2.3  
Target F – international cooperation
Target F requires the provision of financial data on 
international cooperation from recipient countries 
and provider countries. 
Provide country data: Data for this target includes 
that reported on an annual calendar year basis by 
statistical reporters on international cooperation 
in national administrations. A statistical reporter, 
usually located in the national aid agency, Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, or Ministry of Finance or 
Economy, is responsible for the collection of devel-
opment assistance statistics in each country/
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agency.15 Historically, neither all donors nor recipi-
ents have systematically produced data pertaining 
to DRR; therefore, the requirements of the Sendai 
Framework reporting are expected to catalyse 
systematic collection of this data.
The technical guidance notes on Target F recom-
mend statistical reporters apply a new policy 
marker for DRR, adopted by the OECD Working 
Party on Statistics,16 which supports the statistical 
analysis of financial flows from provider to recipi-
ent countries. OECD designed the marker to inform 
deliberations of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). The marker is a qualitative statis-
tical tool to identify and record aid activities that 
target DRR as a policy objective. It offers a method-
ology for greater specificity for providers and recipi-
ents. Data based on the marker provides a measure 
of the aid that DAC members (or, depending on 
where the marker and methodology is applied, 
within the aid budget of a ministry or appropriate 
agency) allocate in support of DRR, including a 
snapshot of:
In adopting the marker methodology, providers 
and recipients of aid have further options to gener-
ate disaggregated data, such as by sector. This 
is an approach consistent with that proposed for 
Targets A–D, wherein disaggregated data can 
be collected and used at the national level to 
inform policy and administrative decisions and 
at the international level to identify global trends, 
challenges and priorities for investment in risk 
reduction.
Recipient country data: OEIWG also encouraged 
recipient countries to provide information on the 
estimated amount of national DRR expenditure. 
By calculating national DRR expenditure using 
data from national accounts, recipient countries 
can estimate the proportion of total expenditure 
on national DRR actions that is accounted for by 
official international support. This responds to the 
observations of OEIWG members of the impor-
tance of demonstrating government policy lead-
ership (of developing countries) in measuring the 
target. 
The Rio Marker methodology, initially developed 
by OECD to track public investment in CCA, and 
later modified by UNDRR to be applied to DRR, has 
been tested in five countries of the South West 
Indian Ocean region and subsequently in 15 more 
countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa, where 
it helped to estimate national expenditure of recipi-
ent countries as part of a risk-sensitive budget 
review (RSBR).17 
RSBR is a simple, systematic, quantitative analy-
sis of a budget, or series of budgets, that enables 
countries to estimate and take credit for invest-
ment in DRR (the budget review methodology is 
described in Annex A18 of each national report), 
and some countries are beginning to use this 
method to review public investment planning and 
financing strategies.19 20 If RSBR is conducted by 
a national government, the findings typically track 
public investment and can include inward financial 
flows. An RSBR conducted on a series of annual 
budgets allows for the identification and tracking 
of trends over time. An RSBR that also catego-
rizes components of risk management can point 
to trends in focus such as increasing investment in 
prevention/risk reduction, as opposed to repeated 
response to disasters.  
RSBR and OECD DRR aid marker methodolo-
gies can be combined by countries during budget 
reviews, depending on their context, to effectively 
obtain all of the figures required to report in SFM 
the international aid received, aimed at national 
DRR actions.
• Individual DRR-focused projects/programmes
• Global estimate of aid committed for DRR
• Proportion of DAC member aid focused on DRR
• Sectors prioritized for DRR-focused aid
• Investments within individual sectors
• Aid prioritized by countries for DRR-focused 
purposes
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15  (OECD 2018b)
16  (OECD 2017c)
17  (UNISDR 2015f)
18  (UNISDR 2015d)
7.2.4  
Target G - availability of and access to multi-
hazard early warning systems and disaster 
risk information
Target G entails a series of qualitative measures 
to assess progress in substantially increasing 
“the availability of and access to multi-hazard 
early warning systems and disaster risk informa-
tion and assessments to the people by 2030.” It 
has six global indicators, relating to the quality of 
MHEWSs, as well as that of disaster risk informa-
tion and assessments. One of the indicators (G-6) is 
a unique output indicator that quantifies the impact 
and effectiveness of early warning information in 
terms of evacuated people. 
Reporting for Target G requires a complex set of 
qualitative data around effective national systems 
for MHEWSs, for which guidance is provided in the 
UNDRR technical guidance manual.21 The guid-
ance is based on the deliberations of OEIWG that 
have also been informed by experts, through open 
consultations. The guidance also draws on the 
MHEWS checklist.22 
7.3 
Conclusions
The centrality of risk reduction to sustainable urban-
ization and development and CCA is unquestioned 
and hardwired into the post-2015 global develop-
ment agendas. Ongoing effort at global, regional 
and national levels demonstrate a collective inten-
tion to foster and implement holistic and risk-based 
approaches to generating resilient and sustainable 
economies and societies. While data availability 
and capacities to realize this ambition are gradually 
increasing, activities are also scaling up at interna-
tional, regional, national and subnational levels and 
define a direction of travel that will be explored in 
more detail in Part III. However, it is critical to main-
tain momentum and continue coordinating global 
and national efforts in terms of strengthening 
statistical capacity and reporting moving forward. 
If those who are furthest behind are to be reached 
first, a sense of urgency is needed. This should 
be translated into political leadership, sustained 
funding and commitment for risk-informed policies 
supported by accurate, timely, relevant, interoper-
able and accessible data.
19  (UNISDR 2015b); (UNISDR 2015c); (UNISDR 2015e)
20  (UNISDR 2015b)
21  (UNISDR 2018b)
22  (WMO 2017)
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Chapter 8:
Progress in achieving 
the global targets 
of the Sendai 
Framework
The 2018 report of the United Nations Secretary-
General on implementation of the Sendai Frame-
work emphasized the vital importance of “a 
comprehensive overview of progress towards the 
seven global targets of the Sendai Framework and 
the disaster risk reduction targets of the Sustain-
able Development Goals” to guide discussions at 
the HLPF and Global Platform for DRR in 2019.23  
The online SFM system is the official Member State 
reporting mechanism and is complemented by 
the preparation and release of technical guidance 
notes. The monitoring system provides an avenue 
for national reporting on:
Monitoring requires significant effort by Member 
States to collect, enter and validate all data required 
by the indicators that were agreed by the United 
Nations General Assembly and the United Nations 
Statistical Commission. 
Using the data from the SFM system, including the 
disaster loss database complemented with data 
from other sources, this chapter focuses on a quan-
titative analysis of the progress made by countries 
towards the achievement of the global targets of 
the Sendai Framework (A–G). It does so through a 
detailed analysis of specific trends, patterns and 
distribution of selected indicators, based on avail-
able data from reporting to date in the online moni-
toring system. It also introduces the structure of 
the monitoring system, showcases results achieved 
and, where possible, data trends, while demonstrat-
ing the level of participation and engagement of 
Member States in the monitoring process. 
• Seven Sendai Framework global targets based 
on the agreed 38 indicators 
• Eleven indicators in three SDG goals, of which 
UNDRR is the custodian
218 Chapter 8
8.1  
Sendai Framework 
Monitoring database
The new online Sendai Framework Monitoring system 
is a state-of-the-art system built to support all the 
new indicators, extended hazards types and meta-
data mechanisms that were recommended by OEIWG 
and adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly. It can be accessed at https://sendaimonitor. 
unisdr.org.
The related online tool for disaster loss and damage 
data collection, DesInventar Sendai, accessible 
at https://www.desinventar.net, was launched on 
15 January 2018. The existing databases in the 
UNDRR public repository of loss and damage data 
were migrated to also support the requirements 
of OEIWG. This improved system will enable the 
collection of detailed disaster loss and damage 
data at all scales (temporal and spatial) using 
common methodologies. It also allows the capture 
of disaster information that is location- and time-
stamped, contributing to a strong analysis of disas-
ter loss and damage. Member States were invited 
to participate in monitoring and to start data-
collection processes as soon as possible; the first 
milestone for data reporting that contributed to the 
SDG monitoring and reporting was set for 31 March 
2018. 
Cyclone Pam made downfall on Vanuatu (2015), destroying and damaging 15,000 homes
(Source: Silke von Brockhausen/UNDP Vanuatu)
23  (United Nations General Assembly 2018)
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8.1.1  
How the loss data subsystem contributes to 
data on the global targets
As of the time of writing of this GAR, data is avail-
able for 104 countries in DesInventar format. These 
databases contain detailed locally collected data on 
disaster losses, enabling a representative view of the 
way the impact of disasters affects countries. This 
initiative is an open data and open source initiative, 
making the information available for governments, 
affected communities and other stakeholders, 
including the private sector. Analysis presented in 
the following sections has been generated based 
on data from the SFM consolidated loss database. 
target is Target A, on mortality, for which 63 coun-
tries supplied data for at least one year. Target B 
was reported by 53 countries, Targets C and E by 
56, Target D by 33, Target G by 48 and Target F 
by 36.
Within each target, there are also differences in 
reporting of the different indicators, which reflects 
the availability of data and collection challenges. 
The most evident of those is Target F (international 
cooperation), for which around half the countries 
reporting were unable to provide data on any of the 
eight indicators (19 out of 36).
8.1.3 
New types of data that may come to the 
monitoring system in the future 
As of July 2018, the Sendai Framework Monitoring 
system allowed Member States to set up nationally 
8.1.2  
Member State participation in the monitoring 
system in 2018
By 31 October 2018, ninety-six countries had 
started to use the Sendai Framework Monitor-
ing system, out of which 79 were entering global 
targets data with different levels of progress on 
each target. Another 16 countries had started 
defining their institutional settings or entering the 
socioeconomic data required in the system such as 
population, GDP, exchange rate and other variables.
Among those 79 countries that entered indica-
tor data, by far the most commonly reported 
Figure 8.1. Progress on global targets, SFM (as of October 2018)
 (Source: UNDRR, SFM)
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defined and customized targets and indicators, in 
addition to those already defined and built into the 
system for the Sendai Framework global targets. 
There are several important reasons a Member 
State may wish to do so. Measuring the level of 
implementation of the Sendai Framework global 
targets can capture only some aspects of prog-
ress in a country. But the Sendai Framework is a 
complex document that contains a broad set of 
suggested measures to reduce risk and losses. 
Countries will need to verify to what extent these 
recommendations and measures are applicable 
to their circumstances, and accordingly may want 
to measure their own level of implementation in a 
way that informs policy implementation. Further-
more, according to Target E, national DRR strategies 
should have national “targets, indicators and time 
frames”, and custom indicators that are part of the 
Sendai Framework Monitoring system. 
Member State efforts to define systems of custom 
targets and indicators are incipient, such that a 
detailed analysis is not possible. It is expected that, 
as part of the efforts to reach Target E, Member 
States will design a variety of custom targets and 
indicators in national DRR strategies, as suggested 
by Priority 2 of the Sendai Framework.
8.2  
Disaster losses: Sendai 
Framework Targets A–D
8.2.1  
Achievement of Targets A–D: are losses being 
reduced?
As the development of the reporting system for 
Member States required extensive expert inputs 
and consultations, the data collection and report-
ing period has been brief so far, and the number 
of countries providing data is too small to provide 
in-depth trend analysis. The following findings are 
therefore qualified, but make the best use of avail-
able data, including comparison with other data 
sources.
Two of the targets, mortality (A) and direct 
economic loss (C), were compared with global 
data sources. Analysis confirmed that progress 
found appears to be correct, as data series from all 
sources present the same trends – despite limita-
tions in the scope and composition of the indicators 
available in global data sets. Most of the conclu-
sions on the achievement of the first four targets 
are rather positive, especially when relative values 
are taken into consideration. As economies grow 
and the world population increases, more assets 
and people are exposed, which affects the interpre-
tation of indicators such as the number of deaths 
or economic losses. Relative values allow inference 
of more accurate conclusions on the real impacts 
and magnitude of disasters over time for differ-
ent people. For example, in absolute terms, richer 
households may lose more as they have more to 
lose. Although absolute figures are useful – they 
offer information on the trends and costs of disas-
ters – they often fail to detail how disasters affect 
people’s lives in the long run. Most important in 
disaster loss data analysis is the proportion of 
income or assets lost, as the severity of losses 
depends on who and how they experienced it.
8.2.2  
Target A – mortality: a confirmed long-term 
decline in fatalities relative to population size
The first of the global targets refers to the reduc-
tion of mortality attributed to disasters. Mortality 
is decreasing in absolute and relative terms in the 
data gathered for the countries participating in the 
Sendai Framework Monitoring process, as well as in 
other global data sets.
Ultimately, Targets A and B, mortality and number of 
people affected by disasters, will require a compari-
son between the HFA years of 2005–2015 and the 
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final decade of the Sendai Framework of 2020–
2030. Only 35 countries have a complete set of data 
from 2005 to 2017. In 2016 and in 2017, 69 and 81 
countries reported mortality data, respectively, but 
these countries are not the same as the group that 
Figure 8.2 reports mortality data from SFM and 
EM-DAT over the period 2005–2015. Numbers 
reported by countries in the Sendai Framework 
Monitoring system are higher than in EM-DAT by 
an average of 39%, and as much as 300% higher 
in some years, due to different methodologies 
applied to the data sets. The thresholds applied 
by EM-DAT on what constitutes a disaster (at 
least 10 people killed, 100 affected, declaration 
of a state of emergency and call for international 
assistance) mean that many small- and medium-
scale disasters are not considered. This differ-
ence can be significant, especially for countries 
not exposed to large-scale hazardous events, or in 
years where large-scale disasters do not dominate 
the data. 
has completed the HFA baseline. Therefore, the 
following preliminary analysis mostly focuses on 
the 83 countries that completed the HFA baseline 
and examines the period 2005–2015.
Global mortality appears to decline from 2005 to 
2015 when looking at data reported in both data-
bases (Figure 8.2). Several reasons may account for 
this. Numerous studies24 and previous GARs have 
highlighted this trend and have associated contin-
ued economic development and better disaster 
management with reduced mortality, especially for 
those types of hazards for which early warning is 
possible. In addition to better and more available 
EWSs, which have demonstrated to be effective in 
hydrometeorological events, Part I discussed the 
added value of vulnerability analysis and the need 
to establish metrics for those dimensions of disas-
ter impacts that accrue to the most vulnerable.25  
Wh i le  ev idence  across  the  g lobe  demon-
strates the direct links between resilience and 
Figure 8.2. Mortality reported nationally in the Sendai Framework Monitoring system and globally in EM-DAT for 83 countries 
and territories with baseline completed, 2005–2015
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and EM-DAT)  
Note: 2010 appears low due to the absence of Haiti in the sample.
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vulnerability reduction, improved data and analy-
sis when moving forward to monitoring the Sendai 
Framework will be able to better reveal these rela-
tionships and inform action and budgeting in the 
right directions. Other possible explanations of the 
reduction of mortality is the active work of Member 
States in reducing the stock of risks, for example 
the construction of flood defences in many areas 
of the world, better preparation for large-scale 
events (including the design of shelters and evacu-
ation facilities) or retrofitting buildings to comply 
with seismic regulations. 
Mortality numbers in the last two decades have 
continued to be driven by large geological events, 
accounting for 51% of worldwide mortality (EM-
DAT), and 39% of all fatalities in the sample of 
Other patterns previously discovered in the distribu-
tion of mortality remain valid. In particular, mortality 
due to disasters is concentrated in lower-income 
countries, still accounting for the majority of overall 
disaster deaths.
Countries with higher relative mortality are concen-
trated in low- and lower–middle-income groups 
(Figure 8.4). For example, of the top 20 countries 
by disaster mortality in proportion to their popula-
tion for the years 1990–2017, the top five are low- 
or lower–middle-income countries, and only five 
are upper–middle income. Haiti, with by far the 
the SFM baseline in the same period. Other data 
sources and studies confirm this pattern. There 
are several possible reasons for this concentra-
tion, including that warnings for earthquake events 
are not possible or not effective, and the enormous 
size of the current stock of existing risk in buildings 
and infrastructure that are not earthquake resistant 
(these are extremely costly and time-consuming 
to retrofit, despite the efforts of owners and gov-
ernments and improved and better-enforced con-
struction codes and land-use plans). In addition, 
tsunami warnings can, in some cases, give enough 
lead time to save lives, as demonstrated in Japan 
in 2011. However, a tsunami event killed more than 
1,500 people following a 7.5 magnitude earthquake 
in Palu, Indonesia, in October 2018, with only a 
4-minute lead time and a less-effective EWS.
highest figure of 91.33 deaths per 100,000 popula-
tion was largely affected by earthquakes, followed 
by a cholera epidemic in 2010, and storms and 
floods in 2004. The second-highest figure comes 
from Myanmar, with a high death toll from cyclones 
(e.g. Cyclone Nargis), tropical storms, floods and 
landslides.
Figure 8.3. Hazard distribution of mortality 1997–2017, for all countries in the Sendai Framework Monitoring system
24  (Guha-Sapir et al. 2017); (Below and Wallemacq 2018)
25  (UNISDR 2017e); (Walsh and Hallegatte 2019)
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar)   
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Figure 8.4. Mortality from disasters concentrated in a few intensive events, 1990–2017  
(Source: UNDRR with data from EM-DAT)
A high concentration in intensive disasters can be 
observed when analysing trends in disaster mortal-
ity (Figure 8.4). Nearly half of the total mortality 
since 1990 is dominated by four big events. The 
2005 earthquake in Pakistan accounted for 64% 
and 93% of global mortality recorded in SFM and 
EM-DAT, respectively, in 2005. The 2008 cyclone 
in Myanmar accounted for 85% and 97% of global 
mortality recorded in SFM and EM-DAT, respec-
tively, in 2008. Although these figures point to an 
upward trend, this trend is statistically insignificant 
as it changes arbitrarily subject to the time period 
chosen and specific intensive disasters in the 
respective period.
As shown in Figure 8.5, which reports data compiled 
from baseline countries and a sample of all SFM 
countries, low-income countries are characterized 
by a much higher number of deaths and missing 
persons relative to population size than any other 
income group. Generally, the average ratio of 
deaths and missing persons to 100,000 people 
tends to be lower for countries classified in higher-
income groups. When compared to income groups, 
SIDS have, on average, higher ratios than lower–
middle-income countries on average. Taking into 
account that data for SIDS remains largely incom-
plete, Figures 8.5  and 8.6 may be underestimated.
26  (Samoa 2018) 27  (UNISDR 2015a); (United Nations General Assembly 2017c); 
(United Nations General Assembly 2014b)
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SIDS have been repeatedly recognized as a special 
case requiring intensified attention and funding for 
sustainable development, in view of their unique 
characteristics and intrinsic vulnerabilities to envi-
ronmental and economic shocks. Future disaster 
losses represent an existential threat for many 
SIDS. 
In the midterm review process of the Samoa 
Pathway, world leaders called for urgent action to 
address the systemic risks and vulnerabilities SIDS 
continue to face:
We remain deeply concerned about the esca-
lating devastation already being inflicted on 
SIDS by the adverse impacts of climate change 
and…… we reaffirm our solidarity with our 
members impacted by increased intensity and 
frequency of natural disasters. We further call 
for the prevention of new and the reduction of 
existing disaster risk through the implementa-
tion of integrated and inclusive economic, struc-
tural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, 
environmental, technological, political, financial 
and institutional measures that prevent and 
reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to 
disaster, increase preparedness for response 
and recovery thereby strengthening resilience.26
Such vulnerabilities relate to small population size 
and land masses, spatial dispersion, remoteness, 
narrow resource and export base, subdued trade 
growth, high levels of national debt and exposure to 
global environmental challenges, including a large 
range of impacts from climate change.27  In several 
cases, weak human, technological and institu-
tional capacities, coupled with scarcity of domestic 
resources and inequality, induce a vicious cycle of 
low productivity and investment and limited tech-
nology transfer. 
SIDS are faced with a particular web of challenges 
making them less able to mobilize and attract the 
significant amount of necessary finance to imple-
ment the 2030 Agenda, as compared to other 
developing countries. For instance, most SIDS 
are classified as middle-income countries and do 
not meet the eligibility criteria for concessional 
loans from multilateral and bilateral lending insti-
tutions, despite their disproportionate exposure 
Figure 8.5. Yearly average number of deaths and missing persons per 100,000 people, income groups and SIDS, 2005–2017
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and World Bank)  
Note: Baseline countries in the analysis refers to countries that consistently reported data over the period 2005–2015. 
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Figure 8.6. SIDS yearly average number of deaths and missing persons per 100,000 people, by country, 2005–2017
to environmental and economic risks. The United 
Nations, the World Bank, the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat, the Caribbean Development Bank and several 
other international organizations have established a 
Figure 8.6 shows the yearly average number of 
deaths and missing persons per 100,000 people in 
the period 2005–2017, for the top 15 countries with 
the highest ratios among SIDS. It is evident that 
disasters represent an existential threat for several 
SIDS and can derail an island’s entire economy. 
Without tropical cyclones, for instance, the World 
Bank estimates that Jamaica’s economy would 
be expected to grow by as much as 4% per year. 
However, over the past 40 years, it has grown 0.8% 
annually. Similarly, when Hurricane Maria struck 
Dominica in 2017, it caused damage and losses 
equivalent to 226% of the country’s GDP.29 Figure 8.7 
captures the same ratio, but for groups of country 
joint technical working group to study how they can 
best support countries to gain access to finance on 
terms and conditions that are appropriate to their 
circumstances.28 
in terms of geographic location. It is observed 
that Asia and Oceania, followed by Africa, are the 
regions with the highest number of ratio of deaths 
and missing persons per 100,000 people.
Long-term trends
As previously stated, trends reported in Figure 8.2 
based on 11 years of data may have limitations, 
even though this is the latest available data to 
inform future measurement of progress towards 
the target. For example, the reduction in mortal-
ity appears to be entirely driven by the higher 
(Sources: UNDRR and the World Bank)
28  (Hurley 2017) 29  (Kreisberg et al. 2018)
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frequency of large-scale events between 2005 and 
2010 compared to the subsequent period, which 
may not be representative given the short period 
of time. It could be assumed that the frequency of 
large-scale events causing high numbers of fatali-
ties is the real driver of trends in global mortality in 
the short term. Therefore, longer periods of time are 
required to draw clearer conclusions.
Figure 8.8 thus examines a 41-year period using 
EM-DAT data. The downward-sloping fitted line 
shows that the ratio of deaths to 100,000 people 
Figure 8.7. Yearly average number of deaths and missing persons per 100,000 people, by region, 2005–2017
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar)
Figure 8.8. Relative global mortality per 100,000 population), 1977–2017
(Sources: EM-DAT, United Nations statistics, processed by UNDRR)
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Figure 8.9. Absolute global mortality (EM-DAT), 1977–2017
has declined from 1977 to 2017. The yearly average 
of the ratio of deaths to 100,000 people was 1.56 
for the period 1977–1996 and dropped to 1.08 for 
1997–2017.
In SFM, the average of number of deaths and 
missing persons attributed to disasters, per 100,000 
people (Indicator A-1), or other relative indicators 
such as number of people affected by disaster per 
(Sources: EM-DAT, United Nations statistics, processed by UNDRR)
Figure 8.10. Indicator A-1, mortality by 100,000 people with data for 2017 from 81 Sendai Framework Monitoring system countries
(Source: UNDRR) 
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
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Countries that build and maintain detailed loss 
databases could use this technique to produce 
proxy risk maps, which can be useful representa-
tions of recurrent and localized hazards such as 
weather-related or biological hazards, even at a low 
level of resolution. Earthquakes, tsunamis and other 
less-frequent hazards cannot be represented with 
100,000 (Indicator B-1), or direct economic loss 
in relation to GDP (Indicator C-1) for each country 
over the reporting period, could be seen as a risk 
map if a long enough history of losses and popula-
tion could be gathered (Figure 8.10). So far, there 
is insufficient data for these maps to be produced 
with a high statistical confidence. If Member States 
continue monitoring the Sendai Framework, data 
for a map like this would become enriched and 
eventually could offer useful insights as to the 
such tools, neither would they replace mathematical 
modelling of the type conducted by risk research-
ers. They would be limited by the degree of resolu-
tion possible from available data, but they provide 
a powerful means of validating models with direct 
data of experienced losses.
advancement in the implementation, progress and 
impact of the Sendai Framework.
GAR09 featured a multi-hazard (major natural 
hazards) map of the world. Abstracting the empty 
areas of the world in the Sendai Framework Moni-
toring system data, there is a good resemblance 
between the map of relative mortality (A-1) and the 
GAR09 mortality risk map. 
Figure 8.11. Mortality risk index, global risk assessment – GAR09
(Source: UNDRR) 
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or accep-
tance by the United Nations.
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Figure 8.12. Indicator B-1a, number of people affected, in SFM 83 countries with 2000–2015 data
8.2.3  
Target B – people affected
A proxy for the number of people directly affected 
by disaster can be made through: (a) the number 
of people who require medical attention (injured or 
ill), (b) those who are living in dwellings damaged or 
destroyed by disasters and (c) those whose liveli-
hoods are affected. While some double counting will 
occur (e.g. those injured and living in affected dwell-
ings), the main objective of this proxy is to verify 
trends. Consequently, it aims to measure the achieve-
ment of the target on the basis that if these numbers 
grow, then the total number of people affected must 
be growing, and vice versa. If this proxy measure 
trends downwards, it would be safe to assume the 
total number of affected people was decreasing.
Application of these methodologies requires impor-
tant data. Each indicator for the relative number of 
people affected by disasters in a country faces chal-
lenges, especially the determination of the number 
of those whose livelihoods were affected. Targets A 
and B of the Sendai Framework require dividing loss 
data by population, so that the numbers are relative 
to population and therefore more comparable with 
each other within a country, and among countries.
For this GAR, good data was available for the first 
five indicators of Target B: relative number affected 
in the population (B-1), ill or injured people (B-2) and 
damaged and/or destroyed dwellings (B-3, B-4 and 
B-5). However, for the livelihoods indicator (B-6), it 
was possible to estimate the number of workers 
associated with losses in agriculture only, not in 
other sectors. As more countries report in the moni-
toring system, including better reporting on produc-
tive assets lost (Indicators C-2 and C-3), these 
indicators will be able to account for more of the 
affected people. 
Figure 8.12 shows the calculated number of affected 
people relative to population size over 16 years. 
Data from 83 countries that had highly consistent 
reporting for 2000–2015 is shown. No clear trend 
emerges from the figure, and high ratios must be 
treated with caution – for instance, 2015 is domi-
nated by the earthquake in Nepal and fewer coun-
tries reported data for this year.
(Source: UNDRR data)
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This contrasts with Target A, where relative trends 
are showing a decrease in mortality. This may be 
a reflection of the good results on reducing mortal-
ity risk, achieved with preventive measures such 
as evacuations, better EWSs and less vulnerabil-
ity in many exposed elements, most notably in the 
housing sector (Figure 8.20, showing the trend 
of relative losses in this sector). However, other 
impacts that are included in the calculation of 
affected people, including injuries and disruption of 
livelihoods, especially agriculture, and the econom-
ics of the associated damage seem to be growing 
in contrast to the decrease in mortality.
People affected and systemic risks – the face 
of displacement
As demonstrated throughout this GAR, a single 
unavoidable natural event may trigger prevent-
able repercussions across sectors and systems 
that expand the breadth, duration, scale and size 
of adverse consequences. These negative impacts 
may come in the form of internal and cross-border 
population movements, preventable business 
disruption, economic distress, social unrest, hunger, 
poverty and diseases, to name just a few.
Over the period 2008–2018, disasters stemming 
from natural hazards have displaced an average of 
23.9 million people each year.30 Disasters, which are 
the main triggers of forced displacement recorded 
– show no signs of abating.31 People choose to 
respond to disaster impacts with a web of in situ 
and ex situ strategies, including mobility. They may 
flee to other areas within their country or cross 
borders32 in search for a safer and less exposed 
place. Other forms of human mobility – includ-
ing forced displacement, voluntary migration and 
planned relocation – are occurring in response to 
hazards and environmental degradation, or in antici-
pation of those. Economic motives pay a key role as 
push and pull factors shaping migration paths from 
rural to urban centres.
On a global scale, the Internal Displacement Moni-
toring Centre (IDMC) counted 17.2 million people 
as newly internally displaced due to climate-related 
disasters and natural hazards in 2018. Displace-
ment in the context of disasters is a global and 
increasingly alarming reality. According to the 
UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network, 
around 883,000 new internal displacements were 
recorded between January and December 2018, of 
which 32% were associated with flooding and 29% 
with drought.  Many more people are believed to be 
on the move, resulting from the slow-onset effects 
of climate change and environmental degrada-
tion.33 The effects of climate change are predicted 
to increase the irregularity and intensity of extreme 
weather events, as well as to drive slow-onset 
disaster displacement risk through exacerbating 
existing natural resource scarcity such as water 
stress. The situation in Yemen, one of the world’s 
most severely water-stressed countries, is a clear 
example and reminder of the face of displacement 
over dwindling resources. 
Figure 8.13. Disaster-related new displacements by hazard 
category
32  (The Nansen Initiative 2015)
33  (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2018)
30  (Irish Red Cross 2018)
31  (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2017)
(Source: IDMC data 2019)
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In an increasingly interconnected and interdepen-
dent world, displacement may exacerbate vulner-
abilities by exposing people to new risks and 
challenges such as inequality, climate change, 
poverty, under/unemployment and fast-paced 
urbanization. Fleeing home to escape the impacts 
of a hazard is often a decision between life and 
death. But disaster displacement – which includes 
evacuation and, in some cases, planned reloca-
tion following environmental stressors – often 
has severe and long-lasting social, economic and 
legal impacts, particularly in protracted contexts.34 
Climate change effects and poor natural resource 
management, leading to the gradual erosion of live-
lihoods, are often decisive factors for alternative 
household strategies, to diversify risks of environ-
mental stressors and disaster impacts. Fast-paced 
and unplanned urbanization comes with new 
risks. Employment opportunities for IDPs are often 
confined to poor-quality daily labour, which has a 
negative impact on household budgets, savings 
and spending, and compounds IDP ability to further 
manage risks and cope with negative shocks.35 In 
addition, IDPs are often obliged to settle in high-
risk areas – such as floodplains, subsiding land 
or hillside slopes – which are less controlled and 
often the most affordable yet hazard-prone areas. 
This further increases the likelihood of secondary 
displacement risk.36
The Sendai Framework pays due attention to the 
systemic complexities of population movements 
as drivers of risk, but also as opportunities for 
strengthened resilience. It highlights consequences 
of disasters in terms of displacement, but equally 
acknowledges the contributions that migrants 
can make – through remittances, networks, skills 
and investments – in addressing root causes and 
promoting resilience. The relationship between DRR 
and disaster displacement has also been recog-
nized by the Global Compact on Migration, aiming 
to mitigate the adverse drivers and structural 
factors that hinder people from building and main-
taining sustainable livelihoods. 
Figure 8.14. Total new displacements in absolute and relative terms, 2018
(Source: UNDRR with data from IDMC 2019)
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Figure 8.15. New displacements due to disasters and conflict, 2008–2017
(Source: IDMC data 2018)
However, Figures 8.13–8.15 demonstrate that 
advancements in the development of global nor-
mative frameworks and policies have not been 
matched by implementation and adequate invest-
ment in preventing and addressing disaster-induced 
displacement challenges.37 Without scaled-up action 
to reduce risk and strengthen resilience, vulnerabil-
ity and exposure will continue contributing to driving 
disaster risks upwards over the years to come.38 
8.2.4  
Target C – direct economic loss
Absolute and relative loss data
For a long time, statements such as “losses are 
growing exponentially” and “rising losses reached 
unprecedented levels” have dictated discussions of 
economic losses due to disaster. These estimates 
are useful for indicating the “stocktake” of average 
losses. Figure 8.16 demonstrates that overall losses 
and insured losses, adjusted to take into account 
inflation, significantly increased from 1980 to 2017. 
However, these figures fail to determine and provide 
finer detail on how disaster losses affect people’s 
lives. 
34  (UNISDR 2018a)
35  (Santos and Leitmann 2016)
36  (UNISDR 2014)
37  (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2018)
38  (UNISDR 2015a)
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A somewhat different picture emerges from several 
studies that examined economic losses by relat-
ing the data to the size of the population or the 
economy. This approach looks at losses relative 
to exposure, be it size of population, GDP, capital 
stock, etc., as well as changes in the size and shape 
of the economy driven by forces such as inflation 
and wealth growth.39  
The Sendai Framework mandates a certain type 
of methodology for economic loss data by stating 
that Target C is to be the reduction of direct disas-
ter economic loss in relation to global GDP by 2030. 
When figures of losses are divided by GDP, a differ-
ent perspective on relative damage emerges, as 
shown later in this section.  
Increases in the level of recorded loss in current 
data may occur because the monetary value of the 
exposed elements is higher and because more of 
these valuable assets are exposed. These factors 
should not be confused with higher risk. Individual 
assets have a specific level of risk, which is inde-
pendent of the value of the asset, and is indepen-
dent of the existence of other assets also being 
exposed. Dividing losses by GDP also reflects better 
the changing levels of risk.
Using the available date, the following sections 
measure the extent to which Target C is being 
achieved by participating countries, and show the 
behaviour of economic losses. As with the case 
of mortality, there is a group of countries that has 
complete data for the years of the baseline (2005–
2015), and a different set of countries that reported 
only for 2016 and 2017. This hampers the possibil-
ity of a full-period consistent analysis. 
It is also important to recall that Target C does not 
explicitly set a minimum period of data to be anal-
ysed. If the results being monitored are to corre-
spond to those of the Sendai Framework period, 
then waiting until year 2030 to analyse trends 
between 2015 and 2030 could be too late. However, 
the work of countries on reducing risk did not start 
in 2015. The HFA period should also be taken into 
account, and even some years before the two 
frameworks (a period when DRR was less high in 
Figure 8.16. Overall and insured disaster losses, 1980–2017
(Source: UNDRR with data from Munich Re)
39  (Barthel and Neumayer 2012); (Barredo 2009)
40  (Zapata Martí and Madrigal 2009)
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government agendas), to obtain the trends that 
can demonstrate the effectiveness of the actions 
recommended in both frameworks.
Data and methodology for economic loss 
assessment
Economic model
The economic model built for the Sendai Frame-
work Monitoring to assess direct economic 
losses caused by disasters is under development. 
It started from concepts and methods of more 
detailed and refined models such as the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) methodology, but was 
simplified to respond to the challenge of evaluating 
hundreds or thousands of events around the globe40 
that did not have a proper economic assessment 
of economic damage in the field and improved with 
the development of the technical guidance notes 
for targets and indicators. 
The methodologies proposed for SFM started with 
simplified versions developed for GARs. The number 
of items considered has increased, from just a few 
in GAR11, adding generic crops and livestock in 
GAR15, to today’s list of over 200 variables. Though 
the proposed set of methodologies is relatively 
simple, the lack of available information needed for 
many indicators has made this a challenging analyti-
cal task. However, as more countries report aggre-
gated and disaggregated data, the outcome will 
become a better and more realistic economic loss 
model that can be used to assess present and past 
disaster losses.
Agriculture
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) developed, jointly with UNDRR, a 
revised methodology for the estimation of losses 
in the agricultural sector. This makes extensive use 
of national agricultural statistics, including planted 
area, yields by crops and other information specific 
to the sector. The economic impact of disasters 
on the agricultural sector has been divided into 
several subsectors (crops, livestock, forest, aquacul-
ture, fisheries, stocks and assets) to better reflect 
the different particularities of each.  In the case of 
Reducing risk and vulnerability to climate change in the region of La Depresión Momposina in Colombia  
(Source: UNDP Colombia)
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agricultural crops and animal produce, the values 
countries are requested to report on – hectares and 
number of animals, respectively – must be trans-
formed to match the units of the available economic 
value. This is possible to calculate when enough 
data is available. For example, for a particular year 
and crop, the number of lost hectares is multiplied 
by the expected yield by the average value per tonne. 
Unfortunately, information on prices and yields is 
not always locally available for all countries, crops 
and years. In many cases, data can be drawn from 
FAOSTAT information, but there will still be impor-
tant data gaps. To fill these, regional clusters of 
prices are estimated based on similar GDP per 
capita (GDPPC). When any country has missing 
information, the respective cluster data is used. In 
extreme cases, the world average must be used. 
In the case of animal product, a similar logic is 
followed, with the only difference being the yield, for 
which an international effective weight average has 
been provided by FAO statistical offices. Another 
particularity occurs when disaggregation has not 
been provided, that is, when crop and livestock 
have not been individually reported. In this case, a 
weighted average is calculated based on the avail-
able area harvested and the crop prices.
Despite possible data gaps, the triangulation of 
sources possible through the SFM functionality 
enables broad analyses of agricultural sector disas-
ter losses, such as in Figure 17.
Figure 8.17. Direct agricultural losses by hazard type, 2005–2015
Productive assets and housing sector
SFM implements a basic methodology to assess 
the economic value of built elements as described 
in the technical guidance notes. This methodology 
assigns a value of a built element (e.g. a house or 
school, or a building in general) based on construc-
tion costs (expressed per square metre), the average 
size of the building, an overhead to account for the 
contents of the building (furniture, appliances and 
equipment) and another to account for the asso-
ciated physical infrastructure (urban and network 
infrastructure such as driveways, sewerage, water 
and electricity connections).
Value= Number of assets × average asset size 
× construction cost per M2 × equipment ratio × 
infrastructure ratio
For the practical implementation of the methodol-
ogy, a database of costs for an important number 
of types of assets has been prepared based on 
the International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion of all economic activities (ISIC, Rev. 4).41 This 
list contains items for almost all types of buildings 
corresponding to major economic sectors, leaving 
it to the discretion of each country to add more 
specific classes, and to refine the construction 
prices initially proposed.
(Source: UNDRR, SFM reported by 83 countries, March 2018 data, in constant 2010 $)
236 Chapter 8
Following analysis advanced in GAR13 and GAR15, 
the housing sector is initially assessed using the 
concept of social housing units (i.e. the default 
economic assessment estimates the cost of houses 
using as its average the size of social housing units 
required to provide basic shelter to the families in 
need). This average size can be modified by coun-
tries to obtain a more accurate and contextualized 
value. In a similar fashion, sizes for educational and 
health facilities are initially set as the size of small 
facilities of each type, thus providing a conserva-
tive estimate of value. Similarly, as with procedures 
used in agricultural losses, the methodology makes 
use of the clustering of country data by GDPPC to 
obtain a construction value per unit area in coun-
tries where no data was found. 
Member States can modify all of the provided 
parameters for each item, based on regional or 
national preferences, such as the average area of 
the assets, the construction costs per type of asset, 
the percentage of equipment in relation to construc-
tion cost, the percentage of related infrastructure 
in relation to construction cost and the average 
repair cost damage ratio of damaged assets. This 
provides an extremely flexible tool that is fully 
adjustable to the context of each country.
Critical infrastructure 
The OEIWG report on terminology related to DRR 
defines critical infrastructure as the physical 
structures, facilities, networks and other assets 
that provide services that are essential to the 
social and economic functioning of a community 
or society. The types of assets listed under the 
section “Proposed UNDRR Classification of Infra-
structure sector”, given in the technical guidance 
notes for Target D as critical infrastructure, cover a 
wide scope of facilities and networks. They include 
health centres, hospitals and educational facilities, 
as required by the target itself, and also specific 
structures in other sectors such as power plants, 
government facilities, transportation networks, and 
water, sewerage and solid waste treatment facili-
ties. Critical infrastructure buildings (e.g. health 
and education facilities) are assessed in a similar 
fashion to the productive assets described in the 
previous section, although their role as critical 
service providers is accounted for differently under 
Target D. 
The technical guidance notes methodology has 
simple recommendations for the economic assess-
ment of linear networks, in particular for roads. The 
methodology is based on either the cost to build 
a linear unit (metre) of the network or the cost of 
rehabilitation of the same. In the case of roads, 
default conservative values for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of unpaved and single lane paved 
roads are provided, based on data and statistics of 
the World Bank.
The types of assets listed also include more 
specific structures such as power plants and water 
treatment facilities. No default values are provided 
for these items, given their enormous variability, 
which must be priced specifically for each country. 
This is particularly important as each one of these 
types of asset is subject to local regulations, and 
is bounded by unique regional geographic, climatic 
and environmental characteristics.
Cultural heritage
Cultural heritage sites relate to monuments, tradi-
tions and places of worship, and also to the 
affected communities whose identity, culture and 
livelihoods are directly linked with those sites. 
Cultural heritages vary vastly within and among 
countries, which makes standardized methodolo-
gies to assign economic value challenging. Most 
losses associated with cultural heritage are intan-
gible losses (i.e. those associated with the histori-
cal and/or artistic value of cultural heritage assets). 
Also, a good part of economic losses associated 
with cultural assets are indirect losses, mainly 
connected to future income losses associated with 
tourism, culture and recreation.
41  (UN DESA 2008)
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However, to calculate at least a portion of the direct 
economic loss, it is suggested that Member States 
report the cost of rehabilitating, recovering and 
restoring the assets to a standard similar to that of 
the pre-disaster situation. This is feasible for fixed 
assets (buildings, monuments and fixed infrastruc-
ture of cultural heritage assets) and for movable 
assets such as paintings, documentation and sculp-
tures. When cultural assets are totally lost, economic 
assessment is extremely difficult, as there is simply 
no way to assign the value of what is recognized 
as priceless cultural artefacts. In some cases (and 
whenever available), the inflation-adjusted acquisi-
tion price or market value of movable cultural heri-
tage destroyed or totally lost can be used, as can the 
cost of building replicas of these assets.
Trends and figures of economic loss
Relative loss is presented in Figure 8.18, where each 
year contains the sum of losses from all 83 coun-
tries, divided by the sum of GDPs of all the same 
83 countries. As GDP is often expected to increase 
from one year to the next, the net result in the base-
line period of 2005–2015, which corresponds with 
HFA, is a steep trend downwards. This apparently 
demonstrates that countries were doing well reduc-
ing risk during that period, as it shows a reduction in 
economic losses from disasters in relation to GDP. 
But, as noted above, outliers are key in the analy-
sis of trends (see Box 9.1). In any time series with 
loss values, the location of the outliers (in this case, 
large-scale disasters) can completely change the 
trend. Furthermore, with such a short time series, 
adding one year before or after could similarly 
disrupt the trend line.
It is well known that 2017 was particularly disrup-
tive in terms of economic loss. According to Swiss 
Re, it broke several records:42 
Figure 8.18. Indicator C-1, direct economic loss relative to GDP, 83 countries with baseline in SFM, 2005–2017
(Source: UNDRR data)
• Total global economic losses from natural haz-
ards and man-made catastrophes were $337 
billion in 2017
• Global insured losses from disaster events 
in 2017 were $144 billion – the highest ever 
recorded 
• Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria resulted in 
combined insured losses of $92 billion, equal to 
0.5% of GDP in the United States of America
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Unfortunately, the data sample in the monitoring 
system has different countries reporting for 2016 
and 2017 than for the baseline years 2005–2015. 
Also, in 2011 and 2017, most losses occurred in 
the United States of America, which is not included 
in the sample of reporting countries. Nevertheless, 
including 2016 and 2017 in the relative loss calcu-
lations still does not alter the downward trend in 
economic losses.
Hazard distribution of economic damage 
Different hazards affect exposed assets in differ-
ent ways. In the following paragraphs, due to data 
limitations, only the total loss, losses to agriculture 
and losses in the housing sector are presented. 
Agriculture and housing are the two sectors for 
which highest losses have been reported among all 
sectors.
Figure 8.19 shows that weather-related hazards 
are the cause of most economic loss, with floods 
as the costliest hazard, bearing 30.5% of all 
losses, followed by multihazard events and earth-
quakes with 12.5%. Notable in the extended data 
set compliant with the Sendai Framework is the 
appearance, in seventh place, of a biological hazard 
(epidemic). 
Figure 8.19. Distribution of total economic loss (constant 2010 $) in 83 countries by hazard, 2005–2015  
Housing sector damage is dominated by the same 
three hazards (floods, earthquakes and cyclones). 
Despite the housing sector being one of the most 
affected and critical sectors for populations, avail-
able data about the global impact of disasters in 
the housing sector is scarce and scattered among 
many sources. 
Using the data from SFM, the importance of the 
housing sector is apparent. In the sample of 83 
countries for the period 2005–2015, losses in the 
housing sector represented 62% of all economic 
losses. While the proportional size of housing 
losses may reduce when better data on other 
sectors and more countries is available, it is never-
theless representative of the importance of this 
sector. For the year 2017 alone, when a different set 
of 81 countries (including China and a large group 
(Source: UNDRR data)
42  (Swiss Re 2019)
• Insured losses from all wildfires in the world 
totalled $14 billion in 2017, the highest ever in a 
single year
• More than 11,000 people died or went missing 
in disaster events in 2017
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Figure 8.20. Housing sector losses (constant 2010 $) in 83 countries by hazard, 2005–2015
of developed countries) reported, the weight of the 
sector was similar: 60.65%.  
National disaster loss databases, and more recently 
SFM, are allowing Member States to collect detailed 
data in these and other economic sectors. Data on 
the housing sector is important during emergency 
response (e.g. for calculation of shelter needs and 
affected population) and is an important input in 
risk assessments, which may use loss data as a 
calibration point. 
Identifying patterns and trends of damage in the 
housing sector is crucial in policymaking, given 
that most populations, especially the poor, are 
affected by their houses, which are the shelter they 
depend on and also the place where livelihoods are 
anchored. Additional factors underlining the impor-
tance of the housing sector are: the understanding 
Agricultural losses mostly driven by floods, 
droughts and biological hazards
Agricultural losses are mostly driven by floods, 
droughts and biological hazards in the 83 countries 
of the sample with baseline data.  
A 2017 report from FAO on the impact of disasters 
in this sector recognizes that impacts on agricul-
ture “are seldom quantified or analysed in depth, yet 
agriculture tends to be one of the main economic 
of risk in cities, which are particularly vulnerable 
due to rapid and chaotic urbanization; the uneven 
concentration of economic wealth in cities, render-
ing large segments of the population with high 
levels of vulnerability; the expansion of slums (often 
into hazardous locations); and the failure of urban 
authorities to enforce building codes and land-use 
planning.
The OEIWG report noted that data on housing 
damage, along with data about who live in those 
houses, will be used in the indicators to measure 
the achievement of Target B, the reduction of 
number of affected people. As with other data 
requirements, it is up to Member States to meet the 
challenge of properly accounting for this data. This 
will ultimately be a beneficial asset in the hands of 
those in charge of reducing risk through evidence-
based information. 
activities in developing countries, contributing on 
average between 10 and 20 percent of national 
GDP in lower-middle-income countries and over 
30 percent in low-income countries”.43  The same 
report, and after a review of 74 PDNAs, found that 
losses in the agriculture sector represent 23% of all 
loss attributed to medium- to large-scale disasters 
and 26% of losses due to climate-related hazards, 
stating that “Almost one third of all disaster loss 
is accrued in the agricultural sectors.” The data 
in the 83-country baseline is consistent with this 
 (Source: UNDRR data)
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figure, showing 31% of losses are in the agricultural 
sector.
The FAO report and the data of the sample concur 
in that the most damaging hazards are droughts 
and floods. However, the relative size of damage 
by drought in the FAO report is much bigger, reach-
ing more than 83% of the total. This disparity results 
from limitations of data and the lack of countries 
highly affected by drought in the 83 countries in 
the baseline sample. Many of the drought-affected 
countries of Africa, the Americas and other conti-
nents do not actively report losses to SFM and 
Regional distribution of economic damage and 
analysis by income group
In terms of geographic distribution of relative to 
GDP loss over the period 2005–2017 (Figure 8.22), 
Asia and Africa continue to outpace others, demon-
strating the gravity and magnitude of the impact 
of disasters in comparison with other regions. 
For example, ESCAP reports that between 1970 
and 2016, Asia and the Pacific lost $1.3 trillion in 
assets.44 A significant part of those losses was 
the result of floods, storms, droughts and earth-
quakes including tsunamis. Forecasts for the future 
are not part of the group of countries that have 
completed their baseline data (2005–2015). These 
data gaps will reduce as Member States proactively 
monitor and account for their losses. 
Another difference comes from the accounting of 
extensive risk. FAO data is from PDNAs, which are 
conducted only for large-scale disasters, most of 
which have been droughts in the past few years. 
Considering extensive risk impacts (small- and 
medium-scale disasters) would likely change the 
final composition due to hazards of agricultural 
damage. 
are equally alarming with 40% of global economic 
losses from disasters being projected to be in Asia 
and the Pacific, with the greatest losses in the 
largest economies: Japan and China, followed by 
the Republic of Korea and India. Yet, when analys-
ing those figures as a proportion of GDP, the burden 
is disproportionately high in countries with special 
needs, in particular SIDS, which are forecasted to 
have average annual losses close to 4% of their 
GDPs.45 The impact in terms of losses and deaths 
is probably much higher than the data suggests, 
as disasters in several of these countries remain 
underreported.
Figure 8.21. Agricultural losses (in constant 2010 $) in 83 countries by hazard, 2005–2015
43  (FAO 2017c)
44  (UNESCAP 2017)
45  (ESCAP 2017a)
(Source: UNDRR data)
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Figure 8.22. Yearly average total loss relative to GDP, by region, 2005–2017
While disaster risks are widespread throughout the 
Asia and Pacific region, analysis points to cross-
border hotspots where higher likelihood of change 
coincides with high concentrations of exposure and 
vulnerability, and thus impact.46 For example, river 
deltas such as the Mekong and the Ganges–Brah-
maputra–Meghna deltas will be affected by sea-
level rise due to subsidence, deteriorating water 
quality, decreases in sediment supply and increases 
in groundwater salinity.
In terms of regional cooperation in DRR, the Asia 
and Pacific region has been particularly active 
in improving collective disaster preparedness 
and exchanging good practices on building back 
better. The ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance 
Centre in Indonesia is actively promoting regional 
cooperation by providing policy advice, research, 
strategic learning and exchange of information 
for effective DRR. In addition, within the exist-
ing regional groupings such as ASEAN, there has 
been growing emphasis on conducting joint exer-
cises for improved disaster preparedness through 
strengthened risk management capacities and 
enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure 
against natural hazards with cross-border spillover 
effects. Post-disaster recovery programmes have 
also been used often as opportunities for exchange 
of good practices, particularly in housing recon-
struction. ESCAP has established a Regional Trust 
Fund on Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Prepared-
ness, which could be used as an effective vehicle 
for sharing data, tools and expertise to support 
disaster resilience in high-risk countries of the Asia 
and Pacific region. ESCAP has also recently estab-
lished the Asian and Pacific Centre for the Devel-
opment of Disaster Information Management to 
provide member countries with advisory services 
and technical cooperation on transboundary disas-
ters such as earthquakes, droughts, sandstorm and 
dust-storms.
Narrow the gaps, bridge the divides. Rebuild 
trust by bringing people together around 
common goals.47 
Disasters discriminate along the same lines that 
societies discriminate against people. This GAR 
has highlighted that headline figures on economic 
losses and deaths hide fragilities and setbacks 
in many countries. Despite significant progress 
over the last two decades, more than 700 million 
people remain below the extreme poverty line, thus 
highlighting the relationship among vulnerability, 
 (Sources: UNDRR and World Bank)
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poverty and exposure. After a prolonged decline, 
the number of undernourished people rose from 
777 million in 2015 to 815 million in 2016, mainly 
due to droughts, conflicts and disasters linked to 
climate change.48 The United Nations forecasts that 
further declines or weak per capita income growth 
are anticipated in 2019 in Central, Southern and 
West Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
These are home to nearly a quarter of the global 
population living in poverty and often those facing 
the highest risks of adverse consequences from 
climate change and extreme weather events.49  
People living in poverty suffer disproportionally 
in the wake of a disaster. They are less able to 
cope as they rarely benefit from social protection 
schemes, have fewer or no savings to smooth the 
impacts, their livelihoods depend on fewer assets, 
and they are more likely to live in low-value, hazard-
prone areas in urban centres or depend on vulner-
able ecosystems in rural areas. They are locked in 
protracted cycles of poverty, translated into irre-
versible effects on education and health, which can 
strengthen the likelihood of intergenerational trans-
mission of poverty. For example, in Peru, the effects 
of the 1970 Ancash earthquake on educational 
attainment can be traced back to the children of 
mothers affected at birth, highlighting that the 
effects of large disasters can extend to future 
generations.50  
Even though causality should be analysed in finer 
detail, there is a close two-way relationship between 
disasters and poverty. Disasters aggravate the 
depth and breadth of poverty, while poverty exacer-
bates the way people experience, cope and recover 
from disasters. ESCAP estimates a significant 
segment of the Asia–Pacific population fall into 
poverty from selected disasters (Figure 8.23). This 
is a reality for several countries across the globe. 
Previous studies point to similar findings in Latin 
America where, among the Guatemalan households 
hit by Tropical Storm Agatha in 2010, per capita 
consumption fell by 5.5%, increasing poverty by 
14%.51 In Senegal, it is estimated that impacts of 
disasters between 2006 and 2011 affected house-
holds, with 25% more likely to fall into poverty.52 
Similarly, according to World Bank analysis, esti-
mates for 89 countries found that if all disasters 
were to be prevented next year, the number of 
people in extreme poverty – those living on less 
than $1.90 a day – would fall by 26 million.53
Figure 8.23. Estimated percentage of people falling into poverty from selected disasters in the Asia–Pacific region
46  (ESCAP 2017a)
47  (United Nations Secretary General 2018)
48  (United Nations 2019a)
49  (United Nations 2019b)
50  (Caruso and Miller 2015)
51  (Baez et al. 2017)
52  (Dang, Lanjouw and Swinkels 2017)
53  (Hallegatte et al. 2017)
(Sources: ESCAP statistical database and country post-disaster damage assessments, Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2017) 
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Four years after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, 
countries have taken bold steps in terms of report-
ing, particularly when it comes to indicators used 
for measuring poverty and inequality (SDGs 1 and 
10). Disaster loss data could be analysed against 
poverty and inequality data to understand, in finer 
detail, how disasters affect people’s lives and 
direct interventions to reduce poverty and disaster 
risk in a complementary way, without adding addi-
tional reporting burden for countries. This means 
seeking out high-quality data that can be applied to 
compare outcomes and changes in poverty, inequal-
ity and impact of disasters over time, among and 
within countries, and investing in doing so year 
after year. It also means making this data available, 
raising awareness and building trust in its use while 
strengthening people’s ability to use it, so that their 
needs are at the core of such processes.54 
Figure 8.24 reports the distribution of absolute data, 
namely the total number of disaster occurrences, 
the total number of deaths and missing persons, the 
total number of affected people and total economic 
losses from 2005 to 2017, among the different 
geographic regions. In terms of geographic distri-
bution, it again becomes apparent that, despite 
accounting for 23% of disaster occurrences, Asia 
incurred 42% of the total economic losses recorded 
at the global level between 2005 and 2017, carry-
ing a disproportionate burden in terms of disaster 
occurrences and impacts. The Americas, where 46% 
of disasters occurred, ranks second as far as total 
economic loss is concerned, but accounts for 12% 
of the total number of deaths and missing people. 
Differences in terms of socioeconomic develop-
ment, preparedness plans and resilience among and 
within regions can explain this disparity.
Figure 8.24. Distribution of disaster occurrences and impacts, by region, 2005–2017
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and World Bank)
Figure 8.25 reports yearly average losses rela-
tive to GDP for different income groups over the 
period 2005–2017. Again, the ratio is significantly 
higher for low-income countries compared to other 
income groups, highlighting the gross inequality 
of burden sharing among income groups, with the 
lowest-income countries shouldering the greatest 
impact of disasters. When compared to economic 
losses, the picture is somewhat different: upper–
middle-income and high-income countries account 
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for 46% of economic losses and low-income coun-
tries account for the bulk of total mortality in the 
period 2005–2017 (Figure 8.26). The higher mone-
tary value and more complete data on assets in 
upper–middle- and high-income countries, where 
41% of disasters reported in the database between 
2005 and 2017 occurred, can explain the larger 
extent of economic losses.
54  (IEAG 2014)
Figure 8.25. Yearly average total loss relative to GDP, by income group and SIDS, 2005–2017
Figure 8.26. Distribution of disaster occurrences and impacts, by income group, 2005–2017
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and World Bank)
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and 
World Bank)
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Economic loss trends in global data sets
These are the disparities that headline figures mask 
where higher registration of disasters and more com-
plete figures on insured losses account for the higher 
registration of costs. Such figures are misleading 
as they fail to demonstrate and provide finer details 
on how disasters affect people’s lives. In absolute 
terms, high-income households lose more because 
they have more to lose, and those losses are more 
visible as they tend to be insured and better reported. 
The 32% of total economic losses that low-income 
countries in Figure 8.26 experience will be far more 
challenging to overcome than similar percentages 
in upper–middle-income or high-income countries. 
An important issue in disaster loss analysis is the 
proportion of income or assets lost, as the severity 
of losses depends on which households experience 
disasters and how. Proxy indicators and combina-
tion of data sources on poverty, inequality, health 
and sanitation, and education outcomes are useful 
for adding finer detail and a more comprehensive 
picture in the analysis, accounting for the real costs 
of disasters and directing funding to the appropriate 
initiatives to address the systemic nature of risks.
8.2.5  
Target D – damage to critical infrastructure 
and public services: an encouraging decline in 
recent years
The Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction (AMCDRR) in 2018 discussed the criti-
cal importance of the problem of infrastructure,55 
highlighting that “half of the infrastructure needed 
in Asia by 2050 has yet to be built”. In addition, the 
whole urban infrastructure should be treated as an 
interconnected and unique entity in terms of resil-
ience, including the housing, industrial and commer-
cial infrastructure that provides basic services to a 
growing population in urban areas. A holistic and 
multisectoral approach is needed when planning 
critical infrastructure. It should look beyond physi-
cal infrastructure and take into account the interde-
pendent nature of services that urban infrastructure 
provides to society, including energy, water supply, 
transportation, telecommunications and other criti-
cal services.
While the private sector needs to be involved and 
regulated via policy instruments (including build-
ing codes and land-use planning), the responsibility 
of governments in creating new resilient, risk-
informed critical infrastructure is undeniable. Indi-
cators of loss in critical infrastructure in the Sendai 
Framework will continue to monitor the outcomes 
of impacts that are usually the direct responsibil-
ity of, and executed directly by, governments. This 
promotes evolution of existing critical infrastructure 
towards sensible, risk-informed public investments 
that should result in resilient critical infrastructures 
serving resilient societies. 
Examining long-term trends for infrastructure 
damage is challenging due to data limitations. 
Upward trends are particularly susceptible to outli-
ers. For example, 2015 is an outlier in relation to 
damage to the education and health sectors. This is 
due to the large impact of the earthquake in Nepal 
during that year, which caused enormous damage 
to the built environment, health and education infra-
structure. However, data attrition about the amount 
of damage reported in national databases is becom-
ing a less-significant problem as more damage is 
reported compared to previous periods.
If shorter-term trends are examined (e.g. 2005–
2017), the view is different and appears more opti-
mistic. Figures 8.27 and 8.28 show the ratio of 
affected education facilities and the number of 
affected health facilities to 100,000 people, respec-
tively, for baseline countries. These figures examine 
extensive risk only, which limits outlier-related 
issues. The numbers reported for 2016 and 2017 
in Figures 8.26–8.28 are highlighted in different 
colours as the countries for which data is available 
is usually different from the baseline period and 
their number is smaller. Figure 8.29 shows the ratio 
of damaged roads to the total length of the road 
network. Health and education damage relative to 
population size have a downward trend, as shown 
in the figures. The same is true as far as relative 
damage to road is concerned, at least before 2016. 
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Figure 8.28. Damage to health facilities, HFA and Sendai Framework period, extensive risk in 83 baseline countries, 2005–2017
Figure 8.27. Damage to education facilities relative to population size, HFA and Sendai Framework period, extensive risk in 83 
baseline countries, 2005–2017
 (Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and World Bank)
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and World Bank)
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Figure 8.29. Damage to roads relative to total length of road network, HFA and Sendai Framework period, extensive risk in 83 
baseline countries, 2005–2017
Disruptions to basic services, the second part of 
the target, also exhibit downward trends in recent 
years. Figure 8.30shows the number of facilities 
affected by disaster in several sectors, relative to 
population size. Shorter-term trends (since the start 
of HFA) show a tendency to decrease in the case of 
all services.
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and CIA World Factbook on global road infrastructure)  
Note: Countries included in the reporting for 2016 and 2017 in the Sendai Framework period may differ.
Figure 8.30. Disruptions to public services relative to population size, 2000–2015
 (Source: UNDRR data)
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These trends are occurring despite the existence 
of a big outlier at the end of the series, in 2015, 
which influences all trends upwards. This is some-
thing that must be taken into consideration when 
analysing trends, as a large-scale disaster can 
happen at any time and the reading of the data may 
completely change.
Some of these downward trends in the last 15 years 
can be explained by DRR efforts of many coun-
tries. Campaigns such as Safe Hospitals and Safe 
Schools have had an important effect on reducing 
overall damage. Development generally reduces 
risk. For example, in countries where the percent-
age of paved roads is growing every year, roads are 
becoming more resilient.
8.2.6  
Targets A–D: extensive risk analysis for 
the period 2005–2017: surprising facts of 
extensive risk in recent years 
Previous GARs (in 2013 and 2015) have 
defined extensive risk as the set of frequent 
disasters associated with relatively low inten-
sity hazards. In general terms, extensive risk 
is the idea of widely spread and relatively 
frequent small- and medium-scale disasters. 
Extensive risk manifests as large numbers 
of recurrent, low-to-medium-severity disas-
ters, which are mainly associated with local-
ized hazards such as flash floods, landslides, 
urban flooding, storms, fires and other time-
specific events. 
When HFA was adopted, the mortality, physi-
cal damage and economic loss from extensive 
risk had not been accounted for in national 
or international reports, except in a few Latin 
American countries. As a result, this risk layer 
remained largely invisible to the international 
community. However, the sustained efforts 
from the United Nations system and partners 
to assist countries in systematically recording 
local disaster losses has generated system-
atic and comparable evidence regarding the 
scale of extensive risk, with data now covering 
more than 100 countries. 
Given most of these data sets have been built 
using the same indicators, a comparable 
approach and similar methodology, it is possi-
ble to analyse these local records at a global 
level of observation. Unlike intensive risk, 
extensive risk is more closely associated 
with inequality and poverty than with physical 
features such as earthquake fault lines and 
cyclone tracks. 
Extensive disaster risk is thus magnified 
by risk drivers such as badly planned and 
managed urban development, environmental 
degradation, poverty and inequality, vulner-
able rural livelihoods and weak governance. 
This layer of risk is not captured by global 
risk modelling, and its losses are not reported 
internationally in global data sources. 
One key feature of previous GARs has been to 
highlight the contingent liabilities associated 
with this risk layer, which tend to be absorbed 
by low-income households and communi-
ties, small businesses, and local and national 
governments, and which are a critical factor 
in poverty. 
Box 8.1. Basics of extensive risk
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Table 8.1. Extensive risk figures disaggregated by hazard family, 2005–2017, summarizing the main figures obtained in the analysis
Framework – meaning the latest 12 years of data. 
In previous GARs, a longer period was researched, 
which may have introduced biases due to less data 
reporting in the initial years covered by the data-
bases. While the period of the research is now 
shorter, the number of records analysed is high, 
with 320,000 disaster records, and includes a higher 
number of countries (104), which add to its strength 
as a statistical sample.
There is now a broader scope of hazards included 
in this sample, because of the call in the Sendai 
Framework to also address biological and envi-
ronmental hazards (grouped under “biological”) 
and human-induced (technological) hazards. This 
sample therefore includes all reported epidemics, 
industrial accidents and deforestation.
This section presents an update to the extensive 
risk analysis featured in previous GARs. Extensive 
risk is important for many reasons. However, the 
main one is that extensive risks are responsible 
for most damage to infrastructure and livelihoods, 
perhaps for most economic loss (as shown below) 
and represents an erosion of development assets 
such as houses, schools, health facilities, roads 
and local infrastructure. GAR efforts to reveal exten-
sive risk aim at making the cost visible, as exten-
sive risk losses tend to be underestimated and are 
usually absorbed by low-income households and 
communities.
For this GAR19, a focused analysis of extensive/
intensive risk has been conducted. It is now limited 
to the period of the monitoring of the two frame-
works – HFA (or the baseline) and the Sendai 
(Source: UNDRR data)
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and with a generally damaging year in 2011. Had 
the sample included the United States of America, 
there would be bigger outliers in 2011 and 2017. 
The trend without the outliers is important because 
it shows how risk is affecting a huge proportion of 
the world – most importantly, the poor. 
Figure 8.31 shows relative losses in the housing 
sector, which dominate the overall losses, along 
with agriculture, in all SFM countries from 2000 
to 2017. Relative losses are calculated by divid-
ing the number of damaged or destroyed houses 
by population. Against steady increases in the first 
10 years, losses have significantly declined since 
2010. However, data for years 2015, 2016 and 2017 
should be taken with caution as the number of 
disasters for which data on the number of damaged 
or destroyed available in the database is signifi-
cantly smaller than in previous years.
One of the conclusions is that economic loss, in 
absolute terms, continues to grow in disasters at all 
scales. However, despite the high number of exten-
sive risk disaster records (99.6% of all data) and a 
higher contribution to overall economic loss, the 
impact of extensive risk is slowly receding within 
the data available at this time. This reduction of 
economic impact is visible at a global scale and is 
Figure 8.31. Number of houses damaged/destroyed relative to population size, extensive risk in all SFM countries, 2000–2017 
It is important to note that year aggregates of 
economic loss cannot be classified as extensive 
or intensive because they are not records of indi-
vidual disasters. In general, the annual consolidate 
surpasses the threshold of extensive risk, so most 
consolidated data would come under the category 
of intensive. 
The weight of extensive risk in the economic losses 
area, using this sample of data, is much higher 
than that found in previous research periods: 68% 
of all economic losses in this period are caused by 
small and medium, localized and frequent disas-
ters. This contrasts with previous findings of 42% of 
economic loss, and is perhaps a confirmation that 
after many achievements made by Member States 
in reducing intensive risk, their attention should now 
shift to addressing extensive risk.
Monitoring extensive and intensive risk
Extensive risk shows different trends from those 
that are apparent in the full sample of data. This is 
a consequence of the absence of outliers produced 
by large-scale disasters. In the case of the HFA and 
Sendai Framework eras, there were some outliers, 
especially in 2015 with the earthquake in Nepal, 
(Source: UNDRR with data from DesInventar and World Bank)
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reflected in similar trends in the relative losses of 
the set of countries reporting to the Sendai Frame-
work Monitoring system.
8.3 
 
Target E: Progress on 
disaster risk reduction 
strategies for 2020
Two years before the deadline of Target E, there is 
no comprehensive picture of all strategies in place. 
The target speaks plainly about “national and local 
disaster risk reduction strategies”, but the indica-
tors that will measure this target are more difficult 
to quantify. Indicator E-1 requires national strate-
gies to be “in line with the Sendai Framework”, and 
local strategies to be “in line with National Strat-
egies”. It could be inferred therefore that local 
strategies should also be aligned with the Sendai 
Framework.
Some strategies are limited in scope and action, 
taking into consideration the specific context and 
capacity of the country. Therefore, DRR strategies 
are considered as a set of policy documents on 
relevant policy areas, from sectoral perspectives, 
or of targeted specific hazards. Measurement of 
compliance with the Sendai Framework should 
consequently be loosely interpreted.
The technical guidance notes proposed that the 
alignment of strategies with the Sendai Framework 
could be measured by a simple system of assign-
ing scores, which, despite their subjectivity, could 
identify the alignment of a national strategy to the 
Sendai Framework. Box 8.2 shows the 10 criteria 
used for monitoring the progress of national DRR 
strategies where Member States conduct their own 
self-assessments. It should be underlined that attrib-
uted scores are for the alignment of national strate-
gies to the Sendai Framework only, and do not offer 
any assessment on implementation of the strategy.
As with other targets and indicators, there are 
several data sources, which gives nuance to the 
conclusions to be drawn. In order of priority, these 
data sources are: the monitoring system, the 
UNDRR survey on implementation of the Sendai 
Framework, the Data Readiness Review and the 
results of the last rounds of reporting of HFA.56 
This section presents the results of the officially 
reported data available in the online Sendai Frame-
work Monitoring system. By expanding on facts 
and figures from other data sources, it provides the 
best available overview of how Member States are 
progressing on DRR strategies. 
Box 8.2. Key elements in DRR strategies used to assign a score to Indicator E-1, Number of 
countries that adopt and implement national DRR strategies in line with the Sendai Framework
i. Have different timescales, with targets, 
indicators and time frames
ii. Have aims at preventing the creation of risk
iii. Have aims at reducing existing risk
iv. Have aims at strengthening economic, 
soc ia l ,  hea l th  and e nv i ronme n ta l 
resilience
v. Address the recommendations of 
Priority 1, Understanding disaster risk
vi. Address the recommendations of 
Priority  2, Strengthening disaster risk 
governance to manage disaster risk
vii. Address the recommendations of 
Priority 3, Investing in disaster risk 
reduction for resilience
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Figure 8.32. Indicator E-1, number of countries reporting on 
national DRR strategies, 2015–2017
(Source: UNDRR 2018b)
(Source: UNDRR data)
8.3.1 
Data from the online Sendai Framework 
Monitoring system 
The first important figure is the number of coun-
tries that reported on their progress on their strate-
gies. In 2017, 47 Member States reported the status 
of their national and local DRR strategies. In 2016, 
only 27 countries reported, and 25 did so for 2015. 
The fact that more data was reported for 2017 than 
previous years reflects that the online monitoring 
system was launched in March 2018 and the techni-
cal guidance notes were developed over the course 
of 2016. Among the 47 reporting countries, only 6 
reported that they have national DRR strategies in 
comprehensive alignment (100% compliance) with 
the Sendai Framework, according to the 10 crite-
ria of the national DRR strategies in line with the 
Sendai Framework. Seventeen countries reported 
that their national DRR strategies have substantial 
alignment with the Sendai Framework (E-1 score of 
0.67–0.99), while 10 countries have limited or no 
alignment (score of 0–0.33). 
As of October 2018, the overall average compli-
ance of alignment with the Sendai Framework is 
0.60.
On closer examination, more Member States report 
that their national DRR strategies have better 
ratings in elements of measuring reducing existing 
risk (0.67 average) and in Priority 1, Understand-
ing risk (0.64 average), than implementing Sendai 
Framework Priority 3, which seems to be more chal-
lenging (0.53 average). In the Readiness Review, 
conducted in early 2017, having indicators in the 
viii. Address the recommendations of Priority 
4, Enhancing disaster preparedness for 
effective response and to build back 
better in recovery, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction
ix. Promote policy coherence relevant to 
DRR such as sustainable development, 
poverty eradication and climate change, 
notab l y  w i th  S D Gs and th e Par is 
Agreement
x. Have mechanisms to follow up, periodi-
cally assess and publicly report on 
progress
Each element is weighted equally with the 
following criteria:
i. Comprehensive implementation (full 
score): 1.0
ii. Substantial implementation, additional 
progress required: 0.75
iii. Moderate implementation , nei ther 
comprehensive nor substantial: 0.50
iv. Limited implementation: 0.25
v. If there is no implementation or no 
existence: 0
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Figure 8.33. Average scores of the 10 key elements for national DRR strategies to be in line with the Sendai Framework 
(Source: UNDRR data) 
national DRR strategies seemed the biggest chal-
lenge for countries. One third of reporting countries 
answered they did not have indicators, while by 
Several countries have reflected recent progress to 
improve their national DRR strategies in line with 
the Sendai Framework in currently reported values. 
For example, Namibia already had national DRR 
strategies in 2015, with a low alignment to the new 
Sendai Framework at that time. The strategy has 
been improved over three years (score of 50% in 
2016). With the National Strategy for Mainstream-
ing Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change 
Adaptation into Development Planning in Namibia 
2017–2021, the set of DRR strategies and poli-
cies is in comprehensive alignment with the Sendai 
Framework (self-score of 100% in 2017). 
Czechia did not have a DRR strategy in 2015. 
National DRR strategies have been implemented 
since 2016 (score of 90% in 2016). In 2017, the 
country added full compliance to subindicator (x) – 
embedded mechanisms to follow up – increasing 
its score to 92.5%.  
October 2018, about one quarter of reporting coun-
tries did not have “different timescales, with targets, 
indicators and time frames” (0.60 average).
8.3.2 
Indicator E-2
Another important figure to highlight is the number 
of countries that reported on their local DRR strat-
egies. In 2017, 42 Member States reported the 
proportion of local DRR strategies available in 
local governments, while only 21 Member States 
reported so in 2016 and 18 in 2015. Note that local 
government is defined as a form of subnational 
public administration with responsibility for DRR – 
to be determined by countries. Among 35 countries 
that reported the status of their local DRR strate-
gies, 17 reported that all of their local government 
bodies have local DRR strategies in line with their 
national DRR strategies, while 7 countries reported 
no local DRR strategies or without alignment to their 
national strategies.
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Several countries have reflected recent progress 
in increasing the proportion of local governments 
having their local DRR strategies. For example, in 
Montenegro, in 2015, there was no DRR strategies; 
however, the number of local governments with 
local DRR strategies in line with the national DRR 
increased from 2 (9.1%) in 2016 to 6 (27.3%) in 
2017, out of all 22 local governments. In Eswatini, 
the number of local governments with local DRR 
strategies in line with the national DRR is gradu-
ally increasing over time: 115 (32.6%) in 2015, 119 
(33.7%) in 2016 and 121 (38.3%) in 2017, out of all 
353 local governments.
Figure 8.34. Indicator E-2, number of countries with local 
DRR strategies in line with their national DRR strategies, 2017
As in the previous section on analysis of moni-
toring data, 47 countries have reported on 
Target E (Indicator E-1) on national DRR strat-
egies. Taking into account that this number 
should not be treated as representative, the 
information was complemented with other 
sources. The following sources of informa-
tion were analysed in order of hierarchy: data 
from SFM, a survey questionnaire and UNDRR 
support to Member States, complemented by 
countries who reported in the Readiness Review 
but not covered in the earliest lists. 
At the time of the Readiness Review that UNDRR 
conducted at the beginning of 2017, out of the 
87 countries who responded, 50 said that they 
either had a national strategy or were working 
on a strategy at different levels of progress. A 
survey was also conducted among Member 
States in the fourth quarter of 2018 to get a 
snapshot of country reported progress in imple-
menting the Sendai Framework, including prog-
ress on Target E. Information of 42 countries 
was collected in this process. UNDRR has also 
been engaging with some Member States to 
support them in their progress on Target E.
Based on the above, a triangulation of informa-
tion from all these sources was conducted. This 
provided information for 121 unique countries as 
available in one or more of these sources. Out of 
these 121 countries, 82 reported that they have 
made substantive or full progress in the develop-
ment of national strategies aligned to the Sendai 
Framework. The remaining 39 countries have 
thus far made medium or low progress. Regretta-
bly, these sources of information do not allow for 
extrapolation, meaning that with the data avail-
able, it is not possible to estimate the progress of 
the remaining 70 Member States.
SFM remains the main and official source of infor-
mation for tracking progress on the implementa-
tion of the Sendai Framework. Hence, all Member 
States are encouraged to continue reporting 
through the monitor. All other sources are comple-
mentary and will not be used when a sufficient 
level of reporting is achieved in the official system.
Box 8.3. Complementing SFM with other data sources
(Source: UNDRR data)
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8.4  
Target F: Measuring 
international 
cooperation – too 
early for conclusions
In the Data Readiness Review study, Member States 
were asked to assess the availability and feasibil-
ity of providing data on the key indicators. This 
revealed that only 38% of Member States (33 out 
of 86 participating countries) would be capable 
of reporting on Indicator F-1: “Total official inter-
national support (official development assistance 
(ODA) plus other official flows), for national disas-
ter risk reduction actions”; similar or lower numbers 
were reported for other indicators. For example, 
only 23% stated they would be able to report Indi-
cator F-4: “Total official international support 
(ODA plus other official flows) for the transfer and 
exchange of disaster risk reduction-related tech-
nology”. Participation in the first cycle of the moni-
toring exercise confirms this sparse availability of 
data. The average reporting rate for Indicator F-1, 
by far the best for Target F, reached only 25% of 
Member States. No analysis is provided for the rest 
of the indicators of Target F due to the low partici-
pation in monitoring.
The data available for tracking ODA and DRR expen-
diture and to fully account for these costs remains 
incomplete at a global scale. For instance, OECD 
reports that where such information exists, it is not 
gathered on a regular basis due to accounting and 
administrative fragmentation across sectors and 
levels of government collecting and processing 
such data.57 Macrolevel data on the global disaster 
risk financing gaps, and national and subnational 
data are necessary. To achieve this, improvements 
in reporting are required immediately. The renewed 
attention through the Sendai Framework provides 
an excellent opportunity for countries to report on 
national data and better understand the interplay 
between national and international sources in disas-
ter risk financing. Providing a more comprehensive 
picture on where disaster aid and spending flows 
will help to build the evidence base for improved 
prevention, mitigation and preparedness funding. 
It is possible to start forming a global picture of 
financing for DRR using proxy indicators. In coming 
iterations of reporting for SFM, the availability of 
nationally reported figures will grow, and the use of 
proxies will complement increasingly granular data. 
Analysing data from other sources such as OECD 
DAC58 shows that, for instance, development assis-
tance for DRR has remained a persistently small 
fraction of the total international aid financing land-
scape, and that disaster expenditure is predomi-
nantly ex post.59 Data on development assistance 
for disasters can be captured – but is not limited 
to – three types of ODA: disaster prevention and 
preparedness, reconstruction relief and rehabilita-
tion, and emergency response (Figure 8.35). The 
figure of $5.2 billion for DRR represents 3.8% of 
the spending in the period 2005–2017, which is a 
marginal fraction of the total amount. Most of the 
finance, $122 billion (89%), flows to emergency 
response, while $9.84 billion goes to reconstruction 
relief and rehabilitation (Figure 8.35).
Resource gaps continue to be significant and 
disproportionally borne by countries most in 
need. In addition, most efforts are concentrated 
in supporting preparedness and recovery, at the 
expense of funding dedicated to understanding the 
underlying vulnerabilities contributing to disasters. 
As captured in previous GARs, the increasing gap 
between demand for response to disasters and 
available global funding stresses the need for effec-
tive integrated measures that support DRR in the 
framework of sustainable development. 
Although there is an increasing convergence 
between international development and humani-
tarian funding, financing gaps for disasters also 
support the above findings. Figure 8.36 demon-
strates the difference between funding requested 
and the funding provided by the global humanitar-
ian community; pointing to an eightfold increase in 
terms of financing gaps. In other words, and aligned 
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Figure 8.35. Share of DRR in international aid for disasters (constant 2016 $, millions), 2005–2017
with previous GAR findings, global funding require-
ments are increasing, while the national and inter-
national capacity to address them is not growing in 
proportionate terms. This finding should be treated 
with considerable caution given pressures on tradi-
tional funding sources and sustained concern for 
the millions of people affected by disasters each 
year, who do not receive the assistance and protec-
tion required to rebuild their lives.60 A previous 
study on 20-year trends of ODA61 demonstrates 
that where the economy is at risk, volumes of 
financing tend to be more timely and substantially 
higher; where predominantly populations are at risk, 
volumes are often lower.
Deliberations in AAAA reiterated the need for 
renewed attention to financial instruments and 
innovations designed to reduce vulnerability to risk. 
For instance, scaling up the use of State contingent 
debt instruments – debt contracts that link debt 
service payment to a country’s obligation to service 
it – linked to disasters could be an alternative 
(Source: UNDRR with data from OECD)
measure. Such approaches need to be integrated 
in a broader package of efforts that seek to ensure 
countries have access to a risk-informed approach 
to finance on terms and conditions commensurate 
with their circumstances.
A positive international development in funding 
for disaster risk is the burgeoning field of disaster 
risk financing – a term that covers a wide range 
of global, regional and national risk-sharing and 
risk-transfer systems and products (public and 
private). The quantification of disaster risk for 
insurance and risk-sharing purposes is another 
form of incentive to reduce risk, although its focus 
is to produce better outcomes in socioeconomic 
development. Again, the financial flows related to 
these are unlikely to be counted in ODA figures. 
The complexity of this field requires a much more 
detailed treatment than can be done in this GAR, but 
these developments are important to note for future 
consideration in reporting on F-1 (total international 
flows), F-2 (multilateral organization flows) and F-3 
60  (OCHA 2019)
61  (Kellett and Caravani 2013)
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8.5  
Target G: Multi-hazard 
early warning systems, 
– progress and 
challenges observed
Target G addresses the availability of, and access 
to, MHEWSs and disaster risk information and 
assessments. Indicators G-2 to G-4 are based on 
the four key elements of EWSs, informed by an 
international network on MHEWSs,66 namely: (a) 
disaster risk knowledge based on the systematic 
collection of data and disaster risk assessments 
(G-5); (b) detection, monitoring, analysis and fore-
casting of the hazards and possible consequences 
(G-2); (c) dissemination and communication, by an 
official source, of authoritative, timely, accurate and 
actionable warnings and associated information on 
likelihood and impact (G-3); and (d) preparedness at 
all levels to respond to the warnings received (G-4). 
Indicator G-1 is a compound indicator of the four 
(bilateral flows). For example, concerning multilat-
eral organizations, GFDRR,62 the World Bank63  and 
its Global Risk Financing Facility,64 and regional 
development banks such as the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB)65 provide national project funding, 
grants and loans specifically targeted at disaster 
risk financing. They also focus on capacity devel-
opment to reduce risk, to track expenditure on DRR 
and to promote integration with CCA and climate 
change mitigation.
Figure 8.36. Funding received and funding requested through United Nations appeals, constant 2017 $, billions, 2000–2018
(Source: UNDRR with data from OCHA Financial Tracking Service)
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Table 8.2. Target G, number of countries by total score for each dimension of Indicators G-2 to G-6 
indicators and stands for a fully fledged MHEWS 
with four key elements taking the values 0–1.
Reporting against Target G has been a challenge 
for Member States, although indicators were 
developed to take into account the global feasibil-
ity of reporting. Thirty-four Member States have 
reported at least one indicator for 2015–2018 
(mostly related to Indicator G-3), while the small-
est number reported on G-2 and G-5, which require 
a multi-hazard approach and specification of major 
hazards. 
Among the 34 reporting countries, 14 have reported 
a complete set of indicators from G-2 to G-5, which 
enables calculation of G-1. Despite a small number 
of reporting countries, the results reveal room for 
improvement on this target in most countries. 
Above all, reporting against G-5, with the lowest 
average among G-2 to G-5, demonstrates that most 
countries need comprehensive risk assessment for 
their defined major hazards.
Indicator G-2 refers to multi-hazard monitoring 
and forecasting systems. This indicator requires 
62  (Hallegatte, Maruyama and Jun 2018); (De Bettencourt et 
al. 2013); (GFDRR 2018b)
63  (Alton, Mahul and Benson 2017)
64  (Global Risk Financing Facility 2019) 
65  (Juswanto and Nugroho 2017); (ADB 2019)
66  (UNISDR 2006); (WMO 2017)
defining major hazards targeted for monitoring 
and forecasting systems. As shown in Table 8.2, 
there are two peaks at the upper and lower ends. 
In other words, several countries have multi-hazard 
monitoring and forecasting systems that cover 
major hazards well, while other countries do not. 
For example, Lebanon identified a wide variety of 
major hazards, including biological hazards, to be 
monitored and forecast. As some institutions are 
involved in MHEWSs, Lebanon is working on the 
development of an early warning platform, which 
will contribute to standardized processes and clear 
roles and responsibilities. Warning messages of 
several types of hazards would be further improved 
to include risk information to trigger response 
reactions disseminated in a timely and consistent 
manner. 
Indicator G-3 relates to coverage of early warning 
information or penetration rate of communication 
modes. Among 31 reporting countries, 10 reported 
their targeted population is fully covered. In the 
case of Namibia, penetration ratios of local commu-
nication and mass media increased from 2015 to 
2017, which has enabled early warning information 
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Figure 8.37. Number of countries reporting on Indicators 
G-1 to G-5
to reach the whole population. Reported penetration 
rates show that mass media can reach more people 
than local communication systems such as sirens 
and public bulletin boards.
Indicator G-4 relates to local plans to act on early 
warnings, which are related to preparedness. 
Among 23 reporting countries, 12 reported that 
all of their local governments have a plan to act 
on early warnings, while 4 reported no plan to act 
on early warnings at the local level. To improve 
preparedness and respond to the warnings received 
at the local level, all local governments need such 
plans to act on early warnings.
Indicator G-5 is related to risk information and 
assessment. Only 3 out of 17 countries have avail-
able disaster risk information and assessment for 
their defined major hazards. Myanmar reported 
the existence of risk information and assessment 
for seven major hazards. The data demonstrates 
that Myanmar has high-quality risk information 
and assessment systems against cyclones, earth-
quakes, floods, heavy rainfalls and tsunamis.
Indicator G-6 relates to population protected 
through pre-emptive evacuation following early 
warning. This indicator can measure a posi-
tive aspect of evacuated people with a focus on 
saving lives. However, data collection and report-
ing against this indicator is a challenge. Among 
six reporting countries, only the United Republic 
of Tanzania reported data for this indicator, while 
another three countries reported nothing and the 
other two reported partially on the number of 
people protected through pre-emptive evacuation 
(or a proxy as evacuated people).
Several countries reported their recent progress on 
improving their MHEWSs from 2015 to 2017. For 
example, Czechia has improved monitoring and 
forecasting systems and risk assessment against 
drought from 2015 to 2016, which can be observed 
by increasing scores of G-1, G-2 and G-5. The United 
Republic of Tanzania has continuously improved its 
MHEWSs over this period in all areas of the four key 
elements. It is piloting implementation of MHEWSs, 
which can provide warning information on natural (Source: UNDRR data)
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hazards such as extreme temperatures, landslides, 
floods, strong winds and storm surges/tsunamis. 
Progress is reflected in increasing scores on the 
five indicators G-1 to G-5. 
8.6 
 
Conclusions on the 
first reporting data 
for Sendai Framework 
Targets A–G
This GAR is informed by the latest disaster data 
available and infers early lessons on where the 
global disaster risk landscape currently stands. In 
terms of data infrastructure, there has been growing 
awareness since 2015 on the need for better and 
more comparable data, and SFM represents a 
unique opportunity to streamline interoperable data 
on disaster losses. While the observed period is still 
too short to reach definitive conclusions on a global 
scale, it is possible to observe certain patterns in 
terms of magnitude, geographic and socioeco-
nomic distribution of disaster impacts and abstract 
several departure points of where and how coun-
tries have managed to do better in reducing disas-
ter risk: 
a. In the broader picture, in terms of losses, 
there are severe inequalities of burden sharing 
between low- and high-income countries, with 
the lowest-income countries taking the highest 
toll and greatest costs of disasters. Asset and 
human losses tend to be higher in countries 
that have the least capacity to prepare, finance 
and respond, such as SIDS. However, the good 
news is that there has been an increase in the 
percentage of reporting containing economic 
loss data, for all income groups, particularly 
in the last four years, in contrast to former 
declining trends.
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b. Mortality relative to population size has declined 
in the long term. However, since 1990, 92% of 
mortality attributed to internationally reported 
disasters associated with natural hazards has 
occurred in low- and middle-income countries, 
persistently concentrated in the Asia–Pacific 
region and Africa. 
c. Geophysical hazard events (e.g. earthquakes 
and tsunamis) have taken the highest toll on 
human lives. Occurrences of reported disas-
ters associated with biological hazards have 
decreased, while the number of disasters 
associated with natural hazards has slightly 
increased, over the past two decades. In terms 
of affected people, multi-hazard disasters 
affected 88 million people in SFM countries, fol-
lowed by floods affecting 76 million people, in 
the period 1997–2017.
d. Disasters stemming from natural hazards have 
displaced an average of 23.9 million people 
each year over the last decade.67 Disasters – the 
main triggers of forced displacement recorded 
– show no signs of decreasing.
e. Intensive risk continues to dominate fatali-
ties, but the participation of extensive risk in 
mortality seems to be increasing. Most eco-
nomic losses in the period 2005–2017 were 
caused by disasters associated with extensive 
risk, with 68.5% of all economic losses attrib-
uted to extensive risk events. With disasters 
becoming increasingly frequent, the cumulative 
damage, especially for people living in poverty, 
is often greater for extensive disasters such as 
droughts, than small- and medium-sized shocks 
that deliver low intensity but more frequent and 
recurrent shocks.
f. In line with the analysis in previous GARs, 
extensive risks represent an ongoing erosion of 
development assets, such as houses, schools, 
health facilities, roads and local infrastructure. 
However, the cost of extensive risk continues to 
be underestimated, as it is usually absorbed by 
low-income households and communities.
g. Weather-related hazards take the lead in 
economic losses, with floods being the costliest 
hazard, followed by earthquakes. Meanwhile, 
losses in the housing sector account for two 
thirds of total economic losses. 
h. Losses in agriculture,  the second most-
affected sector, are again significantly higher 
and more persistent in low- and low–middle-
income countries, with increasing frequency 
and severity of floods, droughts and tropical 
storms. The relationship between drought 
and agriculture deserves special attention, as 
84%68 of the damage and losses caused by 
droughts resides therein. Beyond the obvious 
production losses, disasters have a significant 
impact on rural livelihoods, food value chains, 
trade flows of agricultural commodities, and 
food and non-food agro-industries. Initiatives 
to support diversification of livelihood opportu-
nities, farm and non-farm activities, and more 
sustainable (self-) employment are critical. 
Expanding financial inclusion, providing social 
protection and adaptive safety nets, contingent 
finance and forging ownership by supporting 
rural communities to invest their savings into 
economic ventures of choice can place house-
holds in a better position to cope with disasters 
and build back better.
i. Financing for DRR has been highly volatile, ex 
post and marginal. A total of $5.2 billion for DRR 
represents 3.8% of total humanitarian financing 
between 2005 and 2017 – less than $4 for 
every $100 spent – a marginal fraction of the 
total amount. Global funding requirements are 
increasing, while the national and international 
capacity to address them is not growing in 
proportionate terms, leaving millions of affected 
populations behind. 
j. Member States reporting on the status of their 
national and local DRR strategies are gradually 
increasing, yet improvements for a full coverage 
on a global scale are to be made, one year 
ahead of the deadline.
k. Economic losses from disasters totalled $75 
billion in 2017 (UNDRR data), and over $300 
billion from other sources (Munich Re and 
Swiss Re). The $75 billion estimate of the 
average annual losses deviates substantially 
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67  (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2019)
68  (FAO 2015b) 
from other observations, as data is imperfect 
and disasters remain significantly non-/under-
reported, compromising accurate calculations 
of the true impacts of disasters. Eleven years 
ahead of the 2030 deadline, a sense of urgency 
should be injected into improving reporting 
across indicators and targets, enabling the 
engineering of evidence-based solutions for 
disaster-affected populations.
l. While useful for illustrating the stocktake 
of average losses, average estimates often 
fail to provide finer details on how disasters 
affect people’s lives. In absolute terms, high-
income households lose more because they 
have more to lose, and those losses are more 
visible because they tend to be insured and 
better reported. Previous GARs have repeatedly 
argued that what matters most in disaster loss 
analysis is the proportion of income or assets 
lost, as the severity of losses depends on 
households and how they experience disasters. 
m. This GAR argues that as data-collection efforts 
across different global frameworks are embarked 
upon, it is necessary to look at indicators afresh 
across goals and targets. It is also necessary 
to establish metrics for those dimensions of 
disaster impacts that accrue to the most vulner-
able by delving deeper into distributional anal-
ysis, moving away from regional, national and 
subnational data to the household level. The 
goal is to first learn in finer detail how disas-
ters affect people’s lives in a systemic way and 
then support countries to engineer solutions 
and influence human behaviour to successfully 
rebound from disasters.
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Chapter 9: 
Review of efforts 
made by Member 
States to implement 
the Sendai 
Framework 
The Sendai Framework represents a risk-informed 
approach to sustainable development and is closely 
associated with specific demands regarding data 
collection and analysis. Renewed commitments 
and demand for robust and evidence-based guid-
ance on DRM require the transformation of behav-
iour and practice in multiple dimensions. These 
include data, policy, planning protocols, collabora-
tion mechanisms for effective decision-making, and 
technical and functional implementation capacities. 
The data requirements to meet these goals require 
coordination among relevant stakeholders, which 
has traditionally not been a reality.
The 2017 Sendai Framework Data Readiness 
Review, with contributions from 87 countries, 
assessed countries’ readiness to monitor and 
report, in addition to the availability of national 
disaster-related data and requisite gaps in terms 
of financial resources and technical expertise. 
Within the group of countries participating in the 
review, a quarter reported no or only preliminary 
progress on national and local DRR strategies and 
plans aligning with the Sendai Framework (Target 
E), 72% reported medium to substantive progress 
on alignment and 3% reported full implementation. 
The review concluded that effective reporting of 
progress towards the global targets of SDGs and 
the Sendai Framework would require the use of 
multiple types of data, including EO and geospatial 
information. Advances in national reporting and 
data-collection practices offer useful standards, 
tools and approaches to guide countries efforts in 
bridging the gap between where they are today and 
where they need to be to support the goals of the 
Sendai Framework. 
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9.1  
Disaster loss databases
The Sendai Framework and its predecessor, HFA, 
have explicitly recognized the importance and 
usefulness of collecting loss data as one of the 
actions that will help countries to increase knowl-
edge about the risks they face. In addition to the 
loss data for Targets A–D outlined in the previous 
chapter, Sendai Framework Priority 1, Understand-
ing disaster risk (para. 24), suggests that Member 
States:
(d) Systematically evaluate, record, share and 
publicly account for disaster losses and 
understand the economic, social, health, 
education, environmental and cultural heri-
tage impacts, as appropriate, in the context 
of event-specific hazard-exposure and 
vulnerability information;
(e) Make non-sensitive hazard exposure, vulner-
ability, risk, disaster and loss-disaggregated 
information freely available and accessible, 
as appropriate;
The text of the Sendai Framework (para. 15) states:
The present Framework will apply to the risk 
of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and 
infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disas-
ters caused by natural or man-made hazards, 
as well as related environmental, technologi-
cal and biological hazards and risks. It aims to 
guide the multi-hazard management of disas-
ter risk in development at all levels as well as 
within and across all sectors. 
There are several consequences of the wider scope 
of the Sendai Framework. The explicit recommen-
dations of Priority 1 on loss data collection, and that 
the global indicators for Targets A–D require loss 
data, mean that countries are strongly encouraged 
to account systematically for disaster losses and 
damage for a wide spectrum of disaster scales and 
a broader set of hazards. For over a decade, UNDDR 
has been working with Member States to promote 
disaster loss accounting. Systematically account-
ing for losses translates, in technological terms, 
into the creation of national disaster loss databases 
that can record many loss indicators for disasters, 
at all scales, in a disaggregated manner. Priority 
1 recommendations go even further, suggesting 
these databases and information should be publicly 
accessible.
While there are some reputable global disaster loss 
databases such as EM-DAT, NatCat from Munich 
Re, Sigma from Swiss Re and others,69 it is impor-
tant to note that any reporting process to the Sendai 
Framework Monitoring system has to be based on 
officially endorsed data, collected and validated 
by national governments. This data should comply 
with the requirements of the Sendai Framework. It 
should address small- and large-scale disasters, 
and slow- and rapid-onset events, cover a large 
number of hazards (including man-made hazards) 
and, most importantly, record data for a set of 
global indicators, some of which were not available 
in the global loss databases. 
Furthermore, for effective implementation of 
the recommendations of the Sendai Framework, 
databases should be built gathering geographi-
cally disaggregated data that has to be usable at 
a subnational scale. As a minimum, data in the 
disaster loss databases should be disaggregated 
by event, hazard and geographic area. Aligning 
loss databases with the SDG principles, countries 
are encouraged to pursue even higher levels of 
disaggregation (by recording differences in socio-
economic impacts based on sex and gender roles, 
household level, etc.). People experience disas-
ters differently, even within the same household. 
Traditional measures are not able to capture these 
variations because metrics stop at the national, 
subnational or even household level. While data 
remains sparse, there is evidence that women and 
69  (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2018)
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The first review showed the need for more 
detailed, well-structured disaster loss databases 
at the national level, to enable measurement of 
outcomes under Targets A–D. This will be an 
area for focus on capacity-building and institu-
tional coordination at the national level in the 
coming years. Such systems are valuable tools 
and data sets in their own right; they will contrib-
ute to a better understanding of risks and disas-
ter impacts globally and at national level.
Methodological advice on disaster data and 
trends
Trend analysis is susceptible to manipulation 
to obtain desired results, especially when the 
data being analysed contains either highly 
dispersed values or outliers (i.e. data points 
that are much higher or lower than average). 
When data series contain dispersed values 
or outliers, there is high uncertainty that must 
be accounted for when analysing trends and 
reaching conclusions.
For example, patterns of economic loss from 
disasters may show a general trend towards 
growth or decrease over a certain period, but 
this pattern could be driven by the occurrence 
of large-scale disasters near the beginning or 
end of the series. In many respects, infrequent 
large-scale events can be viewed as outliers, 
compared with extensive risk events that are 
at a smaller scale, recurrent, more frequent and 
show more solid trends. Changing the number 
of years displayed, and including or excluding 
these outliers, can result in trends that look 
markedly different.
Good statistical analysis requires data covering 
an appropriate period. In general, the longer the 
period of the data sample, the more reliable the 
conclusions (and the lower the uncertainty). 
The Sendai Framework targets specify a period 
of time that starts in 2005 and carries on until 
the end of the period of the Sendai Framework 
in 2030 for analysis. The initial period, from 
2005 to 2015, referred to as the baseline, is 
suggested for Targets A and B, but it is highly 
recommended that Member States produce 
data for all four loss-based targets over the 
baseline period.
Nevertheless, a period of 10 years (the base-
line) or even the full 25-year timespan for the 
reporting exercise of the Sendai Framework are 
still short periods of time, which will probably 
not provide enough statistical strength to deter-
mine trends in a conclusive manner. 
Another factor that deeply affects the quality 
of a trend analysis is the quality and complete-
ness of all the data points across the sample. 
Unfortunately, in the case of the baseline, coun-
tries will need to conduct historical research 
going back in time to 2005, at the minimum, 
and ideally even further back, to reduce the 
uncertainty of the analysis. Gathering all this 
past data on the quality and completeness will 
be a challenge for Member States. In many 
cases, no data collection was put in place that 
would guarantee homogeneous gathering of all 
the data required. 
children are disproportionally affected by disasters 
in some – but not all – countries. Therefore, more 
surveys are needed to capture the underlying risks 
that can include, but go beyond, gender and age 
divides and inform policies on such disparities. 
Box 9.1. Methodological aspects of statistical analysis of the first reporting years: 
outliers, and statistical strength in trends and recommendations for further research
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Outliers and misleading trends
Outliers must be taken into consideration when 
analysing trends, as a large-scale disaster can 
happen at any time and the reading of the data 
may completely change. This is particularly 
true for earthquakes. As a result, upward trends 
are more likely to be found if the outlier is in 
recent years; equivalently, downward trends 
are more likely to be found if the outlier event 
happened in earlier years.
Missing data in earlier years and upward trends
Trend analysis depends on the length of period 
being analysed, which should be as long as 
possible. In cases where quality of data is a 
challenge, taking a look at shorter periods of 
time when data availability and quality is better, 
might result in a more reliable analysis. Missing 
data points are more common in earlier years. 
Therefore, by taking absolute values by year, 
upward trends may be found that are the result 
of more data points being available in recent 
years. For example, data quality and cover-
age have a significant effect on determining 
trends of losses. In this case, recognizing that 
not enough good data exists for the years 
under review, thus underestimating losses that 
occurred far in the past, makes more recent 
losses appear relatively higher. 
70  (Marin Ferrer et al. 2018)
From the perspective of the international commu-
nity working towards reduction of disaster losses, 
the need for data triggered by the Sendai Frame-
work and the SDG monitoring processes represents 
a unique opportunity to build a bottom-up global 
disaster loss database. This would catalyse the 
process of global consolidation of data required to 
assess the progress in achieving the targets and 
consolidate a holistic, solid, evidence-based frame-
work for DRR. From a country perspective, national 
disaster loss databases increase the capacity of 
countries to understand their risks and provide 
a solid evidence base upon which to assess and 
address their disaster losses and impacts, particu-
larly those associated with climate and weather-
related hazards. More specifically, loss databases 
may help to significantly improve the understanding 
of how disasters and risks affect the most vulner-
able and could be a basis for better understanding 
trends in climate variability impacts and their true 
magnitude. The common aspirations of the global, 
national and subnational disaster risk community 
call for a better structured, effective, coordinated 
and harmonized way of collecting disaster loss 
data, alongside corresponding reporting
The landscape of disaster loss data is complex, as 
countries follow disparate approaches to collect, 
code and analyse data. Recent studies of the JRC 
Working Group70 show that within the European 
continent, there are disparities in the types of data 
indicators, thresholds, hazards and resolution of 
data collected (which may range from building 
or asset level to national aggregates), including 
data-collection procedures. For example, some 
European countries collect data at the building/
asset level for the purposes of compensation. In 
Spain, compensation from official funds in data 
is collected by the Defensa Civil Española, or in 
France from insurance policies with data collected 
by l’Observatoire National des Risques Naturels. 
Other countries such as Australia and Canada have 
developed property and publicly accessible data 
sets, with the same caveat of smaller sets of indica-
tors. Those databases that are focused on financial 
compensation usually lack disaggregated human 
loss indicators, or even some of the main human 
loss indicators such as numbers of people injured 
or made ill.
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Despite the initial expectations that information-
rich countries could easily comply with all of the 
requirements for the Sendai Framework Monitor-
ing system, preliminary evidence demonstrates 
that most developed countries do not have inte-
grated loss and damage information systems due 
to the large number of data sources that provide 
scattered sector or hazard-specific information. 
Even where national databases exist, they do not 
always contain most of the indicators required in 
OEIWG recommendations. Available databases, 
for example, in Australia, Canada and the United 
States, or other property loss databases, contain 
only a limited subset of the indicators proposed; a 
similar situation has been found in some European 
countries. For instance, no indicators are collected 
around critical infrastructure, injured/ill persons or 
affected people in many of these databases. 
In most known loss databases, no matter their 
origin, software or age, there is little or no disag-
gregation of human loss data by sex, age or other 
criteria requested by the SDG data disaggregation 
work stream.
As Member States continue their commitment 
to build, improve and align these loss databases, 
a consolidated global data set could be feasible 
within a few years. UNDDR has already been 
conducting consolidation exercises with data 
Figure 9.1. Number of countries covered in the DesInventar 
Sendai repository, 2009–2017
from a growing number of countries to build the 
data sets used for analysis posted in GARs. Start-
ing with 12 countries in GAR09, then 21 in GAR11, 
followed by 56 in GAR13, 82 in GAR15 and now, for 
GAR19, a consolidated data set contains data for 
103 countries.
9.2 
 
Successes and 
challenges in 
establishing national 
monitoring capabilities
9.2.1  
Expectations of Member States for monitoring 
Sendai Framework implementation 
To understand the successes and challenges 
of Sendai Framework monitoring, it is important 
to put into perspective what Member States are 
expected to do, in terms of establishing the institu-
tional mechanisms that are required to undertake 
reporting as well as substantive information to be 
collected and shared through the system. Though 
the Sendai Framework Monitoring system has many 
functions that are common to a standard report-
ing mechanism related to any area of international 
development, it also has certain distinctive points 
owing to the cross-sectoral nature of DRR. 
Institutional structure 
The first steps to be undertaken in the Sendai 
Framework monitoring process are to nominate a 
focal point for Sendai Framework monitoring, select 
institutions involved in the monitoring process, and 
define the roles and responsibilities of the selected 
institutions.
(Source: UNDDR)
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Every Member State is expected to nominate a main 
focal point for monitoring its implementation of the 
Sendai Framework and formally inform UNDDR. 
The focal point then has to undertake a selection 
of national institutions that will be engaged in the 
monitoring process. This enhances a decentralized 
and systematized process of monitoring through 
data sharing among various ministries and depart-
ments. It is also possible for the designated focal 
point to bring in institutions outside its jurisdiction, 
if deemed necessary for the monitoring progress. 
The last step involves the designation of roles to 
the individuals nominated by the selected institu-
tions. Roles can include: 
Technical requirements
Different institutions are made responsible for 
reporting against one or more of the 38 global indi-
cators or national custom indicators based on the 
above-mentioned structure. Unlike the reporting 
process for HFA, there are no established cycles in 
Sendai Framework Monitoring. However, there are 
usually two milestones when a snapshot is taken: 
(a) every March, contributing to the SDG monitoring 
reporting in HLPF for global Targets A, B, C, D and 
E and (b) in October for GAR in one year or a stock-
take of the reported progress in the other year, for 
all Targets A–G. In addition, each Member State is 
expected to develop its own set of nationally deter-
mined targets and indicators for implementing the 
custom reporting. However, the reporting require-
ments on this are the prerogative of the Member 
State and can be adjusted according to the needs 
and requirements of national DRR strategies. 
Through a rigorous process of consultation, UNDDR 
has developed guidelines that are publicly available 
in all United Nations languages, including informa-
tion on minimum data sets required, recommended 
optimal data sets (including disaggregation), chal-
lenges, temporal considerations, computation 
methodology (minimal to recommended data sets) 
and metadata: contents, methodology and other 
topics (coverage, representativeness and quality).71 
These technical guidance notes form the basis for 
the reporting process but allow parameters to be 
defined within their national contexts.
71  (UNISDR 2018b)
a. Coordinator: This role is usually assumed by 
the national Sendai Framework focal point. S/
he has the responsibility of setting up national 
reporting for the global targets, which includes 
adding institutions/users, configuring metadata, 
and for custom reporting, setting up nationally 
determined targets and indicators. (Metadata 
refers to the additional demographic and socio-
economic parameters needed as an input into 
SFM by each country for calculations to be 
performed according to the technical guidance 
for monitoring and reporting on progress in 
achieving the global targets of the Sendai 
Framework, for example: currency foreign 
exchange rate, GDP and population.)
b.  Contributor: Representative of institution 
assigned different indicators as per the area 
of focus of their parent institution. The main 
responsibility is to enter data for the indicators 
assigned. 
c. Validator: This responsibility is usually held by 
the parent institution of the Sendai Framework 
focal point, but could be held by others as well. 
It is usually held within the government and at 
a high level of seniority. Only after a validator 
validates the data is it publicly available in the 
online system (under the analytics module). 
d. Observer: An optional function that allows the 
holder to observe and make comments on the 
data entered. However, it does not come with 
rights for editing. Hence, this function could 
be held by any institution within or outside the 
government.
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As the gatekeepers of social, economic and envi-
ronmental statistics, NSOs are well positioned to 
respond to important data needs arising from the 
Sendai Framework, the 2030 Agenda, the Paris 
Agreement and other global initiatives.
The integration of metrics for the global targets 
of the Sendai Framework within the global indica-
tor framework for SDGs provides the opportunity 
for many of the aspects to be addressed as part 
of countries’ broader follow-up to the 2015 agree-
ments. An appetite for joint analysis and develop-
ment of applied information has been observed 
in many countries.73 Some Member States have 
brought in NSOs as one of the key contributors in 
their monitoring system, demonstrating the need 
for rigorous evidence to respond systematically 
and consistently to the requirements of the Sendai 
Framework. 
Capacity development for monitoring: 
mastering the skills
The new Sendai Framework was developed in a 
consultative manner following calls by Member 
States for a more robust, comprehensive quan-
titative framework. As recommended by OEIWG, 
steps were taken by UNDDR while developing the 
monitor: 
9.2.2  
Successes in establishing national 
capabilities for monitoring Sendai Framework 
implementation 
This section presents the successes that have 
emerged since the launch of the Sendai Framework 
Monitoring on 1 March 2018, regarding the scale of 
reporting, engagement of NSOs, capacity-develop-
ment efforts, and cross-sectoral, multi-stakeholder 
partnerships in data collection and monitoring 
procedures.
Scale of reporting: nothing succeeds like 
numbers
The success of Member States in developing 
capabilities for the Sendai Framework Monitoring 
system can be gauged from the number of coun-
tries that have reported since the launch of the 
Sendai Framework Monitoring until the time when a 
snapshot of data was taken in October 2018. During 
this period, 80 countries reported on one or more of 
the reporting years since 2015. In addition, there are 
many others who have established the institutional 
structures described above. A review of these struc-
tures shows that 43 of the Member States have 
three or more ministries and departments to whom 
one or more of the roles have been assigned in the 
online system.
In terms of country reporting against at least one 
target in each of the years, there is an upward trend, 
with the number of countries gradually increasing 
from 43 to 75 countries between 2015 and 2017, 
against at least one target in each of the years. 
Engagement of national statistical offices: vital 
statistics 
Monitoring and data collection should be embed-
ded in NSOs and support a culture of evidence-
based learning at the national and subnational 
levels.72
• The overarching finding of the Sendai Frame-
work Readiness Review (a comprehensive 
survey among Member States) was that almost 
no country had the necessary capacities and 
subsequent functions to report against all the 
targets. In response, the technical guidance 
notes were developed to serve as a road map 
in support of Member State data consolidation 
efforts. 
• Countries have been supported by trained 
personnel since the launch of the monitor-
ing system, with different approaches in each 
region. The African Union Commission led the 
charting of a road map through its Africa Work-
ing Group on DRR at a policy level. Regional 
Economic Communities also committed 
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Strategic approach to capacity development
The Sendai Framework recognizes a State’s primary 
role in facilitating the achievement of its DRR goal 
and priorities and highlights the criticality of sharing 
these responsibilities with other stakeholders and 
realizing a participatory approach. To support this 
approach, United Nations Member States have 
identified a need for implementation support and 
enhancement of the capacity of institutions and 
individuals dealing with DRR. Without adequate 
capacity, it will be challenging to implement the 
Sendai Framework. 
With the aim of guiding sustainable capacity devel-
opment for Sendai Framework implementation, 
the UNDDR Global Education and Training Insti-
tute began facilitating consultations with Member 
States, stakeholders and partners towards a 
Strategic Approach to Capacity Development for 
Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disas-
ter Risk Reduction – a Vision of Risk-informed 
Development by 2030. 
Consultations resulted in refinement of language, 
and Member States and other relevant stakeholders 
re-emphasizing the driving principles for effective 
capacity development for DRR, including that efforts 
are nationally owned and coordinated. Importantly, 
the strategic approach generalized advice on the 
capacity-development roles and responsibilities 
of various DRR stakeholders, provided high-level 
guidance in six critical areas of need, and validated 
proposed “anchors” to help strengthen and institu-
tionalize capacity development. 
The strategic approach is a guidance document 
that aims to reflect changes in needs and trends 
over time, envisaged to capture and share lessons 
learned, best practices and examples over time. 
Among the next steps for its implementation are 
orientation and awareness-raising for all, pilot 
testing, development of a monitoring, evaluation 
and learning mechanism for its implementation, 
and development of capacity development “market-
place” guidance for adaptation at various levels. 
Capacity development is a long-term process that 
should be included in the implementation plans of 
DRR strategies, to effectively support the imple-
mentation of the strategy and realize the Sendai 
Framework.
Engagement of multiple departments and 
stakeholders: leaving no one behind in 
monitoring
Sendai Framework monitoring calls for a new way 
of thinking when it comes to national reporting on 
DRR. In the HFA era, the national disaster manage-
ment organization (NDMO) assumed responsi-
bility for submitting the required information in 
the HFA monitor. The reporting was a centralized 
72  (Peters et al. 2016) 
73  (United Nations 2017a)
themselves to supporting their Member States 
in the monitoring process. In 2018, the Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
organized an event in June, the Southern Afri-
can Development Community (SADC) in August 
and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in November. In the Asia–
Pacific region, subregional training was com-
plemented at the national level, hosted by the 
Member States (subregional training involved 
two to three key officials from focal institutions, 
including the National Disaster Management 
Agencies and NSOs, while the national ones 
brought in representatives from virtually every 
ministry or department responsible for sharing 
the required data). 
• Development of an online e-training module to 
support Member States in encouraging self-
learning of assigned staff members in their 
focal ministries and departments. It is designed 
with the incentive of certification for trained 
personnel, and will also incorporate refresher 
courses as required, to ensure that the trainees 
have cutting-edge knowledge of the periodic 
improvements envisaged in the Sendai Frame-
work Monitoring system.
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exercise conducted under the authority of NDMOs. 
Many NDMOs established an offline coordination 
process, which, in most cases, involved the National 
Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction as the multi-
sectoral and multi-stakeholder mechanism for 
coordination in this area of work. However, it was 
still the primary responsibility of NDMOs to compile 
the reports and feed into the HFA monitor.74  SFM 
provides a different approach to data sharing and 
information management. It presents the opportu-
nity to assign different roles to various ministries 
as per the indicators accorded to them for data-
collection purposes. For example, while the Ministry 
of Agriculture could focus on the economic losses 
of the sector in Target C, the Ministry for Health and 
the Ministry for Education could contribute data for 
the related infrastructure in Target D. However, it 
should be noted that responsibility of data provision 
must be distributed in a structured manner within 
established limits to ensure qualitative rigour and 
timeliness of reporting. 
In addition, governments are not the sole produc-
ers of data. Private companies, universities and 
other third-party actors may offer complementary 
sources of data useful for augmenting or validat-
ing the official reporting system.75 In line with this, 
several Member States have brought their inter-
national and national development partners in as 
observers or contributors. Building interoperability 
and comparisons into existing reporting and data-
collection systems may also enhance such part-
nerships for a wide range of purposes supporting 
global frameworks on sustainable development.76 
9.2.3  
Challenges in establishing national 
capabilities 
This section identifies the challenges that Member 
States are experiencing in reporting against the 
indicators of the seven global targets of the Sendai 
Framework. Challenges relate to data management 
through sequential phases of collection, valida-
tion, storage and analysis, proposed baselines for 
analysis, as well as overall institutional capacities 
in monitoring and reporting as they emerge from 
different country experiences.
Data is at the core of the monitoring process. The 
United Nations Secretary-General’s Independent 
Expert Advisory Group (IEAG) on the data revolu-
tion has suggested nine core principles that should 
be common to all actors contributing data to the 
measurement of sustainable development.77 With 
regard to the Sendai Framework, the initial years of 
reporting point to the following challenges:
• Data availability. This includes collection 
practices, organizational culture, data-sharing 
mechanisms or the lack thereof, cost (e.g. of 
establishing collection systems, housing data 
and purchasing data), private sector proprietary 
concerns and data governance. Critical data 
gaps exist in specific areas of disaster loss, in 
all areas of international cooperation, and for 
many aspects of early warning, risk information 
and DRR strategies.
• Data quality. The implementation, monitoring 
and repor t ing of the Sendai Framework 
and the 2030 Agenda is predicated on the 
generation and provision of, and access to, 
high-quality disaster-related data that will allow 
effective collation, comparison and analysis 
by Member States and other stakeholders, 
within a country context, as well as among 
countries and regions. This will become all 
the more challenging without the application 
of commonly agreed methodologies and 
quality standards. Some NSOs are exploring 
the integration of open EO data and statistical 
data in existing decision-making structures. 
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The need for collective effort in enhancing aspects 
of data availability, accessibility and quality has 
been recognized by some key communities such as 
NSOs, and national mapping and geo-information 
agencies. Unless gaps in data availability, quality 
and accessibility are addressed, countries’ ability 
to ensure accurate, timely and high-quality moni-
toring and reporting of implementation across all 
targets and priorities of the Sendai Framework will 
be severely impaired.78
Disaster loss accounting: working behind the 
scenes
Processes and methods involved in the collection 
of loss data is a complex task, with the involvement 
of technical and non-technical inputs, as well as 
partners from a range of different disciplines. Even 
though having a disaster loss database has not 
been made compulsory by the Sendai Framework, 
a loss accounting system without an event-wise 
recording of events would lack credibility. Some of 
the key challenges related to the output-oriented 
indicators are as follows:
The complementarity of EO with traditional 
statistical methods means that EO can offer 
validation options of in situ data measurements 
(e.g. survey and inventory data), can commu-
nicate and visualize the geographic dimensions 
and context of SDGs and Sendai Framework 
indicators, and, where appropriate, provide 
disaggregation of the indicators.
• Data accessibility. Data sharing among gov-
ernment institutions is a cause of concern 
for several countries. A minority of agencies 
have a set procedure in place for data access. 
Even if informal exchanges occur, publica-
tion or secondary use may be difficult without 
official authorization. However, as reflected in 
the above paragraph on the division of labour 
among relevant ministries, some Member 
States are beginning to set up mechanisms 
of data sharing that facilitate comprehensive 
reporting in SFM.
• Application of data. While sustained invest-
ments in data creation and management are 
necessary, the ultimate value of information is 
not in its production, but in its use. To ensure 
the appropriate application of data, there is 
a need for data to be generated with users in 
mind. Herein lies one of the critical challenges 
that Member States face with the uptake of data 
and translation of information into actionable 
policies. Data providers often underinvest in 
operational tools supporting the translation 
of information and oversee the importance of 
engaging with those in a position to use data 
and drive action, thus compromising opportu-
nities for uptake. 
• Not all countries systematically collect disaster 
loss and damage data, and even fewer integrate 
this data into official national statistics.79 
• Several disaster loss databases exist, but they 
face challenges such as standardizing data-col-
lection processes, missing data, and inconsis-
tent economic valuations of physical damage 
and losses.80
• There is a lack of simple loss data reporting 
procedures and common language to ensure 
the standardization of loss data collection, 
comparability, recording and reporting across 
countries. Even where loss accounting systems 
exist, they may be in the non-governmental 
domain and thus not officially endorsed as 
required for Sendai Framework monitoring 
purposes. 
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Disaggregation of data: more is less
Even though disaggregation has not been made 
compulsory by the Sendai Framework, Member 
States are encouraged to provide as much disag-
gregation as possible against the different crite-
ria established in support of each of the global 
indicators. The key theme “leave no one behind” 
recognizes that the dignity of the individual is 
fundamental and that the 2030 Agenda’s goals and 
targets should be met for all nations and people 
and for all segments of society. Ensuring that these 
commitments are translated into effective action 
requires a precise understanding of target popula-
tions. Disaggregation of indicators, where relevant, 
by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, 
disability, geographic location and other character-
istics is essential in measuring vulnerabilities of 
affected populations. Aggregated data may mask 
inequalities within vulnerable groups that, unless 
disaggregated, will remain hidden to policymakers. 
Paying closer attention to the differentiated vulner-
abilities of people requires data and analysis that 
zooms in on specific groups in finer detail. Differ-
ent levels of disaggregation are useful depending 
on the context. Household data is widely used in 
examining, monitoring and evaluating the impact 
of disasters at the microlevel and informing policy 
development accordingly. Policies and nationwide 
programmes may necessitate data at the national 
or regional level, while interventions wishing to alter 
poverty and vulnerability dynamics at the household 
level (e.g. elderly, women and children) require data 
collection at the individual level.
Significant efforts in this regard are being made 
for the indicators of SDG 1 on poverty eradica-
tion. The international household survey network, 
demographic and health surveys, multiple indicator 
cluster surveys, as well as regional initiatives such 
as the Africa Household Survey Databank, the Latin 
American and Caribbean Household Survey Data-
bank, are promising examples. They offer opportu-
nities for cross-sectoral data collection, tackling the 
interfaces of systemic global challenges.
Baselines: going back in time
Progress and change can be monitored only if there 
is a baseline. For example, in the Sendai Frame-
work targets, countries are expected to report on 
human-related loss data for the period 2005–2015 
to enable comparison with data from 2015 to 2030, 
per 100,000 population. However, the collection of 
• Most of the countries responding to the Global 
Readiness Review collect a critical mass of 
disaster loss data (Targets A–D, more so 
for A and B). The practice of disaster loss 
accounting was said to be well established in 
many countries; however, data sets are typically 
more available on physical damage and human 
impact, and less available on economic losses, 
livelihoods, losses of specific assets and infra-
structure, cultural heritage and disruptions to 
basic services.81
• Multiple taxonomies for hazards exist, including 
the Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) 
peril classification82 and Cambridge taxonomy 
of threats for complex risk management.83 
Controlled vocabularies are an essential 
component of technical data standards, as they 
provide a precise and agreed definition of what 
is being measured or counted.84
• In relation to classification, among hazard types, 
a system for naming individual tropical cyclones 
has been widely adopted only at the international 
level. At the same time, expansion of a system 
for assigning unique identifiers across multiple 
hazard types introduces some challenges (e.g. 
lack of creation of internationally recognized 
mechanisms for identifier generation, proce-
dures for reconciliation of identifiers for events 
affecting multiple countries and adoption of 
standard operating procedures).85 
• Lastly, 40% to 60% of countries reporting in the 
Global Readiness Review felt they could develop 
a baseline for most indicators for the disaster 
loss-related Targets A–D, though much fewer 
could do so for critical infrastructure, disrup-
tions to basic services, losses to productive 
assets and the housing sector.86
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historical loss data will require an investment of 
time and resources and may not be possible for 
countries lacking the necessary data infrastruc-
ture. The GBD study led by the Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation is a potential resource to 
understand trends in disaster-related mortality. It is 
the most comprehensive worldwide epidemiologi-
cal study in existence, with a description of mortal-
ity from a variety of causes at global, national and 
regional levels. The extraction of baseline health 
measurements for some SDGs from GBD is already 
being explored. Capitalizing on and maximizing use 
of complementary data sets monitoring disaster 
loss data is critical for: (a) data comparability and 
(b) a nuanced understanding of more accurate 
benchmarks as points of departure if commitments 
under the Sendai Framework and the 2030 Agenda 
are to be realized. 
Adapting to expected institutional mechanisms 
Despite robust steps by many Member States, there 
is still room for improvement in terms of political 
recognition and active engagement for improved 
alignment of the different global frameworks in 
national planning. It will be necessary to demon-
strate the synergies among the frameworks and 
efficiencies that can be realized in ensuring coor-
dination by integrating, for example, Sendai Frame-
work discussions into SDG data when advising at 
the country level. 
In addition to this, political will and sustained 
funding is also required to enhance investment in 
the required data infrastructure. Raising awareness 
with national and subnational governments on how 
the different frameworks align is also critical. Given 
the higher international and political profile of SDGs, 
the SDG community needs to be sensitized to the 
Sendai Framework and actively consider coher-
ence with the framework as it advocates for SDG 
81  (United Nations 2017a)
82  (IRDR 2014)
83  (Coburn et al. 2014)
84  (Fakhruddin, Murray and Maini 2017)
85  (Dilley and Grasso 2016) 
86  (United Nations 2017a)
87  (Murray 2018)
88  (Peters et al. 2016)
data system improvements. This combination will 
serve to reduce fragmentation and duplication.87 
The criteria for portfolio development in donors 
and regional development banks should recognize 
and reward initiatives designed in ways that deliver 
progress on multiple resilience goals and targets.88 
Some countries have also set up committees 
comprising national stakeholders to identify data 
holders and gaps in data needed, which should be 
coordinating with SDGs as and where available.
SFM provides an opportunity for a shared approach 
to monitoring and related reporting. However, given 
the need for interministerial policy decisions and 
associated administrative steps, it has not been 
easy for countries to establish this institutional 
structure within a short period of time. This has 
led to some countries reverting back to HFA proce-
dures of soliciting offline information and opting 
for a centralized data management process. As 
a result, sometimes the dilemma has been that 
Member States that did not focus on establishing 
a decentralized institutional mechanism may have 
progressed faster in their reporting commitments, 
while those that put extended efforts into develop-
ing the new institutional structure as per SFM may 
have done so at the cost of a delay in their reporting 
in the system. 
Problems encountered in the first year
SFM is expected to have a lifespan of 12 years. At 
the time of writing this GAR, it has been launched 
for about a year. It was launched in a phased 
approach where different modules were released 
over time. There was a period of learning as the 
online tool was rolled out and gained more users. 
However, nomination of the country focal points 
has also taken time in many cases, and there has 
been a high turnover in the focal agencies and their 
staff, requiring retraining orientation of new staff.
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Over 600 users now have access to the system, 
with different kinds of roles. However, it cannot be 
assumed that all users become conversant with the 
system with equal ease. Even when information is 
available within the government domain, there is 
still a period of time needed to ensure its smooth 
transition into the desired formats of the monitor-
ing system. In fact, to assume the assignment of 
these roles is a mere technical function would be a 
gross underestimation. Even if within the monitor-
ing system it is a simple matter of filling a form, 
in the context of the government’s procedural 
requirements, the efforts and commitment behind it 
cannot be overemphasized. This is another process 
that requires dedicated time and must be under-
taken at the outset. 
SFM is an online tool, and is therefore highly depen-
dent on broadband Internet access. Thus, the differ-
ential bandwidth among regions and even countries 
within the same region, was a fundamental issue, 
as expected in any online reporting mechanism. 
Though part of this is a broader challenge of con-
nectivity, the substantial reporting from some of 
the developing countries is a testament to how they 
have not let such constraints inhibit their commit-
ment to accountability. 
Translation of content into the languages of the 
United Nations has taken time and has sometimes 
been conducted in a staggered manner. Moreover, 
translation is not a one-time phenomenon, as the 
deployment of each new module (including in multi-
ple languages) requires a similar feedback loop. 
This enriches the software, making it progressively 
easier for users to record their data. 
9.2.4 
Reporting by targets: trying to be on target 
There are several target-specific challenges 
that Member States may be facing while report-
ing against the indicators of each of the global 
targets. This requires further technical discussion 
on those issues that have been highlighted in the 
technical guidance for monitoring and reporting 
on progress in achieving the global targets of the 
Sendai Framework. One of the main considerations 
OEIWG made in its report89 was that Member States 
agreed that countries may choose to use a national 
methodology or other methods of measurement 
and calculation to measure the key parameters 
of individual targets, especially for Targets A–D. 
However, OEIWG also recommended that countries 
keep the metadata consistent if the methodology 
is changed.90 For the purposes of this GAR, some of 
the key issues are outlined below.
Target A
As described previously, this target is related to 
reduction of mortality by 100,000 population in the 
decade 2020–2030 as compared to 2005–2015. 
Some issues related to the estimation of mortality 
are as follows:91
• Determining which deaths are relevant and 
comprehensively attributable to disasters 
is complex; alongside the direct impact of 
a hazard on health, there are many indirect 
pathways to mortality. 
• The time periods between the exposure to 
a hazard and death can vary widely. The 
disruption of care for chronic conditions and 
onset of persistent stress can lead to a greater 
disease burden or deaths that may not occur for 
months or years after a disaster.
• Data availability is not uniform across the 
world. WHO regularly receives cause-of-death 
statistics from about 100 Member States, yet 
two thirds (38 million) of 56 million annual 
deaths are still not registered.
• Though all countries are vulnerable to disasters 
and loss of life, there is generally a higher 
exposure to disasters and the risk of death in 
low- and middle-income countries, which often 
coincide with those lacking vital registration 
data, further magnifying the data gap.
• Populations are mobile across country borders, 
causing challenges in accounting; it has been 
suggested that each death should be counted in 
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A disaster loss accounting system that records 
event-wise losses is a critical requirement to make 
credible information available for Target A. In fact, 
despite the above-mentioned challenges, Target 
A had the highest number of countries reporting 
comparing to other targets. It is also evident that 
more countries are making concerted efforts in 
accumulating disaggregated data, even though this 
was not a mandatory requirement. 
Target B
This target is related to reduction of people affected 
by disasters by 100,000 population in the period 
2020–2030 as compared to 2005–2015. Some 
issues related to the estimation of affected persons 
are as follows:93
89  (United Nations General Assembly 2016a) 
90  (UNISDR 2018b)
91  (Saulnier et al. 2019)
92  (UNISDR 2018b)
93  (Clarke et al. 2018)
Given the different forms in which disasters can 
affect individual lives and assets, countries need 
to take a multisectoral approach to monitoring and 
reporting, to foster a broader set of information and 
strengthen the resultant analysis. Key organizations 
working on health such as WHO and Public Health 
England are trying to address some of the health-
related issues through extended guidelines for the 
ministries and departments of health. Critical study-
ing, careful planning and robust systems to improve 
data analysis across different sectors in health, agri-
culture and transport can assist building trust in the 
data, expanding people’s ability to use it, so that their 
needs are at the heart of data-collection processes.
the country where the death occurred, regardless 
of the nationality of the dead person.92
• Most vulnerable people, including il legal 
migrants, tend to be unrecognized by author-
ities; thus, the real number would be higher than 
that reported. 
• As reported by some Member States, data disag-
gregation is a challenge that requires systematic 
records of disaster losses per hazardous events. 
In spite of addressing this in the target, it is 
difficult to obtain baseline data without disaster 
loss accounting systems from the respective 
period.
• As with Target A, concerns around attribution 
apply. Target B encompasses scenarios where 
cascading effects from hazards can develop 
into significant impacts. A simple assessment 
approach is critical, as measurement involves 
drawing information from a wide range of 
sectors.
• Like Target A, data on injured and ill people can 
come from existing health indicators that are 
adapted to target disaster-specific impacts, but 
clarification is essential of the periods of time 
used for measurement and the inclusion of sec-
ondary illness and injury. Mental health issues, 
among the most acute health impacts associated 
with disasters, are a specific area requiring defini-
tion within ill- and injured-person calculations. 
• Local authorities and international standards 
need to also account for degrees of damage to 
informal settlements through GIS and remote-
sensing techniques that can assess impacts to 
the physical environment such as for dwellings 
and local infrastructure. 
• When data for assessing impacts of disasters 
on affected persons is not available or suf-
ficient, proxies may serve as useful, alternative 
sources. Proxy indicators for instance, are 
widely used by the World Bank Group’s GFDRR, 
which has employed PDNA techniques using 
sector-specific data for employment, agricul-
ture, health, transport and communication, and 
by FAO using data on agriculture, food security 
and nutrition. 
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Target C
This target encompasses the reduction of total 
direct economic losses as a proportion of global 
GDP. Some issues related to the estimation of 
economic losses are outlined below:94
Though indicators related to economic losses seem 
to be one of the more complicated ones in terms 
of methodology and computation, this is the target 
that is covered most comprehensively by the avail-
able guidelines. Moreover, since a large part of the 
economic losses are borne by high-income coun-
tries, these are also the same countries where the 
penetration of formal insurance mechanisms is 
high, thus providing more structured information on 
validation of economic losses. Reiterated efforts 
and sustained funding are needed to better capture 
the indirect costs and cascading impacts of disas-
ters for the most vulnerable segments of the world’s 
population.
Target D
This target aims at the reduction of losses to criti-
cal infrastructure and disruption of basic services. 
Some issues related to the estimation of losses are 
outlined below:97
• The definition of global annual losses attributed 
to disasters omits the substantial losses in pro-
ductivity and well-being, which lead to economic 
impact. However, the complexity of necessary 
assessment protocols is avoided to ensure that 
indicator calculation is practical and feasible.
• Measurements for assessment of indirect 
economic losses are less developed and not 
included in the Sendai Framework. But under-
standing the cascading impacts of disasters 
on economic welfare and productivity is critical, 
particular as drivers of hazard risks changes 
over time.
• As in the case of Target B, when reliable infor-
mation is absent, proxies may be useful, but 
come with the caveat that non-private price indi-
ces be used as often as possible; an example 
of this is reconstruction inputs such as building 
materials. Noted challenges extend to the appli-
cation of affected ratios (i.e. amount of damage 
due to a hazard) that may give binary, catego-
rized (segmented) or continuous (percentage) 
values in damage ratios. At different periods 
following a hazard impact, reporting practices 
should also reflect need, thus requiring assess-
ment protocols providing for a rapid one and 
a subsequent one, a year later.95 Estimating 
losses to cultural heritage is a unique and 
context-specific challenge. While available guid-
ance proposes assignment for non-movable 
and movable cultural heritage assets, their value 
is difficult to disentangle from local connection 
and (if applicable) tourism-related income. Cul-
tural heritage issues associated with the natural 
environment further add to this challenge. 
• In the Global Readiness Review, the responding 
countries mentioned that data sets were typically 
more available on physical damage and human 
impact, and less available on economic losses.96
• Clear definitions are key to consistency in 
reporting on Target D. For instance, there are 
challenges of measuring disruption due to slow-
onset and small-scale disasters.98
• Disaster loss data is greatly influenced by large-
scale catastrophic events, which represent 
important outliers in terms of damage to critical 
infrastructure. UNDDR recommends countries 
report the data by event, so that complementary 
analysis can be undertaken to obtain trends 
and patterns in which such catastrophic events 
(which can represent outliers in terms of 
damage) can be included or excluded.
• As national disaster loss databases that have 
been developed do not necessarily include 
historical data on damage to railways, ports, 
airports and other infrastructures, establishing 
baseline data is a challenge.99
• Contrary to recommendations, damage and 
disruption to infrastructural assets and services 
can be disaggregated according to the institu-
tional level (e.g. primary or secondary health 
facilities), rather than based upon size. Such 
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For the purposes of the Sendai Framework monitor-
ing, baselines for Targets C and D are not compul-
sory because the targets, as articulated, do not 
include a baseline comparison. However, to the 
extent possible, it is recommended that countries 
account for data by event, so that complementary 
analysis can be undertaken to obtain trends and 
patterns in which such catastrophic events (which 
can represent outliers in terms of damage) can be 
included or excluded. As part of Target D, captur-
ing information on critical infrastructure is key for 
a government, as reducing losses on this infra-
structure and these services could lead to reduced 
losses in other targets, especially Targets A and B.
Target E
This target relates to the increase in the number of 
countries having national and local DRR strategies, 
aligned to the Sendai Framework:
Countries are therefore recommended to conduct 
detailed self-assessment of national DRR strategies 
and use them as a benchmark against established 
global targets and indicators. They can then iden-
tify gaps for undertaking DRR actions and for other 
actions. 
Target F
This target aims at enhancing international coop-
eration on DRR. In the Global Readiness Review, for 
Target F, only 20% (the lowest among all targets) of 
the countries reported that they have the available 
data.101 The provision or receipt of international 
cooperation for DRR is conducted with subsequent 
modalities in each country.102
The challenges raised by Member States for some 
of the Target F indicators include:103
classifications are in line with practices in public 
sector risk assessment and private sector 
catastrophe modelling used to inform insurance 
products.100
• There is an element of subjectivity in the self-
assessment of the national DRR strategies 
because Member States score themselves 
against 10 criteria related to the Sendai Frame-
work. However, it is similar to the HFA monitor 
with which Member States are familiar, where 
there was also an element of subjective scoring. 
• SFM can provide a monitoring platform for DRR 
strategies with defined indicators and targets. 
• A focus should be placed on implementation of 
DRR strategies. As the statutory and regulatory 
systems vary among Member States, the deci-
sion regarding the adoption and implementation 
• Separating DRR components from the overall 
amount of resources.
• Confidentiality concerns about sharing the 
requested information. 
• Common terminology for “disaster risk reduc-
tion actions”, “disaster risk reduction-related 
technology” and “disaster risk reduction-related 
capacity-building”.
of DRR strategies to be included in the calcula-
tion has been left to Member States.
• Compared to national strategies, local DRR 
strategies are far more heterogeneous, vary 
across countries and local administrative units, 
and change over time. It is therefore difficult 
for the national government to track all local 
strategies without a substantial scheme (e.g. 
legislation).
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Target G
This target relates to enhanced capacities for 
EWSs, risk information and assessment, and pre-
disaster evacuation. As with Target E, this target 
also has an element of subjective scoring based on 
ranking of hazards and scoring of initiatives under-
taken on issues related to EWSs and risk informa-
tion. Key components of effective MHEWSs include 
aspects of systematic detection, monitoring and 
forecasting of hazards, vulnerability and exposure. 
They also include detailed capacity analysis of the 
risks involved and appropriate means of communi-
cating risk information from accountable authori-
ties to populations exposed to or at risk at the local 
level, such that appropriate action to prepare and 
respond in a timely manner is prompted. 
A few issues for consideration are as follows:104
Early lessons on MHEWSs highlight that early 
warning practice can still improve from past expe-
riences and increase its efficiency, at the level of 
analysis (data collection and risk assessments) 
and ensuing action (response). National institu-
tions need to exercise strong ownership of the 
risk assessment and identification steps of the 
system. There is no single “off-the-shelf” EWS; 
instead, a variety of practices make the MHEWS 
design diverse and context specific. International 
organizations, strengthening local capacities, can 
have a complementary role by means of promot-
ing national ownership and strengthening national 
capacities for early warning.
• While useful to identify DRR actions, the OECD 
DAC Creditor Reporting System codes do not 
comprehensively cover DRR-related support to 
developing countries in terms of sectoral defini-
tion within development assistance.
• The methodology for capturing the data for Indi-
cator F-2. This needs to be further developed 
and clarified, particularly about the option to 
report as a “provider” and ways in which funding 
channelled through multilateral agencies should 
be reported.
• SDG Indicator 17.7.1 does not have an interna-
tionally established methodology or standard 
yet, and a definition of “environmentally sound 
technologies” is missing from the methodologi-
cal development for Indicator F-4.
• There is a lack of useful and reliable indicators 
for science and technology innovation in many 
developing countries. In addition, there is no 
internationally established methodology or stan-
dard yet for SDG Indicator 17.6.1. on “science 
and/or technology cooperation agreements 
and programmes between countries, by type of 
cooperation”.
• As MHEWSs vary considerably among countries, 
instead of counting the number of systems, 
UNDDR suggested a focus on functionality.
• The selection of major hazards to be included 
in MHEWSs is determined nationally, recogniz-
ing that hazardous events differ significantly 
among countries in terms of frequency, scale 
and intensity.
• With regard to measuring coverage of early 
warning information, Member States may wish 
to examine proxies for the level of “information 
redundancy”, that is, the number and kind of dif-
ferent warning dissemination channels provid-
ing the same authoritative warning information.
• In calculating coverage, the number of exposed 
populations would ideally be used. However, 
identification and calculation will be challeng-
ing, especially for small- and medium-sized 
hazardous events and for such an event when 
not everyone exposed is affected. Therefore, 
UNDDR suggested the use of a proxy, for exam-
ple, the total population in targeted subnational 
administrative units.
• As more than one MHEWS could cover the 
same geography or population, Members States 
should consider double counting and consis-
tency of information.
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9.3
  
Support for thematic 
and sectoral review 
of progress 
Sectoral analysis is required for full reporting under 
the Sendai Framework. There has already been 
considerable international cooperation in various 
sectors. Two examples are given below of such 
cooperation, relating to agriculture and school 
safety.
9.3.1 
Agriculture sector
Agriculture forms the livelihoods of 2.5 billion 
people worldwide. Three quarters of the world’s 
poor obtain their food and income from farming, 
livestock rearing, forestry or fishing. Smallholders 
manage over 80% of the world’s estimated 500 
million small farms and provide over 80% of the 
food consumed across the developing world.105 
With the growing frequency and impact of disas-
ters and extreme events, they regularly face storms, 
drought, floods, pests and diseases that destroy 
or damage harvests, livestock, supplies, equip-
ment, seeds and food. Over the past decade, 26% 
of all damage and loss from climate-related disas-
ters in developing countries was in the agriculture 
sector.106 Moreover, the impact of disasters is not 
limited to the immediate short term. Disasters 
often undermine decennial development gains, 
thus making communities increasingly vulnerable 
and less able to absorb, recover and adapt to future 
risks. 
In partnership with UNDDR, FAO has developed the 
Methodology to Assess Direct Loss from Disas-
ters in Agriculture, which is used to track progress 
towards achieving Indicator C-2 on reducing direct 
agricultural loss attributed to disasters, under 
104  (UNISDR 2018b)
105  (UNEP and International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment 2013)
106  (FAO 2018)
Sendai Framework Target C on global economic 
loss. This new methodology seeks to standard-
ize disaster impact assessment in agriculture. 
However, it needs to be institutionalized at the 
country level. FAO has therefore been providing 
support and building capacity of national institu-
tions for the adoption, operationalization and imple-
mentation of this methodology. A growing number 
of countries across Latin America, the Caribbean, 
East Africa and Southeast Asia are already adopt-
ing this new approach and are becoming ready 
to report and track their progress towards Sendai 
Framework commitments to reduce direct loss 
from disasters in agriculture.
FAO supports countries in reducing risk and 
strengthening agricultural livelihoods for building 
resilience to disasters and crises, while remain-
ing context specific and anchored in local liveli-
hoods and food systems. FAO resilience-relevant 
work is defined around three main groups of 
shocks: natural hazards, including climate change 
extreme events; food chain crises and transbound-
ary threats, including pests and diseases and food 
safety, in alignment with the Sendai Framework 
broader scope of hazards; and protracted crises, 
including violent conflicts. Through this holistic 
approach, FAO is able to address the compound 
nature of disasters and the interconnectedness of 
threats.
Improving crisis and risk governance
Agricultural livelihoods can be protected from multi-
hazards only if adequate disaster risk and crisis 
governance is present at all levels through risk-
informed legal, policy and institutional systems, as 
well as disaster and risk management capacities 
for the food and agriculture-related sectors. 
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partners from the Global Alliance on Disaster 
Risk Reduction Education and Resilience in the 
Education Sector as a response to the High-Level 
Dialogue Communiqué at the 2013 Global Platform 
for Disaster Risk Reduction. This initiative aims at 
securing political commitment and fostering the 
implementation of safe schools globally. The World-
wide Initiative motivates and supports governments 
to develop and implement national school safety 
policies, plans and programmes in combination 
with the three technical aspects of comprehensive 
school safety. It offers technical assistance and 
expertise to support interested governments in 
implementing comprehensive school safety at the 
national level and promotes good practices and 
achievements in safe school implementation for 
replication in other countries and regions. 
Partners of the Global Alliance developed different 
tools and methodology to enhance school safety. 
For example, the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) promotes 
a multi-hazard school safety assessment method-
ology, namely visual inspection for defining safety 
upgrading strategies (VISUS). The VISUS methodol-
ogy has a strong component on capacity-building 
for decision makers, technical staff and universi-
ties. It allows them to make better informed deci-
sions on how to prioritize funding for improved 
school safety and has been successfully tested in 
seven countries (El Salvador, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique 
and Peru), where the security of more than 500,000 
students and educational staff was assessed. 
UNESCO is working on the conceptualization of an 
International Programme for Safe School Assess-
ment, through the implementation of the VISUS 
methodology worldwide. 
Early warning – early action
Monitoring risk and disasters helps to prevent, 
prepare and reduce impact. The FAO Early Warning 
Early Action (EWEA) system translates warnings 
into anticipatory actions to reduce the impact of 
specific disaster events. It focuses on consolidating 
available forecasting information and putting plans 
in place to ensure government partners act when a 
warning is at hand. On a global level, early warning 
sources to monitor the main risks to agriculture and 
food security are published in the EWEA quarterly 
report. At a country level, FAO works closely with 
country offices to develop EWEA systems tailored 
to local contexts. Implementation is under way in 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Pacific Islands, Para-
guay, Sudan and others.
9.3.2 
School safety initiatives
The Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Resilience in the Education Sector is a multi-stake-
holder mechanism composed of United Nations 
agencies, international organizations and regional 
networks. Partners are working to ensure that all 
schools are safe from disaster risks and all learners 
live in a culture of safety. The work of the Global Alli-
ance is expected ultimately to contribute to a global 
culture of safety and resilience through education 
and knowledge, in support of SDGs and in line with 
the Sendai Framework. It promotes a comprehensive 
approach to DRR education through the Compre-
hensive School Safety Framework.107 This is based 
on education policies, plans and programmes that 
are aligned with disaster management at regional, 
national, subnational, district and local school site 
levels, whose goals are to: (a) protect students and 
educators from death, injury and harm in schools, (b) 
plan for continuity of education through all expected 
hazards and threats, (c) safeguard education sector 
investments and (d) strengthen risk reduction and 
resilience through education. 
The Worldwide Initiative for Safe Schools was 
launched in 2013 by UNDDR in collaboration with 
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ience in the Education Sector 2017)
9.4 
Development of  
national disaster-
related statistics
The adoption of common reporting mechanisms 
for the Sendai Framework and the 2030 Agenda has 
prompted the international statistical community to 
support the development of disaster-related statis-
tics and frameworks. The following section exam-
ines this work and its repercussions.
Within the context of a globally agreed policy frame-
work and global indicator monitoring systems, 
governments have given increased attention to 
disaster-related statistics. As this area of statistics 
is a new endeavour in nearly all countries, there is a 
strong demand for technical guidance and sharing 
of tools and good practices internationally. 
Core concepts and indicators for DRR for interna-
tional monitoring are defined in the Sendai Frame-
work and SDGs, but there is a need to translate 
the agreed concepts and definitions into specific 
instructions and technical recommendations for 
production and dissemination of statistics. Basic 
requirements for the international indicator monitor-
ing systems include comparability of concepts and 
methods for measurement across disaster occur-
rences. These systems depend heavily on coordi-
nation and consistency at the national and local 
levels.
Countries have different practices for compil-
ing data and preparing statistical tables related 
to disasters, which makes it difficult to make 
comparisons or conduct time-series analyses 
covering multiple disasters. The Sendai Framework 
focuses on risk assessments, mirroring government 
demands for improving prevention and prepared-
ness efforts. As risk assessments require infor-
mation beyond operational disaster data, there is 
a need for disaster measurements and statistics 
across disasters, times and geographic locations, 
and for the integration of disaster information with 
social, economic and environment statistics. 
In many cases, disaster-related data is produced 
outside the national statistical system and is not 
included in official statistics. NSOs are often not 
involved in compiling the data. However, consider-
ing the traditional strengths of NSOs and the institu-
tional context for national DRM, different roles can 
be identified for NSOs. These roles can be grouped 
into two parts: 
9.4.1 
Conceptual issues
Disaster-related statistics include, but are not 
limited to, statistics about disaster occurrences 
and their impacts. Disaster-related statistics also 
include statistical information used for risk assess-
ment and post-disaster impact assessments, which 
rely on analysis of a variety of sources of data on 
the population, society and economy, like censuses, 
surveys and other instruments used in official 
statistics for multiple purposes. Geo-referenced 
• Core roles that should be undertaken by any 
NSO. These reflect typical strengths of NSOs, 
such as producing time-series statistics and 
indicators, providing baseline information 
f i t for purpose for DRM, suppor ting the 
assessment of social, environmental and 
economic impacts, etc.
• Expanded roles with additional tasks that could 
be incorporated into the functions and respon-
sibilities of NSOs. These can include leading 
impact assessments, coordinating geographic 
information services and conducting risk 
assessments. Some NSOs have already imple-
mented such roles.
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statistics on population, businesses and infra-
structure support the assessment of the number 
of affected people and other possible impacts of 
disasters from natural hazards.
Disaster risk is unevenly dispersed within countries, 
across the world and over time. Each disaster event 
is different; it is relatively unpredictable, and creates 
significant changes to the social and economic 
context for affected regions. To identify authentic 
trends, rather than random fluctuations or effects 
of extreme values, much of the analysis of disaster-
related statistics requires a coherent time series 
and depends on clear and well-structured statisti-
cal compilations. This context puts an exception-
ally high value on harmonizing of measurement for 
related statistics over time and, as much as feasi-
ble, across countries and regions.
Statistics on impacts of disasters are linked to 
uniquely identifiable disaster occurrences. Collec-
tions of these statistics need to be structured 
and documented in such a way as to maintain the 
links to relevant characteristics of the underlying 
disaster occurrence (e.g. timing, location or hazard 
type), while also remaining accessible to users as 
inputs for cross-disaster analyses (e.g. monitor-
ing indicators over time or in models for predict-
ing and minimizing disaster risk). Thus, a basic 
challenge in disaster-related statistics is to make 
statistics accessible for use in multiple forms and 
purposes of analyses, while maintaining harmo-
nized and coherent compilations via structured use 
of metadata.
The challenge is best addressed through the devel-
opment, agreement and application of a commonly 
agreed measurement framework. 
Based on the above, the fiftieth session of the 
United Nations Statistical Commission took place 
from 5–8 March 2019. In this Session (Report of the 
Commission subject to editing),108 the Commission 
requested the United Nations Statistics Division, 
ESCAP, UNECE, ECLAC and UNDDR, in consulta-
tion with members of the existing regional expert 
groups and task forces to consider options and 
modalities for the establishment and coordination 
of: (a) a formal mechanism under the purview of 
the Commission to progress a common statisti-
cal framework on disaster-related statistics; (b) a 
network across the expert communities to sustain 
cooperation, coordination and fundraising for 
enhancing statistics related to hazardous events 
and disasters; and (c) report back to the Commis-
sion at a suitable time. 
The Commission also urged the international statis-
tical community to expand its capacity building 
efforts in statistics relating to hazardous events 
and disasters to assist countries in strengthen-
ing capacities for disaster management agen-
cies, national statistical offices and other related 
contributors of official data to meet reporting 
requirements for evidence-based approaches to 
achieving national development policies, plans 
and programmes, and the goals and targets in the 
Sendai Framework and the 2030 Agenda.
9.4.2 
International support for development of 
disaster-related statistics
There are several international initiatives to support 
development of disaster-related statistics. Key high-
lights include: the United Nations Statistics Division 
Framework for the Development of Environment 
Statistics109 with the support of the Expert Group on 
the Revision of the Framework for the Development 
of Environment Statistics, and the UNECE Task 
Force on Measuring Extreme Events and Disasters 
since February 2015. 
At a regional level, ESCAP established an expert 
group on disaster-related statistics in Asia and 
the Pacific in 2014. This has produced a disaster-
related statistics framework and a technical guide-
line designed for national statistics systems and 
applicable at multiple scales. ECLAC has long 
provided technical assistance and training to coun-
tries in disaster statistics and indicators and has 
now established a Working Group on Measuring 
and Recording Indicators related to DRR for the 
biennium 2018–2019.
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108  (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2019)
109  (UN DESA 2017)
110  (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2018a)
111  (GEO 2019b) 
112  (GEO 2019b)
113  (GEO 2019a)
9.4.3 
Leveraging disaster-related geospatial and 
Earth observation data
The 2030 Agenda requires data to understand 
needs, to study and define solutions, and to monitor 
progress. The leveraging of disaster-related geospa-
tial and EO data and tools in the pursuit of SDGs 
and the goals and targets of the Paris Agreement, 
NUA and other related agreements is essential.
The United Nations Committee of Experts on Global 
Geospatial Information Management (UN-GGIM) 
supports country implementation by focusing 
on guidance setting directions with regard to the 
production, availability and use of geospatial infor-
mation within national, regional and global policy 
frameworks. This will lead to a better integration 
of geospatial and other key information in support-
ing the various post-2015 development agendas as 
well as their national risk reduction strategies and 
other national plans. Two reports considered at the 
eighth annual session of UN-GGIM are particularly 
important as they bring into context the contribution 
of geospatial information and services for disasters 
as well as geospatial information for sustainable 
development.110 
The Group on Earth Observations111 (GEO) is an 
intergovernmental partnership working to improve 
the availability, access and use of EOs for the 
benefit of society. GEO has a work programme of 
over 70 activities, which cover the global priority 
areas of the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement 
and the Sendai Framework. Through this work, GEO 
has brought together the Global Earth Observa-
tion System of Systems,112 which makes available 
more than 400 million units of data, information and 
resources.113 
9.5
Conclusions
Four years after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda 
and the Sendai Framework, countries have taken 
bold steps towards meeting the ambitious aspira-
tions of these transformative plans. In their shared 
quest to achieve the goals, countries are dealing 
with daunting global challenges: inequality, a chang-
ing climate, instability and fast-paced urbanization. 
Decision makers across the globe need to critically 
reflect on how their countries, cities and communi-
ties can become more resilient while confronting 
the interrelated risks. These normative aspirations 
must be matched with implementation and tangible 
progress by providing the most up-to-date data 
and achievements so far. More solid evidence is 
required, but preliminary findings reiterate previous 
trends on the highest toll of disasters experienced 
in the most vulnerable segment of the world’s 
populations. 
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Part II  
Conclusions and 
recommendations 
Conclusions
Direct losses are only one piece of the puzzle. The 
impact of disasters needs to be understood more 
holistically. When disasters hit, indirect effects are 
experienced in terms of mortality and morbidity, 
as well as assets, infrastructure, employment and 
education opportunities that determine the well-
being of affected populations. It is necessary to 
look at data afresh across goals and targets and 
establish metrics for those dimensions of disas-
ter impacts that accrue to the most vulnerable by 
going deeper into distributional analysis, moving 
away from regional, national and subnational data 
to the household level.114 Key indicators such as 
mortality, morbidity, educational attainment and 
nutrition outcomes should be disaggregated across 
all metrics wherever appropriate. If it is endeav-
oured to reach first those who are furthest behind, 
it is necessary to understand how socioeconomic 
circumstances affect any given individual’s likeli-
hood of being healthy and educated, accessing 
basic services, leading a dignified life and eventu-
ally building back better after a shock. 
Open access, validated and interoperable data 
across the disaster continuum is critical for the 
development of evidence-based policies. The exam-
ples presented above, together with the roll-out of 
technical guidance notes on Sendai Framework 
Monitoring, encourage understanding of the cross-
sectoral benefits of reporting on progress against 
SDGs and the Paris Agreement. Increased interna-
tional attention and targeted funding across differ-
ent goals is slowly starting to yield results. However, 
it is critical to maintain momentum and continue 
to coordinate global and national efforts in terms 
of taxonomy and comparability across databases 
moving forward.
This part has demonstrated that while disaster 
risks are intensifying at a global scale, the collec-
tive will to address them has been insufficient. The 
hope with initial findings is that by assessing the 
true costs of disasters, prioritization will be placed 
on the trade-offs inherent in the setting of national 
planning and budgeting. Given limited capacities 
and funding on data collection, governments need 
to decide where they should invest their resources 
first. By analysing the underlining risks inherent in 
social, economic and environmental activity and 
having precise understandings of target popula-
tions, policymakers can tailor durable solutions and 
effective action for their societies. 
Recommendations 
to Member States 
on improved data 
collection for Sendai 
Framework monitoring
• Connect data-collection efforts for the Sendai 
Framework, which should be brought into the 
realms of official statistics in coordination with 
NSOs. This can make disaster loss accounting 
a standard good practice for feeding into Sendai 
Framework monitoring as it enables event-wise 
disaggregated data that lends itself to more 
credible analysis.
• Invest efforts on building a strong customized 
reporting mechanism that focuses on nationally 
oriented issues and supports the monitoring 
framework of national DRR strategies in con-
junction with NAPs and local-level monitoring of 
the Sendai Framework.
• Align targets and indicators with other countries 
in the region or with similar geo-political/hazard 
profile so that spatial comparison can be under-
taken if desired.
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114  (UNISDR 2017e); (Walsh and Hallegatte 2019)
115  (Data Revolution Group 2019)
116  (Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2017)
• Leverage the latest research in data science 
to facilitate the reporting process based on 
common principles and standards. Meanwhile, 
it is essential to support the data revolution 
for sustainable development as recommended 
by the Secretary-General’s IEAG on the data 
revolution.115 
• Invest in physical infrastructure, especially in 
the IT sector, to ensure better online reporting 
and loss accounting at all administrative levels 
while building capacities in cartography and 
geospatial data to better record losses through 
a complementary initiative of in situ and 
satellite-based monitoring.
• Build synergies so that Member States, espe-
cially developing and less developed countries, 
endeavour to engage with resident and non-
resident United Nations entities that are cus-
todian agencies for different SDG targets and 
indicators, to ensure best possible in-country 
synergies for SDG reporting.
• Build partnerships with other stakeholders and 
expert organizations as a key to enable a strong 
data-sharing network and comprehensive 
reporting. To the extent possible, such partner-
ships should explore multiple uses of the data 
so that there is a broader demand and intrinsic 
incentivization for data collection and sharing. 
Engage with the private sector, for example, the 
insurance industry, housing sector, chambers 
of commerce and industry. This is essential for 
a more comprehensive capture of economic 
losses.
• Promote a data system that is fit for purpose to 
monitor and achieve SDGs and the other United 
Nations landmark agreements and help govern-
ments to:116
 о Manage and govern more effectively, pro-
viding policymakers with real-time or near-
time information on the quality of services, 
the welfare of the population and the state 
of the environment so they can correct their 
course and change policies to meet chang-
ing demands.
 о Monitor historical progress and ensure 
objectives can be met, track changes over 
time and help to project where we are 
headed into the future. 
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Developing urban and community 
disaster risk reduction plans using 
collaborative mapping techniques  
– Dar es Salaam, United Republic of 
Tanzania
Special
Case Study
Eliciting community knowledge to 
understand the extent of historical floods 
(Source: Mark Iliffe)
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Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, is one 
of the fastest growing cities in Africa. With a current 
population of 4.1 million, it is projected to become 
a megacity by 2030. Maps and geospatial infor-
mation are critical to the development of any city, 
vital for placing public services and ensuring the 
safety of its citizens. However, numerous factors 
add complexity to the security of Dar es Salaam’s 
residents. 
These include the rapid population growth from a 
population of roughly 300,000 in 1970 to that of 
the present day, unplanned and informal settle-
ment, and a highly variable climatic environment, 
all of which contribute to a high risk of flooding.117 
Dar es Salaam’s institutions have limited technical 
capacity in terms of skills, training and equipment. 
This challenge is further compounded by lack of 
access to existing geospatial information and gaps 
in data.118 
In early 2018, heavy rains caused widespread flood-
ing that affected 50,000 people and claimed at least 
41 lives. According to official figures, the emer-
gency response and recovery cost to the Govern-
ment was more than $780,000.119 
In response to this rising set of challenges, a 
consortium of local academic institutions and 
NGOs working with the Tanzanian Commission of 
Science and Technology, the Tanzania Red Cross 
Society, the World Bank and community members 
formed Ramani Huria in 2015. This is a commu-
nity risk mapping project in Dar es Salaam that is 
generating substantial amounts of geospatial infor-
mation. Such information includes land-use, infra-
structure and exposure data that directly informs 
the development of DRM and DRR plans. As of 
October 2018, Ramani Huria has mapped neigh-
bourhoods covering roughly 3.5 million residents in 
over 228 communities. 
117  (Calas 2010)
118  (World Bank 2017)
119  (World Bank 2018)
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The collaborative process informs decision-making 
at various levels within the city to take actions that 
can ameliorate urban conditions for the residents 
of Dar es Salaam. At a community level, the maps 
are used to inform actions related to drain cleaning 
programmes and evacuation planning, supporting 
the establishment of 10 emergency flood response 
teams, in collaboration with the Tanzania Red Cross 
Society programme Zuia Mafuriko (Swahili for “Stop 
Flooding”). At the city level, the mass of geospatial 
information supports the development of an ex ante 
plan for emergency declaration, actions, and defini-
tions of roles and responsibilities in the event of a 
disaster. This is done through the Dar es Salaam 
Multi-Agency Emergency Response Team, a city-
wide, multi-stakeholder initiative that coordinates 
city- and regional-level response and planning for 
disasters.
 
Maps are created through a collaborative process 
that combines students and community members. 
This enables technological skills that generate 
geospatial information to be transferred, historical 
flood extents to be established, and the commu-
nity to participate and be informed with respect to 
disaster plans as a single process. In increasing the 
capacity for generating and consuming geospatial 
information, city- and community-level resilience to 
disasters is strengthened. 
Furthermore, the collaborative approach acts as 
a mechanism to engage and inform community 
members and local government to simultaneously 
change behaviour and support community action. 
For example, the combination of informing commu-
nity members on the impact of solid waste being 
dumped into drains and the provision of locally 
accessibly solid waste processing sites facilitates a 
reduction in the severity of flooding. At the broader 
city level, this allows for a streamlined focus on the 
larger underlying issues and causes of risk.
Flooding near Jangwani Bridge, Dar es Salaam, April 2018  
(Source: Ramani Huria 2018)
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Introduction  
Chapters 1, 2 and Part I of this GAR described how 
the Sendai Framework calls on governments to 
move towards risk-informed governance arrange-
ments that include a broader hazard and risk scope, 
and incorporate the concept of systemic risk. This 
requires integration across different sectors and 
levels of government, working with scientists, civil 
society and the private sector to address current 
and emerging risks. Part II then provided the first 
global reporting of Member States’ progress 
against the Sendai Framework targets and indica-
tors, and identified priority areas to increase the 
necessary data-collection capacity. 
This part takes Target E as its starting point, that is, 
to substantially increase the number of countries 
with national and local DRR strategies by 2020, but 
it places it in the broader context of Member State 
efforts to achieve all the targets and ultimately the 
Sendai Framework outcome and goal through inte-
grated risk management. Fulfilment of Target E is a 
stepping stone towards achieving the 2030 targets 
of reducing disaster losses, mortality, affected 
people, economic losses, damage to infrastruc-
ture and disruption to critical services. Hence, the 
decision by Member States to set delivery of this 
target by 2020. This part therefore takes a quali-
tative approach to give a broad picture of current 
practices, challenges and lessons learned in creat-
ing the enabling environment for integrated risk 
governance at national and local levels. It consid-
ers the role of regional cooperation, as well as the 
many ways and means Member States are using 
to also integrate DRR into national and local plans 
for development, CCA, urban settings and fragile or 
complex contexts.
Our greatest responsibility is to be good ancestors
(Jonas Salk)1 
1  (Cornish 2005)
Part III: 
Creating the National 
and Local Conditions 
to manage Risk
291
Enabling environment and regional 
cooperation 
The Sendai Framework promotes regional and 
national cooperation, particularly in Priority 2, which 
speaks of “disaster risk governance at the national, 
regional and global levels”. Global and regional 
mechanisms are therefore important elements of 
the enabling environment for effective risk gover-
nance at national level. As the technical support 
systems and resources around the Sendai Frame-
work monitoring processes have been discussed 
previously, it is timely to recognize the support 
and resources that Member States access through 
their regional organizations and agreements, as 
well as the governance frameworks they have put 
in place at national and local levels. Accordingly, 
the first chapter of this part looks at progress 
in the enabling environment created by Member 
States through regional plans, strategies and 
knowledge-sharing. 
Disaster risk reduction strategies or plans 
aligned with the Sendai Framework 
Achievement of Target E by 2020 is a marker of 
progress and an essential element of the enabling 
environment to achieve all the Sendai Framework 
targets and goal by 2030. With only a year to go 
until 2020 and only 11 years until 2030, it is now a 
matter of urgency for countries to set themselves 
more ambitious priorities by updating their exist-
ing strategies and plans to pursue prospective risk 
management objectives that can access public and 
private investments. 
Recognition of the importance of national and 
local DRR strategies is not new and was already 
highlighted during the HFA implementation period, 
albeit without a dedicated target. By the end of the 
implementation period of HFA in 2015, 94 of the 
105 countries that made progress reports in the 
2013–2015 period reported having legislative and/
or regulatory provisions for managing disaster risk,2 
and 69 countries reported having national strate-
gies and plans. There was no official record of local 
DRR strategies, as this has only been monitored 
systematically since 2015. However, as docu-
mented in GAR15, most national DRR strategies and 
plans endorsed under HFA were primarily focused 
on disaster preparedness and on reducing existing 
risk. Now, unless countries can curb the creation 
of new risk, the goal of the Sendai Framework is 
unlikely to be achieved by 2030. 
It is also important to heed one of the lessons from 
the implementation period, which was that many 
excellent DRR strategies were developed but not 
implemented because a country either lacked the 
resources or political support, and stakeholder 
awareness were not present.3 Plans and strategies 
need to be practical in the country context, not only 
aspirational. To be effective, they need to engage 
relevant stakeholders and be developed and imple-
mented with sufficient resources, capacity and 
commitment. Chapter 11 looks at selected country 
practice in developing and implementing national 
and local plans.
Risk reduction in development planning  
Unless nations accelerate their efforts to curb the 
development-based drivers of risk, the sustainabil-
ity of development will be at stake. Also at stake 
is the need to hold on to the many co-benefits that 
DRR may bring to sustainable development.4  GAR15 
stated that annual global investment of $6 billion 
in appropriate DRR strategies would generate total 
benefits in the realm of $360 billion.5 
The 2030 Agenda recognizes that disasters 
threaten to reverse much of the development prog-
ress in recent decades.6 Building the resilience of 
development assets to shocks and disasters, and 
reducing the disaster risks inherent in new invest-
ments is therefore a logical and important course 
of action. But it is not enough to address the risk of 
disasters to development, as many risks arise from 
development. Development can be a major driver of 
disaster risk, resulting in populations and economic 
assets located in exposed geographic areas, accu-
mulation of risk in urban areas due to rapid and 
unplanned development, overreliance on natural 
resources and degradation of ecosystems, and 
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3   (Jackson, Witt and McNamara 2019); (UNISDR 2015b)
4   (Tanner et al. 2015)
5   (UNISDR 2015c)
6   (United Nations General Assembly 2015a)
7    (Leahy 2018)
8    (UNISDR 2015c)
9    (Centre for Science and Environment 2018)
10  (ADPC and iPrepare Business facility 2017)
social inequalities due to limited income-generating 
opportunities for some population groups.
There are sectoral development dynamics that are 
contributing to risk, such as tourism development in 
hazard-prone coastal areas or farming of water-inten-
sive crops in drylands, as well as the wider conse-
quences of climate change.7 Development patterns 
The potential to stimulate economic activity by 
reducing disaster risk is yet to be fully understood. 
However, it can create a conducive environment for 
public and private investment, as well as livelihoods 
investment at the household level. This is not the 
that increase inequalities result in poverty and also 
create processes of social and political exclusion, 
which drive disaster risks.8 This makes social justice 
and equality core values for disaster- and climate-
resilient development, as they ensure that options, 
visions and values are deliberated, among and within 
countries and communities, without making the poor 
and disadvantaged worse off.9 
sole responsibility of government, as disaster risk 
and climate change need to be considered in busi-
ness continuity management by large and small 
enterprises; this is now recognized increasingly in 
the private sector.10  
Flooding in Jakarta 
(Source: World Bank)
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Despite the growing political commitment to inte-
grating DRR into development as reflected in the 
Sendai Framework and other global and national 
policy frameworks, the working knowledge of how 
to mainstream DRR in practical and effective ways 
is still uneven across countries. The mechanisms 
explored in Chapter 12 are intended to illuminate 
how to achieve this in practice through integrated 
national and local plans and strategies, now that 
it has become so clear through the post-2015 
agendas that risk-informed development is the only 
type of development that is sustainable.
Risk reduction and climate change adaptation
The idea of converging DRR and CCA agendas has 
been gathering interest progressively, conceptu-
ally and in practice at international, national and 
subnational levels. These efforts share the common 
aim of building resilience of people, economies 
and natural resources to the impacts of extreme 
weather and climate. 
At the global level, the integration of DRR with 
CCA has been a key component of decisions 
under UNFCCC since the 2007 Bali Declaration, as 
well as the outcomes of the 2012 United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), 
and of course the post-2015 agreements already 
discussed. The Sendai Framework gives explicit 
recognition of the importance of CCA in calibrat-
ing DRR.11 However, especially in light of the 2018 
IPCC special report Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC 
SR1.5), action on climate change is now understood 
as an urgent global and national priority for risk 
reduction strategies and plans.12 
The impacts of climate change are already being 
felt in many regions of the world. Current projec-
tions make it clear that, without concerted action 
on climate change, the goal of sustainable devel-
opment cannot be achieved, many societies are 
likely to face significant reversals and the longer-
term survival of the human species on the planet 
is under threat. Climate change is already causing 
shifts in average conditions, more-frequent and 
more-intense weather events, and sea-level rise. It 
is expected to further exacerbate weather-related 
disasters in the coming decades, leading to losses 
that could soon erase development gains in key 
sectors,13 with cascading impacts on human health 
and food security, and many related ecosystems 
and human-made structures and systems.
Countries that face high risk from impacts related 
to climate change and other natural and human-
made hazards have tended to prioritize develop-
ment of stand-alone CCA strategies and plans, 
rather than integrating them with DRR strategies, 
especially if resources and capacities are limited 
and external financing is more readily available for 
CCA. Some national CCA strategies and plans have 
integrated DRR, especially in the Pacific. However, 
it is time for a more fully integrated approach to 
the combined risks each country faces – short and 
long term. As reiterated in earlier parts of this GAR, 
the systemic nature of risk requires systems-based 
approaches; climate risk needs to be a part of all 
development and risk reduction planning.
Local disaster risk reduction strategies and 
plans in urban areas
Much of the world’s population – 4.22 billion, or 
55.3%14 – now lives in urban areas. By 2050, it is 
expected that 66% of the population will be living in 
cities, urban centres, peri-urban areas and agglom-
erations. Most of this growth will take place in 
cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where the 
expansion rate of informal settlements is high 
and capacities for urban management are limited. 
As of 2014, the urban slum population worldwide 
was 880 million.15 At the same time, displacement 
patterns are changing. UNHCR figures indicate that 
“one in every 122 people in the world is now either 
a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum, 
while 6 out of 10 refugees and at least half of all 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) are located in 
urban areas, in cities and towns across the globe.”16 
In addition to changing the entire landscape of 
cities, it also adds context-specific vulnerabilities, 
which were previously absent or exceptional, and 
reduces the capacity of local governments to under-
stand and manage risk. 
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11  (UNISDR 2017a)
12  (IPCC et al. 2018); (IPCC 2018); (Centre for Science and 
Environment 2018)
13  (IPCC 2012); (IPCC et al. 2018)
14  (UN DESA 2018b) 
15  (UN-Habitat 2015); (Sarmiento et al. 2019)
16  (Global Alliance for Urban Crises 2016); (Crawford et al. 
2015); (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015)
17  (Rosenzweig et al. 2018)
18  (OECD 2017b)
19  (OECD 2017b)
20  (OECD 2017b)
21  (UNISDR 2018a) 
22  (Gencer 2013); (UNISDR 2017c); (OECD 2017b); (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd 2013) 
The physical and spatial characteristics of cities, 
their settlement patterns, the standards of their 
built environment, socioeconomic vulnerability and 
poverty of urban residents, and environmental chal-
lenges are some of the risk drivers that thrive in 
rapidly developing urban areas. Unplanned expan-
sion of cities to accommodate rising populations 
often gives rise to inappropriate land use, where 
vulnerability to climate change impacts combines 
with poor infrastructure and services. Frequently, 
a lack of appropriate building codes and chal-
lenges in regulating compliance with existing build-
ing standards further increase risk. The risks from 
inadequate living conditions, poor health, inad-
equate nutrition, poverty and poor sanitation are 
magnified during events such as floods and heat-
waves. Indeed, under changing climate conditions 
and the extension of coastal cities, “heat-waves, 
drought, heavy downpours, and coastal flooding 
are projected to increase in frequency and inten-
sity in many cities over the twenty-first century, 
adding to the risk of urban residents.”17 Urbaniza-
tion and the complex characteristics of cities can 
increase vulnerabilities and risk to natural hazards 
and climate change; at the same time, they can also 
present opportunities for sustainable development. 
National urban policy is identified as a key instru-
ment for governments to support the implementa-
tion of NUA, SDGs and DRR in line with the Sendai 
Framework. The 2016 United Nations Confer-
ence on Housing and Sustainable Urban Devel-
opment (Habitat III) considered an assessment 
of the state and scope of national urban policies 
across 35 OECD countries, based on data collected 
by UN-Habitat.18 Those countries implementing 
national urban strategies understand that there is a 
strong economic argument for doing so, with urban 
areas contributing an increasingly higher proportion 
of GDP as urbanization proceeds. If policy and 
financial support is given to urban areas to under-
stand and effectively reduce or manage climate and 
other risks, then this improves the area’s economic 
competitiveness, brings businesses in, attracts 
investment capital, creates jobs, and improves tax 
revenue and services.19 
Increasingly urban areas and cities may look to 
bond financing to improve infrastructure. However, 
in the past five years, credit ratings agencies have 
issued warnings about or guidance on municipal 
credit ratings and climate change. Cities may be 
downgraded if they are not managing and reducing 
risk, so this reinforces the need for national govern-
ments to support cities through national urban poli-
cies to help them attract investments needed for 
resilient development.20 
Local and urban strategies and plans21 need to 
address these risk drivers to reduce current risk and 
prevent future risk creation, and to move towards 
inclusive and equitable urban development, which 
can be more resilient and sustainable.22 If these 
challenges of rapid urban growth are not addressed, 
the greater exposure of people and assets (physi-
cal, cultural and economic) and higher frequency 
of extreme events can create an explosive combi-
nation of risk with potentially disastrous conse-
quences from which it is hard to recover. 
Disaster risk reduction strategies in fragile 
and complex risk contexts
Contexts in which disaster risks manifest, and 
local and national DRR strategies are designed and 
implemented, are increasingly complex. However, 
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most tools and guidelines designed to facilitate 
the development of such strategies consider only 
conducive, “normal” development, non-crisis and 
non-complex risk scenarios. Decision makers have 
to contend with existing known dynamic devel-
opment trends, together with new threats such 
as climate change, and emerging threats, which 
are yet to be realized.23 Entities such as the World 
Bank, OECD and the World Economic Forum have, 
for some time, sought to identify major threats 
posing challenges to development progress.24 Most 
recently, these have included: global economic and 
financial instability, international criminal activity 
and terrorism, severe environmental change includ-
ing climate and oceanic change, cyberfragility and 
technological disruption, geopolitical volatility, 
growing antibiotic resistance, pandemics – and of 
course, natural hazards.25 The interaction of such 
threats and risk drivers creates complex risks that 
already have a significant bearing on the environ-
ment in which DRR, the development and imple-
mentation of national and local DRR strategies, and 
therefore the attainment of the Sendai Framework 
Target E is sought.
Understanding complex risks is important when 
developing local and national DRR strategies as 
these complexities influence the context in which 
disaster risk manifests, by altering patterns of 
hazards, exposure, vulnerabilities and capacities 
to cope. Policies are commonly designed where 
value-laden, subjective assessments of risk – influ-
enced by nuances in risk perception and risk toler-
ance – come to bear. Implementation takes place 
where the trade-offs inherent in development trajec-
tories shape the barriers and incentives for advanc-
ing progress on DRR, and where decisions that 
lead to the creation of new risk materialize. Those 
concerned with attaining DRR therefore need to 
begin moving towards a deeper understanding of 
complex risk, adopting systems thinking, and using 
interdisciplinary insights and knowledge, across 
spatial and temporal scales, to more effectively deal 
with uncertainty. DRR is one well-known demon-
strated means to reduce and manage risks related 
to natural hazards, with much to offer the wider 
world. There is a growing understanding within 
the DRR community that DRR approaches can be 
applied to reduce and manage risks beyond natural 
hazards. This is reflected in the expanded scope of 
the global framework, wherein the Sendai Frame-
work includes natural and man-made, biological, 
technological and environmental hazards, leading 
to slow- and rapid-onset, large- and small-scale 
disasters. 
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Chapter 10: 
Regional support and 
national enabling 
environments for 
integrated risk 
reduction
10.1 
Regional support for 
integrated risk reduction 
The Sendai Framework calls on Member States to 
establish common platforms to exchange good 
practices and experiences relating to common 
and transboundary disaster risk, emphasizing the 
importance of regional and subregional DRR strate-
gies and mechanisms for cooperation. In this way, 
regional cooperation is recognized as an important 
element in creating the enabling environment for 
effective DRR at national level, especially for small 
States and developing economies. 
While recognizing that Member States have the 
primary role in implementing the Sendai Framework, 
regional organizations are able to support efforts 
with regionally focused strategies and frameworks, 
tailored risk information, risk-sharing mechanisms, 
tools and capacity-building on DRR. They do this 
through pooling regional capacity and resources 
and also by accessing international funding and 
technical assistance. Regional organizations are 
especially important for smaller developing States, 
which do not individually have the economic means 
to invest in such a range of tools, but are more able 
to bring their voices and experience to regional 
processes in developing the systems and capacity 
most useful to them.
In most regions with high exposure to natural 
hazards there are already intergovernmental 
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organizations and mechanisms in place for coor-
dination on DRM. Therefore, the regional focus 
for supporting Sendai Framework implementa-
tion has been ensuring existing organizations have 
updated DRR mandates to align with its goal and 
priorities. Specifically, regional intergovernmental 
organizations can play a practical role in national 
compliance with Target E, by building capacity and 
supporting the development and implementation of 
national and local DRR strategies and plans. They 
can also lead and support their Member States 
to integrate DRR into risk-informed development 
planning, CCA and risk financing, as well as agree 
on approaches and coordinate action on shared 
regional and transboundary risks.
In addition to treaty-based regional organiza-
tions, the regional platforms on DRR facilitated 
by UNDRR to consult with and support Member 
States are another important mechanism for infor-
mation sharing and capacity-building to imple-
ment the Sendai Framework. Regional platforms 
became an established mechanism during the HFA 
years 2005–2015, and these continue under the 
Sendai Framework. They have already produced or 
approved important regional strategies and plans 
on Sendai Framework implementation, also engag-
ing at the political level with regional intergovern-
mental organizations.
Regional platforms for DRR are not fixed in the 
breadth or narrowness of focus or who can be 
involved. For example, an innovation in 2018 was 
the first combined Africa-Arab Platform on Disas-
ter Risk Reduction. This provided these two very 
large regions, which face significant drought, aridity, 
refugee and migration issues, with opportunities to 
share knowledge, experiences and best practices in 
advancing DRR in the context of the Sendai Frame-
work.26 In contrast, the second Central Asia and 
South Caucasus (CASC) Sub Regional Platform also 
held in 2018 is an example of a subregional focus, 
with an emphasis on DRR integrated with develop-
ment planning.27  
Regional strategies and plans are not intended to 
supersede or substitute for national strategies and 
plans. Instead, they support and complement them 
by providing guidance and coherence, promot-
ing collaboration and exchange, or addressing 
issues that cross national borders, for which a 
joint approach can create synergies, comparative 
advantages or economies of scale. For example, 
the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) mandates the EU “to 
foster cooperation, effectiveness, and consistency 
in disaster risk management among member coun-
tries.”28 In line with the African Union (AU) Africa 
Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction,29 the 
Programme of Action for the Implementation of 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030 in Africa30 calls for integration of DRM 
into policies of the member countries, but leaves 
the responsibility of implementation with national 
governments.31 There are also other types of 
regional partnerships that go beyond governmental 
arrangements, such as the ISDR Asia Partnership 
(IAP), which is an informal multi-stakeholder forum 
of Asian governments and stakeholders to facilitate 
DRR. IAP has been the main consultation forum for 
the Asia Ministerial Conferences, which operate as 
the Regional Platform in Asia, and is made up of 
regional intergovernmental organizations, govern-
ments, civil society organizations, United Nations 
and international organizations, and bilateral and 
multilateral donors.32 Similarly innovative is the 
Pacific Resilience Partnership, a multi-stakeholder 
partnership established by Pacific leaders in 2017 
for an initial trial period of two years, to support 
implementation of the 2016 Framework for Resil-
ient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated 
Approach to Address Climate Change and Disas-
ter Risk Management 2017–2030 (FRDP).33 This is 
discussed further in section 13.5.1 on the Pacific 
region approach to integrated DRR development 
and action on climate change.
In addition to such broad-spectrum regional coop-
eration on risk reduction and integration with devel-
opment planning and climate change, there are also 
many instances of regional action within sectors, 
on particular issues or even for smaller climatic or 
geological subregions. For example, the Mekong 
River Commission for Transboundary Development 
allows the four member countries of Cambodia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Viet 
Nam to cooperate on sustainable development and 
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hydrological/climate risks in the transboundary river 
basin.34 An example of sectoral coordination is the 
Central American Council for Agriculture concerning 
disaster risk in rural development,35 based around 
the Central American Strategy for Rural Develop-
ment,  which aims for stronger relationships with 
other risk management instruments, highlighting 
the issues associated with integrated water 
resource management and climate change. It dove-
tails with the Central American Policy on Compre-
hensive Disaster Risk Management (PCGIR)36 and 
the Central American Forestry Strategy.37 Some 
cooperation relies on the regional level to magnify 
and complement national efforts, such as risk 
Media winners at the Africa and Arab States Regional Platform, 2018
(Source: UNDRR)
reduction, warning systems and management of 
regional and transboundary hazards. Following the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, networks of national, 
regional and eventually global seismic and observa-
tional monitoring systems were set up to allow early 
warnings to reduce the impacts of tsunamis (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). The Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Warning and Mitigation System is an example,38 as 
is the Indian Ocean Tsunami Information Center, 
which is not part of a warning system but shares 
26  (AU 2018)
27  (UNISDR 2018a)
28  (Morsut 2019)
29  (AU and UNISDR 2018)
30  (AU 2016)
31  (Omoyo Nyandiko and Omondi Rakama 2019)
32  (AMCDRR 2016)
33  (SPC 2016)
34  (Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development 
2018)
35  (Central American Council for Agriculture 2010)
36  (Coordination Center for the Prevention of Disasters in 
Central America 2010)
37  (Central American Council for Agriculture 2010)
38  (Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System 2019) 
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knowledge and builds capacity.39 National meteoro-
logical and hydrological services are also cooperat-
ing to provide earlier warning and more complete 
data for regional extreme weather warnings,40 
while other initiatives take a regional multi-hazard 
approach.41
Disaster risk financing was noted in section 8.4 as 
a growth area in international development coop-
eration requiring more detailed analysis for future 
monitoring of Sendai Framework Target F. It is 
also an area where regional mechanisms are being 
established in addition to global mechanisms, espe-
cially in highly exposed regions. Examples include: 
the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facil-
ity established in 2007 as a parametric insurance 
facility;42 the African Risk Capacity, a specialized 
agency of AU established in 2012, and the related 
African Risk Capacity Insurance Company;43 the 
Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company, which 
was set up as a multinational sovereign risk pool 
in 2012;44 and a new ASEAN facility, the Southeast 
Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility currently being 
piloted.45 ESCAP has recently identified significant 
areas for regional cooperation in the Asia–Pacific 
region on risk financing.46 The importance of 
disaster risk financing for national- and local-level 
implementation of the Sendai Framework is also 
considered in Chapter 12, which describes how 
financing can be an entry point for mainstreaming 
DRR into development (see section 12.3.5).
There are many types of partnerships and mecha-
nisms for regional cooperation and planning for 
DRR. The Sendai Frameworks encourages new 
partnerships and networks, as well as reliance on 
more traditional intergovernmental processes. New 
models may be needed to work across sectoral 
silos and different geographic areas and times-
cales, to step outside “business as usual” and apply 
systems thinking to address immediate and long-
term risk. 
The following overview of key regional mechanisms 
and the roles they play in supporting Member States 
in implementation of the Sendai Framework in each 
global region, focuses on: (a) regions that have 
high exposure to natural hazards and significant 
numbers of smaller and/or lower-income States 
and (b) innovation in regional support for integrated 
risk governance across the post-2015 frameworks. 
For these reasons, developments in Africa, South-
East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific are given more attention.
10.1.1 
Africa
Natural and human-made hazards in Africa, such 
as drought, floods, cyclones, earthquakes, epidem-
ics, environmental degradation and technological 
hazards are a springboard for disasters. Although 
efforts to reduce exposure and vulnerability, under-
pinned by accountability at all levels, are predicted 
to reduce disaster risks, economic losses are 
mounting and disasters have become a barrier to 
sustainable development.47 
One of the two declarations adopted at the Africa-
Arab Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction 2018 was 
the Tunis Declaration on Accelerating the Imple-
mentation of the Sendai Framework and the Africa 
Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction. This 
reaffirmed the urgency of implementing the strat-
egy first adopted in 2004,48 and supported the 2016 
Programme of Action for the implementation of the 
Sendai Framework in Africa. The Programme of 
Action had already received support at the political 
level.49 The Programme of Action’s objectives are 
to: (a) increase political commitment to DRR; (b) 
improve identification and assessment of disaster 
risks; (c) enhance knowledge management for DRR; 
(d) increase public awareness of DRR; (e) improve 
governance of DRR institutions; and (f) integrate 
DRR in emergency response management. It builds 
on the intergovernmental work on DRR of AU and 
the Regional Economic Communities in Africa.
The Programme of Action is specifically linked to 
reporting under the Sendai Framework, with the 
monitoring and reporting system validated through 
formal agreement with AU member States. The 
AU Commission monitors progress of Regional 
Economic Communities towards the Programme of 
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Action goals. The Regional Economic Communities 
then guide its implementation at the subregional 
level, in cooperation with their respective member 
States. Progress will be reviewed using existing 
global and regional monitoring systems and mech-
anisms, with each member State and Regional 
Economic Community expected to submit a bien-
nial report through SFM. The reports generated 
will support the monitoring of progress under the 
Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action.50 
The monitoring information also supports DRR 
ministerial meetings, the Africa Regional Platform, 
the Africa Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion, and review processes and DRR programming 
at all levels. It is thus a multilevel regional mecha-
nism that supports Member States with information 
and tools for implementation, facilitates subre-
gional and regional cooperation through Regional 
Economic Communities and AU Commission roles 
and regional platforms, and also supports reporting 
under the Sendai Framework.
The AU regional approach has created an enabling 
environment for Regional Economic Communities 
and member States to pursue DRR policies and 
strategies with a focus on regional risks and using 
existing institutional structures. Each Regional 
Economic Community therefore has its own 
methods and mechanisms.
SADC already had a strategic plan aligned to HFA 
and the 2004 Africa Regional Strategy. Then in 
2016, the SADC Council of Ministers approved the 
Sendai Framework aligned SADC Regional Disaster 
Preparedness and Response Strategy 2017–2030. 
An SADC draft DRR strategic plan 2017–2030, and 
a regional DRR and CCA study are pending SADC 
Council approval.51 In 2018, the SADC Regional 
Disaster Risk Reduction Conference recognized the 
importance of regional strategies, plans and frame-
works, but also urged SADC to move beyond these 
to help accelerate implementation of the Sendai 
Framework, along with SDGs and the other key post-
2015 framework agendas.52 
In the Horn of Africa, IGAD has had a regional 
focus on drought risk through the IGAD Drought 
Disaster and Resilience Initiative since 2011,53  and 
ECOWAS has had in place its Policy for Disaster Risk 
Reduction since 2006.54 Neither of these Regional 
Economic Communities has yet adopted new subre-
gional policies based on the Sendai Framework, 
although the IGAD drought initiative is an ongoing 
approach that seeks to address the effects of 
drought and related shocks in the IGAD region in a 
sustainable and holistic manner. The initiative still 
serves as a common framework for developing 
national and subregional programmes designed to 
enhance drought resilience through building sustain-
ability in the region. IGAD also engages at a practi-
cal level, for example through the project Building 
Resilience to Disasters through Risk Management 
and Climate Change Adaptation, implemented with 
GFDRR and the National Meteorological and Hydro 
Metrological Services.55 This is evidence of an inte-
grated approach to climate and disaster risk, in line 
with the broader post-2015 frameworks. 
ECOWAS has also focused on practical imple-
mentation of the Sendai Framework, including 
39  (International Oceanographic Commission and UNESCO 
2019)
40  (WMO 2018)
41  (Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System 2019)
42  (CCRIF 2019)
43  (African Risk Capacity 2019)
44  (Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initia-
tive 2019)
45  (ASEAN Finance Ministers’ Meeting 2018)
46  (ESCAP 2018)
47  (AU 2004); (International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment 2016)
48  (AU 2004)
49  (AU 2016); (Mauritius 2016)
50  (AU 2016) 
51  (SADC 2018b)
52  (SADC 2018a)
53  (IGAD 2019); (IDDRSI 2014)
54   (Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest and ECOWAS 2006)
55  (World Bank 2019)
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capacity-building towards meeting Sendai Target 
E,56 and advocating for improved hydrometeoro-
logical services to address the risks of flood and 
drought in West Africa.57  
This small sample of regional and subregional 
mechanisms in Africa illustrates how they are linked 
into global monitoring but also have a specific 
geographic focus based on the shared risk of 
Member States in the subregions. They are thus part 
of the enabling environment for Sendai Framework 
implementation at international, regional and subre-
gional levels, where they provide direct support and 
capacity-building to Member States through sharing 
regional expertise and accessing international 
resources, as well as through regional strategies.
10.1.2 
Americas and the Caribbean
The Americas and the Caribbean region is highly 
exposed to a range of natural hazards, including 
drought, earthquakes, floods, forest fires, hurri-
canes, landslides, tsunamis and volcanoes. The El 
Niño and La Niña phenomena occur periodically, 
exacerbating the impacts of hydrometeorological 
events. 
The sixth Regional Platform for Disaster Risk 
Reduction in the Americas, held in June 2018, 
approved the Regional Action Plan for the Imple-
mentation of the Sendai Framework.58 It is a non-
binding plan that marks a step towards wider 
regional efforts to support countries build commu-
nity resilience and reduce disaster risk and its 
impacts.59 The action plan helps further the imple-
mentation of the Sendai Framework in the Ameri-
cas and the Caribbean through the identification of 
regional initiatives that contribute to one or more 
of the Sendai Framework priorities for action,60 
and it respects the whole-of-society approach that 
features prominently within the Sendai Framework. 
The initiatives it includes can be advanced collec-
tively by Member States, civil society organiza-
tions, volunteers and other relevant actors.
Held as part of the same Regional Platform in 2018, 
the high-level ministerial meeting issued the Carta-
gena Declaration, which affirmed the region’s politi-
cal commitment to the Sendai Framework, including 
an integrated approach to the post-2015 agree-
ments, and noted the importance of the Regional 
Action Plan.61 
Caribbean
The Caribbean States were early adopters of coor-
dinated intergovernmental approaches to manag-
ing disaster risk, faced as they are with a shared, 
high exposure to natural hazards and comprising 
mainly smaller developing economies with relatively 
limited resources to manage the risk. 
Within the Caribbean Community institutions, 
the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management 
Agency (CDEMA) serves 18 States, most of them 
lower-income countries and/or SIDS. CDEMA 
has supported the region since the 1990s, with 
tools such as its Model Comprehensive Disaster 
Management Legislation and Regulations 2013.62 
In the Caribbean region, the comprehensive disas-
ter management (CDM) concept includes DRR and 
sustainable development, and CDEMA has operated 
under a CDM framework since 2001. The current 
CDM Strategy 2014–2024, endorsed by Member 
States, is in alignment with the Sendai Framework.63 
The CDM Strategy 2014–2024 has four priority 
areas: (a) strengthened institutional arrangements 
for CDM; (b) increased and sustained knowledge 
management and learning for CDM; (c) improved 
integration of CDM at sectoral levels; and (d) 
strengthened and sustained community resilience. 
CDEMA member States report directly to CDEMA on 
CDM Strategy implementation through their country 
audits and the Performance Management Frame-
work with a basket of indicators aligned to the 
indicators of the Sendai Framework’s seven global 
targets. To support the implementation of the strat-
egy, there is a corresponding CDEMA Corporate 
Plan and a CDM Monitoring Evaluation and Report-
ing Policy, along with country audits to identify gaps 
and needs at the national level, the Country Work 
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Programming and the overarching Performance 
Management Framework. 
CDEMA is an example of a long-standing regional 
mechanism that is well adapted to meeting the 
needs of a group of broadly similar member States 
that face common regional hazards. It had already 
pioneered integration of DRR and sustainable devel-
opment through the regional concept of CDM. 
CDEMA has therefore been readily able to support 
member States implement the Sendai Framework’s 
integrated approach to risk governance based on 
the new Sendai Framework compliant regional strat-
egy, but using existing mechanisms.
Central America
The Central American States also have long-stand-
ing mechanisms for regional cooperation and coor-
dination in managing disaster risk. They continue 
to be active and innovative on Sendai Framework 
implementation.
PCGIR64 was approved in December 2017 by the 
Heads of State of the Central American Integra-
tion System (SICA).65 It is entirely aligned with the 
Sendai Framework as well as SDGs and the Paris 
Agreement, and serves to guide DRM at the regional 
and national levels, especially for the Member 
States that are already part of SICA specialized 
agency, the Coordination Centre for the Prevention 
of Disasters in Central America and the Dominican 
Republic (CEPREDENAC). First established decades 
ago, CEPREDENAC is the coordination mechanism 
among the national DRM agencies of SICA Member 
States.66 
PCGIR is the main Central American regional public 
policy instrument for DRM within SICA, and involves 
five main pillars: (a) DRR in public and private invest-
ment for sustainable economic development, linked 
to Sendai Framework Priorities 1 and 3; (b) devel-
opment and social compensation to reduce vulner-
ability, linked to Sendai Priorities 1, 2 and 3; (c) 
DRM related to climate change, linked to Sendai 
Framework Priorities 1 and 2; (d) land-use manage-
ment and governance (linked to Sendai Framework 
Priorities 2 and 3); and (e) disaster management 
and recovery, linked to Sendai Framework Priority 4. 
Subsequently, a Central American Regional Disas-
ter Reduction Plan 2019–202367 made under PCGIR 
seeks to contribute to the integration of disaster 
reduction into sustainable development of SICA 
member States, complementing such integration at 
the global level among the Sendai Framework and 
SDGs. 
The Central American policy framework for DRR 
under the Sendai Framework has thus built upon 
long-standing cooperation among SICA member 
States, but has also extended this to support inte-
gration of the post-2015 agendas. Another source of 
integration is that, in addition to CEPREDENAC, SICA 
also has regional organizations working on environ-
ment and climate change, and water and climate. 
The three intergovernmental bodies that form the 
environmental subsystem of SICA have established 
a functioning mechanism with the purpose of avoid-
ing competition and pursuing joint advocacy.
CEPREDENAC is financed by annual contribu-
tions from member States, as well as significant 
resources via international cooperation. It is thus 
also an example of a regional focus for international 
56  (ECOWAS and UNISDR 2018)
57  (ECOWAS 2018)
58  (Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres 
and UNISDR 2018)
59  (UNISDR 2017c)
60  (UNISDR 2017c)
61  (VI Regional Platform for DRR in the Americas, Third High-
level Meeting of Ministers and Authorities 2018); (UNISDR 
2016)
62  (CDEMA 2013)
63  (CDEMA 2014)
64  (Coordination Center for the Prevention of Disasters in 
Central America 2010)
65  (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana 2019)
66  (CEPREDENAC 2019)
67  (Coordination Center for the Prevention of Disasters in 
Central America and World Bank 2014)
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investment that can be utilized efficiently by an active 
regional organization to better support member 
States. This is especially important in a region where 
countries face high levels of common risk, and most 
are developing economies with relatively small popu-
lations that would not have the national resources to 
develop such tools and resources independently.
South America
In South America, the four Andean Community 
member States of the Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia have already 
adopted the Andean Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Management 2017–2030, which is in alignment 
with the Sendai Framework. It builds on the previ-
ous 2005 strategy. The new strategy seeks to 
strengthen institutional capacities in its member 
States, to enhance DRM, reduction and preven-
tion, and to support the alignment of disaster risk 
information systems. It is supported by the Andean 
Committee for Disaster Prevention and Response. 
It is also intended to support the formulation and 
implementation of policies; including national, 
regional and sectoral strategies and plans on DRM 
that promote sustainable development and social 
inclusion among Andean countries, as exemplified 
by the Andean Disaster Risk Management Strate-
gy’s Implementation Plan 2019–2030 and its asso-
ciated indicators. It thus addresses the broader 
2015 agenda, while providing guidance and enhanc-
ing the capacity of its members States to imple-
ment the Sendai Framework priorities and goal as 
well as to meet Target E. 
Within the Southern Common Market (MERCO-
SUR), the technical intergovernmental DRR entity is 
the Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities on 
Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management. At the 
time of the development of this GAR, MERCOSUR 
was developing its five-year risk reduction strategy.
The two long-established subregional mecha-
nisms in Central America and the Caribbean have 
adapted their cooperation and capacity-building to 
support Sendai Framework implementation. Within 
South America, the Andean member States have 
established a new mechanism. These are very posi-
tive developments, including as they do the member 
States in the region that are most exposed to 
hazards and disaster risk.
10.1.3 
Arab States
Historically, the Arab region has been exposed to 
seismic activity.68 More recently, it has faced chal-
lenges stemming from secondary risks linked to the 
displacement of people and migration trends, the 
spread of epidemics, food insecurity, conflict and 
civil unrest, rapid urbanization, environmental degra-
dation and water scarcity.69  
The Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2030 was adopted in January and subsequently 
endorsed by Heads of State in April 2018 at the 
Arab League Summit.70 The strategy is in align-
ment with the Sendai Framework and SDGs, and 
focuses on a multisectoral approach to substan-
tially reduce disaster risk in the Arab region by 
2030.71 It is essentially a framework to foster 
progress in core agreed areas of implementa-
tion, and to produce a detailed programme of 
work across three phases until 2030. These will 
be implemented with various levels of cooperation 
with humanitarian and development partners.72 
An Extraordinary Session of the Arab Coordination 
Mechanism for Disaster Risk Reduction adopted the 
Phase I programme of work in January 2018. 
A biennial matrix for 2019–2020 defining a road 
map of time-bound regional targets was also final-
ized and adopted as an outcome document of 
the 2018 Africa-Arab Platform. That platform also 
adopted the Tunis Declaration on Disaster Risk 
Reduction.73 
The League of Arab States (LAS) coordinates 
further action on implementation of the regional 
strategy. Together with its technical organizations, 
LAS mainstreams DRR measures into projects and 
technical assistance programmes across the Arab 
States. 
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10.1.4 
Asia and the Pacific 
The Asia–Pacific region is highly exposed to hydrometeorological hazards as well as geophysical and 
human-made hazards. Although economically mixed, it has a high proportion of lower-income and develop-
ing economies. Located within the “Pacific Ring of Fire”, many Asia–Pacific countries are confronted with 
persistent earthquake, tsunami and volcano risks.74 Hydrometeorological hazards, heightened by climate 
change, adversely affect social and economic development. The Asia–Pacific region tops the table in terms 
of frequency of occurrence and notwithstanding significant progress made in DRR, still accounts for half of 
the global disaster impacts with respect to mortality and affected people.75 It is therefore imperative to inte-
grate DRR measures across development programmes and sectors, as well as in CCA. 
The Prime Minister of Mongolia, Khurelsukh Ukhnaa, at the Asian Ministerial Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(Source: UNDRR)
68  (Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030 2018)
69  (Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030 2018)
70  (LAS 2018)
71  (Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030 2018)
72  (Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 2030 2018)
73  (AU 2018)
74  (APEC 2016)
75  (AMCDRR 2018)
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Asia
In June 2014, the sixth AMCDRR and IAP agreed 
to develop a regional plan for the post-2015 frame-
work. The Asia Regional Plan for Implementation of 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030 was then finalized and approved at the 
2016 AMCDRR in India. 
The Asia Regional Plan aims to provide: (a) broad 
policy direction to guide implementation of the 
Sendai Framework in the context of the 2030 
sustainable development agendas in the region; (b) 
a long-term road map, spanning the 15-year horizon 
of the Sendai Framework outlining a chronological 
pathway for implementation of priorities to achieve 
seven global targets; and (c) a two-year action 
plan with specific activities that are prioritized 
based on the long-term road map and in line with 
the policy direction.76 The plan emphasizes that 
it seeks to guide and support the national imple-
mentation of the Sendai Framework, not to replace 
national plans, and so it identifies priority regional 
activities “to support national and local actions, 
enhance exchange of good practice, knowledge 
and information among governments and stake-
holders, in addition to strengthening regional coop-
eration to support the implementation of the Sendai 
Framework.”
The first occasion to assess the implementa-
tion of the Asia Regional Plan came at the July 
2018 AMCDRR in Mongolia. A key outcome of that 
meeting was the current Action Plan 2018–2020. It 
highlights the main milestones to be realized as the 
creation of national platforms and national coor-
dination mechanisms for DRR, and the assimila-
tion of DRR in development plans. The action plan 
suggests enhancing the role of the Asia–Pacific 
Regional Coordination Mechanism to support coun-
tries in advancing implementation of the Sendai 
Framework.77 
Focusing on the economic development dimension, 
in 2015, APEC leaders formally adopted the APEC 
Disaster Risk Reduction Framework, centred on 
the phenomena of the “new normal”, which demon-
strates the rising frequency, scale and range of 
disasters and the ensuing disruption of interlinked 
production and supply chains.78 The framework is 
a blueprint for scaling up disaster-resilient econo-
mies focused on inclusive and sustainable develop-
ment. From this, the APEC Disaster Risk Reduction 
Action Plan was made to operationalize the APEC 
Framework, and was pledged in a 2015 Joint Minis-
terial Statement. Its purpose is to enhance coopera-
tion on DRR and it will be operationalized through 
APEC.79 The action plan comprises four DRR pillars, 
with specific areas for cooperation and activities, 
responsible partners, timelines and indicators. 
The key Asian subregional intergovernmental 
organizations have long-standing mechanisms 
for regional cooperation on “disaster manage-
ment”. While inconsistent with the terminology 
agreed by the OIEWG and endorsed by the United 
Nations General Assembly, disaster management 
is the preferred term in the region; it also encom-
passes elements of DRR, more often described as 
mitigation. 
The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster and Emer-
gency Management (AADMER) entered into force 
in 2009. Its ongoing workplans emphasize disaster 
preparedness and response and also mitigation, but 
are not specifically aligned with the Sendai Frame-
work.80 However, the new ASEAN agreement on 
economic cooperation, ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead 
Together, has a key objective to establish, “a resil-
ient community with enhanced capacity and capa-
bility to adapt and respond to social and economic 
vulnerabilities, disasters, climate change as well as 
emerging threats and challenges (12.4).”81 ASEAN 
and the United Nations have developed the ASEAN-
United Nations Joint Strategic Plan of Action on 
Disaster Management 2016–2020, the third itera-
tion of this action plan.82 Together, these three 
ASEAN plans take a highly integrated approach 
to regional development planning and disaster 
management. However, while Sendai Framework 
implementation is noted in the AADMER Workplan 
and the Joint Strategic Plan of Action as an area for 
cooperation in disaster prevention and mitigation, it 
is not a central part of these plans, which are largely 
focused on disaster preparedness and response, 
and economic development.
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The South Asian Association for Regional Coop-
eration (SAARC) also has a long-standing regional 
framework on disaster management,83 but so far 
has not agreed a specific mechanism to support 
member States’ implementation of the Sendai 
Framework.  
Pacific
The Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting in 2012 
agreed to develop a joint regional framework on 
climate change and DRM. This would supersede 
the two existing but distinct regional frameworks, 
namely the Pacific Islands Framework for Action 
on Climate Change and the Pacific Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Disaster Management Framework 
for Action, both of which concluded in 2015. 
As noted above, FRDP was then developed, and 
endorsed at the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders 
meeting in 2016.84 This is the first regional frame-
work of its kind. It provides high-level strategic guid-
ance to Member States and a range of different 
stakeholder groups on how to enhance resilience 
to climate change and disasters, in ways that also 
contribute to sustainable development. 
FRDP envisions a developed and sustainable future 
for the Pacific region’s people, societies, econo-
mies, cultures and natural environments. It calls 
for significant collaborative efforts from local and 
regional stakeholders to reduce carbon-based 
economic development, unplanned urbanization, 
destruction of ecosystems, poverty, inequality, insti-
tutional and capacity constraints, and fragmented 
action to strengthen resilience and sustainability 
and protect development gains. 
FRDP is not prescriptive; rather, it suggests a set of 
priority actions to be used as appropriate by multi-
stakeholder groups. Specific actions lean towards 
regional implementation, while others require 
further articulation at national level to ensure that 
context-specific priorities and needs are met.85  
In 2018, at their meeting in Nauru, the Pacific 
Islands Forum Leaders reaffirmed their commit-
ment to FRDP, recognizing “the value and impor-
tance of a multisectoral approach to addressing 
climate change and its impacts. Leaders acknowl-
edged the establishment of a regional risk gover-
nance arrangement through the Pacific Resilience 
Partnership and the Pacific Resilience Partnership 
Taskforce.”86  
To support implementation of FRDP and the overall 
integration of risk governance agenda, the Pacific 
Resilience Partnership was established by Pacific 
leaders in 2017 for an initial trial period of two 
years. The partnership works to strengthen coordi-
nation and collaboration and has four main compo-
nents that make up its governance structure: (a) a 
task force made up of 15 constituent groups (five 
positions for countries and territories, five for civil 
society and private sector, and five for regional 
organizations and development partners); (b) a 
support unit to support effective functioning of the 
task force; (c) a technical working group to support 
implementation of the three goals of FRDP; and (d) 
a Pacific resilience meeting that consolidates exist-
ing regional meetings focused on climate change, 
disaster response, preparedness and risk reduction 
and opens the door to stronger engagement with 
the wider development community.
76  (AMCDRR 2016)
77  (United Nations General Assembly 2018a)
78  (APEC 2016)
79  (APEC 2016)
80  (ASEAN 2005); (ASEAN 2016a)
81  (ASEAN Secreteriat 2015)
82  (ASEAN 2016b)
83  (SAARC 2007); (SAARC Environment Ministers 2006)
84  (SPC 2016)
85  (SPC 2016)
86  (DFAT 2018)
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10.1.5 
Europe and Central Asia
Much l ike other regions, Europe is exposed 
to a broad range of natural hazards such as 
earthquakes, drought, floods, storms, wildfire, 
avalanches and landslides, which persistently result 
in economic and human losses, as well as a range 
of technological hazards. In contradiction to its 
regional capacity, awareness of natural hazards 
and the existing knowledge base on DRR, data indi-
cates that vulnerability to region-specific hazards is 
mounting. 
EU DRM policies have laid the groundwork to imple-
ment some of the Sendai Framework recommenda-
tions, including those on ongoing civil protection, 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid 
action.87 For DRR within its civil protection system: 
“The EU’s modus operandi in the field of DRR is 
very much the EU’s footprint: it gathers its member 
States around a common policy, shows challenges 
that are shared by all the member States, points 
out that there is the need to solve these challenges 
together, and provides a set of answers in the form 
of guidelines, financial support, exchange of knowl-
edge and experiences at national level.”88  
The European Forum for Disaster Risk Reduction 
Roadmap 2015–2020 was developed to guide 
Europe’s implementation of the four priorities 
of action and seven global targets of the Sendai 
Framework, with the two identified priority areas 
of: (a) development or review of national- and local-
level strategies for DRR, in line with Target E of the 
Sendai Framework, based on the building blocks of 
risk assessments and disaster loss databases and 
(b) integration of DRR into different sectors, espe-
cially climate change and the environment.89  
For its part, the EC has adopted the “Sendai Frame-
work for Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plan 
[2016–2020]: A disaster risk-informed approach 
for all EU policies” to foster implementation of the 
Sendai Framework and other international agree-
ments by supporting inclusion in EU policies. The 
action plan identifies, under each key area, a set of 
measures that could underpin a more integrated 
risk-informed policy landscape in the EU.90 The 
key action plan implementation areas include: (a) 
building risk knowledge in EU policies, (b) using an 
all-of-society approach in DRM, (c) promoting EU 
risk-informed investments and (d) supporting the 
development of a holistic DRM approach.
The second CASC Sub Regional Platform held 
in 2018 had a subregional focus on DRR inte-
grated with development planning.91 The platform 
approved a Plan of Action,92 a Roadmap for Cities93 
and the Yerevan Declaration containing political 
commitments to implement the Sendai Framework. 
The declaration has a focus on reaching Target E by 
2020, but aims to do so “in coherence with the 2030 
Development Agenda including the Paris Agree-
ment on climate change, NUA and other relevant 
instruments, and to recognize the importance of 
engaging with local governments to implement and 
invest in DRR.”94  
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10.2 
National enabling 
environments for 
integrated risk reduction 
The subsequent chapters of this part focus on 
Member State practice in developing and imple-
menting risk reduction strategies and plans at 
national and local levels, how these are estab-
lished, how they interact with planning for devel-
opment and CCA, and how they operate in urban 
settings and fragile contexts. This approach, 
and the extensive use of national and local case 
studies, recognizes that Member States have the 
primary role in implementing the Sendai Frame-
work, the 2030 Agenda and the other post-2015 
agreements. Before addressing the plans and 
strategies, it is useful to highlight some aspects of 
national systems of government, law, culture and 
risk perception that can either enable or hinder risk 
reduction, and therefore the development and effec-
tive implementation of such plans. It is not possible 
to discuss these with any specificity at a global 
level, given the unique character of each country’s 
sociopolitical and physical environment and risk 
profile. However, some key national factors are 
identified in the Sendai Framework, as they were 
also in HFA, that are larger than the specific targets 
and indicators and yet are also necessary enablers 
to achieve those targets.
The targets and priorities of the Sendai Framework 
emphasize the importance of understanding risk 
better, by improving risk information through moni-
toring, assessing, mapping and sharing (para. 14).95 
Priority for action 1 on understanding disaster risk 
brings this into focus as a fundamental aspect of 
reducing risk and preventing risk creation (paras. 
21–25). Also reiterated throughout the Sendai 
Framework, continuing strongly from HFA, is the 
importance of “strengthening disaster risk gover-
nance and coordination across relevant institutions 
and sectors and the full and meaningful participa-
tion of relevant stakeholders at appropriate levels” 
(para. 14). This is a concept captured more fully 
under Priority for action 2 on strengthening disas-
ter risk governance to manage disaster risk (paras. 
26–28). These two aspects of the Sendai Frame-
work require constant interaction between the 
creation of information and its use to reduce risk 
across all of society, including that which accrues 
to the most vulnerable, and with the participation 
of relevant stakeholders. These are the aspects of 
the Sendai Framework most relevant to enabling 
the development of well-informed national and local 
DRR strategies and plans as required by Target E, 
and to implementing them effectively.
Two other principles that run through the Sendai 
Framework need a mention in this context. The 
first is the issue of integration with the other post-
2015 global agendas. This is not for the sake of 
conceptual neatness, but because the international 
community expressed through this and the other 
global agreements, the realization that integrated 
risk reduction and management, or a systems-
based approach, is the only way to attain sustain-
able development in the face of disaster risk and 
climate change. The second is the issue of gender 
equality, more specifically empowering women in 
DRR, along with the broader notion of inclusiveness 
of people of all ages and abilities, as essential to 
understanding risk, risk perceptions and involving 
the whole community in deciding how to manage 
and reduce risk effectively. Youth and women 
87  (EC 2016)
88  (Morsut 2019)
89  (EFDRR 2016)
90  (EC 2016)
91  (UNISDR 2018a)
92  (Plan of Action Implementation of the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Central Asia and 
South Caucasus Region 2016)
93  (UNISDR 2015a)
94  (Yerevan Declaration 2018)
95  (United Nations 2015a)
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become more of a focus when considering the 
Sendai Framework in light of the other agendas and 
the issues they address – SDG 5 on gender equal-
ity and women’s empowerment for instance – and a 
heightened awareness of the need for intergenera-
tional equity in responding to climate change and 
preventing the types of shocks that can have such a 
damaging and long-lasting impact on the health and 
well-being, education and employment opportuni-
ties of young people.
10.2.1 
Legal and institutional frameworks for 
disaster risk reduction and development
Risk reduction strategies and plans, reduction of 
risk in development planning and governmental 
support for CCA do not occur in a vacuum. Insti-
tutional responsibility for developing, resourc-
ing, implementing and being accountable for the 
Workshop in Antigua and Barbuda 
(Source: UNDRR)
effectiveness of such strategies and plans is almost 
invariably set out in government laws, decrees 
and rules at national and local levels. Indeed, the 
specialist institutions for DRM and CCA are often 
created by legislation, or where they are part of 
ministerial mandates, they are subject to rules and 
policies made under the relevant legislation.96 
Member States do not generally establish legisla-
tion for DRR alone, and such an initiative would now 
run counter to the Sendai Framework’s approach 
to integrated risk reduction, as well as to the 
emerging understanding of systemic risk eluci-
dated in Chapter 2 of this GAR. DRR mandates are 
embedded within broader frameworks for DRR 
and management, and, importantly, in a range of 
sectoral laws that are not widely understood as 
risk management frameworks. These include: 
land zoning and land-use planning; building codes; 
environmental protection and anti-pollution laws, 
including environmental impact assessments of 
development projects; water resource management; 
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96    (IFRC and UNDP 2014b)
97    (IFRC and UNDP 2014b)
98    (IFRC and UNDP 2014a)
99    (IFRC 2016a)
100  (ADPC 2017b)
101  (IFRC 2017)
102  (IFRC 2015); (IFRC 2016b)
103  (Neumayer and Plumper 2007)
104  (Nishikiori et al. 2006) 
105  (Santos-Burgoa et al. 2018)
solid and liquid waste management; and fisher-
ies, wildlife and forests. In other words, relevant 
legal frameworks exist for almost all elements of 
the wider risk scope of the Sendai Framework. The 
nature of these mandates, the institutions they 
establish, the resources allocated, and the way they 
communicate and work together as a system, are 
the essential infrastructure for effective risk gover-
nance to address systemic risk.97  
Research shows that there are few cross-sectoral 
linkages, and often few opportunities for non-govern-
mental stakeholders to participate in risk gover-
nance through public institutions. Yet, these are 
fundamental to either enabling or creating barriers to 
effective and participatory risk management strate-
gies at national and local levels. There is extensive 
research and practical tools available to Member 
States wishing to undertake assessments of their 
legal frameworks for effective DRR,98  including many 
specific country case studies.99 Further analysis 
is available for particular focus areas, such as the 
legal and institutional enabling environment for SME 
disaster resilience in Asia, which considers the exist-
ing and additional needs for integration in the areas 
of DRM, CCA and business development.100
10.2.2 
Inclusion and equality
The Sendai Framework calls for a people-centred, 
inclusive and non-discriminatory approach to DRR 
that pays special attention to people dispropor-
tionately affected by disasters. It specifically notes 
the importance of involving “women, children 
and youth, persons with disabilities, poor people, 
migrants, indigenous peoples … and older persons 
in the design and implementation of policies, plans 
and standards.” (Para. 7).
It is well established that through direct and indi-
rect losses to infrastructure, livelihoods and oppor-
tunities, disasters compromise the capabilities of 
communities to lead a dignified life and realize their 
aspirations. They undermine sustainable oppor-
tunities for development. Inclusion of all relevant 
stakeholders and principles of equality are there-
fore essential to understand the way these systemic 
risks affect different groups within the population, 
and what to do about it. DRR needs to take account 
of a range of socioeconomic sources of vulner-
ability, including age (children, youth and older 
persons), disability, ethnicity, poverty, and in circum-
stances of gender inequality, women as a group. 
Gender equality and empowerment 
Women as a group are not intrinsically vulnerable, 
but differentiated gender roles and gender inequal-
ity have shown that disasters often have greater 
socioeconomic impacts on women than on men,101 
as well as higher risk of GBV.102 In some contexts, 
women have higher rates of death and injury,103  as 
observed in some populations affected by the 2004 
Asian tsunami.104 This can however be very cultur-
ally and context specific (e.g. in Hurricane Maria 
in Puerto Rico, men over the age of 65 had the 
highest mortality).105 An essential step in ensuring 
effective risk reduction is to engage women so that 
their experience of risk is a default input to global, 
regional, national and local strategies for risk reduc-
tion, sustainable development and climate change. 
This is recognized in the Sendai Framework, and in 
greater detail in the 2030 Agenda through SDG 5 on 
gender equality and women’s empowerment. These 
goals are to be realized through increasing women’s 
participation and decision-making roles in the rele-
vant institutions and processes.
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SDG 5 aims to “to achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls.”106 Target 5.5 of SDG 
5 is to “Ensure women’s full and effective partici-
pation and equal opportunities for leadership at 
all levels of decision-making in political, economic 
and public life.” Its achievement will be measured 
by the quantitative indicators of: the proportion of 
seats held by women in national parliaments and 
local governments, and the proportion of women in 
managerial positions.107 National governments and 
legislatures are, of course, free to set higher targets; 
indeed, many do set targets on women’s participa-
tion in government administration through their 
national development plans, but they also need to 
develop ways to implement them. 
In light of SDG 5, the Regional Asia-Pacific Confer-
ence on Gender and Disaster Risk Reduction issued 
clear recommendations – the Ha Noi Recommen-
dations – on implementing the Sendai Framework 
to promote gender equality.108 Of particular rele-
vance to risk governance, law and policy, the confer-
ence recommended that governments: 
Finally, the recommendations emphasize the need 
to “institutionalize” the leadership of women and 
diverse groups in disaster preparedness, response, 
recovery and reconstruction, and propose that at 
least 40% of the composition of national and local 
mechanisms responsible for developing disaster 
preparedness, response and recovery decisions 
must be made up of “women and diverse groups”.109 
The careful analysis of the Sendai Framework by 
the Ha Noi Recommendations applying the lens 
of SDG 5, gives Member States some practical 
options to address representation of women in 
developing national and local risk reduction strate-
gies, and to engage women in needs assessments. 
Both these elements can provide a fuller picture of 
the systemic risks faced by women due to gender 
inequality. Recognition of the differentiated impact 
of disasters and targeted actions is a prerequisite 
for an inclusive approach.
Protection of children and participation of 
young people
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this GAR, disasters 
affect individuals in different ways at different 
stages of their life cycle with compounding effects. 
While being a child does not define vulnerability, the 
ability of children and young people to cope when 
risk is realized can often be surpassed. Children 
are at increased risk of being separated from their 
parents, family members or carers during disasters; 
the cause of deep distress, such separation can 
have a severe and long-lasting negative effects on 
mental health and development. Unaccompanied 
and separated children may face greater risks to 
certain threats; threats that may include abduction, 
trafficking, sale, illegal adoption, sexual and GBV 
(including child prostitution and child marriage), 
physical violence and neglect have all  been 
observed in the aftermath of disasters.110 Having 
risk reduction strategies that incorporate aspects 
of child protection can help to prevent and mitigate 
some of these impacts on children. 
Children’s vulnerability profiles in the aftermath 
of a disaster are often correlated with increased 
• Seek to understand risk, including by mandat-
ing up-to-date national and local statistics 
disaggregated by sex, age and disability, as 
well as developing socioeconomic baselines to 
inform gender-responsive DRR;
• Conduct gender analysis of disaster risk to 
inform national and local policies, strategies 
and plans; 
• Implement strong laws that mandate women’s 
par ticipation and leadership in decision-
making and also create accountability for their 
implementation; 
• Invest in social protection and social services 
that reduce gender inequali ty and other 
inequalities and enable at- risk groups of 
women and men to mitigate disaster risks and 
adapt to climate change; 
• Implement security and protection interven-
tions led by women to reduce current risks 
and prevent creation of new risks arising from 
gender-based discrimination and violence.  
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111  (UNICEF 2017) 
112  (UNICEF 2015)
113  (HelpAge International 2012) 
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115  (Handicap International 2015)
116  (Guadagno 2017)
117  (United Nations General Assembly 2014a)
risk of disease and malnutrition, which may trigger 
interruption of schooling trajectories, ill-developed 
social and cognitive skills. These are highly likely 
to affect their capabilities to attain the skills neces-
sary to achieve their full earning potential, and in 
turn send their children to school, etc. Worldwide 
evidence highlights that persistence of inequity 
in enrolment, attendance, learning outcomes and 
achievement based on gender, poverty, exposure to 
natural hazards, etc., are all determining factors in 
defining which children attend what kind of school 
and for how long.111 In addition, malnutrition in early 
childhood is likely to impair cognition; children who 
do not complete primary school are likely to earn 
less money in their first job than those with higher 
levels of education. In essence, children who are 
forced to drop out of school at an early stage, or 
who never enrol in school, will likely never attain the 
skills required for them to achieve their full earning 
potential. 
The needs and interest of young adults are also of 
concern in the broader post-2015 agendas, particu-
larly considering the potential impacts of climate 
change.112 Climate change, sustainable develop-
ment and disaster risk all raise the compelling issue 
of how to ensure intergenerational equity. Engage-
ment with young adults and ensuring they are repre-
sented in planning and decision-making processes 
on risk reduction are important elements in ensur-
ing their futures.
Groups with limited mobility and access to 
information
Very young children, older persons with limited mobil-
ity113 and people with disabilities and their carers 
(most of whom are women) can be at a significant 
disadvantage in disaster situations.114  Physical 
mobility issues can reduce their capacity to evacu-
ate. Invisible disabilities such as hearing or sight 
impairment and intellectual disabilities can reduce 
people’s capacity to receive and understand risk 
reduction education, participate in drills, early 
warning and evacuation instructions, as well as 
to move around in chaotic circumstances.115 Prior 
planning, preparedness and risk reduction for these 
groups should be undertaken in a participatory 
fashion with the persons concerned or their advo-
cates, to ensure that their needs are considered in 
advance, and that plans and strategies are effec-
tively inclusive. 
Access for the poorest and most marginalized 
groups
Other groups – that are commonly marginalized in 
community DRR, as well as during disasters – also 
have diverse skills and knowledge to contribute in 
planning for risk reduction. These include: migrants, 
who may have limited knowledge of local hazards, 
institutions and services and may not have social 
and family support networks, but may also bring 
new knowledge and skills from previous experi-
ences;116 indigenous peoples, who may be socially 
or economically marginalized, but also hold tradi-
tional knowledge of relevance to risk reduction;117 
and the very poorest people, who may be housed in 
poor quality dwellings or informal settlements, but 
may also have developed numerous individual and 
communal survival and organizing skills.
The central message from the Sendai Framework 
on these issues is that equality and effectiveness 
in risk reduction is reached through inclusion of all 
stakeholders. When certain groups are omitted, the 
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strategies and plans that ensue are often less effec-
tive. Ignoring or omitting the acquired experience of 
risk and disaster impacts of such groups, can result 
in impacts that are unequal, even discriminatory. 
Inclusion and empowerment of women, vulner-
able groups, people with disabilities and socially 
marginalized people within national frameworks of 
law, policy and institutions underpin effective risk 
reduction and uphold the all-of-society tenets of the 
Sendai Framework and “leave no one behind” prin-
ciple of the 2030 Agenda.
10.3 
Conclusions 
Regional and national frameworks are important 
aspects of the enabling environment for successful 
risk reduction by Member States.
Regional intergovernmental organizations, regional 
platforms on DRR and new forms of partnership 
within global regions allow Member States and 
other stakeholders to pool resources and capaci-
ties to support national and local risk reduction. 
They also provide mechanisms to focus on specific 
regional risks. The foregoing account indicates a 
high degree of engagement and activity at regional 
level to support implementation of the Sendai 
Framework. These processes are now at the stage, 
with strategies and mechanisms in place, where 
the focus can shift to practical support to Member 
States’ efforts in implementation, supplemented by 
regional and cross-border risk reduction efforts.
The primary responsibility for Sendai Framework 
implementation lies with the Member States. 
The broader national framework of laws, policies 
and institutions for risk reduction, development 
and action on climate change have a significant 
impact on States’ ability to formulate and imple-
ment national and local strategies and plans on 
DRR, development and CCA. Such overarching 
frameworks are key in empowering and including 
all stakeholders, establishing the basis for gender 
equality, and for including people and groups more 
exposed and more vulnerable to disaster impacts 
than the wider population. 
The legislative, policy and institutional structures 
and processes that include the views and experi-
ences of women and girls, people with disabilities, 
older persons, and for example, people from differ-
ent ethnic or religious backgrounds, and which 
include protection measures for children, result in 
measures at national and local levels that allow a 
more equal and more effective reduction of risk.
These enabling frameworks can be understood 
as central components of national and local plans 
for DRR, development, CCA and the emerging inte-
grated approaches to risk reduction, which are 
discussed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 11: 
National and local 
disaster risk reduction 
strategies and plans 
The development of national and local DRR strategies and plans by 2020 is a dedicated target in the 
Sendai Framework (Target E). Compared with the other global targets, which are due by the end of the 
agreement in 2030, the 2020 deadline for DRR strategies and plans was established in recognition of their 
importance as enablers to reduce disaster risk and loss. This chapter complements the Sendai Framework 
monitoring data reported in Part II with examples of the challenges, lessons learned and emerging good 
practices at country level.
11.1 
Sendai Framework 
monitoring data 
on Target E 
As discussed in Part II above, the Sendai Frame-
work monitoring system shows that 47 Member 
States reported on Target E in 2017 in relation to 
national strategies (Indicator E-1). This is a signifi-
cant increase compared with 27 countries in 2016, 
but at 25% of the total falls well short of what is 
required by 2020. Of these, 6 countries reported that 
they have national DRR strategies in comprehen-
sive alignment with the Sendai Framework, while 
16 reported substantial-to-comprehensive align-
ment, 15 moderate-to-substantial alignment, and 
7 moderate alignment; 3 of the 47 reported limited 
or no alignment. However, using other sources of 
State self-reporting in addition to the formal SFM, 
the number is much higher. One hundred and three 
countries report having a national DRR strategy 
at some level of alignment, including 65 Member 
States that rated their alignment as above 50% 
(moderate to complete).118 This number is much 
more significant as it represents more than 50% 
of the United Nations Member States (Chapter 8 
Target E: Progress on disaster risk reduction strate-
gies for 2020. Indicator E-1).
118  (United Nations General Assembly 2018a)
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Target E also has an indicator on local strate-
gies (Indicator E-2). It requires countries to report 
on the proportion of their local governments that 
have local DRR strategies. SFM indicates that 42 
countries reported on local strategies. Of these, 18 
reported that all their local governments have local 
strategies aligned with their national such strate-
gies, and 7 reported no local strategies (or none 
aligned with their national strategies) (Chapter 8 
Target E: Progress on disaster risk reduction strate-
gies for 2020. Indicator E-2).
Although the data on Target E thus remains 
partial, it indicates attention to the issue of align-
ing national and local DRR strategies and plans 
with the Sendai Framework, as well as suggesting 
there is still some way to go to meet this target by 
2020. That said, it is also important to recognize 
that these indicators are not designed to provide 
detail on the challenges countries face and what 
innovations and good practices they are developing 
to create the right enabling environment to reduce 
risk along the way to meeting the target. The essen-
tial purpose of asking for national and local strate-
gies to be developed and implemented in alignment 
with the Sendai Framework is to create the optimal 
enabling environment to enable the wide range of 
risks addressed in the Sendai Framework to be 
reduced. It is therefore important to look at the 
ways countries have tackled this issue.
11.2 
The importance of 
national and local 
disaster risk reduction 
strategies and plans 
National and local DRR strategies and plans 
are essential for implementing and monitor-
ing a country’s risk reduction priorities by setting 
implementation milestones, establishing the key 
roles and responsibilities of government and non-
government actors, and identifying technical and 
financial resources.119 While strategies are a central 
element of a wider disaster risk governance system, 
to effectively implement policy, these strategies 
need to be supported by a well-coordinated institu-
tional architecture, legislative mandates, political 
buy-in of decision makers, and human and financial 
capacities at all levels of society. 
The Sendai Framework does not require countries 
to develop stand-alone DRR strategies and plans. 
However, it does ensure they have in place and 
implement national and local plans that do the job 
of supporting DRR in alignment with the Sendai 
Framework. Although there has been debate in 
the past about the merits of stand-alone or main-
streamed DRR strategies, in practice, this binary 
notion is not especially helpful in applying the 
Sendai Framework requirements. Under Priority 2: 
Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage 
disaster risk, paragraph 27(a) highlights the need to 
“mainstream and integrate DRR within and across 
all sectors and review and promote the coher-
ence and further development, as appropriate, of 
national and local frameworks of laws, regulations 
and public policies.” Paragraph 27(b) then advises 
Member States to “adopt and implement national 
and local DRR strategies and plans, across differ-
ent timescales, with targets, indicators and time 
frames, aimed at preventing the creation of risk, the 
reduction of existing risk and the strengthening of 
economic, social, health and environmental resil-
ience.” Paragraph 27(b) highlights the importance 
context in defining strategies and plans, and the 
significance of developing of nationally-determined 
targets and indicators by 2020. Paragraph 27(a) 
identifies the fundamental role of strategies and 
plans in achieving the goal of the Sendai Framework 
by 2030. This suggests that the precise form that a 
country chooses to pursue DRR at a strategic level 
is less important than the content and effectiveness 
of the strategies and plans in that country context.  
In some cases, risk reduction may be integrated 
into broader national policy planning or sectoral 
risk management plans and strategies; indeed, this 
316 Chapter 11
119  (UNISDR 2015e) 
120  (UNDP 2019o) 
121  (IFRC and UNDP 2014b); (IFRC and UNDP 2014a)
could meet the goal of integrating risk manage-
ment and development planning. In contexts where 
awareness of DRR is emerging, stand-alone DRR 
strategies and plans can be used as an important 
advocacy tool to sensitize decision makers to take 
specific actions.120 But such strategies and plans 
should have among their objectives the integration 
of DRR into mid- and long-term planning processes, 
including climate risk management where these 
areas overlap. 
In many country contexts, stand-alone DRR strate-
gies and plans are needed because their objectives 
are not automatically addressed through national 
development or sectoral policy frameworks, or even 
within the systems established to manage disaster 
risk, many of which have traditionally focused atten-
tion and resources on response.121 This is often, 
though not necessarily, the case in countries with 
lower governance capacity where DRR strategies 
and plans compensate for risk management gaps 
in development or sectoral policies. 
Clearly it is easier to point to and assess a single 
strategy, but this can also be in the form of a frame-
work for integrated risk governance across sectors 
and ministries, addressing climate resilience and 
risk-informed socioeconomic development. In line 
with the Sendai Framework and 2030 Agenda, either 
mainstreamed or stand-alone risk reduction strat-
egies should extend beyond the systems of civil 
protection or DRM and also include elements that 
are highly cross-sectoral in nature, such as urban risk 
management, land-use planning, river basin manage-
ment, financial protection, public investment resil-
ience regulations, preparedness and early warning, 
which cannot be addressed comprehensively 
through any individual sectoral strategy or plan. 
Figure 11.1. DRR strategies and plans by 2020 aligned with the Sendai Framework and among national and local levels
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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DRR strategies, whether stand-alone, mainstreamed 
or a combination of both approaches, may also 
have a role in tempering market mechanisms, 
requiring public policy to address issues related to 
DRR as a “public good”. Public goods are under-
provided by the market, are non-excludable and 
create externalities.122 For example, individuals and 
communities may not construct sufficiently robust 
levees if they do not consider that their flood protec-
tion could help others, instead constructing levees 
that protect themselves only, which may even have 
a negative impact on those who live outside the 
embankments.123  
Having in place subnational and local DRR strate-
gies or plans that complement the national policy 
framework has been increasingly recognized over 
the past two decades as an important require-
ment of a functioning risk governance system. The 
implementation of national DRR strategies hinges 
on the ability to translate and adapt the national 
priorities to local realities and needs. Local strate-
gies or plans then allow for a much more nuanced 
territorial approach (local, subnational and national) 
that fosters accountability through direct engage-
ment with a range of stakeholders who need to be 
involved to avoid creating new risk, to reduce risk 
behaviours or to have a voice as the main groups 
suffering the impacts of disaster events.124 The 
penetration of DRR strategies or plans down to the 
local level is likely to depend on the level of practi-
cal decentralization, while the formal structure of 
government – centralized or federal – may or may 
not be a critical factor depending on the country 
context.125 As risk is not confined to any territorial 
or political division, it is also critical that DRR strate-
gies or plans consider transboundary and regional 
solutions, such as basin- or ecosystems-based 
management, or arrangements that comprise multi-
ple local government territories.
11.3 
Aligning strategies 
and plans with the 
Sendai Framework
The Sendai Framework calls on national and local 
governments to adopt and implement these strate-
gies and plans, across different timescales, and to 
include targets, indicators and time frames. They 
should aim to prevent the creation of risk, reduce 
existing risk and strengthen economic, social, 
health and environmental resilience. Importantly, 
Target E has also been reflected in two SDG indica-
tors: (a) number of countries that adopt and imple-
ment national DRR strategies in line with the Sendai 
Framework and (b) proportion of local governments 
that adopt and implement local DRR strategies in 
line with national DRR strategies.126 
The Sendai Framework suggests several require-
ments to be covered by DRR strategies, and these 
have been distilled into 10 criteria for monitoring 
(Box 11.1). 
It is assumed that DRR strategies and plans that 
meet all 10 requirements will create the best condi-
tions to substantially reduce disaster risk and 
losses in lives, livelihoods, health, economic, physi-
cal, social, cultural and environmental assets. While 
all 10 criteria are important, a few stand out in 
terms of what is considered “new” about the Sendai 
Framework and its contribution to the global DRR 
policy agenda. These include a stronger focus on 
preventing the creation and accumulation of new 
risk, reducing existing risk, building the resilience of 
sectors, recovery, building back better and promot-
ing policy coherence with SDGs and the Paris 
Agreement. 
Policy coherence requires that national and local 
plans are aligned and designed for the context of 
the society and environment as defined by relevant 
hazards, high-priority risks and socioeconomic 
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Box 11.1. Drawing from the Sendai Framework, the following 10 key elements should be 
covered by DRR strategies to be considered in alignment with the Sendai Framework
122  (Wilkinson, Steller and Bretton 2019); (Dianat et al. 2019) 
123  (Wilkinson, Steller and Bretton 2019) 
124  (Quental Coutinho, Henrique and Lucena 2019)
125  (Wilkinson et al. 2014)
126  (United Nations General Assembly 2017c)
127  (UNISDR 2017d)
setting. Hence, the selection of risk reduction 
targets and the balance of different types of 
measures will be situation specific and will also 
depend on the risk perception and risk tolerance 
of the society represented by decision makers.127 
However, making a mere reference to other relevant 
policies and strategies is not sufficient to meet 
this requirement. Done in earnest, establishing 
policy coherence depends on identifying common 
actions and instruments in support of shared policy 
(Source: UNDRR 2018)
objectives to reduce disaster risk or vulnerabilities, 
or to build resilience. 
The 10 criteria recommended for assessing DRR 
strategies and plans against the Sendai Frame-
work requirements are intended to ensure some 
consistency. But when the strategies or plans that 
have been endorsed since 2015 are compared, it is 
apparent that there is no “one size fits all”. Depend-
ing on the national or local country context, DRR 
i. Have different timescales, with targets, 
indicators and time frames
ii. Have aims at preventing the creation of 
risk
iii. Have aims at reducing existing risk
iv. Have aims at strengthening economic, 
social, health and environmental resilience
v. Address the recommendations of Priority 
1, Understanding disaster risk: Based 
on risk knowledge and assessments to 
identify risks at the local and national 
levels of the technical, financial and 
administrative DRM capacity
vi. Address the recommendations of Priority 
2, Strengthening disaster risk governance 
to manage disaster risk: Mainstream 
and integrate DRR within and across 
al l  sectors with defining roles and 
responsibilities
vii. Address the recommendations of Priority 
3, Investing in DRR for resilience: Guide to 
allocation of the necessary resources at 
all levels of administration for the devel-
opment and the implementation of DRR 
strategies in all relevant sectors
viii. Address the recommendations of Priority 
4, Enhancing disaster preparedness for 
effective response and to “Build Back 
Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction: Strengthen disaster 
preparedness for response and integrate 
DRR response preparedness and devel-
opment measures to make nations and 
communities resilient to disasters
ix. Promote policy coherence relevant to DRR 
such as sustainable development, poverty 
eradication and climate change, notably 
with SDGs and the Paris Agreement
x. Have mechanisms to follow-up, periodi-
cally assess and publicly report on 
progress.
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strategies can take a range of formats. Some coun-
tries pursue them as stand-alone DRR strategies, 
and others take the route of a system of strategies 
across sectors linked by an overarching document 
or framework. There is also a wide range of differ-
ent strategic and hazard- or sector-specific plans in 
place, for example: 
The titles that countries select for their Sendai 
Framework aligned DRR strategies or plans can be 
revealing. While in some instances these may indi-
cate context specificity and national priority, taken 
together they suggest greater similarity and conver-
gence as compared with their predecessors under 
the HFA. For example: Master Plan for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (Mozambique); Joint Action Plan 
on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction 
(Tonga); National DRM Plan or Strategy (Argentina, 
Colombia, Georgia, Madagascar and Thailand); 
Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction (Myanmar); 
National Disaster Risk Management Framework 
(Zimbabwe); or National Strategy for Disaster 
Prevention, Response and Mitigation (Viet Nam). 
HFA equivalents often used language related to civil 
protection, preparedness and emergency manage-
ment even though they addressed elements of 
DRR – Burkina Faso, Canada, Dominican Republic, 
Kyrgyzstan and Mali for example. Consequently, the 
title of the policy, strategy or plan may not be a true 
indicator of the degree to which disaster or climate 
risk reduction are addressed.
11.4 
Lessons learned from 
the Hyogo Framework 
for Action and 
Sendai Framework 
While the Sendai Framework monitoring require-
ments for Target E set high standards for assess-
ing compliance, there are also other criteria that 
viable DRR strategies or plans need to meet to 
achieve results. These observations are derived 
from country-level experiences, mostly during the 
HFA implementation period, since such information 
on recently endorsed strategies under the Sendai 
Framework is not yet available. 
Country experience suggests that there needs to 
be room for flexibility to adjust, evolve and adapt 
to changing contexts and priorities for strategies 
or plans to remain relevant and implementable. 
Hence, regular revisions and updates are strongly 
recommended. In particular, this relates to the 
activity level, where real-world changes need to be 
• In Norway, the National Disaster Risk Reduction 
Strategy is outlined in the Civil Protection and 
Emergency Planning White Paper128  
• In the Russian Federation, the National Disas-
ter Risk Reduction Strategy forms part of the 
national security strategy129  
• In Luxembourg, which does not have a sepa-
rate national strategy, DRR strategies are in 
place in specific sectors, as part of one or more 
combined strategies, such as with respect to 
flood risk management130  
• In Kenya, the National Disaster Risk Manage-
ment  Pol icy 131 is  complemented by the 
Kenya Vision 2030 Sector Plan for Drought 
R isk  Management  and Ending  Drought 
Emergencies132  
• In Angola, a twofold approach is adopted with 
a Strategic National Plan for Prevention and 
Disaster Risk Management, covering three of 
the Sendai Framework’s global priorities, and a 
National Preparedness, Contingency, Response 
and Recovery Plan, which covers the Sendai 
Framework’s fourth global priority
• In Costa Rica, it was decided to align to the 
Sendai Framework through the adoption of a 
National Risk Management Policy 2016–2030 
that provides a broad multisectoral mandate 
and is complemented by five-year National Risk 
Management Plans
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133  (UNDP 2019l)
134  (Chakrabarti 2019); (Djalante et al. 2017); (Daly et al. 2019); 
(UNDP 2019g)
135  (Bangladesh, Ministry of Disaster Management and 
Relief 2017); (Sri Lanka, Disaster Management Centre, Minis-
try of Disaster Management 2017); (Omoyo Nyandiko and 
Omondi Rakama 2019)
136  (Twigg 2015); (Wilkinson et al. 2017)
137  (IFRC and UNDP 2014b); (Sands 2019) 
reflected, such as in the case of making the switch 
from printed hazard maps to online information 
systems, as in Tajikistan.133 In addition, implementa-
tion needs to be supported by financial and techni-
cal resources, and operational guidelines and tools 
that are commensurate with the available capaci-
ties and skills of those involved. 
Implementation also benefits from having subna-
tional and local strategies or plans in place that are 
linked with national DRR and development policy 
priorities. Good examples of this practice are known 
in India, Indonesia and Mozambique.134  Implemen-
tation plans at different scales of governance can 
be either stand-alone, as in Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, 
or they can be integrated into local development 
plans as in Kenya.135 In some instances, countries 
pursue a hybrid solution where subnational DRR 
plans exist in parallel with local development plans 
that integrate risk considerations, as the below case 
study from Mozambique shows. 
With regard to the process of drafting or developing 
DRR strategies or plans, there are now increasing 
calls for them to be grounded in a comprehensive 
“theory of change” that allows for a better under-
standing about how beneficial, long-term change 
happens. This means that strategies and plans 
are produced through a process of reflection and 
dialogue among stakeholders, through which ideas 
about change are discussed alongside underlying 
assumptions of how and why change might happen 
as an outcome of different initiatives.136  
The involvement of multiple stakeholders is already 
a key principle of the Sendai Framework, and 
essential when it comes to seeking agreement on 
and setting the DRR priorities at different levels 
of government. Ensuring active participation of 
women, persons with disabilities, youth and other 
groups who may not automatically have a seat at 
the table is a prerequisite for ensuring that their 
needs are addressed, and their specific knowledge 
and skills accessed. Calls for the recognition of the 
right to participate in DRM decision-making, in line 
with the right to self-determination and access to 
information, are becoming more frequent.137 This 
will also require an understanding of the incentives, 
interests, institutions and power relations facing 
key stakeholders engaged in risk-reducing and 
risk-creating behaviours. Hence, understanding the 
political economy of DRR will be an essential step 
for insuring the involvement of all interest groups.  
Ariel view of Bhutan
(Source: Curt Carnemark/World Bank)
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11.5 
Good practices at 
national and local levels
11.5.1 
Triggers to review or develop strategies
The most obvious impulse for countries to develop 
or revise their existing DRR strategies or plans is 
Target E. For example, Costa Rica, Montenegro 
and Sudan assessed their current strategies and 
concluded that they were out-dated and did not 
meet the requirements of the Sendai Framework 
and other international conventions.138 Kyrgyzstan 
and Madagascar identified the need for a new strat-
egy that was able to better address changes in the 
internal and external environments, meet the prin-
ciples of sustainable development and be part of 
the national development strategy.139 A working 
group was established within the National Platform, 
which led the drafting process of the strategy and 
implementation plan in 2016–2017, which was then 
approved in January 2018.140  
In Kyrgyzstan, parliamentarians and heads of the 
Ministry of Emergency Situations and other State 
bodies participated in the Sendai conference in 
2015. This was the impetus for the Government of 
Kyrgyzstan to instruct the Ministry of Emergency 
Situations and other State institutions to consider 
ways to implement the Sendai Framework. Having 
undertaken stakeholder consultations, the Ministry 
of Emergency Situations and the National Platform 
for Disaster Risk Reduction submitted a proposal for 
consideration by the government on the development 
of a new strategy. During 2016–2017, the National 
Platform led the drafting of the strategy and an imple-
mentation plan; the National Disaster Risk Reduction 
Strategy was approved in in January 2018.141 
Another important impulse has been the occurrence 
of major disaster events and the realization that 
sustainable development is difficult to achieve in 
the face of the pervasive damage from disasters.142 
For example, this was the case after the 2016 
drought in Mozambique,143 and the 2017 floods in 
Chiapas, Mexico.144 In Argentina, a host of develop-
ments following the 2015 floods in Buenos Aires 
Province paved the way for a DRM policy overhaul 
in line with the Sendai Framework, with support 
from the Federal Congress for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion and the National Congress for Disaster Risk 
Management, the passage of a new DRM law (No. 
27287) in 2017 and a national plan in 2018.145  
Another typical trigger for developing or reviewing 
DRR strategies or plans can be the enactment of 
new legislation. This has been the case in the Philip-
pines during the HFA implementation period, where 
the 2010 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Act tasked government with developing a compre-
hensive DRM plan and framework. Also, the new 
DRM law (2015) in Argentina mandated the elabo-
ration of a National Disaster Risk Reduction Plan.146 
Strategies or plans can have a role in supporting the 
process of legal reform by providing details for the 
implementation of new and more ambitious laws. 
They can also extend the reach of out-dated laws 
by advancing the focus on DRR or requiring DRR to 
be integrated into development, as was the case in 
Nepal until the new Disaster Risk Management Act 
was endorsed in 2017.147  
No matter what impels countries to align their strat-
egies with the Sendai Framework, it is important 
that a self-sustaining process is initiated that can 
keep stakeholders motivated to keep the strategy 
alive over an extended period of time. This is partic-
ularly important at times of infrequent disasters 
when the memory of devastating impacts is fading. 
Periods that are free from major disasters provide 
the best opportunities to focus efforts on reducing 
the accumulation of new risks while also tackling 
existing risks.
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11.5.2 
Foundations in assessment 
Although it appears self-evident that risk analy-
sis precedes priority setting and planning, it 
appears this is not yet common practice. Resource 
constraints often lead to short cuts when it comes 
to analysis; many strategies or plans therefore 
In Europe and Central Asia, risk assessments and 
disaster loss databases have been identified as 
essential building blocks for the development and 
implementation of national and local strategies.149 
Low-risk awareness is one of the main challenges, 
identify risk and capacity assessments as a key 
output to be produced. This may be a fair and 
pragmatic solution, if indeed the assessments are 
conducted, and their results used to review or refine 
the original DRR strategy. While the importance 
of both local and scientific knowledge is usually 
highlighted in the assessment process, in practice, 
it appears that scientific knowledge tends to be 
preferred in formal strategies.148  
not only when it comes to setting the right DRR 
priorities but also in implementing DRR strate-
gies. Having access to risk information is there-
fore an important first step. Haiti,150 Mexico,151 
Rwanda152 and Uganda153 have made great strides 
Ongoing infrastructure development in Egypt 
(Source: Tejas Patnaik/ UNDRR)
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in understanding their risk profiles by developing 
national risk atlases, which provide a comprehen-
sive assessment of existing risks at the national 
and local level in areas that are highly risk prone. 
The risk assessments and profiles are updated and 
expanded and are reportedly informing the ongoing 
process to align the respective DRR strategies and 
plans with the Sendai Framework. 
In Colombia, the preparation of the National Disas-
ter Risk Reduction Plan 2015–2030 was preceded 
by the development of a risk management index 
and a diagnostic of public expenditures for DRM in 
2014.154 Tajikistan is another interesting example of 
a government making a deliberate effort to take into 
consideration emerging threats in developing a new 
strategy. The country’s increasing scale of indus-
trialization and mining is expected to create new 
risks related to hazardous wastes and the growing 
volume of goods transported by road. These require 
risk management measurements that the Govern-
ment of Tajikistan is not sufficiently familiar with. 
Also, so-called legacy threats from radioactive 
materials will require greater attention as they are 
technically complex and often beyond the means of 
local capacities.155  
Namibia’s National Disaster Risk Management 
Policy from 2009 was revised in 2017, in line with 
the Sendai Framework. The subsequent Disas-
ter Risk Management Framework and Action Plan 
(2017–2021) draws upon the findings and recom-
mendations of a national capacity assessment 
facilitated by the United Nations system through 
the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative and 
the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coor-
dination. The recommendations of the assessment 
were endorsed by the National DRM Committee in 
February 2017. Following the endorsement, a stake-
holder consultation process has been rolled out at 
national and subnational levels to prioritize actions, 
assign responsibilities, and agree on budgetary 
and timeline requirements across institutions, 
sectors and governance levels.156 Other examples 
of DRR strategies and plans that were based on 
comprehensive cross-sectoral capacity assess-
ment, include those of Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Ghana, 
Jordan, Sao Tome and Principe, and Serbia.157 In 
Sudan, a SWOT (strength–weaknesses–oppor-
tunities–threats) analysis laid the foundation for 
identifying gaps in the DRR policy framework and 
emphasized the need for the new strategy to better 
consider the local risk context.158   
11.5.3 
Engagement with stakeholders
Most plans have been developed through some 
form of collaborative multisector arrangement. 
Inter-agency working groups, often linked to a 
country’s National Platform for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, or inter-agency coordination mecha-
nism, are usually guiding the process with repre-
sentation from ministries, departments and other 
interested parties, such as NGOs, local govern-
ments, academia and the United Nations, like in 
Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro and Peru.159 In 
Sudan, a dual mechanism of a task force and tech-
nical committee provided oversight and strategic 
guidance. 
However, broad engagement is not always a guar-
antee for success. For example, in Tabasco, Mexico, 
the Civil Protection Master Plan of 2011 was devel-
oped in a participatory process by representatives 
of all state government ministries under the leader-
ship of the Ministry of Planning. Despite the politi-
cal will this process had generated the plan was 
only partially implemented.160 This indicates that 
a range of other factors can influence the level of 
implementation.
There are also countries in which the national DRM 
authority spearheaded the drafting process, as was 
the case in Colombia,161 Costa Rica162 and Mozam-
bique,163 by seeking inputs on the draft text through 
consultations in a subsequent step. The Ministry of 
Local Affairs and Environment was the driving force 
for the strategy development in Tunisia.
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Consultations, workshops and sector or focus 
group meetings are common features to many 
countries, although little information is available as 
to the quality of participation and access of various 
stakeholder groups, especially those who are “most 
left behind”. Some countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, 
also have a requirement to publish new policy 
instruments publicly for comments before finaliza-
tion.166 Yet again, the ability of some stakeholder 
groups, especially the most vulnerable, to take part 
in such a process is questionable. Interestingly, 
countries in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States see value in the final strategies, and also 
appreciate the coordinated process to develop such 
strategies, building on national risk assessments, 
taking into account likely climate change scenarios, 
discussing and agreeing on priorities and making 
explicit linkages to SDGs.167  
Apart from the difficulty in ensuring an all-inclusive 
process that is genuinely a whole-of-government 
and whole-of-society approach, a real challenge for 
developing strategies and plans relates to the lack 
of awareness of decision makers who are involved 
in the process, and their lack of knowledge of DRR 
and its links to development. It is therefore advis-
able to accompany DRR strategy and plan devel-
opment with training and capacity-development 
support.
11.5.4 
Policy coherence
Overcoming the siloed approaches and duplicative 
efforts in implementing DRR, climate change and 
sustainable development stands at the centre of 
the 2030 Agenda and is also ingrained in the Sendai 
Framework. In aspiring to tap into synergies among 
these interconnected policy and practice areas, and 
to overcome the related competition over resources 
and power, only a few countries have made good 
advances on this Sendai Framework requirement. 
Case study: Awareness-raising in Tunisia resulted in stronger political commitment 
towards DRR
In Tunisia, a national debate on DRR started in 
2012 thanks to the leadership of the Ministry 
of Local Affairs and Environment – the national 
focal point for HFA and the Sendai Framework. 
To back this debate with all stakeholders, the 
ministry carried out an analysis on the legal 
and institutional framework to identify gaps 
related to DRR. In addition, the ministry set 
up a database of disaster-related human and 
asset losses over 30 years (1983–2013).164 
These efforts led to awareness-raising of deci-
sion makers about the development challenges 
emphasized by disaster risks. It also strength-
ened political support for the elaboration and 
adoption of a national strategy for DRR and 
improved coordination of DRR at national and 
local levels.165 
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building, which is anchored in SDGs and other rele-
vant global and regional policy instruments. This is 
also highlighted as a national good practice case 
study in section 13.5.2. A key element of Tonga’s 
second plan, JNAP II, is a strong focus on the devel-
opment of sectoral, cluster, community and outer 
island resilience plans that fully integrate climate 
resilience and practical on-the-ground adaptation, 
reduction of GHG emissions and DRR.170 Other 
countries’ DRR strategies and plans, such as those 
of Vanuatu and Madagascar, also take account 
of risks related to climate change. Other positive 
examples of policy integration, between DRR and 
CCA, are discussed in Chapter 13.
In Montenegro, the main hindrance noted during 
development and implementation of the strat-
egy was that decision makers and stakeholders 
did not come with prior knowledge of the fields 
of DRR, SDGs and climate change, including how 
these areas interact.168 A spot check of several 
Sendai Framework aligned strategies and plans has 
revealed that this requirement is not, or only superfi-
cially, met. As noted in section 10.1, and discussed 
further in section 13.5, this is not the case in the 
Pacific region. There, FRDP provides high-level 
strategic guidance to different stakeholder groups 
on how to enhance resilience to climate change 
and disasters, in ways that contribute to and are 
embedded in sustainable development. Under FRDP, 
Pacific Island governments are called to provide 
policy direction, incentivize funding to support 
implementation of coherence initiatives, ensure 
cross-sectoral collaboration and take measures to 
gauge progress.169 Tonga’s Joint National Action 
Plan (JNAP) on CCA and DRM (2018–2028) is one 
such example of a coherent approach to resilience 
Box 11.2. Issues for countries to consider when seeking alignment among DRR and other 
policy arenas, derived from lessons learned and case studies
(Source: UNDRR 2017)
• Understanding the similarities and differ-
ences among CCA, DRR, development 
objectives, processes and stakeholders.
• Establishing a common ground regarding 
rationale, objectives, and methodologies, 
instruments and terminologies.
• Clarifying the administrative set-up for 
developing CCA, DRR and development 
planning and agreement on who leads and 
participates in which mandate. Integrat-
ing parts of the administrative set-up if 
possible.
• Establishing joint or joined-up monitoring 
and progress reporting of CCA, DRR and 
development planning.
• Ensuring that the coherence agenda is also 
pursued at the subnational and local levels. 
• Identifying common action and instruments 
in support of shared policy objectives to 
reduce disaster risk.
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would also be useful to better understand the role 
of champions, political developments, administra-
tive reforms, or the allocation of financing and the 
extent to which they foster or hinder coherence.
Additional research may be required to identify 
the specific factors that helped drive the policy 
alignment process in some countries. The global 
and regional policy agenda is certainly a support-
ing factor, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 10. It 
Another example of policy integration is Egypt’s 
National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy, which 
provides a strong rationale for coherence.
Case study: Policy coherence in Mozambique’s Master Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2017–2030
Case study: Policy coherence in Egypt’s National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, 
2017–2030
In Mozambique, the Disaster Risk Reduction 
Master Plan (2017–2030) is aligned with the 
climate change strategy, as well as with other 
development policy instruments, which have 
common mechanisms and indicators have 
been articulated for the strategies or plans.
Chapter 4 of the plan establishes the National 
Juridical Context and Public Policies, which 
articulates linkages with the country’s National 
Development Plan, the National Agenda 2025: 
Visão Estratégica de Nação, the National 
Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation 
Strategy 2013–2025, as well as the Sustainable 
Development Objectives. 
National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(NSDRR) Courses for Action identify incorporat-
ing DRR into sustainable development policies, 
particularly the Sustainable Development Strat-
egy: Egypt’s Vision 2030, as one of the key focus 
areas. NSDRR also acknowledges that “disaster 
risk reduction is better addressed through devel-
oping a clearly defined vision as well as specific 
plans, specializations and tasks and high-level 
coordination within and across sectors.”
At the level of actions, the plan presents 
concrete examples through the development of 
educational approaches integrating risk reduc-
tion and CCA (Action 1.1.3), or the creation 
of mechanisms for ensuring that all projects 
and programmes relating to poverty reduc-
tion, agriculture and rural development take 
into account access to water, environmen-
tal considerations and contributions to the 
sustainable use of water (Action 2.3.1) as a 
way to reinforcing resilience.171 
The strategy specifically identifies that envi-
ronment, agriculture, water, energy, housing 
and infrastructure sectors are more pertinent 
for incorporating risk considerations due to 
their high vulnerability to disasters and under-
scores the need for the government to work to 
mitigate the risks arising from them.
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As mentioned above, the limited public and private 
investment in DRR has been a primary reason 
for the patchy implementation of DRR strategies. 
This has been the case during the HFA period, and 
appears to remain an issue also for Sendai Frame-
work aligned strategies and plans as risk reduction 
priorities still compete against other government 
priorities over scarce resources, rather than being 
seen as enabling sustainable development and 
stable economic growth. The limited understanding 
of risk and how it interrelates with development are 
obvious culprits.176 But also, powerful disincentives 
in countries’ risk governance systems hinder priori-
tizing risk reduction. In Indonesia, for example, local 
governments rely on the national disaster fund and 
are reluctant to use their provincial budgets for the 
implementation of DRM.177 Other countries have 
established similar funds, such as the Mexican 
Federal Fund for the Prevention of Natural Disas-
ters, providing a dedicated funding source for 
disaster prevention and a tool to central govern-
ment to co-finance disaster prevention. The Fund 
Against the Effects of Natural Disaster in Morocco, 
under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, 
Making Cities Resilient in action in Cilicap, Indonesia
(Source: Tejas Patnaik, UNDRR)
11.5.5 
Overcoming challenges in implementation
Many countries are faced with challenges when 
it comes to implementation of their DRR strate-
gies or plans. The reasons are manifold.172 Some 
DRR strategies or plans are too general to guide 
concrete actions. Means of implementation, such 
as budgets, institutional arrangements, guidelines 
protocols and multisectoral agreements are not 
defined, or left for further development after the 
strategies’ approval.173 In other cases, strategies are 
too ambitious and not aligned with existing capaci-
ties. Weak managerial capacity for DRR, and low 
awareness of stakeholders involved in implemen-
tation are the most common causes.174 As a result, 
strategies are not implemented, or only partially so. 
Therefore, Sudan proactively developed standard 
operating procedures and a DRR training manual 
that were adopted by government. Awareness-rais-
ing campaigns were also conducted at the federal 
and state levels, which helped foster trust, under-
standing and ownership among involved stakehold-
ers.175 Such measures are essential, especially in 
contexts of insecurity, fragility and conflict. 
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is another dedicated tool to finance risk reduction 
through the State budget. They are usually referred 
to as being successful in broadening public finance 
for risk reduction but may carry the danger of over-
reliance on these central funds at the expense of 
co-financing from subnational and sector budgets; 
noting that the former are usually more constrained 
than the more affluent sector budgets.
In Tajikistan, the lessons related to the lack of 
funding for implementing the country’s 2010–2015 
DRR strategy led to a phased approach in which 
three-year plans are to be developed that underpin 
the new 2018–2030 strategy. In this process, the 
first year would identify funded and already ongoing 
actions. The second year would define actions and 
funding requirements for the following year, and so 
forth.178  
Recommendations in a recent OECD report focus 
on the establishment of a financial strategy led by 
the Ministry of Finance or equivalent to support 
the implementation of DRR strategies and plans.179 
The report also recommends assessing financial 
vulnerabilities, conducting comprehensive risk 
assessments, developing risk transfer markets 
and carefully managing the financial impacts 
from disasters. However, it falls short of explicit 
language that calls on members and partners to 
ensure that all investment is “risk informed”. The 
issue of public and private investment and disas-
ter risk is critical as this is the “heavy-lifting” of 
risk reduction, and it is through investment that the 
public and private sectors either create new risk or 
reduce risk. Ex ante investments in risk reduction 
must be carefully weighted when considering the 
benefits of risk retention and risk transfer.180  
The World Bank’s recent Beyond the Gap report 
takes the resource discussion to a new level, 
advocating strongly for a systems approach that 
combines infrastructure investment and risk reduc-
tion as a much more cost-effective means to 
manage risk, while also reducing risk from climate 
change.181 Its key messages include that: low- and 
middle-income countries can control spending on 
infrastructure for the same results through improved 
spending efficiency (with a spending range of 
between 2% and 8% of GDP); that maintaining infra-
structure is central to longer-term efficiency; that 
with the right policy mix, low- and middle-income 
countries can achieve the infrastructure-related 
SDGs with investments of 4.5% of GDP and still be 
on track to limit climate change to 2°C; and that 
“infrastructure investment paths compatible with 
full decarbonization by the end of the century need 
not cost more than more-polluting alternatives.”182 
The message is that risk-informed development 
is possible for low- and middle-income countries 
if infrastructure needs, risk reduction, and climate 
change mitigation and adaptation are all integrated 
into coherent and system-wide planning and spend-
ing policies. 
11.5.6 
Local-level plans and their implementation
So far, there is little information available on the 
impact of Sendai Framework aligned strategies in 
reducing disaster risk on the ground, as most plans 
have been endorsed only recently, and monitoring 
and reporting on their implementation are still in 
progress. However, it has been observed that imple-
mentation of national DRR strategies often does not 
penetrate to the local level. The results of a global 
survey of local DRR strategies show that among the 
local governments with DRR strategies, 27.4% have 
fully implemented the DRR strategies, while most 
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of the cities, accounting for 53.4%, have partially 
implemented their strategy and 19.2% have not yet 
started the implementation.183 The reason quoted 
by 46% of the respondents for incomplete imple-
mentation of the strategy was the lack of financial 
resources, while 22% said it was due to changes in 
the government and priorities.184  
Decentralized DRM systems are generally consid-
ered more effective than top-down national 
approaches, which may enhance power structures 
at the top and draw the focus away from local 
concerns and initiatives. Decentralized approaches 
can contribute to inclusive DRM, a more success-
ful identification of people needs, bottom-up plan-
ning and empowerment of the local population. It 
is nevertheless crucial to ensure that DRR remains 
nationally driven to keep its profile a high priority 
on the political agenda, ensure countrywide and 
sectoral coordination, and warrant sufficient allo-
cation of resources where necessary.185 Having 
a system of local strategies and plans that can 
address territorial DRR priorities and that are, at 
the same time, well aligned with national DRR and 
development policy and planning frameworks 
appears to be the most promising approach. 
This has been the case in the province of Potenza186 
in Italy, which outlined the #weResilient strat-
egy aimed at pursuing territorial development 
through a structural combination of environmental 
sustainability, territorial safety and climate change 
contrasting policies. It presents a “structural” tool 
for analysing the needs and driving the choices of 
over 100 local governments and municipalities with 
a wide strategic point of view and a multilevel holis-
tic approach.187 In Vanuatu, the decentralized DRM 
system was well laid out on paper, with international 
and local stakeholders working together. However, 
new NGO actors often found the operational gover-
nance system opaque and proper channels elusive. 
Other factors limiting implementation include the 
human and physical geography, poor understanding 
of the causal factors of risk, community disputes 
and a perceived dependency on aid. It was also 
noted that while there are bottom-up and top-down 
approaches to DRM, top-down strategies were more 
prevalent and that more connection and continuity 
between the DRR strategies and stakeholders at 
different levels was needed.188  
Indonesia’s policy of decentralization of 1999 was 
reflected in the 2007 Disaster Management Law 
and resulted in the establishment of local disaster 
management agencies in provinces and districts 
throughout the country. However, due to gaps in 
technical knowledge or skills, local government 
staff struggle to develop DRR plans. Despite receiv-
ing training, they are still unclear about what DRR 
means in practice and how to translate the national 
policy framework into concrete programmes.189 But 
there are also more promising reports of how local-
level DRR action plans in Indonesia laid the foun-
dation for the enactment of local DRM legislation, 
which had a positive effect on increasing financial 
allocations for DRR.190  
In Bhutan, district disaster management and 
contingency plans (DMCPs)191 were developed 
in a bottom-up process and then integrated into 
the national level DMCP, covering around 50% of 
districts. The district plans were informed by local 
assessments of hazards, vulnerability and capac-
ity, which were used to generate district-level risk 
profiles. The plans’ disaster reduction priorities 
address the four priorities for action of the Sendai 
Framework. An important aspect of the planning 
process was the identification of the necessary 
risk governance arrangements, including the identi-
fication of key roles and responsibilities and train-
ing of a cadre of newly appointed District Disaster 
Management Officers. In a next step, DMCPs are 
being integrated into the districts’ annual devel-
opment plans and programmes to muster more 
support and buy-in for the plans from stakehold-
ers.192 Linking local DRR strategies or plans with 
the development planning system appears to 
be a promising implementation mechanism that 
has received increasing traction. In Norway, most 
municipalities have DRR strategies integrated into 
local development plans with plans being coherent 
among local, municipal and national levels.193  
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11.5.7 
Monitoring
Vague formulations and ambiguous assignment of 
DRR functions to broad stakeholder groups in DRR 
strategies can result in overlaps and gaps. This 
leaves organizations and individuals with an option 
to withdraw themselves from their responsibilities 
or to shift them to someone else, making it nearly 
impossible to hold organizations or individuals 
accountable for their action or inaction. Even when 
DRR strategies clearly spell out mandates and roles, 
the bottleneck may be a lack of awareness or train-
ing of stakeholders regarding their roles.194  Agree-
ment on assigned roles and responsibilities may 
require some negotiation in cases of competition 
over roles, or the reluctance to engage in certain 
functions that are seen to be too complex or less 
rewarding.195 To keep strategies at a sufficient 
strategic level, such detail could be fleshed out in 
supportive standard operating procedures or similar 
implementation plans. 
When it comes to oversight and reporting on the 
implementation of DRR strategies and plans, there 
appears to be a growing number of countries that 
integrate such a provision. For example, Montene-
gro specifies an obligation of the Ministry of Inte-
rior to regularly report on implemented activities 
of all institutions involved.196 The DRR strategy of 
South Sudan features a dedicated section on Moni-
toring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning.197 
In Mozambique, monitoring is part of a national 
mechanism for the follow-up of the country’s multi-
year development plan. Other countries that feature 
some type of mechanism for follow-up include 
Angola, Colombia, Costa Rica and Vanuatu.198 
However, a spot check of 10 selected plans showed 
that only 5 featured follow-up mechanisms.
11.6 
Conclusions
Governments have many instruments of public 
policy at their disposal that can be used to influence 
the risk-generating or risk-reducing behaviour of 
the general public, the private, public and voluntary 
sectors. DRR strategies and plans are only one such 
instrument, laws and regulations, public administra-
tion, economic instruments and social services for 
example, can also determine the creation, accumu-
lation or reduction of risk. Despite the development 
of such strategies over a span of two decades, 
it appears that national disaster risk governance 
systems are often still underdeveloped; this poses 
potentially a serious constraint on the implementa-
tion of the Sendai Framework.199
  
Examination of the contents of strategies and plans 
reveals considerable gaps, especially regarding the 
newer elements introduced in the Sendai Frame-
work, such as preventing risk creation, including 
targets and indicators, and guaranteeing monitoring 
and follow-up mechanisms. Surprisingly, some of 
the more established elements are also not consis-
tently addressed in the strategies reviewed, such 
as clear roles and responsibilities, and methods to 
devise and deliver local strategies. 
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It is nevertheless encouraging to see that there is 
a growing number of countries which see the value 
of the process, and are making a greater effort to 
devise more inclusive and consultative approaches 
to discuss and agree on their DRR priorities. 
At this stage, there is little to report on the level of 
implementation or impact of Sendai Framework 
aligned strategies, as many of them have been 
endorsed only in the last 12–18 months. But there 
are early indications that the challenges encoun-
tered during the HFA decade still apply, despite 
many good practices and examples. With the 2020 
target date fast approaching, and given the role of 
DRR strategies or plans as key enablers for reduc-
ing disaster risk and losses, their development and 
implementation in line with the Sendai Framework 
needs to be made an urgent priority at country level. 
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Chapter 12: 
Disaster risk reduction 
integrated in 
development planning 
and budgeting 
12.1 
The importance of 
integrating disaster 
risk reduction in 
development planning 
Development can be a major driver of disaster 
risk, for example when it results in populations 
and economic assets being located in exposed 
geographic areas; in the accumulation of risk in 
urban areas due to rapid and unplanned develop-
ments; when it places excessive strains on natural 
resources and ecosystems; and when it exacer-
bates social inequalities if the income-generating 
opportunities for some population groups is 
curtailed. Therefore, risk should be seen as a 
normal and inseparable part of economic activities 
and development, as something built into particular 
development pathways and practices, constructed 
through day-to-day decisions by those who have a 
stake in particular patterns of development. Disas-
ter risk is thus a social construct conditioned by 
each society’s perceptions, needs, demands, deci-
sions and practices.200  
As presented in previous GARs and reiterated in 
this edition, it is time to cast off the notion that risk 
is exogenous to development, something that can 
be reduced simply by complementing development 
200  (Lavell and Maskrey 2013)
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with risk reduction measures.201 Integrating (also 
termed mainstreaming) risk reduction must be 
driven from within key development sectors to 
ensure that specific sectoral vulnerability can be 
assessed, and risk management institutionalized in 
the policymaking, planning, project cycle and invest-
ment planning processes. The integration of DRR 
into development planning and budgeting is there-
fore predominantly a governance process. It needs 
to ensure that development is risk informed to 
improve the safety of people and critical facilities, 
to protect the natural and built environment, and 
to build resilient livelihoods and economic activ-
ity. Although risk governance is a multi-stakeholder 
task, governments have an exemplary role as risk 
avoiders providing public goods and services by 
refraining from actions that generate risk.202 
The practical relationship between disaster risk 
and development therefore provides the core ratio-
nale for integrating DRR into development planning 
and budgeting.203 However, the need to address 
the development-based drivers of risk, and the 
acceptance that disaster risk is a symptom of 
unsustainable maldevelopment, have yet to fully 
permeate conventional DRR and development 
policy and practice. 
Avoiding the creation and propagation of risks that 
occur through flawed development pathways, can 
best be addressed through prospective and correc-
tive DRM measures; both of which require systems-
based approaches to managing risk. Prospective 
measures to prevent or reduce risk creation can 
be combined with corrective DRM efforts that 
reduce the level of existing risk (e.g. through retro-
fitting of critical infrastructure such as schools or 
hospitals). Compensatory risk management activi-
ties also have a role in strengthening the social 
and economic resilience of individuals and societ-
ies in the face of residual risk (the remaining risk 
that cannot be effectively eliminated), for example 
through preparedness, response and recovery 
activities, contingent credit, insurance and safety 
net programmes that are designed to help affected 
populations mitigate disasters or recover from 
their impacts. The Sendai Framework supports 
all of these approaches, but as part of a holistic 
approach, not as a set of alternatives or options. 
Figure 12.1. The 2030 Agenda recognizes DRR as central to sustainable development 
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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As risk is increasingly multifaceted, integrating DRR 
into development planning and practice needs to 
consider multiple and intersecting threats. Risks 
associated with natural hazards can manifest in 
conjunction with man-made hazards, epidemics, 
conflict or economic shocks for example, which 
can interact, cascade and amplify impact across 
sectors, geographies and scales. Pursing integra-
tion solely from a DRR angle is therefore unlikely 
to achieve the targets and indicators of the Sendai 
Framework and SDGs. There is agreement however 
that the realization of SDGs will depend on the 
successful implementation of the Sendai Frame-
work and the Paris Agreement. Success therefore 
hinges on the ability of decision makers to realize 
risk-informed development, so driving integrated 
DRR approaches, different aspects of which can 
also be described as policy coherence, integrated 
risk governance and systemic risk reduction. 
12.2 
The Sendai Framework 
and integrating 
disaster risk reduction 
in development
12.2.1  
Scope of the Sendai Framework
Integrating DRR into development planning and 
budgeting is not a new goal in global policy processes. 
It was already part of the 1989 resolution on IDNDR,204 
the 1994 Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action,205 
the 1999 ISDR,206 and of course HFA.207 HFA called 
for reducing underlying risk factors to address 
disaster risk in sectoral development planning and 
programmes as well as in post-disaster situations, 
yet the integration of DRR into policy and legal 
instruments remained at a nascent stage in most 
countries by the end of the HFA decade. Even where 
this had occurred, progress in implementation was 
limited according to HFA monitor reports.208 
The Sendai Framework commits Member States 
to address DRR within the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication, and to inte-
grate DRR into policies, plans, programmes and 
budgets at all levels. It states that effective DRM, 
addressing underlying risk drivers through risk-
informed public and private investments, contrib-
utes to sustainable development. It recognizes the 
importance of integrating DRR within and across all 
sectors of development to achieving disaster and 
climate risk-informed development.209  
The Sendai Framework highlights several specific 
entry points that can be pursued to foster the inte-
gration of DRR into development. For example, 
inclusive risk-informed decision-making that is 
based on the exchange and dissemination of disag-
gregated data is included under the Sendai Frame-
work principles. Priority for Action 2 recognizes that 
strengthening disaster risk governance is a means 
to foster collaboration and partnership across 
mechanisms and institutions for the implemen-
tation of sustainable development. It specifically 
mentions that integrating DRR into development 
requires national and local frameworks of laws, 
regulations and public policies to define roles and 
responsibilities and to guide the public and private 
sectors. Priority for Action 3 calls for integrat-
ing disaster risk assessments into land-use policy 
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development and implementation, including urban 
planning, land degradation assessments, and infor-
mal and non-permanent housing, as well as into 
rural development planning and management of 
various ecosystems. Priority for Action 4 stresses 
the need to: (a) incorporate DRM into post-disaster 
recovery and rehabilitation processes; (b) facilitate 
the link between relief, rehabilitation and develop-
ment; and (c) use opportunities during the recovery 
phase to develop capacities that reduce disaster 
risk, including through land-use planning, improving 
structural standards and others.210 
Compared with HFA, the Sendai Framework places 
a much greater focus on the drivers of disaster risk, 
such as poverty, climate change, improper land-
use planning, environmental degradation, weak 
building codes and governance, which also under-
mine sustainable development. However, the calls 
to curb the creation of new risk through informed 
development practice and investment that priori-
tizes long-term risk reduction are what truly sets 
the Sendai Framework apart from its predecessor. 
As discussed in section 11.5.5, the World Bank 
contends that such risk-informed development 
is possible in low- and middle-income countries 
– particularly in respect of infrastructure develop-
ment – through more efficient spending based on 
system-wide policies.211 
As elucidated in Part I of this GAR, the Sendai 
Framework also has a much wider scope in terms 
of the hazards it covers (natural, man-made, envi-
ronmental, biological and technological) and the 
types of disasters (slow and fast-onset, extensive 
and intensive disasters), while also widening the 
spectrum of actors it includes.212 This is intended to 
facilitate integration of DRR practices into sectors in 
a way that is more conducive to the systems think-
ing required for risk and loss to be reduced and 
resilience strengthened, and mobilize development 
actors as architects and vehicles of risk reduction. 
The Sendai Framework thus has the potential to 
simultaneously transform the risk landscape and 
facilitate accelerated achievement of the goals and 
targets of the climate change and SDG agendas.
12.2.2 
Disaster risk reporting under the Sustainable 
Development Goals
Integration post-2015 is not unidirectional. All 46 
Member States that presented voluntary national 
reviews of progress in achieving SDGs at the United 
Nations HLPF in 2018 included disaster-related 
information, with many highlighting the importance 
of implementing different risk reduction measures. 
These elements are reported differently by differ-
ent countries. Some focused on identifying hazards, 
and others described their understanding and effort 
in implementing the Sendai Framework, relating 
their work on DRR to a specific SDG. 
As discussed in Part II of this report, within the 
2030 Agenda, SDGs 1, 11 and 13 include explicit 
risk reduction indicators for measuring prog-
ress in achievement. However, with the scope of 
Sendai Framework hazards and risks ranging from 
the biological, to environmental, to technological 
processes and phenomena, many of the other goals 
are of relevance.213 
This is propelling the development of integrated 
approaches, in implementation, monitoring and 
reporting. The Philippines and Mexico are harmo-
nizing processes and methods to enable coherent 
implementation of the Sendai Framework, NUA, 
the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda at the 
national level. The Department of the Interior and 
Local Government of the Philippines is harmonizing 
risk assessment approaches and planning guide-
lines of different ministries, to provide clear guid-
ance to local government units on the prioritization 
of measures and planning that take climate and 
disaster risks into consideration (e.g. in public build-
ing codes). In Mexico, the Ministry of Finance and 
Public Credit is being supported to develop method-
ologies and processes for prioritizing the projects 
that require an in-depth disaster risk analysis, and 
for integrating risk mitigation and CCA measures 
into prioritized projects. Additionally, Mexico is 
integrating the requirements of the Sendai Frame-
work into the National Agenda for Sustainable 
Development.214  
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12.3 
Country experiences 
with integrating disaster 
risk reduction into 
development planning 
and budgeting
Integrating DRR into development strategies and 
plans is complex and highly context specific. Coun-
tries are pursuing a range of different entry points 
in their quests to undertake risk-informed develop-
ment, and there is no single blueprint plan. Instead, 
learning and sharing from experience, including 
from other cross-cutting issues, has been of great 
value. Mainstreaming is a dynamic process that 
aims to understand risk at the heart of develop-
ment decisions in policymaking, planning, budget-
ing, programming, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation at national, sectoral and subnational 
levels, rather than seeing risk management as an 
add-on.215 Since development does not follow a 
linear path, it is important to be sufficiently flexible 
to seize the opportunity to undertake risk-informed 
development when and where the political economy 
is ripe. 
DRR mainstreaming at the local and subna-
tional levels encounters similar challenges and 
constraints as at the national level, but there are 
often more pronounced gaps in resources and 
capacities. For local-level mainstreaming efforts 
to be successful and take root, they are best 
pursued as part of a wider national undertaking 
that spans all scales of government administration, 
several sectors and groups of stakeholders. Joint 
approaches in mainstreaming of related cross-
cutting issues, such as DRR, climate adaptation 
and gender equality, are also likely to result in more 
cohesive and effective action.
Experiences with DRR mainstreaming vary consid-
erably among countries with federal or centralized 
systems, and small or geographically dispersed 
countries. In many resource-constrained contexts, 
such as the Pacific Island countries, integrated 
approaches to DRR and climate adaptation have 
gained much traction (e.g. in the Framework for 
Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated 
Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster 
Risk Management).216 Some urge caution, warning 
of the risk of overburdening already strained capaci-
ties.217 In Fiji, risk reduction was integrated within 
approaches mainstreaming the already familiar 
themes of gender and social inclusion. Familiar-
ity with such mainstreaming approaches promoted 
acceptance of the concept by those involved, who 
could easily identify the people more affected by 
climate change and disaster.218 
Several analyses of DRM and its relationship to 
development and overall governance suggest that 
as a general rule the higher the level of development 
in a country, the greater the progress made in incor-
porating DRR into development pursuits.219 
In the following sections of this chapter, country-
level experience is examined according to the 
five entry points for integrating DRR into develop-
ment planning and budgeting shown in Box 12.1. 
Although these are presented as separate entry 
points for analysis, they are, of course, interrelated.
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12.3.1 
Policy and law as an entry point for 
mainstreaming
Integrating risk into laws, policies and plans is an 
important conduit for translating political will into 
concrete risk management actions. The policy entry 
points are at national, sectoral and local levels, 
where plans may be conceived through a mix of 
bottom-up and top-down processes to reflect the 
needs and capacities of communities exposed to 
natural hazards. Mainstreaming DRR into devel-
opment planning requires a systematic effort to 
assess the risks from and to development, identify 
DRR measures, apply them to development activi-
ties and include them in a strategy document that 
guides annual planning and budget allocations and 
public investment instruments. 
Legal and regulatory frameworks play a comple-
mentary role to plans and strategies as they estab-
lish the institutional mandates, the system of 
accountability for making risk reduction a priority, 
and budget allocations for implementation. While 
dedicated DRM laws have been the vehicle of 
choice for DRR integration so far, there are also 
efforts being made to integrate risk management in 
sectoral laws and regulations. The sectors driving 
economic growth and development in many devel-
oping countries (e.g. agriculture, manufacturing 
and tourism) have a significant influence on the 
development-based drivers of risk, so the regulatory 
frameworks that guide these sectors should receive 
more attention.220  
Standards are also a form of regulation, either 
voluntary or compulsory, that are approved for 
common and repeated use in sectors – these 
include building codes, standards on electrotech-
nical equipment, electricity plants and electrically 
powered utilities, management system standards, 
codes of best practice on social responsibility, tech-
nical standards of professional associations of 
architects and engineers,221 and the Sendai Frame-
work minimum standards and metadata for disas-
ter-related data, statistics and analysis.222 A range 
of relevant standards developed by the International 
Box 12.1. Entry points for integrating DRR into development
(Source: UNDP 2019o)
• Policy and law: Providing the enabling 
environment for DRR mainstreaming and 
achieving risk-informed development. Entry 
points include: leadership and advocacy; 
legislation and regulation; policies, strate-
gies and plans; and standards.
• Organization: Supporting the implemen-
tation of risk-informed policies and plans. 
Entry points include: coordination and 
responsibilities for mainstreaming; capac-
ity development; procedures and tools; and 
programmes and projects.
• Stakeholders: Enabling the involvement of 
critical actors in mainstreaming, such as 
government, civil society, the private sector, 
and partnerships and networks. 
• Knowledge: Driving the mainstreaming 
process through raising the risk awareness 
and understanding the links with develop-
ment. Entry points include: risk assess-
ment; awareness and education; and 
monitoring and evaluation. 
• Finance: Providing the essential support 
for implementation. Entry points include: 
budgeting and expenditure analysis; public 
and private sector resource mobiliza-
tion; risk financing and transfers; and risk-
informing investments.
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Organization for Standardization (ISO) also exist, 
including Environmental Management Systems 
(the ISO 14000 family of standards), the new ISO 
Risk Management Guidelines (ISO 31000:2018) 
and Societal Security Emergency Management 
(ISO 22320:2011), which includes risk manage-
ment as an “integral part of business”.223 There are 
standards indicate which SDGs they contribute to, 
and their use will require a high level of policy coher-
ence and integrated implementation.
As sectoral standards are often market driven and 
developed to respond to requests from industry or 
highly relevant new ISO standards under develop-
ment under the category of “Sustainable cities and 
communities”, which are close to being launched. 
Sustainable cities and communities – indicators for 
resilient cities (ISO 37123)224 and Sustainable cities 
and communities – indicators for smart cities (ISO 
37122)225 are the most relevant to urban DRR. These 
consumer groups, governments or regional organi-
zations and administrations, they tend to command 
a high degree of ownership, which facilitates 
compliance. Ultimately, political leadership and 
advocacy to create the political will to reduce risk 
must go hand in hand with self-regulation – through 
Flooding in Philippines 
(Source: Mathias Eick EU/ECHO)
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mechanisms such as standards and community 
leadership – to drive and eventually absorb the inte-
gration approach.226 
Country experiences
In Kenya, DRR was successfully integrated as 
a cross-cutting issue to be addressed in nine 
thematic areas and sectors in the Second and Third 
Medium Term Development Plans (2013–2017 
and 2018–2022). A new National Disaster Risk 
Management Policy was approved in 2018 – which 
is currently being translated into an act of parlia-
ment – demanding various sectors to integrate DRR 
into the sectoral planning process at national and 
subnational levels.227 The policy was initially cham-
pioned by the Ministry of Planning, and then taken 
on by the National Disaster Risk Reduction Plat-
form, which has a wider representation from techni-
cal ministries, academia, United Nations agencies 
and civil society. A key lesson from the Kenya expe-
rience has been that high-level political goodwill is a 
prerequisite for success. The support of the Kenyan 
President for the Sendai Framework and the involve-
ment of the Parliament and Senate by identifying 
focus politicians were key factors in the push for 
legislation.228  
The five-year National Socio-economic Develop-
ment Plan VIII (2016–2020) of Viet Nam, and 
the Philippines Development Plan (2017–2022) 
consider DRR as a main cross-cutting concern. 
Such integration will increasingly help to mobi-
lize required financial resources for national and 
subnational government bodies to implement 
Clean up work in Kisumu, Kenya 
(Source: Tejas Patnaik /UNDRR)
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programmes and projects addressing DRR.229 In 
Tunisia, DRR, was for the first time, explicitly intro-
duced in the five-year development plan for 2016–
2020 under a chapter on green growth.230  Indonesia 
is another example of advanced DRR mainstream-
ing practice, where the National Development Plan-
ning Agency took the lead in integrating DRR into 
Indonesia’s Mid-Term Development Plan 2010–
2014, as one of nine development priorities.231 The 
national DRM law in Armenia mandates all develop-
ment processes in the country and all development 
sectors to integrate disaster risk considerations.232  
The legal basis for DRR mainstreaming was also 
a decisive factor in Costa Rica, where the 2005 
National Law on Emergencies and Risk Preven-
tion considers DRM as a cross-cutting issue to all 
development practices, requiring that all institu-
tions must plan and budget for disaster prevention 
and preparedness. As a consequence, an increas-
ing number of public services in Costa Rica now 
carry out risk assessments and adopt measures 
to control risk. To date, 10 public policies related 
to planning and investment in different sectors 
(urban, rural and natural resource management) 
have benefited from DRR mainstreaming. The 
scope of integration is significant; they include: 
the National Development Plans for 2014–2018 
and 2019–2022; the National Housing and Human 
Settlements Policy and Plan; the National Policy of 
Territorial Organization; the National Urban Devel-
opment Policy; the National Wetlands Policy; the 
National Health Policy; the National Policy of Adap-
tation to Climate Change; the National Public Invest-
ment Plan; the National Water and Sanitation Policy; 
and the Risk Management Strategy of the Educa-
tion Sector.233 Recognizing that municipalities have 
a particularly central role in risk management, the 
Government of Costa Rica also strongly advocates 
integration of risk management into local planning 
instruments, rather than developing stand-alone 
local risk management plans.234  
Uganda pursued the mainstreaming process 
through an integrated approach that encompassed 
DRR and climate adaptation into development plan-
ning. Both issues are recognized in the Resilience 
and Disaster Risk Management Strategic Frame-
work and Investment Program 2015, which will 
operationalize the country’s National Development 
Plan 2015–2020. DRR and CCA have also been 
integrated into Uganda’s National Building Control 
Regulations and the National Urban Policy, which 
reaches over 1.2 million people with its safety 
measures. In 2018, the National Development Plan 
was being reviewed to assess the impacts of disas-
ters during its implementation period, which will 
provide recommendations for the development of 
the third National Development Plan.235  
In Mozambique, DRR is considered an integral part 
of the National Strategy for Climate Change Adap-
tation and Mitigation (2013–2025), which has 13 
strategic actions that are expected to guide adapta-
tion and DRR measures. Subsequent to the national 
plan, DRR and CCA have been mainstreamed into 
district planning and budgeting systems in the 
eight key sectors of agriculture, health, water, social 
protection, roads, the environment, meteorology and 
energy.236 Bosnia and Herzegovina also approached 
DRR and CCA mainstreaming in an integrated way 
by making it a mandatory part of the country’s stra-
tegic planning process through its Law on Develop-
ment Planning and Management.237 By using the 
existing development planning process for DRR 
integration that built on agreed methodologies and 
organizational frameworks, the issue is now main-
streamed into 23 local and 8 cantonal development 
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strategies. The standard planning process was 
complemented by risk assessments and enforced 
with guidelines on DRR mainstreaming.238  
Indonesia, the Philippines and the province of 
Potenza in Italy are also integrating resilience, DRR 
and CCA concepts into local development and 
land-use planning.239 However, experiences are 
mixed. For example, in Indonesia, the 2007 Disas-
ter Management Law made subnational govern-
ments at provincial, district and subdistrict levels 
responsible for DRR integration into development 
programmes, requiring them to allocate sufficient 
funding to do so. Pilot projects on DRR planning 
were implemented at the community level, which 
were expected to feed into village level develop-
ment plans, which were to inform development 
planning processes at the subdistrict and district 
level. However, these efforts have had low rates of 
success due to limited involvement of executive 
and legislative bodies of district and subdistrict 
governments, etc.240  of the sectoral integration of 
DRR into development may have originated in the 
education and agriculture sectors. Madagascar has 
been one of the first countries to have integrated 
DRR into the education sector. In 2006, a student 
manual and a teacher’s guide on integrating DRR 
into the school curriculum were developed and are 
being updated. The Ministry of Education is also 
committed to strengthening the resilience of the 
education system and has established a depart-
ment for DRM within the Directorate of Educational 
Planning. This has been complemented by capac-
ity-building support for the Heads of the Regional 
Directorates of National Education.241  
In a subsequent wave, other key development 
sectors have been selected for mainstreaming 
activities such as health, infrastructure, tourism, 
urban planning and housing. While numerous 
sectoral mainstreaming tools and guidelines have 
been developed, aside from the agricultural and 
infrastructure sectors, very few systematic analy-
ses of the experiences and lessons learned have 
been carried out.242 One such study in South-
ern Africa found that DRR mainstreaming across 
sectors appears to be generally low, except within 
climate change policy. Key sectors such as health 
and education rarely refer to global, regional or 
national policy frameworks for DRR. Nonetheless, 
because of the nature of their mandate, health 
sector policies and strategies in Southern Africa 
implicitly incorporate risk reduction tools and activi-
ties, undertaking risk assessments, prevention 
activities (for example, for malaria), conducting 
disease surveillance, early warning and emergency 
management.243  
An interesting angle on sectoral mainstreaming has 
taken root in the agricultural sector in several coun-
tries, where complementary planning processes on 
DRR, climate adaptation and agriculture are being 
promoted in a three-pronged approach that entails: 
(a) integrating DRR into agricultural sector plans; 
(b) designing dedicated DRR plans for the agricul-
tural sector; and (c) prioritizing agricultural risk 
management practices in national DRR strategies 
and plans (case study countries included Belize, 
Cambodia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic, Nepal, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia and 
Zimbabwe).244 This is exemplified by the Coconut 
Risk Management and Mitigation Manual for the 
Pacific Region, and related training. Supported by 
an integrated planning approach and developed by 
the Pacific Community and development partners, it 
takes into account CCA, DRR and business continu-
ity risk management in the production and market 
dimensions of this key industry for the region.245  
Space for cross fertilization among different 
government planning processes on DRR must be 
created and timelines coordinated to ensure DRR 
take-up in the different planning documents that 
have pre-set time frames such as agricultural sector 
development plans. This highlights how planning 
for DRR in a sectoral context is not an isolated 
process; it should link to and complement other 
sectoral planning processes, such as those related 
to NAPs, NDCs or similar.246 
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12.3.2 
Organization as an entry point for 
mainstreaming
For DRR mainstreaming to take root, a change in 
organizational culture is required,247 as accom-
panied by the institutionalization of risk manage-
ment process in the procedures, tools and project 
management cycle of public and private sector 
organizations.248 Examples include risk screening 
tools for sector planners, or checklists in approval 
mechanisms that integrate risk. Such measures 
facilitate the implementation of risk-informed 
projects and programmes that build disaster and 
climate resilience. The organizational entry point for 
integrating DRR into development planning is signif-
icantly determined by the organization’s broader 
institutional and governance challenges. Estab-
lished bureaucratic procedures can be very chal-
lenging to reform.249  
A lack of personnel, expertise and capacity to opera-
tionalize DRR mainstreaming has been a bottleneck 
in many countries, especially when the mainstream-
ing process moves to the subnational level.250 It is 
of paramount importance that staff are aware of 
their roles and have the commensurate technical 
and management capacity to conduct their assigned 
risk management functions and drive the main-
streaming process. To be effective, capacity devel-
opment needs to move beyond traditional training 
approaches and support more sustained changes 
in behaviour.251 Other stakeholders (e.g. civil society, 
communities, the private sector and contractors) 
need to be equipped with mainstreaming know-how, 
in addition to public planners and sectoral staff. 
The interdisciplinary nature of DRR demands that 
coordination and collaboration arrangements 
among a wide group of government and non-
government stakeholders should be established 
with roles clarified. National Platforms for Disaster 
Risk Reduction or National Disaster Risk Reduction 
Committees should be go-to mechanisms, but have 
so far been only modestly effective in promoting 
DRR mainstreaming.252 
Country experiences
While there are many mainstreaming tools and 
approaches,253 mainstreaming DRR effectively into 
planning processes and project cycles is still a chal-
lenge resulting in scattered implementation of DRR 
measures. However, there is a growing number of 
countries that have made strides in this direction. 
In Ghana, a Guidebook on Integrating Climate 
Change and Disaster Risk into National Develop-
ment, Policies and Planning was already devel-
oped in 2010. The guidebook suggests a five-step 
process to integrate CCA and DRR into the planning 
process at the district level, resulting in projects or 
programmes now being included within the district 
composite budgets.254 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
pursued DRR mainstreaming through the existing 
development planning process by way of agreed 
methodologies and organizational frameworks 
supported by DRR mainstreaming guidelines.255 
In the ASEAN region, Member States have agreed 
on a “plan–do–check–act” (PDCA) cycle for 
DRR which incorporates climate change impacts 
consisting of five stages: institutional and policy 
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+development, risk assessment, planning, implemen-
tation and reviewing.256 However, a regional study 
on risk-informed public investment planning found 
that there is not yet a sufficient or consistent level 
of attention to climate and disaster risk informa-
tion. For example, road sector public investment 
In Fiji, the Ministry of Rural and Maritime Develop-
ment formally adopted risk screening into its stan-
dard operating procedures, making it an ongoing 
requirement that eventually helped transform the 
national public sector investment programme 
managed by the Ministry of Economy.258 In Tonga, 
the Ministry of Finance and National Planning is 
piloting risk screening of development projects that 
are funded through the national budget to facili-
tate systematization of a risk-informed approach 
throughout government.259  
plans do not yet undergo a systematic environmen-
tal or social impact assessment, and cost–benefit 
analysis does not routinely cover risk scenarios by 
calculating costs and benefits with or without risk 
reduction measures.257  
A critical aspect of strengthening mainstreaming 
capacities is to encourage sharing of expertise and 
learning across actors from different backgrounds 
through joint analysis of the challenges and the 
development of context. For example, in Ethiopia, 
the Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance has 
developed a training programme for government 
and civil society organizations to mainstream DRR 
and CCA. The initiative focuses on practical learn-
ing that can be readily applied, to gradually provide 
knowledge and skills and bring together a range 
Figure 12.2. Incorporation of climate change impact in an ASEAN region PDCA cycle for DRR 
(Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency 2017)
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of participants with different expertise and from a 
variety of agencies.260  
In Uganda, a key starting point for integrated 
mainstreaming of DRR and adaptation at subdis-
trict level was sharing good practice among local 
governments. District DRM committees headed by 
the Chief District Administrative Officer brought 
together stakeholders to discuss and understand 
the potential threats, hazards, disaster-prone areas 
and identification and mobilization of resources 
to implement DRR options. The discussions drew 
on information from Uganda’s damage and loss 
database that has 30 years of historical data. The 
capacity-development approach was also comple-
mented by training local-level planning officials 
on the use of risk information in development 
planning.261 
In Kenya, the DRR mainstreaming process was 
initially championed by the Director of Planning, 
who provided decisive leadership. A system-
atic training programme on integrating DRR into 
development planning was implemented through 
the Ministry of Devolution and Planning. Partici-
pants in the training included policymakers, plan-
ning officers, DRR focal points from different line 
ministries, military and police officers, emergency 
service providers, civil society members, humanitar-
ian workers and interested members of the public. 
Of particular note is the training of County Devel-
opment Planning Officers from all 47 counties in 
Kenya, which was an important enabler of the inte-
gration of DRR into the development plans of some 
counties.262  
In Indonesia, the National Development Planning 
Agency offers two-week training for national and 
local government officials on integrating DRR and 
climate change concepts into local development 
plans.263 Other examples of training at the local level 
are found in the agricultural sector in Indonesia, 
Myanmar and the Philippines, where farmers are 
provided with location-specific weather and rainfall 
forecasts, and are trained to use this information to 
increase crop yields.264  
Establishing DRR focal points in sectoral depart-
ments as a vehicle for advancing sectoral main-
streaming has yielded mixed results globally. This 
has proved successful in a regional programme 
in the Pacific where full-time senior government 
posts were established in ministries – such as 
local government, agriculture, finance and plan-
ning, and women’s affairs – in Fiji, the Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.265 The posts were 
important for building in-house capacity to drive 
and sustain risk-informed development within 
subnational development planning. They also iden-
tified existing and new development projects that 
were at risk from disaster or climate change, or 
that could inadvertently drive risk accumulation.266 
In some cases, these posts resulted in new institu-
tional arrangements for resilience, such as the Risk 
Resilience Unit embedded in Vanuatu’s Ministry of 
Agriculture. Most of these posts were permanently 
adopted within public service within a period of one 
to two years. Initial coaching through the regional 
programme is gradually being replaced by peer to 
peer networks that enable in-country and regional 
learning. 
The expectation that National Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion Platforms would be able to advance the DRR 
mainstreaming agenda has not materialized as 
hoped. For instance, a 2013 review showed that 
more than half of the national platforms surveyed 
did not address public investment or risk trans-
fer options within their work. Only 35% assisted 
stakeholders with the integration of risk-sensitive 
256  (Maeda et al. 2018); (Japan International Cooperation 
Agency 2017)
257  (UNDP 2018c) 
258  (UNDP 2019h)
259  (Tonga 2018)
260  (Twigg 2015)
261  (UNDP 2019p)
262  (UNDP 2019e); (Omoyo Nyandiko and Omondi Rakama 2019)
263  (Maeda, Shivakoti and Prabhakar 2019)
264  (Maeda, Shivakoti and Prabhakar 2019)
265  (UNDP 2019h); (Tonga 2018); (UNDP 2019i); (UNDP 2019q)
266  (UNDP 2019h); (Tonga 2018); (UNDP 2019i)
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analysis of public investment systems and the 
use of financial mechanisms to reduce or transfer 
risk.267 However, there are numerous examples of 
cross-agency collaboration in DRR mainstream-
ing. One such example is in Ghana, where the inte-
gration of DRR and climate adaptation into district 
development plans has become a collaborative 
effort of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
NDMO and the National Development Planning 
Commission. The process began with district and 
local assemblies validating the approach and was 
followed up by systematic training. Despite such 
progress, implementation in Ghana has been chal-
lenged by limited funding at district level.268  
Cross-sectoral coordination is also being strength-
ened in the Philippines where the National Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management Council and the 
Climate Change Commission have a memorandum 
of understanding for effective cooperation and 
collaboration.269 In Viet Nam, the General Depart-
ment of Disaster Prevention and Control under the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development coor-
dinates effectively with other departments in charge 
of management of flood risks, water resources, 
agriculture and forestry within the ministry.270 Yet 
some national DRM lead agencies – that have long 
fought for adequate status and resources – find it 
difficult to “relinquish power and resources” linked 
to DRR to other departments. This has restricted 
institutional and organizational change in some 
countries.271 Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tonga and 
Vanuatu have all recognized that mainstream-
ing requires: horizontal collaboration – by linking 
central with sectoral planners across key develop-
ment sectors; vertical collaboration – by linking 
national with subnational and community levels; 
and diagonal collaboration – by linking sectors, 
including the private sector, with local and commu-
nity levels.272  
12.3.3 
Knowledge as an entry point for 
mainstreaming
Knowledge is a critical component of any main-
streaming process. The ability to make a strong 
case for the link between disaster risk and devel-
opment and to provide the evidence base for risk-
informed development hinges on having access to 
risk information and knowledge. This entry point 
also encompasses public education and aware-
ness campaigns to build a common understanding 
of why mainstreaming is important, and to secure 
the buy-in of policymakers and other stakeholders 
to mobilize the resources and capacities needed. In 
addition, DRR knowledge should be integrated into 
the curricula of schools, universities, and public and 
professional training institutes. Formal education 
and training are key entry points for mainstreaming. 
Knowledge related to risk assessment deserves 
special attention as the foundation for developing 
a shared vision of what needs to be done. Informa-
tion on the nature and extent of hazards, vulnerabili-
ties, and the magnitude and likelihood of potential 
damage and loss needs to expand from single-
hazard to multi-risk assessments to capture the 
range of intersecting threats. For example, address-
ing desertification and drought risk in Sudan needs 
solutions that take into consideration the factors 
that result in heightened competition over land and 
resources between settled cultivators and nomadic 
pastoralists.273  
Integrating risk management into development 
decision-making and the roles of development 
actors requires a good appreciation of the wider 
development context, the political economy and 
how it supports or hinders DRR.274 As outlined 
above, effective mainstreaming of DRR requires a 
sustained commitment that needs to be nurtured 
over time. The ability to evaluate the impact of DRR 
integration through good monitoring and evalua-
tion systems is therefore vital, albeit challenging, 
because measuring the avoided or reduced risk is 
not an easy task.275 Monitoring compliance with 
legal frameworks, including land-use regulations 
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and building codes, can provide an insight into how 
DRR measures can make a difference. However, 
blurred lines of accountability between the many 
stakeholders involved often hampers such monitor-
ing and compliance.276 
Country experiences
In the ASEAN region, most countries have prepared 
hazard and risk maps for floods, storms and land-
slides. However, the scale, including topographic 
data, often does not provide enough information 
for detailed quantitative risk assessment, land-use 
planning, evacuation planning and the design of 
prevention and mitigation measures. 
Several countries are integrating climate change 
impacts when developing risk maps. For example, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Viet Nam are using climate data downscaled from 
global climate models for risk mapping and plan-
ning for DRR and CCA. However, countries are also 
struggling to use this type of climate risk informa-
tion due to the high level of uncertainty of global 
climate projections and a lack of standardized 
guidelines for incorporating the information into 
planning and implementation processes.277 
Several countries have made impressive progress 
in the application of risk information in policy and 
planning processes. The Rwanda National Risk 
Atlas provides a comprehensive assessment of 
existing risks at the national and local level across 
the country’s 30 districts.278 The atlas features 
sex-disaggregated data on population exposure 
to risks related to earthquakes, landslides, storms 
and drought. Since its launch in 2015, the risk atlas 
has shaped the government’s DRR agenda and has 
contributed to updating the national and district 
land-use master plans, the Rwanda Building Code 
and district development plans.279  
Uganda has also recognized that building a credible 
risk knowledge base is a driving force for change at 
policy and local levels. Since 2013, the government 
has developed hazard, vulnerability and risk profiles 
for all of the country’s 112 districts. Apart from 
informing public investment decisions and national 
and local development planning, they also feed into 
contingency planning and preparedness measures. 
In 2017, the government further systemized its 
risk assessment work through the National Disas-
ter Risk and Vulnerability Atlas, which will shape 
the second National Development Plan. The atlas 
focuses on seven major hydrometeorological and 
geological hazards, and is complemented by online 
and offline data-sharing mechanisms.280  
Making hazard, land-use and vulnerability data 
freely accessible to increase awareness of policy-
makers and citizens alike is a feature of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Analysis 
System, which maps high-risk areas using a GIS.281 
This risk information has been applied in cost–
benefit analysis to help make the economic ratio-
nale for public and private sector investment in DRR 
and to support consideration of alternative interven-
tions.282 In the ASEAN region, countries have yet to 
start quantitatively assessing the effects of DRR 
and CCA measures on economic performance.283 
Countries participating in the Pacific Risk Resilience 
Programme are conducting risk governance needs 
assessments, which have been instrumental in 
267  (UNISDR 2013a)
268  (UNISDR 2017d)
269  (Maeda et al. 2018)
270  (Maeda et al. 2018) 
271  (Aysan and Lavell 2015)
272  (UNDP 2019h); (Tonga 2018); (UNDP 2019i); (UNDP 
2019q)
273  (Aysan and Lavell 2015)
274  (UNDP 2019h)
275  (Aysan and Lavell 2015); (World Bank 2017); (Mitchell 2003)
276  (Planitz 2015)
277  (Maeda, Shivakoti and Prabhakar 2019)
278  (MIDIMAR 2015)
279  (UNDP 2017a)
280  (UNDP 2019p)
281  (UNDP 2018a)
282  (UNDP 2019c)
283  (Maeda, Shivakoti and Prabhakar 2019); 
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aligning the leadership at all levels in support of the 
respective countries’ risk reduction priorities.284 The 
programme also conducts risk assessments; these 
are not pursued as a stand-alone activity, but build 
on pre-existing community priorities, identifying the 
risks with the greatest potential impact as priorities 
for action.285  
The spatial and temporal complexity of multiple 
hazards requires sector-specific risk assessments 
that can consider highly localized extensive risk, as 
well as a broader range of hazard types to which 
a particular sector may be exposed. Private utili-
ties are often at the forefront when it comes to risk 
assessment and taking measures to protect their 
services. However, the information and know-how 
are rarely shared with other private or public sector 
entities.286  
12.3.4 
Stakeholders as an entry point for 
mainstreaming
Although governments have the primary respon-
sibility to prevent and reduce risk, the Sendai 
Framework states what is well established, that 
DRR requires an all-of-society engagement and 
partnership if it is to be effective.287 Private sector 
investment has long surpassed that of the public 
sector, and with it the greater potential to generate 
risk.288 Likewise, actions and decisions at house-
hold and community level can contribute to the 
accumulation of risk, although finding the means 
to meaningfully involve such stakeholders in risk 
management can be a hurdle. Government is also 
made up of a myriad of sectors and departments, 
interests, powers and knowledge bases that need 
to be well understood to be effectively deployed 
in the process. Decision makers, legislators and 
administrators at national, sectoral and local levels 
must also set the necessary regulations and exer-
cise their coordination and oversight functions to 
ensure implementation and compliance. It is criti-
cal that governments set the enabling environment 
and provide incentives for the engagement of other 
stakeholders in the risk management process. 
Ultimately, such engagement promotes broader 
ownership and sustainability of mainstreaming 
efforts and related DRR measures. 
As DRR mainstreaming needs to be driven from 
within the development sector, the proactive 
involvement of development actors is needed. 
Although national disaster management authori-
ties have been indispensable for paving the way 
and advocating for mainstreaming, most countries 
have been able to make significant progress only 
after getting the full engagement of development, 
planning and finance ministries. This ensures a 
more holistic approach with explicit linkages to 
development planning and implementation at all 
levels. Involving a country’s development planning 
system helps to overcome obstacles linked to hori-
zontal and vertical integration of DRR, as well as 
mainstreaming DRR more systematically by way 
of cooperative goal definition, planning and action. 
This ambition is a long-term, incremental process 
towards risk-informed development that requires 
strengthening incentive systems to cooperate with 
others on shared tasks. Since the role of many tradi-
tional DRM institutions is still in need of support, a 
two-track approach is recommended that also helps 
consolidate and strengthen the legitimacy and 
accountability of national DRM authorities or civil 
protection agencies.
Communities play a key role in terms of their local 
knowledge, articulating social demands for DRR 
measures, and ultimately implementing these. 
Distinct attention must be placed on involving all 
members that make up a community, including 
women, youth, older persons, minority and margin-
alized groups, and persons with disabilities. The 
mainstreaming process cannot be separated from 
gender and other social factors that determine 
vulnerabilities, capacities and exposure to natural 
hazards. Civil society organizations are indispens-
able as intermediaries between government and 
communities, as service deliverers and as activists. 
Within the private sector, some companies have 
been observed to go beyond social responsibil-
ity considerations recognizing DRR as a means to 
ensure competitiveness and business continuity in 
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the event of a disaster.289 But the short-term busi-
ness focus of some companies and sectors still 
stands in the way of long-term sustainability in DRR. 
For example, maximizing income at the expense of 
fragile ecosystems is unfortunately still the norm in 
many sectors.290 Many businesses do not consider 
their exposure to risk, and face losses every year, 
even in high-income countries.291 However aware-
ness is growing within governments and busi-
ness sectors of the need to strengthen disaster 
and climate resilience of their own businesses and 
those of their suppliers, including SMEs. This has 
been notable in South-East Asia, particularly since 
the 2011 Bangkok floods.292 
Other key stakeholders include academia and 
research institutions, as well as the media in terms 
of its role in fostering awareness, transparency, and 
influencing decision makers and the wider public, 
while noting that ill-informed media may also be 
harmful. Partnerships and networks can be effec-
tive in bringing together multiple actors. Their 
respective comparative advantages, skills, experi-
ences and resources can be pooled, and can help 
connect sectors and overcome institutional silos. 
Country experiences
Lessons from mainstreaming DRR in the agricul-
tural sector emphasize that the process must tran-
scend government boundaries and involve other 
stakeholders such as academia, NGOs and people 
at risk such as farmers.293 In the Solomon Islands, 
for example, community knowledge hubs were initi-
ated to improve communication between farming 
communities and government extension workers, 
thus providing a platform for regular information 
exchange and training on climate resil ience 
crops.294  
An interesting example of private sector involve-
ment was pursued in Fiji’s Northern Division when 
one of the first risk-screened capital projects was 
implemented in the road sector. In addition to 
addressing the risks to, and from, the road project 
in each and every phase of the project manage-
ment cycle, the contractors received targeted risk 
management instructions to fully understand the 
rationale behind risk-informed road construction. As 
this is one of many publicly financed initiatives, over 
time, this approach is expected to positively affect 
practice throughout the construction sector.295 
In the municipalities of Paraná in Brazil, the Univer-
sity Center for Studies and Research on Disasters 
has promoted the Making Cities Resilient (MCR) 
Campaign as a means to strengthen risk manage-
ment capacities. The University Centre has started 
a network of 23 public and private sector institu-
tions at state, federal and international level, called 
REDESASTRE. It is the first thematic network offi-
cially established in Brazil to promote coopera-
tion and scientific and technological exchange on 
reducing disaster risk. Thanks to its pluralistic 
composition, the network has proved a success 
and a valuable resource to over 80% of municipali-
ties in Paraná seeking to promote resilience in their 
cities.296  
284  (UNDP 2017b)
285  (UNDP 2019h)
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12.3.5 
Finance as an entry point for mainstreaming
The issue of funding needs to be approached with 
an awareness of the scale of change required to 
move towards risk-informed sustainable develop-
ment, and the challenges countries face where 
resources are scarce and everyday decisions 
must be made about where to spend precious 
budget allocations. Many countries report financial 
constraints as the main barrier to mainstreaming 
and that these explain the lack of progress in reduc-
ing underlying risks nationally and locally.298 The low 
level of financing reflects a lack of overall means 
in many countries, but it also reflects perceptions 
and priorities of governments and donors on where 
investment should be made. Historically invest-
ment that supports long-term resilience tends to 
lose out to investment focused on shorter-term 
goals. Amplifying long-standing arguments that risk 
reduction is a better public investment than disas-
ter recovery and reconstruction, the World Bank 
provides evidence – in respect of infrastructure 
– of how resources can be optimized if spending 
is undertaken strategically and from a systems 
perspective.299  
Financing for prospective DRM can be pursued 
through development processes such as infra-
structure investments through detailed engi-
neering design and planning; this can entail little 
incremental expense (on average 4.5%), for as 
long as regulation is strong enough to mandate 
and monitor these requirements.300 Strengthening 
financial mechanisms for DRR remains important. 
So too, understanding the resources the public 
sector invests in risk reduction, and the relationship 
among earmarked budgets and allocations internal 
to ministerial or agency budgets. The latter is not 
always straightforward, as risk reduction measures 
are not always clearly labelled as such, take invest-
ment in forestry management in areas exposed to 
high levels of landslide risk for example. 
Having dedicated budget lines for DRR within 
sectoral budgets is one of the most promising 
approaches for integrating DRR in national and local 
budgetary systems. As an intermediate measure, it 
may be necessary to establish dedicated funds for 
Water scarcity has been a persistent problem 
in the Ha’apai Islands, negatively affect-
ing people’s health, crop yield and livestock 
productivity. It was therefore not surprising 
that community consultations to draw up 
risk-informed community development plans 
identified water supply as the top priority. 
Site selection, safe access to water at night 
for women, and accessibility of persons with 
disabilities and older persons were among 
some of the issues discussed and solutions 
identified. 
The pool ing of  technical  and f inancial 
resources from a wide range of partners 
increased the purchasing power to obtain 
new water tanks and overcome the logistical 
challenges of transporting equipment to 
isolated islands. Drawing upon local volun-
teers and engineers ensured that capacity to 
implement and maintain the project was kept 
local. Low-technology equipment and training 
of village committees also helped strengthen 
the communities’ technical capacities to cope. 
As a result of this bottom-up mainstreaming 
initiative, the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning has started to make decisions based 
on the community needs and priorities outlined 
in community development plans. The ministry 
has also started to pilot risk screening of devel-
opment projects funded through the national 
budget in a top-down process that contrib-
utes to further systematizing the risk-informed 
approach throughout government.297 
Case study: Community-driven mainstreaming in the Ha’apai Islands, Tonga
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DRR, or to allocate a portion of such funds for risk 
reduction, as is done in the Philippines.
Dedicated funding has yielded good results in 
some countries, but may also be a disincentive for 
While not a focus of this GAR, as noted in Chapter 10, 
risk transfer mechanisms are receiving increasing 
attention as a means to manage shocks incurred 
when residual risk is realized – risks that are not, 
or cannot be reduced through risk management 
sectoral ministries and agencies to allocate their 
own resources, unless it is possible to trace their 
allocations through budget tagging, as the Philip-
pines is doing for mainstreamed climate change 
expenditure.301 
measures, or that may not be cost-effective to 
reduce further. Access to and deployment of 
disaster risk financing mechanisms is becoming 
an increasingly popular option for governments 
seeking to manage such risk, especially from large 
297  (UNDP 2019n)
298  (Aysan and Lavell 2015)
299  (Rozenberg and Fay 2019)
300  (UNDP 2018c)
301  (Alampay et al. 2017)
302  (Philippines 2010a)
The Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Act 2010 (DRRM Act)302 has 
detailed provisions on risk reduction budgets:
Case study: Risk reduction budget in the Philippines
The Act (s.22) and the Implementing Rules 
and Regulations also authorize all government 
agencies to use a portion of their appropria-
tions on DRRM projects in line with the National 
DRRM Council guidance and in coordination 
with the Department of Budget (Act s.5, Rule 
19).
• Under the DRRM Act, the national budget 
for DRRM is appropriated under the annual 
General Appropriations Act, and is known as 
the National DRRM Fund. The amount must 
be approved by the President. The DRRM 
Act specifies that, of the amount appropri-
ated for the National DRRM Fund, 30% is 
allocated as a Quick Response Fund for 
relief and recovery and the remaining 70% 
can be used for broader DRR, preparedness 
and recovery activities (Act s.22).
• The DRRM Act also requires local govern-
ments to establish local DRRM funds by 
setting aside at least 5% of their revenue 
from regular sources, to support all types of 
DRRM activities: 
 о Of the Local DRRM Fund, 30% is 
automatically allocated as a Quick 
Response Fund for relief and recovery 
programmes.
 о The remaining 70% can be used for 
pre-disaster measures. This Local 
DRRM Fund may also be used to pay 
premiums on calamity insurance (Act 
s.21).
• State budget for DRRM also includes the 
Office of Civil Defense annual budget allo-
cation, provided for in the DRRM Act (s.23). 
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and infrequent events.303 Such mechanisms are 
made increasingly available through international 
and regional mechanisms, including a range of 
tailored insurance products for sovereign risk; as 
discussed in Chapter 8 in respect of Sendai Frame-
work Target F on international cooperation, and in 
Chapter 10 on regional initiatives (see section 10.1). 
As elucidated in previous GARs, engineering risk-
informed investment by the private sector is argu-
ably the key to effective risk reduction. There is 
important work to be done on how governments 
can create incentives to engage and mobilize the 
private sector more fully in this joint enterprise, 
for example through the lens of business continu-
ity, or in encouraging risk-reducing behaviour in the 
capital markets – “green bonds” for climate-resil-
ient investment that are subject to voluntary prin-
ciples within the capital markets framework,304 for 
instance.
The featured case study prior to Part I of this GAR, 
on SME disaster resilience in the Philippines, illus-
trates how in recognizing the benefits to efficient 
operations, the country’s major businesses have 
invested in disaster resilience of supply chains 
through the Philippine Disaster Resilience Founda-
tion. This mechanism collaborates with the govern-
ment to provide training on business continuity 
planning and capacity-building. The increasing use 
of public–private partnerships to build new infra-
structure provides governments the opportunity to 
steer or incentivise investment that prevents the 
creation of new risk, thereby enhancing the quality 
and resilience of the built environment.305 
Public resource allocation is influenced by compet-
ing plans, policies and pressures that are present 
during the bureaucratic process of preparing budget 
proposals and the political process of approving 
them. This calls for careful analysis of the poten-
tial to leverage resources to attract private, public 
and international finance (which is especially rele-
vant for national disaster management authori-
ties, climate services or similar). A shift is required 
in the determination of what constitutes a “good” 
investment. Investments that truly pursue the soci-
etal sustainability and resilience outcomes of the 
post-2015 agreements must consider the wider 
risks emanating from the interaction of human 
and ecological systems. Especially, as the conse-
quences of failing to do so will have potentially 
more widespread and less foreseeable impacts, as 
interactions among social, ecological, economic 
and political systems intensify.
In summary, governments can choose from a 
range of financing options that include ex post 
measures such as tax increases, donor assistance, 
raising debt and budget reallocation. Other options 
include risk transfer, contingent financing and 
reserve funds. The potential of private sector invest-
ment in risk reduction has yet to be harnessed. 
The conversation on how to achieve risk-informed 
development through more efficient investment 
of the available resources using a systems-based 
approach is only just beginning.
Country experiences
Governments are increasingly creating internal 
mechanisms to ensure public investment in new 
development is vetted for its risk-reducing or risk-
generating impacts. Examples include the Minis-
tries of Finance in Fiji, Peru, Tajikistan, Tonga and 
Uzbekistan, which have recognized the need to 
align public investment decisions more closely 
with a strong understanding of disaster risk and its 
potential economic impacts.306 The implementation 
of public investment rules in Costa Rica, Peru and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia are good examples 
of how mainstreaming can go beyond pure declara-
tions of intent.307 
In general, budgetary allocations for DRR and CCA 
are found to be insufficient, and the funding gap 
between the plans and implementation is increas-
ing. A study on the agricultural sector found that 
dedicated funding for DRR in agriculture was diffi-
cult to obtain, unless this was backed by legislation 
or mandatory allocations for DRR across sectors. 
But there are exceptions, such as in the case of 
Cambodia; in 2017, the national budget indicated 
a considerable increase of the Ministry of Agri-
culture’s budget for climate adaptation from $23 
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million to $247 million, which directly contributed to 
flood control and drought management measures. 
In the ASEAN region, countries have taken initiatives 
to establish dedicated disaster funds to finance 
disaster prevention and climate adaptation. Also, 
national climate adaptation funds, such as the Indo-
nesia Climate Change Trust Fund and the Philip-
pine People’s Survival Fund, have promoted local 
adaptation and disaster resilience projects in water 
resources management, land, ecosystems conser-
vation and EWSs.308  
For subnational financing of DRR, the Government 
of Viet Nam piloted a mechanism to link DRR and 
climate adaptation plans to the annual provincial 
budget process and targets. The approach was 
rolled out in eight high-risk provinces and reached 
more than 8,000 people, of whom over 50% were 
women, and is now being scaled up in more than 
1,700 communes.309 In Cuba, municipalities are inte-
grating DRR into the investment planning process. 
Every public entity is legally obliged to include 
actions to reduce risk in its economic planning. The 
National Civil Defense authority carries out regular 
inspections, and when DRR is not fully integrated in 
the local investment planning, a mandatory action 
plan is recommended for implementation by munic-
ipal governments within a certain time frame.310  
As noted in the Philippines case study above, a 
mandated funding pool of 5% of local govern-
ment budget for DRR and management activities 
in the Philippines has strengthened the capacity 
of local governments in prevention and mitigation 
measures.311 Indonesia also has a sophisticated 
legal framework that sets out the principles to 
ensure DRR is factored into national and regional 
budgets, as part of the overall disaster manage-
ment funding structure. The complexity of the 
system means that it is difficult to track and assess 
the budgeting and funding flows for DRR, and the 
actual investments in DRR are probably higher as 
many activities are “embedded” within other sectors 
and not identified as disaster management/DRR 
related.312 However, tracking of public expenditure 
on DRM is a useful exercise to review how public 
funds are spent by governments across sectors 
nationally and/or subnationally, and what was 
achieved as a result. 
A Disaster Risk Management Public Expenditure 
and Institutional Review conducted by UNDP in 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and 
Viet Nam found that expenditure in support of 
DRM appeared to be low in relation to GDP and 
total budget expenditure in the three countries.313 
However, estimated expenditure on DRM-related 
activities was higher than that estimated for climate 
change investments in a similar review on climate 
change expenditures in Thailand and Viet Nam. 
Expenditure on DRM-relevant activities was concen-
trated in a small number of similar ministries and 
agencies across each of the three countries. These 
ministries included those responsible for agricul-
ture, irrigation, natural resources, environment and 
construction. DRM-relevant expenditure that was 
specifically focused on activities related to DRM 
policy, community awareness, capacity-building, 
early warning and research, was very small and 
usually embedded as components in other projects 
and investments.
While its ability to support prospective risk manage-
ment is under-optimized, leveraging the private re/
insurance industry and capital markets can afford 
some degree of fiscal protection in disaster-prone 
economies. Examples of regional parametric insur-
ance schemes were highlighted in section 10.1, but 
303  (Alton, Mahul and Benson 2017)
304  (International Capital Market Association 2019)
305  (World Bank 2018)
306  (UNDP 2019h); (UNISDR 2017d)
307  (Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2015); (UNDP 2019d); 
(Peru, Office of the Director-General of Public Investment, 
Ministry of Economics and Finance 2016)
308  (Maeda, Shivakoti and Prabhakar 2019)
309  (Digregorio and Teufers 2019)
310  (UNDP 2017a)
311  (Maeda, Shivakoti and Prabhakar 2019); (Philippines 
2010)
312  (IFRC 2016a) 
313  (Lavell et al. n.d.); (Abbott 2018)
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national schemes are also emerging. Parametric 
insurance is a financing tool for governments to 
transfer their rising climate and disaster risk to the 
international insurance markets. It allows for fast 
payouts in the wake of disaster, triggered by agreed 
parameters, which are correlated with insured 
damages, financial losses or funding needs. 
The introduction of the Turkish Catastrophe Insur-
ance Pool in 2000 has resulted in 47% of dwellings 
having compulsory earthquake coverage.314 Other 
sovereign risk transfer options include Mexico’s 
Catastrophe (“CAT”) bonds, which allow the govern-
ment to transfer a pool of disaster risk to the capital 
markets.315  
In the Philippines, the parametric insurance scheme 
covers 25 provinces. Mexico’s committee for 
response to national disasters and emergencies 
(CADENA in its Spanish title) has established an 
agriculture pool that offers more traditional live-
stock insurance and crop area-linked index insur-
ance. For such financing mechanisms to work 
effectively, they need to be built on thorough 
national and regional level risk information. This 
is also the approach of the Risk Assessment and 
Financing Program in the South-West Indian Ocean, 
which is led by the Prime Minister's Office and the 
Ministry of Finance in Madagascar.316  
12.4 
Conclusions 
The clear relationship between risk from natural 
and man-made hazards and risks to and from 
development is the core rationale for integrating 
DRR into development planning and budgeting. 
Unless nations accelerate their efforts to curb the 
development-based drivers of risk, sustainable 
development may not be possible, and certainly 
not achievable by 2030. However, recognition of 
the need to address these development-based risk 
drivers, and to accept that disaster impacts are an 
indicator of unsustainable development, have yet 
to permeate conventional DRR and development 
policy and practice. As described previously in this 
GAR, especially in Chapter 2, this requires a new 
understanding of risk in the interactions between 
the environment and human-made systems, and a 
shift towards systems-based thinking in risk reduc-
tion within mainstream policymaking at practice.
There has been some progress in DRR mainstream-
ing through a range of entry points such as policy, 
organizations, knowledge, stakeholder engage-
ment and finance. However, several key challenges 
remain. The capacities and skills to drive main-
streaming and risk reduction processes over a suffi-
cient length of time are still not adequate. Despite 
many innovative financing mechanisms and regu-
latory advancements, bottlenecks persist in financ-
ing the effort required to achieve the risk reduction 
goals that countries have set for themselves, includ-
ing those enshrined in their global commitments 
under the Sendai Framework, Paris Agreement, 
2030 Agenda and other global frameworks. 
Setting the right incentives to engage key stakehold-
ers in a meaningful way, including communities at 
risk and the private sector, is not a new challenge, 
but is one that requires genuine action. There are 
still gaps in generating and making accessible risk 
information, the related tools that are able to gener-
ate disaggregated and geospatial data down to the 
lowest level of analysis, and also in understanding 
the vulnerability of human systems to cascading 
and systemic risk.
314  (UNDP 2018b)
315  (International Capital Market Association 2019)
316  (Andriamanalinarivo, Falyb and Randriamanalina 2019)
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13.1 
Disaster and 
development risks 
from climate change
13.1.1 
Risk from climate change is profound and 
urgent responses are needed
Current national commitments to reduce GHG 
emissions and otherwise mitigate global warming 
under the Paris Agreement will not contain global 
warming within 2°C above pre-industrial levels, let 
alone the preferred containment within 1.5°C. The 
IPCC SR1.5 projects that, based on Member States’ 
current NDCs, the climate system is heading off 
track into the territory of 2.9°C to 3.4°C warming.317 
If this happens, it would take future hydrometeo-
rological hazard extremes well outside the known 
range of current experience and alter the loss and 
damage equations and fragility curves of almost all 
known human and natural systems, placing them at 
unknown levels of risk. This would render current 
strategies for CCA and DRR, in most countries, 
virtually obsolete. It also means that it is no longer 
sufficient to address adaptation in isolation from 
development planning, and that sustainable socio-
economic development, by definition, must include 
mitigation of global warming.
The IPCC SR1.5 and its Fifth Assessment Report 
(published in 2014)318 have also reiterated that 
Chapter 13: 
Integration between 
disaster risk reduction 
and national climate 
change adaptation 
strategies and plans 
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global warming triggers climate change effects 
that are not linear. This is based on multiple lines of 
evidence, including on observations already made 
in recent decades and on the projections of a range 
of different global climate models about future 
effects. So even if global warming is contained 
within the range of 1.5°C to 2°C, there will be very 
significant health and socioeconomic effects due 
to increasing average temperatures. In addition, 
and significantly for understanding and reducing 
risk, humanity now faces the current reality and the 
future prospect of more-extreme and much higher 
frequency “natural” hazards – extremes of cold to 
heat-waves, longer and more sustained drought, 
more intense and more frequent storm events, 
heavier rainfall and more flooding. This means that 
the line between DRR and CCA, if indeed such a 
line ever existed, is no longer possible to discern. 
Climate change is by no means the only source of 
disaster risk. As the foregoing parts of this GAR 
have emphasized, risks arise from a range of other 
natural, environmental, biological and technologi-
cal hazards and drivers. Climate change is increas-
ing the risk of disaster – amplifying existing risk 
and creating new risks including the direct conse-
quences of a warming planet – with cascading 
consequences in the short, medium and long term.
In this sense, CCA can be characterized as essen-
tially a subset of DRR. Climate mitigation can also 
be understood as a subset of development plan-
ning.319 The main policy implication, within the risk 
framework of this GAR, is that at a minimum, CCA 
needs to be integrated with DRR, and that govern-
ments need to move to a coherent policy approach 
that sees both of these risk reduction measures as 
integral to planning for sustainable development.
This situation has become much clearer since the 
Sendai Framework was agreed in 2015. There is also 
no obligation on Member States to divide their policy 
formulation and implementation according to the 
scope of different international agreements negoti-
ated along thematic lines. Accordingly, this chapter 
is an account of a range of country policy practices 
on integration of CCA and DRR. It also gives some 
examples of fuller integration into development plan-
ning and an exhortation to governments to explore 
more fully the efficiency and effectiveness benefits 
of taking a systems-based approach to disaster and 
climate risk management.
13.1.2 
International framework
As part of the processes and mechanisms under 
the 1992 UNFCCC,320 the Paris Agreement estab-
lished a global goal on adaptation of enhanc-
ing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience 
and reducing vulnerability to climate change. It 
seeks to contribute to sustainable development 
and ensure an adequate adaptation response in 
the context of the temperature goal referred to in 
Article 2: “Holding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recog-
nizing that this would significantly reduce the risks 
and impacts of climate change.” 321 
In the years before the Paris Agreement, during the 
climate negotiations, and since 2015, there has been 
considerable debate about the likely differences in 
impact between warming of 1.5°C and 2°C, focus-
ing on the capacity and scope for adaptation. Since 
1990, this debate has included a strong message 
from the Alliance of Small Island States322  that 
containment of warming within 1.5°C was essen-
tial for socioeconomic survival of its members, 
and in many cases their physical existence, due to 
projected sea-level rise and other climate change 
impacts.323  
As the United Nations body for assessing the 
science related to climate change, IPCC was 
created in 1988, to provide policymakers with 
regular scientific assessments on climate change, 
its implications and potential future risks, as well as 
to put forward adaptation and mitigation options. 
Its assessment reports, based on the work of a 
large network of experts globally, have long been 
familiar to policymakers in the fields of environ-
mental protection and hydrometeorology.324 Its 
work is also now widely recognized as relevant to 
356 Chapter 13
319  (Kelman 2015)
320  (UNFCCC 1992)
321  (United Nations 2015b)
322  (Alliance of Small Island States 2019)
323  (Thomas, Schleussner and Kumar 2018)
324  (United Nations General Assembly 1988)
325  (IPCC 2014) 
326  (IPCC 2012)
327  (IPCC 2018)
328  (Centre for Science and Environment 2018)
329  (IPCC 2018; summary based on input from Wilfran Moufouma-
Okia, IPCC)
policymakers concerned with the broader agendas 
of development planning and DRR. 
The last major synthesis report of the IPCC, the 
Fifth Assessment Report, was published in 2014,325 
and was informed by research undertaken for the 
2012 Special Report on Managing the Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation.326 These remain current and 
relevant resources. The 2018 IPCC SR1.5 is signifi-
cant in that it addresses the probable differences in 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C compared with 
2°C, specifically “in the context of strengthening the 
global response to the threat of climate change, 
sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate 
poverty.”327 It is a compelling new resource that 
makes it clear that addressing climate change 
mitigation and adaptation is an urgent global and 
national priority for DRR strategies as part of plan-
ning for risk-informed socioeconomic develop-
ment, in particular that containing global warming 
within 1.5°C will reduce the impacts significantly 
compared with 2°C warming.328 Relevant highlights 
of IPCC SR1.5 are considered here as an essential 
context for addressing questions of disaster and 
climate risk at national policy level.
13.1.3 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Special Report 2018 – Global Warming of 1.5°C
The IPCC SR1.5 highlights that the global climate 
has already changed relative to the pre-industrial 
period and that these changes have affected organ-
isms and ecosystems, as well as human systems 
and well-being.329 Human activities have already 
caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming 
above pre-industrial levels, which has led to multiple 
observed changes including more extreme weather, 
frequent heat-waves in most land regions, increased 
frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events, 
increased risk of drought in the Mediterranean 
region, rising sea levels and diminishing Arctic sea 
ice. If global warming continues at the current rate of 
0.2°C per decade, the surface of the planet will warm 
by 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels between 2030 
and 2052, provoking further non-linear change with 
potentially increasingly systemic consequences. 
Future climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, 
food security, water supply, human security and 
economic growth depend on the rate, peak and 
duration of warming, but risks to natural and human 
systems are expected to be lower at 1.5°C than 
at 2°C of global warming. Future risks at 1.5°C 
of global warming will depend on the mitigation 
pathway and on the possible occurrence of a “tran-
sient overshoot” (i.e. if the increase goes above 
1.5°C but later returns to the 1.5°C level). The 
impacts on natural and human systems would be 
greater if mitigation pathways cause such a tempo-
rary overshoot above 1.5°C warming and then return 
to 1.5°C later in the century, as compared with 
pathways that stabilize at 1.5°C without an over-
shoot. That is, it is far preferable to ensure that the 
increase does not ever exceed 1.5°C warming. This 
would avoid climate change impacts on sustain-
able development, and support efforts to eradicate 
poverty and reduce inequalities, if mitigation and 
adaptation synergies are maximized while trade-
offs are minimized.
Some aspects of climate risk most relevant to adap-
tation strategies at national level – and which also 
highlight the urgency of integrating climate change 
mitigation into all development strategies to avoid 
these risks eventuating in their more extreme forms 
– are highlighted in Box 13.1.
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Box 13.1. IPCC SR1.5 – key climate risks relevant to national adaptation and risk 
reduction strategies
Extreme hazard events
• Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would 
limit risks of increases in heavy precipita-
tion events on a global scale and in several 
regions, and reduce risks associated with 
water availability and extreme drought. 
• Human exposure to increased flooding is 
projected to be substantially lower at 1.5°C 
than at 2°C of global warming, although 
projected changes create regionally differ-
entiated risks. 
Impacts on ecosystems and species important 
for human food and livelihoods
• Constraining global warming to 1.5°C, 
rather than to 2°C and higher, is projected 
to have many benefits for terrestrial and 
wetland ecosystems and for the preserva-
tion of their services to humans.
• Risks for natural and managed ecosystems 
are higher on drylands than on humid lands. 
• If global warming can be limited to 1.5°C, 
the impacts on biodiversity and ecosys-
tems and on terrestrial, freshwater and 
coastal ecosystems are projected to be 
lower than at 2°C of global warming. 
• Limit ing global  warming to 1.5°C is 
projected to reduce risks to marine biodi-
versity, fisheries and ecosystems, and their 
functions and services to humans, as illus-
trated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice 
and warm-water coral reef ecosystems. 
• Risks of local species losses and, conse-
quently, risks of extinction are much less in 
a 1.5°C versus a 2°C warmer world. 
Agriculture and fisheries 
• Limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared 
with 2°C, is projected to result in smaller 
net reductions in yields of maize, rice, 
wheat and potentially other cereal crops, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, South-
East Asia, and Central and South America. 
• Reductions in projected food availability 
are larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global 
warming in the Sahel, Southern Africa, the 
Mediterranean, Central Europe and the 
Amazon.
• Fisheries and aquaculture are important to 
global food security but are already facing 
increasing risks from ocean warming and 
acidification. These risks are projected to 
increase at 1.5°C of global warming and 
affect key organisms such as fin fish and 
oysters, especially at low latitudes. 
Human health
• Every extra bit of warming matters for 
human health, especially because warming 
of 1.5°C or higher increases the risk asso-
ciated with long-lasting or irreversible 
changes. 
• Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 
2°C for heat-related morbidity and mortality, 
and for ozone-related mortality if emissions 
that lead to ozone formation remain high. 
• Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts 
of heat-waves in cities. 
• Risks for some vector-borne diseases, such 
as malaria and dengue fever, are projected 
to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 
2°C, including potential shifts in their 
geographic range.
(Source: IPCC SR1.5 2018)
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with present-day levels and increase further 
at 2°C, limiting adaptation opportunities 
and increasing loss and damage. 
• Impacts associated with sea-level rise and 
changes to the salinity of coastal ground-
water, increased flooding and damage 
to infrastructure are projected to be criti-
cally important in vulnerable environments, 
such as small islands, low-lying coasts and 
deltas, at global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C. 
• Projections of increased frequency of the 
most intense storms at 1.5°C and higher 
warming levels are a significant cause 
for concern, making adaptation a matter 
of survival. In the Caribbean islands for 
instance, extreme weather linked to tropical 
storms and hurricanes represent one of the 
largest risks facing nations. Non-economic 
damages include detr imental  health 
impacts, forced displacement and destruc-
tion of cultural heritages. 
• Small-scale fisheries in tropical regions, 
which are acutely dependent on habitat 
provided by coastal ecosystems such as 
coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass and kelp 
forests, are expected to face growing risks 
at 1.5°C of warming because of loss of 
habitat.
Small islands 
• Small islands are projected to experience 
multiple interrelated risks at 1.5°C of global 
warming, which will increase with warming 
of 2°C and higher levels. Climate hazards at 
1.5°C are projected to be lower than those 
at 2°C. 
• Long-term risks of coastal flooding and 
impacts on populations, infrastructure and 
assets, freshwater stress, and risks across 
marine ecosystems and critical sectors are 
projected to increase at 1.5°C compared 
Regional differences in impacts
• Climate models anticipate robust regional 
climate differences within global warming. 
For instance, temperature increases in sub-
Saharan Africa are projected to be higher 
than the global mean temperature increase. 
• The differences in the risks among regions 
are also strongly influenced by local socio-
economic conditions. Depending on future 
socioeconomic conditions, limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C, compared to 2°C, may 
reduce the proportion of the world’s popula-
tion exposed to a climate-change-induced 
increase in water stress by up to 50%, 
although there is considerable variability 
among regions. Regions with particularly 
large benefits could include the Mediter-
ranean and the Caribbean. However, socio-
economic drivers are expected to have a 
greater influence on these risks than the 
changes in climate. 
Economic growth
• Risks to global aggregated economic 
growth due to climate change impacts are 
projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C 
by the end of this century. 
• The largest reductions in economic growth 
at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of warming are 
projected for low- and middle-income coun-
tries and regions (the African continent, 
South-East Asia, Brazil, India and Mexico). 
• Countries in the tropics and southern hemi-
sphere subtropics are projected to expe-
rience the largest impacts on economic 
growth due to climate change should global 
warming increase from 1.5°C to 2°C.
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In response to the projected climate risks, the range 
of climate mitigation and adaptation actions that 
can be deployed in the short run are well known. 
These include: low-emission technologies, new 
infrastructure and energy efficiency measures in 
buildings, industry and transport; transformation of 
fiscal structures; reallocation of investments and 
human resources towards low-emission assets; 
sustainable land and water management; ecosys-
tem restoration; enhancement of adaptive capaci-
ties to climate risks and impacts; DRR; research and 
development; and mobilization of new, traditional 
and indigenous knowledge.
Strengthening the capacities for climate action of 
national and subnational authorities, civil society, 
the private sector, indigenous peoples and local 
communities can support the implementation 
of ambitious actions implied by limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C. International cooperation can 
provide an enabling environment for this to be 
achieved in all countries and for all people, in the 
context of sustainable development. 
It is now clear that human health and welfare, 
national socioeconomic development in most coun-
tries globally, and the global systems of food produc-
tion and trade are likely to be affected negatively by 
climate change, even if global warming is contained 
within 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The extent 
and intensity of climatological hazards is also set 
to increase, leading to more risk of disasters, even 
under this most favourable scenario. To an extent, 
the whole discussion of integrated policy approaches 
is predicated on the belief that global warming will 
not exceed 2°C. If it does, the risks to all human 
systems and societies become incalculable based on 
present knowledge, and are likely to be catastrophic. 
In this sense, effective climate change mitigation is 
now recognized as the foundation for sustainable 
development, CCA and DRR. However, the focus of 
this chapter is on integration of CCA and DRR, and 
the extent to which they can become part of coher-
ent development policy in practice, based on the 
immediate short-term needs, and on a degree of 
optimism that global warming will be contained in 
the medium to long term. 
The landscape for broader climate action is becom-
ing increasingly clear. The following requires further 
exploration for the purposes of national and local 
risk governance in the context of this GAR: (a) the 
range of options and mechanisms for CCA, espe-
cially in developing economies and the regions 
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
and (b) whether there are system efficiencies to be 
gained by integrating CCA and DRR, and ultimately 
combining all such risks into planning for risk-
informed sustainable development. 
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13.2 
Synergies between 
climate change 
adaptation and disaster 
risk reduction 
CCA and DRR efforts share the immediate common 
aim of building resilience of people, economies 
and natural resources to the impacts of extreme 
weather and climate change. But IPCC SR1.5 makes 
it clearer than ever that climate change may lead 
to changes in risk levels for non-climate hazards, 
including impacts on food security and human 
health due to cascading risks from higher tempera-
tures, warmer seas, sea-level rise and others. As 
already described in the foregoing chapters of this 
GAR, the Sendai Framework requires policymakers 
to contemplate disaster risk from a multi-hazard 
perspective that includes the traditionally recog-
nized natural hazards that lead to disasters, as well 
as a range of man-made and mixed hazards, espe-
cially the newly included environmental, technologi-
cal and biological hazards and risks,330 described in 
Part I of this GAR.
While DRR has a much wider scope than climato-
logical hazards, CCA is also much more related to 
extreme hydrometeorological hazards and warmer 
temperatures than DRR. Chapter 2 of this GAR 
provided significant insights into how multiple 
risks cascade, and how complex systems generate 
and respond to shocks in ways that are not linear, 
making the impacts difficult to predict through 
traditional hazard-by-hazard monitoring, so that a 
systems-based approach is needed for effective 
risk management. 
From a policy and governance perspective, climate 
and disaster risks present a significant degree of 
uncertainty in estimating potential impacts. This 
is due to the complex nature of the phenomena, 
as well as limitations in science and technology 
to understand projected events and how exposed 
people and assets will react, due to varied sources 
and types of vulnerability. However, understand-
ing the commonalities and differences between 
DRR and CCA in each national context is important 
for policy coordination, especially if a decision is 
made to integrate DRR and CCA into one national 
or local strategy. In some cases, the two are also 
mainstreamed into risk-informed socioeconomic 
development planning; it is then essential not to 
lose sight of the full range of risks that need to be 
considered, and to include the short-, medium- and 
long-term timescales required for a systems-based 
approach. 
The question of policy coordination, integration 
and synergies between CCA and DRR has national 
and international dimensions. At the national level, 
governments tend to mandate different depart-
ments to deal with the two issues separately, with a 
few exceptions discussed in the following sections 
on country experiences. DRR is often assigned 
to national disaster management agencies, civil 
protection and response. Given its evolution as an 
environmental issue, climate change tends to be 
coordinated through ministries of the environment, 
in close coordination with finance and planning 
ministries. Having two departments lead the two 
agendas separately ensures high cabinet repre-
sentation, especially in larger countries with more 
ministries. The downside is that, in some cases, 
coordination between these activities is limited. 
The source of financing is also a major factor in the 
degree of integration of the two issues, with differ-
ent streams of international financing reinforcing 
silos at national level due to the funding criteria and 
compliance requirements.
330  (United Nations 2015a)
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At the international level, Member States have 
agreed to different elements in terms of report-
ing, funding and other mechanisms for their imple-
mentation under the Paris Agreement and the 
Sendai Framework. As at the national level, the two 
agendas being governed by separate agreements 
and mechanisms ensure effective international 
representation. Decisions are in place to promote 
synergy and coherence in the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement and the Sendai Framework. The 
2030 Agenda provides the common basis for coor-
dinating the implementation of the two, as disasters 
and climate change have the potential to severely 
affect development efforts. As discussed in Part II 
of this GAR, practical coordination for international 
reporting is in the early stages, and Member States 
need to address very distinct reporting require-
ments and funding streams for CCA and DRR. 
However, new initiatives do exist integrating CCA, 
climate change mitigation, DRR and sustainable 
development agendas.
In considering integrated approaches, Member States 
can also try to avoid some of the perhaps-artificial 
divisions that occur in international agreements due 
to the negotiation process and established orga-
nizational mandates. For example, one analysis is 
that the mentions of climate change in the Sendai 
Framework overemphasizes the hazard dimension 
of disaster risk, rather emphasizing an all-vulner-
abilities and all-resilience approach that includes 
climate change and development.331 It may also 
be helpful in organizing institutional responsibili-
ties at national level to think of CCA as a subset 
within DRR and climate change mitigation as a 
subset within sustainable development,332 even if 
the choice has been made to establish a separate 
legal or institutional framework to deal with climate 
change holistically. 
Positive evidence of synergy is already seen in 
Member States’ reports on NDCs under the Paris 
Agreement. More than 50 countries referenced DRR 
or DRM as part of their NDC. Colombia and India 
made explicit references to the Sendai Framework 
in their NDCs.333  
Figure 13.1. A systems-based approach to risk reduction: the Sendai Framework, 2030 Agenda and Paris Agreement call for 
policy integration of development, disaster and climate risk management
(Source: UNDDR 2019)
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13.3 
Guidance and 
mechanisms for integrated 
climate change adaptation 
under the United Nations 
Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 
13.3.1 
Evolution of technical guidance on national 
adaptation plans
At the global level, specific goals and guidance 
for Member States to conduct CCA comes from 
UNFCCC, especially the Paris Agreement, as does 
an increasingly important stream of public interna-
tional financing for CCA through the UNFCCC finan-
cial mechanism, especially the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF).334  
UNFCCC has a process to formulate and imple-
ment NAPs, which was established in 2010 under 
the UNFCCC Cancun Adaptation Framework. These 
types of plans began in 2001 as an initiative only for 
the least developed countries to formulate NAPAs 
and thereby access the Least Developed Countries 
Fund. However, since 2010, there has been a shift to 
NAPs as a relevant tool for all developed and devel-
oping countries.335 UNFCCC developed initial guide-
lines for the formulation of NAPs in 2011, which 
outline four main elements and instruct countries 
to lay the groundwork and address gaps, develop 
preparatory elements, establish implementation 
strategies, and report, monitor and review them on 
a regular basis.336  
In 2012, the UNFCCC Least Developed Countries 
Expert Group developed technical guidelines for 
the process to formulate and implement NAPs.337 
These are: (a) to reduce vulnerability to the impacts 
of climate change, by building adaptive capacity 
and resilience, and (b) to facilitate the integration 
of CCA in a coherent manner, into relevant new 
and existing policies, programmes and activities, 
in particular development planning processes and 
strategies, within all relevant sectors and at differ-
ent levels, as appropriate.338  
DRR is not explicitly mentioned in the initial guide-
lines for NAPs/NAPAs, and they principally address 
climate-related hazards, typically drought, floods, 
sea-level rise and severe storms. However, recent 
and ongoing efforts by countries to develop NAPs 
and to undertake broad national and local adapta-
tion planning according to their own needs assess-
ments, provides a clear opportunity for countries to 
consider multiple risks in development decisions 
and accelerate the common goal of climate and 
disaster-resilient development. 
Focusing on this opportunity, a supplement to NAP 
technical guidelines to countries was developed 
from a disaster risk angle in 2017 specifically dedi-
cated to “promoting synergy with DRR in National 
Adaptation Plans”.339 In 2018, the UNFCCC Adapta-
tion Committee considered a report from an expert 
meeting focusing on national adaptation goals/
indicators and their relationship with SDGs and the 
Sendai Framework.340  
The supplementary guidance aims to provide 
national authorities in charge of adaptation planning, 
331  (Kelman 2015)
332  (Kelman 2015)
333  (UNFCCC 2017)
334  (GCF 2019a)
335  (UNFCCC 2012a)
336  (UNFCCC 2012a)
337  (UNFCCC 2012b)
338  (UNFCCC 2012a)
339  (UNFCCC 2012b)
340  (UNFCCC 2018)
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as well as the many actors involved in adaptation, 
with practical advice on when and how to incorpo-
rate DRR aspects in the adaptation planning process. 
It also aims to give DRM authorities a better under-
standing of the NAP process, including advice on 
how they can contribute to and support its devel-
opment, and to prompt central planning authorities 
such as ministries of planning and finance on how 
to use national adaptation planning in shaping resil-
ient development. 
13.3.2 
Taking the next step – fully integrated 
development planning
Considering the commonalities in the approaches 
and requirements of integrating DRR and sustain-
able resilient development in national CCA strate-
gies such as NAP and NAPA processes, three major 
actions seem to be most conducive to success. 
Firstly, establishing a strong governance mecha-
nism that involves all relevant stakeholders across 
disciplines, which helps avoid ineffective and inef-
ficient action, communication and cooperation. 
Secondly, developing a central and accessible 
knowledge management platform and risk assess-
ment system for CCA and DRR with a balanced 
combination of scientific and local knowledge, 
good practices, natural and social scientific data, 
and risk information. And lastly, redesigning funding 
schemes and mechanisms to support coher-
ent CCA and DRR solutions encourages coopera-
tion and coordination for efficient use of financial 
resources.341 The technical expert meeting on adap-
tation in Bonn, Germany, in 2017 made recommen-
dations to countries to bring DRR and CCA together 
to ensure sustainable development (Box 13.2). 
13.3.3 
National Adaptation Plan-Sustainable 
Development Goals Integrative Framework 
To support the formulation of NAPs that integrate 
well with development planning, the UNFCCC Least 
Developed Countries Expert Group developed the 
NAP-SDG Integrative Framework (iFrame) that 
facilitates integration of different entry points to 
planning by managing relationships between the 
entry points and the systems being managed. By 
focusing on the systems that are key to a coun-
try’s development, it is possible to map to differ-
ent drivers (climatic hazards for instance), as well 
as to sectors or ministries, specific SDGs, different 
spatial units, development themes or other frame-
works such as the Sendai Framework. See Figure 
13.2, which shows a sample collection of systems 
in the middle. These systems become the focus of 
assessment and subsequent planning and actions 
to address adaptation goals. The achievement of 
particular SDGs is ensured by safeguarding that all 
the necessary systems of governance relevant to 
that goal are included in the analysis and subse-
quent action. 
NAP-SDG iFrame is being tested in some countries. 
Early results indicate that this systems approach is 
effective at focusing on outputs and outcomes that 
would have the greatest impact on development 
dividends, while avoiding potential bias introduced 
when actors promote their interests over those 
of more essential systems. The approach also 
helps ensure multiple frameworks are addressed 
simultaneously. The approach has the potential to 
manage multiple and overlapping climatic factors 
or hazards, and should facilitate governance and 
synergy among different actors and ministries. The 
systems can be singular, as in the case of nexus 
approaches, or compound, to represent develop-
ment themes such as food security, which would 
invariably include aspects of crop/food production, 
as well as other aspects of food availability, access 
and utilization. This approach lends itself to easy 
design and implementation of integrated models 
for the system to facilitate assessment of climate 
impacts and potential losses within a broader devel-
opment framework. It also becomes easy to assess 
impacts of one or multiple interacting climatic 
drivers or hazards, as it is often the case that coun-
tries may be faced with multiple hazards in a given 
year such as serious drought, flooding, shifting 
seasons and heat-waves. 
364 Chapter 13
Box 13.2. Opportunities and options for integrating CCA with SDGs and the Sendai 
Framework, May 2017
(Source: UNFCCC 2017)
The systems at the centre of the iFrame can be 
defined in a manner that makes sense for the 
country, and can include value or supply chains, 
each with an implied scale and models of drivers 
and interacting parts, and with specific pathways 
for how climatic or other natural hazards would 
have an impact. iFrame can be applied to dissolve 
working in silos and to manage different lenses to 
adaptation, and should open up completely new 
horizons and developments in adaptation planning, 
implementation, monitoring and assessment, and 
knowledge management.
The World Bank and GFDRR have also developed a 
methodology that supports countries to integrate 
climate change and DRM into development plan-
ning. The methodology, that has so far been used 
in Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi and Senegal, acknowl-
edges that developing countries have limited finan-
cial resources and financial planning capacities.342 
It supports governments in the prioritization of their 
investments by considering existing government-led 
plans such as national development plans, NAPs, 
NDCs, etc., and by contributing to highlighting areas 
and sectors where investments can have the largest 
341  (UNISDR 2017a)
342  (De Bettencourt et al. 2013) 
Key recommendations: 
• While maintaining the autonomy of each 
of the post-2015 frameworks, improved 
coherence of action to implement the three 
frameworks can save money and time, 
enhance efficiency and further enable 
adaptation action.
• Both “resilience” and “ecosystems” can act 
as core concepts for motivating integration. 
Actors, including State and non-State, oper-
ating across multiple sectors and scales 
ranging from local to global, can facilitate 
policy coherence, and vulnerable people 
and communities can benefit from and 
initiate effective bottom-up, locally driven 
solutions that contribute to multiple policy 
outcomes simultaneously.
• Building the capacity for coherence and 
coordination will help to clarify roles and 
responsibilities and to encourage partner-
ships among a wide range of actors.
• The availability of data, including climate 
and socioeconomic data, and their resolu-
tion remain a challenge, especially in Africa. 
Better data management, more informed 
policymaking and capacity-building are 
needed.
• The process to formulate and imple-
ment NAPs can effectively support the 
implementation of enhanced adaptation 
action and the development of integrated 
approaches to adaptation, sustainable 
development and DRR, thanks in part to 
its demonstrated success as a planning 
instrument, the resources available for its 
support, its iterative nature and flexible, 
nationally driven format.
• Adequate, sustainable support for adap-
tation efforts from public, private, inter-
national and national sources is crucial. 
Accessing finance and technology devel-
opment and transfer and capacity-build-
ing support is also critical, particularly for 
developing countries.
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Figure 13.2. Collection of sample national systems showing links to multiple entry point elements including SDGs, as part of 
NAP-SDG iFrame, being developed by the UNFCCC Least Developed Countries Expert Group
(Source: UNFCCC Least Developed Countries Expert Group)
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impact in building resilience while supporting the 
country’s development objectives. The method 
relies on an evidence-based participatory and iter-
ative process among national and international 
climate scientists and economists, sectoral institu-
tions, policymakers and civil society.
In addition to questions of process and financing, 
the content of DRR and adaptation plans is crucial, 
as are the mechanisms for their implementation. 
IPCC SR1.5 does not provide a comprehensive 
discussion of risk and adaptation options for all 
natural and human systems due to its scope, but it 
clearly illustrates key risks and adaptation options 
for ocean ecosystems and sectors. Adaptation 
options specific to national contexts, if carefully 
selected together with enabling conditions, will have 
benefits for sustainable development and poverty 
reduction with global warming of 1.5°C, although 
trade-offs are possible. Most adaptation needs will 
be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 
2°C. There is a wide range of adaptation options 
that can reduce the risks of climate change, though 
there are sectoral variations. There are also limits to 
adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human 
and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, 
with associated losses. Furthermore, if the 1.5°C 
threshold is breached, the possibilities to adapt will 
diminish as ecosystem services collapse. Unable to 
support current economic activity and human popu-
lations, migration on a scale never before seen may 
be triggered from arid and semi-arid regions to low 
elevation coastal zones, building risk. 
Many adaptation initiatives are currently occur-
ring at local levels in response to observed and 
projected environmental changes as well as 
social and economic stresses. Recent studies 
have suggested that some of the climate adapta-
tion actions are not sustainable, lack evaluation 
frameworks and hold potential for maladaptation. 
Utilizing indigenous and local knowledge and stake-
holder engagement can aid the development of 
adaptation policies and broader sustainable devel-
opment, along with more proactive and region-
ally coherent adaptation plans and actions, and 
regional cooperation. But sometimes the approach 
needs to take a wider and more systemic view of 
risk and adaptation. For example, synergies can 
be achieved across systemic transitions through 
several overarching adaptation options in rural and 
urban areas. Investments in health, social security, 
risk sharing and spreading are cost-effective adap-
tation measures with high potential for scaling up. 
Social protection programmes, including cash and 
in-kind transfers to protect poor and vulnerable 
households from the impact of economic shocks, 
natural hazards and other crises, can also build 
generic adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability 
when combined with a comprehensive climate risk 
management approach.
DRR and education-based adaptation to climate 
risks are critical for building adaptive capacity, but 
may have lower prospects for scaling up than some 
of the more system-wide adaptation approaches 
mentioned. As a process for designing, imple-
menting and evaluating strategies, policies and 
measures to improve the understanding of risk, DRR 
is a tool that can be integrated with adaptation to 
reduce vulnerability. However, institutional, techni-
cal and financial capacity challenges in front-line 
agencies often constitute constraints.
The following exploration of national and regional 
practices in integrated approaches to DRR and CCA 
therefore aims to identify some of the challenges, 
synergies found in practice and lessons learned 
from different approaches.
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13.4 
Selected country 
experiences with 
integrated climate and 
disaster risk reduction 
13.4.1 
Enabling legislation and institutions
The International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), in collaboration 
with United Nations organizations and donors, has 
developed tools to support countries to strengthen 
their legal and policy frameworks for DRR and 
CCA. The Checklist on Law and Disaster Risk 
Reduction is a succinct and easy-to-use assess-
ment tool that, by guiding a research and assess-
ment process, helps countries identify strengths in 
legal frameworks. These are areas where greater 
focus is needed on implementation, as well as 
whether drafting or revision of legislation is neces-
sary. Another relevant tool is the Law and Climate 
Change Toolkit. This is a global electronic resource 
designed for use by national governments, interna-
tional organizations and experts engaged in assist-
ing countries to implement national climate change 
laws.
To establish a strong governance mechanism, strat-
egies benefit from an enabling legal framework 
which also applies to integrated DRR and CCA strat-
egies. Recent reviews of DRR laws and regulations 
in various countries indicate that the integration of 
DRR and CCA into legal frameworks remains the 
exception rather than the rule.343 The trend in the 
countries reviewed has been to allocate responsibil-
ity for the administration of CCA laws to ministries 
of environment, without requiring them to coordi-
nate with DRM institutions, while DRM institutions 
are also not required to coordinate with Ministries of 
Environment. Only more recently have some coun-
tries, notably in the Pacific but also other regions, 
adopted a new model in which CCA and DRR are 
integrated with development planning and resource 
management legislation. 
Examples of such integrated legal frameworks 
include Algeria, Mexico and Uruguay. In Algeria, 
the National Agency on Climate Change, based in 
the Ministry for the Environment, is responsible for 
mainstreaming CCA into development planning. 
However, as Algeria’s National Committee on Major 
Risks, established by law, is mandated to coordinate 
all activities on major risks, including implementa-
tion mechanisms for CCA and DRM institutions, it 
provides an overarching coordination mechanism. 
The enabling law for this in Algeria is the 2004 Law 
on Prevention of Major Risks and Disaster Manage-
ment. This legal and institutional framework has the 
potential to achieve a high level of CCA and DRR 
integration if implemented as planned.344 
In Mexico, the General Climate Change Law of 2012 
is supported by a special national climate change 
programme and an Inter-Ministerial Commission 
on Climate Change, which is a cross-sectoral coor-
dination body formed by the heads of 14 federal 
ministries. In Uruguay, a special decree, the National 
Response to Climate Change and Variability, was 
passed in 2009. Implemented by the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, its 
purpose is to coordinate actions among all institu-
tions relevant to achieving risk prevention in the 
whole territory.
13.4.2 
Financing
Financing for adaptation and DRR is a key element 
for enhancing capacity and ensuring successful 
implementation. Although many countries have 
undertaken climate and disaster risk assessments, 
the systematic integration of these assessments 
into national financial and fiscal planning processes 
is still limited. This suggests a need to redesign 
funding schemes and mechanisms to encourage 
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cooperation and coordination for efficient use of 
financial resources. 
International public financing of CCA is now also a 
major resource and influence on national approaches. 
GCF was set up in 2010 by Parties to UNFCCC as 
part of the Convention’s financial mechanism to 
increase financial flows from developed countries 
to developing countries for mitigation and adapta-
tion. It implements the financing provisions of the 
Paris Agreement (especially Article 9) aimed at 
keeping climate change well below 2°C by promot-
ing low-emission and climate-resilient development, 
at the same time taking into account the needs of 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change impacts.345 It is the most significant source 
of public international financing for national adapta-
tion planning (through a range of instruments such 
as grants, concessional debt financing, equity and 
guarantees), with $5 billion already committed by 
early 2019 and over 100 country mitigation and/or 
adaptation projects under way through accredited 
partners.346  
Many of the GCF adaptation projects integrate 
components that would often be seen as DRR or 
sustainable development. This indicates the extent 
of policy coherence or integrated risk governance 
that is already being made possible under this 
mechanism. Projects are explicitly documented in 
relation to the SDGs that they help to implement. 
The criteria include safeguards for indigenous 
peoples, gender mainstreaming and environmental 
and social safeguards. For example, a project just 
commenced in Namibia is on building resilience of 
communities living in landscapes threatened under 
climate change through an ecosystems-based 
adaptation approach (Project SAP006). It serves 
GCF results areas (health, food and water security; 
livelihoods of people and communities; and ecosys-
tems and ecosystem services) as well as SDG 13 
on climate action; SDG 14 on life below water; and 
SDG 15 on life on land.347 In DRR terminology, this 
project is also about drought resilience. It is hoped 
that this clear move towards integrated risk gover-
nance by GCF will encourage integrated project 
proposals from countries where disaster and 
climate risk have significant overlaps, either gener-
ally or in specific regions or sectors.
13.4.3 
Risk information
An integrated CCA/DRR policy, strategy or plan 
needs to be complemented by adequate, accessible 
and understandable risk information. Ideally, this 
is an available resource during the policy develop-
ment stage, to help formulate objectives and goals, 
but joint risk assessments and ongoing information 
sharing are key elements of integrated strategies. 
A study in Vanuatu identified a well-developed DRR 
operational governance structure comprising many 
government levels and non-governmental actors 
working together to implement top-down and 
bottom-up DRR strategies that contemplate CCA 
elements. Stakeholders in Vanuatu accept local and 
scientific risk knowledge to inform DRR policies, 
although scientific knowledge is still precedent for 
the development of formal instruments to reduce 
disaster risk.348  
Several good practices in the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have been 
identified. These include strong support for the 
assessment of flood and climate risk through the 
Adaptation Reporting Powers under the Climate 
Change Act, which encouraged key infrastructure 
institutions to consider the impacts of hazards 
such as flood and climate change on their business 
and the provision of key services. Additionally, the 
government encourages use of ecosystem-based 
343  (IFRC and UNDP 2014b); (Picard 2018)
344  (UNISDR 2013c)
345  (GCF 2019a)
346  (GCF 2019a)
347  (GCF 2019b)
348  (Jackson, Witt and McNamara 2019)
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approaches (e.g. sustainable urban drainage) and 
infrastructure that has the flexibility to be adapted 
in the future (e.g. the flood defence walls imple-
mented in Morpeth, north-east England, which have 
been constructed so that they can be modified 
easily if required in the future).349
A Regional Initiative for the Assessment of the 
Impact of Climate Change on Water Resources and 
Socio-Economic Vulnerability in the Arab Region 
(RICCAR) assesses the impacts of climate change 
on freshwater resources in the Arab region and 
their implications for socioeconomic and envi-
ronmental vulnerability. It does so through the 
application of scientific methods and consulta-
tive processes involving communities in CCA and 
DRR. The initiative prepares an integrated assess-
ment that links climate change impact assess-
ment outputs to inform an integrated vulnerability 
assessment to climate change impacts, such as 
changes in temperature, precipitation and run-off, 
drought or flooding due to shifting rainfall patterns 
and extreme weather events.350 The RICCAR 
example shows that joint assessments and knowl-
edge development involving two otherwise siloed 
communities of experts can help build a common 
understanding of risk, which is the precondition for 
planning and budgeting. 
13.4.4 
National adaptation plans 
Although NAPs are developed by many countries, 
the focus for UNFCCC monitoring is on develop-
ing countries, and it maintains a public database 
of these, NAP Central. As at 31 March 2019, 13 
NAPs from developing country Parties were devel-
oped and submitted on NAP Central between 2015 
and 2018, namely Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Kenya, Saint Lucia, 
Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan and Togo.351  All 
of these include aspects of DRR, providing scope 
for increased coherence between DRR and broader 
adaptation during the implementation of NAPs.
When evaluating the latest developing country 
examples of NAPs, which seem to have great 
potential for integration with DRR, a survey was 
conducted that showcases the following country 
experiences.
Rwanda integrates DRR into its NAP. Its NDC 
under the Paris Agreement lists early warning 
and community-based DRR as adaptation 
measures, and a guiding principle of the 
National Disaster Management Policy is to 
mainstream climate change into DRR. 
The two thematic areas are managed through 
the Ministry of Disasters and Refugees, in 
charge of DRR, and the Ministry of Environ-
ment,  through the Rwanda Environment 
Management Authority, in charge of CCA. 
These institutions are key partners in DRR and 
CCA, and have adopted a multidisciplinary and 
multisectoral approach. The National Disas-
ter Management Policy provides that all public 
institutions in Rwanda should be involved in 
disaster management, and it allocated neces-
sary resources to ensure that disaster manage-
ment is fully incorporated and mainstreamed 
into plans.
Rwanda’s vulnerability to disasters and climate 
change is rooted in the reliance of most of its 
population on rain-fed subsistence farming 
practised on steep topography. Given the liveli-
hood dependence on weather conditions, it is 
critical that climate change is mainstreamed 
to help guide interventions aimed at reducing 
vulnerability to potentially adverse impacts. The 
policy commits to ensuring that climate change 
is mainstreamed into all activities related to 
Case study: Rwanda national adaptation plan
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disaster management using the East African 
Community regional climate change policy and 
the Rwanda Green Growth and Climate resil-
ience strategy as a point of reference.
One of the 14 programmes of action in Rwan-
da’s National Green Growth and Climate Resil-
ience Strategy is dedicated to DRR from a 
health perspective and is entitled Disaster 
Management and Disease Prevention. The 
programme enables risk assessments, vulner-
ability mapping and vector-borne disease 
surveillance; the establishment of an integrated 
EWS, and disaster response plans; the incorpo-
ration of disaster and disease considerations 
into land-use, building and infrastructure regu-
lations; and the employment of community-
based DRR programmes designed around local 
environmental and economic conditions, to 
mobilize local capacity in emergency response 
and to reduce locally specific hazards. 
The example of Rwanda shows that strong 
political leadership, based on the scien-
tific evidence that livelihoods are affected 
by disaster risk and climate change, led to 
the development of a comprehensive gover-
nance framework and the integration of DRR 
and CCA at different policy levels. As climate 
change and disaster management are classi-
fied as cross-cutting issues in the top national 
economic development documents, all sector 
plans are required to include interventions for 
these issues as budget allocation follows the 
same guidelines. However, the main hinder-
ing factor in implementation remains limited 
human and financial resources, which make it 
difficult to move from information exchange 
and coordination to coordinated action. 
The Rwanda case illustrates the strong links 
between disaster and climate risk in an agrarian 
economy, and the potential for cascading risk to 
human health, to which it has responded with an 
integrated approach including multi-hazard risk 
assessments and institutional partnerships.
The example from the State of Palestine demon-
strates a complex interaction among natural 
hazards, pressures of population growth and 
agriculture, fragile ecosystems, water scarcity 
and regional politics, requiring the systems-
based approach it has taken towards assess-
ing and managing disaster and climate risks to 
development.
349  (Clegg et al. 2019)
350  (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia 2017)
351  (UNFCCC 2019)
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The State of Palestine is highly vulnerable to 
earthquakes, floods, landslides, drought and 
desertification, rapidly declining groundwa-
ter resources and seawater intrusion. Water 
shortage is compounded by overexploitation 
of water resources and transboundary restric-
tions. Recent drought events and high popula-
tion growth have added pressure to its capacity 
to adapt. Pollution and environmental problems 
are also exacerbated by restrictions in access 
to and control over natural resources, such 
as fresh water and agricultural lands, which 
are key drivers for overgrazing, deforestation, 
soil erosion, land degradation and desertifica-
tion. Environmental degradation of the coastal 
zone and solid waste disposal are becoming 
serious concerns in the Gaza Strip. These risks 
adversely affect the economy, society, environ-
ment, health and other sectors. After assess-
ing them holistically, the State of Palestine is 
making a shift from disaster management to 
risk management following a 2017 Ministerial 
Decree.
From the climate adaptation angle, the compre-
hensive assessment for the 2016 NAP identi-
fied a wide range of “highly vulnerable” issues 
in relation to water, agriculture and food that 
also affect the vulnerability of other sectors.352 
The NAP assessment revealed that the 
complex political environment has implications 
on the State of Palestine’s adaptive capacities 
in relation to many sectors, which compound 
and aggravate climate vulnerabilities. Consulta-
tions with the Environmental Quality Authority 
were then initiated to support the development 
of strategies for better embedding ecosystem-
based DRR and CCA into policies to protect and 
manage the ecosystem and natural resource 
base of the country.
Two national committees provide platforms for 
coordination among government agencies and 
other actors: the National Platform for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, chaired by the Prime Minister’s 
Office, and the National Committee for Climate 
Change, chaired by the Environment Quality 
Authority, which is also establishing a General 
Directorate for Climate Change and Disaster 
Risk Reduction. 
The institutional and legal framework of the 
DRM system has been set by a national team 
of governmental agencies, advised by an inter-
national advisory team, and there is a draft 
DRM law with the Prime Minister’s Office. 
The DRM framework forms part of the Disas-
ter Management Policy that is included in the 
2017–2022 National Policy Agenda. Prepara-
tions for a risk analysis study and the develop-
ment of a national DRM strategy were under 
way at the time of writing, with plans to develop 
a risk map during 2019. 
Exploring what ecosystem services can 
contribute to CCA and DRR, the State of Pales-
tine is developing a coherent set of policies, 
and there is ongoing work to establish units for 
CCA and DRR in the institutional set-up of the 
main relevant Palestinian institutions. Progress 
has been possible due to the existing politi-
cal will and commitment. CCA, NAPs and the 
ecosystem–DRR–CCA nexus are well estab-
lished in national policies, strategies and plans.
Hindering factors are restrictions on the 
control of natural resources, a lack of finan-
cial resources and environmental education, 
low-level awareness of climate change risk 
and difficulty in implementation of integrated 
development programmes, especially in mobile 
Bedouin Communities. There are also issues of 
overlapping mandates among different Pales-
tinian institutions, different sources of tradi-
tional knowledge and culture, and limited data 
availability.
Case study: State of Palestine national adaptation plan
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The Chadian NAP includes a project on 
Community-Based Management of Climate 
Risks in Chad. By 2021, it aims to ensure that 
farms, fishing communities and small produc-
ers, notably youth and women in targeted 
regions, use sustainable production systems 
that allow them to meet their needs, bring food 
to market and adopt a living environment that 
is more resilient to climate change and other 
environmental challenges. 
As a Sahelian country,  Chad suffers the 
adverse effects of climate change on all areas 
of activity of the population, particularly in rural 
communities. In recent years, there have been 
many extreme events (e.g. floods, drought and 
wildfires), as well as increasing land degrada-
tion. The limited capacity of local populations 
to adapt to climate risks is the context for the 
project, which proposes ways to strengthen 
the capacities of local communities to adapt to 
climate change, as well as to develop financial 
mechanisms for adaptation. 
The lead institution is the Ministry of Agri-
culture, which will integrate outcomes into 
its plans and policies and will influence the 
debate on climate risk management in Chad. 
However, the Ministry of Environment, Water 
and Fisheries, the Ministry of Civil Aviation and 
National Meteorology, the Directorate for the 
Fight against Climate Change, the Microfinance 
private institution and civil society are also 
closely involved.
An interesting feature of the project is the 
focus on gender, strengthening women’s 
involvement in the CCA system. The project will 
provide women with regular access to infor-
mation and credit for production. As women 
play a vital role in community-based produc-
tion systems, this initiative will involve women 
in the implementation of all the project deliver-
ables, ranging from access to information, to 
credit and microinsurance. The design of train-
ing modules on climate risk management will 
enable women to benefit from current knowl-
edge on CCA and risk management.
The promotion of financial risk transfer mecha-
nisms to help rural households minimize losses 
and provide safety nets against climate shocks 
contributes to providing a more comprehensive 
approach to DRR and CCA integration. 
The approach in Chad sees a national policy that 
is focused on community resilience and capacity-
building for the disaster and climate risks that 
Case study: Chad national adaptation plan
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affect rural households directly, by recognizing and 
supporting the role of women in these communities 
as leaders and primary producers. 
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The Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Act and its institutional system 
is often cited as a positive example of a strong 
emphasis on risk reduction in a develop-
ing country that faces extraordinary levels of 
natural hazards – hydrometeorological and 
geological. Less well known is the Philippine 
Climate Change Act, which aims to mainstream 
climate action into all government ministries 
through the advocacy and technical support 
of the Climate Change Commission. These 
laws refer to each other in ensuring synergies 
and coherence on CCA and DRR, and both also 
include gender equality provisions and repre-
sentation of women’s organizations. 
The National Economic and Development 
Authority has led the development of the Guide-
lines on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion in Development Planning. The results of 
assessments based on the guidelines are used 
to enhance all aspects of the planning process: 
visioning, analysis of the planning environ-
ment, and derivation of development potential 
and challenges; translation into corresponding 
goals, objectives and targets; and specification 
of the appropriate strategies and programmes, 
projects and activities. 
Features of the combined approach include 
mainstreaming of CCA and DRR into compre-
hensive land-use plans prepared by each local 
government unit, as part of the building-back-
better approach. These plans define the land 
use of a particular administrative area and are 
one of the important entry points for main-
streaming CCA and DRR. 
In 2015, the Supplemental Guidelines on Main-
streaming Climate and Disaster Risks in the 
Comprehensive Land Use Plan was developed 
by the Housing and Land Use Board with the 
Climate Change Commission, adding the inte-
gration of climate change considerations as 
part of risk assessment. These guidelines 
help local governments formulate climate and 
disaster risk-sensitive comprehensive land-
use plans and zoning ordinances that guide 
allocation and regulation of land use so that 
exposure and vulnerability – of the population, 
infrastructure, economic activities and environ-
ment – to natural hazards and climate change 
can be minimized or even prevented. The 
resulting improvements in land-use planning 
and zoning processes will strengthen the ability 
of local governments to achieve their Sustain-
able Development Objectives given the chal-
lenges posed by climate change and natural 
hazards.
The example from the Philippines shows how inte-
gration of DRR and CCA can be successful from 
national, to sectoral, to local levels, including an 
integration of knowledge management and data 
provision. Strong political will, in part due to an 
extremely high-risk environment, has accelerated 
the process, and a solid governance framework 
involving all relevant actors has supported practical 
action and implementation. 
353  (De Bettencourt et al. 2013)
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Figure 13.3. Mainstreaming framework of climate and disaster risk assessment into comprehensive land-use planning in the 
Philippines 
(Source: Policy Development Group, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, Philippines 2014)
13.4.5 
Other integrated strategies and plans
Well-defined national legislation can set the preconditions for successful integration of DRR and CCA, and 
establish a coordination mechanism, but defining and coordinating institutional arrangements for climate- 
and disaster-resilient development often remains difficult. This can be due to institutional resistance, given 
that different institutions have historically driven climate change and DRM agendas with separate finan-
cial sources.353 Emerging experience indicates that to have effective convening power, the relevant agency 
should be located at the highest possible level of government. Indeed, as climate and disaster risk affect 
multiple sectors, the lead agency needs to have a strong convening power of decision makers from multiple 
agencies and levels of government, as well as the private sector and civil society.
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The Mexico example shows that strong political 
will, based on an understanding of risk, can result 
in the establishment of an efficient governance 
mechanism, which can overcome capacity gaps 
and limited budget. 
In addition to NAPs, which are tailored to the 
UNFCCC reporting structure and GCF, Member 
States of all levels of incomes and types of 
economic development are addressing climate and 
disaster risk as part of integrated national and local 
policy and planning processes. For example, in 
Costa Rica, the National Disaster Risk Management 
Policy and the National Adaptation Policy adopted 
in 2017 were formulated with the participation 
of communities of practice and shared respon-
sibilities in implementation. In Mozambique, as 
described in Chapter 11, the Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion Master Plan (2017–2030) is aligned with the 
Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation National 
Strategy, as well as with other policy instruments. 
In both these cases, common mechanisms and 
Mexico has the General Law on Climate Change 
2012, and the Special Climate Change Program 
2014–2018, which is a planning instrument to 
establish climate adaptation and mitigation 
priorities.354 Through these mandates, DRR 
has been integrated into the formulation of the 
NAP and NDC of Mexico for the period 2020–
2030.355 It has also been integrated into CCA 
strategies and plans through two programmes: 
the National Program Against Hydraulic Contin-
gencies and the National Program Against 
Drought. These programmes are implemented 
by multiple institutions, coordinated by the 
Inter-Ministerial Commission for Attention of 
Droughts and Floods. 
In Mexico, the actions selected to integrate 
DRR into adaptation plans include:
• Implementation of water reserves for envi-
ronmental needs and to meet future water 
supply demand
• Development of algorithms for better 
measurement of the extent and distribution 
of water reserves in complex basins
• Drought EWS
• Establishment of risk reduction measures 
for the agricultural sector, including drought 
scenarios
• Fluvial restoration measures and hydrolog-
ical-agroforestry restoration of watersheds
• Measures to improve drainage of linear 
infrastructures
• Flood prediction measures
• Insurance promotion
• Improvement of the hydrometeorological 
monitoring network, which reports in real 
time, and implementation of numerical 
flooding and drought models
Some conducive or hindering factors in the 
development and implementation of DRR-
informed adaptation strategies or plans can be 
derived from the Mexico case. The strong polit-
ical support of the federal government ensured 
that a strong governance mechanism for CCA 
with risk reduction components could be estab-
lished. The use and availability of integrated 
flood and drought management concepts and 
modelling data allowed substantive develop-
ment and integration. However, capacity gaps, 
such as the lack of sufficiently trained person-
nel and low numbers of monitoring stations, 
related to budget and financing, represented 
hindering factors as insufficient communica-
tion among participating institutions. 
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indicators have been articulated for the strategies 
or plans. 
In Africa, Namibia has taken steps to integrate DRR 
with CCA priorities through the National Strategy 
for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Climate Change Adaptation (2017–2021). Several 
other countries’ strategies and plans establish links 
among DRR, climate change, health, environment or 
other developmental goals through the involvement 
of competent ministries or coordination mecha-
nisms. However, such formulations appear to be 
too generic to lead to concrete joint or complemen-
tary action and implementation. A study on Kenya 
points out that the roles of country governments 
and the National Drought Management Agency in 
support of resilience are complementary, but that 
there is little evidence to suggest they are working 
together in practice.356 
Chapter 11 of this GAR observed that Chapter 4 of 
Mozambique’s Master Plan for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion 2017–2030, establishes the National Juridical 
Context and Public Policies, which articulates link-
ages with the country’s National Development Plan, 
the National Agenda 2025: Visão Estratégica de 
Nação, the National Climate Change Mitigation and 
Adaptation Strategy 2013–2025, and the Sustain-
able Development Objectives. The plan contains 
actions reinforcing resilience that range from the 
development of educational approaches integrat-
ing risk reduction and CCA (Action 1.1.3), to the 
creation of mechanisms to ensure that all projects 
and programmes relating to poverty reduction, agri-
culture and rural development take into account 
access to water, environmental considerations 
and contributions to the sustainable use of water 
(Action 2.3.1).357 At the time of writing, Mozam-
bique was reeling from the passage of Cyclone 
Idai, which made landfall on 14 March, 2019. It 
flooded an area estimated at approximately 520 
km2 with wind speeds of approximately 160 km/h, 
and caused extensive storm damage that was 
particularly severe in the city of Beira. Preliminary 
estimates cited at least 600 killed, more than 1.5 
million people affected and hundreds of thousands 
of hectares of crops damaged. A post-disaster 
needs assessment was initiated on the 16 April. 
Hazards of the magnitude of Idai test the resilience 
and capacity to cope of any country. However, in 
due course, ex post evaluations of the root causes 
of loss and damage may indicate achievable oppor-
tunities for reducing risk.
In 2011, Nepal developed a National Framework on 
Local Adaptation Plans for Action, in addition to its 
NAPA.358 Implementation has been a challenge, but 
recently, several government, non-government and 
international institutions have been focusing on 
activities related to climate adaptation for enhanc-
ing the adaptation capacity of the most vulnerable. 
Water, health, sanitation, agriculture, biodiversity, 
food security and nutrition have been identified as 
the most vulnerable sectors to climate impacts, and 
are taken as priorities for providing support to local 
vulnerable people.359 Others have focused on the 
concept of climate-smart villages and an integrated 
approach to local level resilience. 
Brazil directly referenced the Sendai Framework in 
its NAP.360 The Netherlands has developed a long-
term planning vision for water management that 
considers climate change scenarios and has devel-
oped integrated safety and adaptation policies to 
handle risk. Other countries (e.g. France, Spain and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland) have collaborated with the private sector 
to install insurance and risk financing mechanisms 
based on public–private partnerships, while others 
such as Switzerland have enabled vertical collabo-
ration with local governments by setting up a multi-
level risk governance system.
354  (Mexico, Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources 
2014)
355  (Mexico 2016)
356  (Omoyo Nyandiko and Omondi Rakama 2019)
357  (Information provided to UNDP by Government of Mozam-
bique 2017)
358  (Nepal, Ministry of Environment 2010); (Nepal, Ministry of 
Forests and Environment 2018)
359  (Dhakal, Wagley and Karki 2018)
360  (Brazil, Ministry of Environment 2016); (Urrutia Vásquez 
et al. 2017)
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13.5 
Pacific region 
approach to integrated 
climate, disaster and 
development policy 
13.5.1 
Regional approach to support integration – 
Framework for Resilient Development in the 
Pacific
As noted in section 10.1 on regional approaches 
and in section 11.5 in relation to policy coherence, 
the Pacific region is leading the way, at regional and 
country levels, in integrating reduction of climate and 
disaster risk with development planning in FRDP.361  
Although it is not prescriptive, FRDP suggests prior-
ity actions to be used as appropriate by different 
multi-stakeholder groups, at regional and national 
levels, in sectors or other groupings as appropri-
ate.362 Its implementation was also supported by 
the Pacific Resilience Partnership established by 
Pacific leaders in 2017 for an initial trial period of 
two years. The partnership works to strengthen 
coordination and collaboration, working with a 
multi-stakeholder task force, a support unit, techni-
cal working groups and Pacific resilience meetings.
13.5.2 
Pacific countries
Given the importance of climate-related disasters 
to the Pacific Islands, many countries of the region 
have developed JNAPs, action plans that consider 
DRM and CCA, since 2010. This process began well 
before the 2016 FRDP, which evolved at the regional 
level from national practice. 
JNAPs normally reflect a recognition of the rela-
tionship among development, disaster and climate 
risk and the role of environmental management in 
development and risk management.363 The Cook 
Islands, the Marshall Islands, Niue and Tonga repre-
sent some of the countries that have developed and 
published their JNAPs, while Vanuatu has chosen 
an alternative route through national legislation and 
institutional restructuring to integrate DRR and CCA.
There are two broad approaches followed by Pacific 
Island countries regarding JNAPs and NAPs. One 
set of countries works on formulating NAPs explic-
itly, with proposals and/or plans under way to 
access the GCF NAP formulation funding (e.g. Fiji, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu). Another set of countries char-
acterize their JNAPs as their NAPs (Cook Islands, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau and 
Tonga). The second group of countries is planning 
to use the GCF NAP formulation funding to revise or 
update CCA components of their JNAPs to ensure 
full coverage of the features of NAPs.
One country, Samoa, is applying its national devel-
opment strategy as the overarching plan for devel-
opment planning, climate change, DRR, SDGs, etc., 
all in one, with no separate plans for the different 
issues. Implementation of activities is coordinated 
through the country’s medium-term expenditure 
framework.364 
The Cook Islands launched its second plan, JNAP2, 
in 2016, covering the period 2016–2020. This 
JNAP2 has nine sectoral strategies to ensure a 
safe, resilient and sustainable future. It aims at 
strengthening climate and disaster resilience to 
protect lives, livelihoods, economic, infrastruc-
tural, cultural and environmental assets in the Cook 
Islands in a collaborative, sectoral approach. The 
Paris Agreement and Sendai Framework are men-
tioned in the foreword, and there is a mapping of 
how both have informed JNAP.365 
The Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan (KJIP) is 
being updated to complement the National Disaster 
Risk Management Plan and the National Framework 
for Climate Change and Climate Change Adap-
tation.366 Among other things, the KJIP revision 
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361  (SPC 2016)
362  (SPC 2016)
363  (Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
2013)
364  (Samoa 2016)
365  (Cook Islands 2016) 
366  (Kiribati, Office of Te Beretitenti 2013); (Kiribati 2012)
367  (Vanuatu 2015); (Jackson, Witt and McNamara 2019); (UNDP 
2019q)
368  (Vanuatu 2017)
Honiara beach debris 
(Source: UNDDR)
responds to the gender equality policy imperative 
set out in the Paris Agreement.
The Marshall Islands is updating its JNAP 2014–
2018. It has set the adoption of SDGs, the Paris 
Agreement (together with NDCs and NAPs) and the 
Sendai Framework as the national policy context 
and guiding principles for updating its JNAP. The 
country plans to align its National Framework for 
Resilience Reform with its NAP to ensure appropri-
ate relevance to funding.
Vanuatu has integrated CCA and DRR institutions 
and policy development processes.367 The National 
Advisory Board on Climate Change and Disaster 
Risk Reduction is jointly directed by the Vanuatu 
Meteorological and Geohazards Department and 
NDMO, and operates as Vanuatu’s principle policy, 
knowledge and coordination hub for all matters 
concerning climate change and DRR. This was set 
up before the new law that formalizes integration.368 
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Figure 13.4. Institutional arrangements for Tonga JNAP version 2
(Source: Tonga 2018)
Tonga was the first country in the region 
to develop its JNAP 2010–2015. This was 
conceived when Tonga was considering 
developing its Disaster Risk Management 
Action Plan under HFA, in conjunction with the 
regional DRM framework that was in place, 
the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disas-
ter Management Framework for Action. At the 
same time, Tonga was developing its NAPA for 
climate change under UNFCCC and the Pacific 
Islands Framework for Action on Climate 
Change. An integrated approach to CCA and 
DRR made sense given community vulner-
abilities and risk profiles of the archipelago, 
and was also the most efficient approach for 
capacity-constrained governments. 
The experience of Tonga, together with other 
countries in the Pacific, helped prepare the way 
for the 2016 FRDP.
The approval of the Tonga Climate Change 
Policy in January 2016 triggered the review of 
JNAP 1 on climate change and DRM (2010–
2015), and a second JNAP to 2028 was 
approved in May 2018.369 The second JNAP 
process also had clear roles for relevant stake-
holders, led by the Department of Climate 
Change at the Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, 
Information, Disaster Management, Environ-
ment, Climate Change and Communications, 
with support of a JNAP task force.
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The Tonga case study demonstrates that policy 
and institutional integration is possible where there 
is a high degree of overlap between disaster and 
climate risk and obvious connections to national 
development. It also demonstrates that integration 
can be an efficient solution for a small government, 
when backed by strong governmental commitment 
to JNAP priorities thereby attracting long-term 
resource commitments from development partners.
13.6 
Conclusions 
Coordinated national policymaking for climate 
change adaptation and disaster risk reduction 
Coordination can be achieved most effectively at 
the national level during the production of strate-
gies and plans in support of development. CCA and 
DRR are both sufficiently flexible concepts to enable 
countries to develop and implement plans and strat-
egies based on national circumstances and needs. 
How countries report and produce plans in response 
to different multilateral agreements is a differ-
ent issue; at times, such requirements can militate 
against integration. The international context also 
includes coordination of support that comes under 
the different umbrellas based on the special require-
ments of each source. 
Coordinated national technical assessments 
and solutions for the full spectrum of risk 
Risk assessments for climate change and disas-
ters are often carried out by different teams, and are 
supported and guided by different agreements and 
bodies internationally. It must be recognized that 
although disaster and climate risk have significant 
overlap, there are also substantial aspects in which 
they do not coincide, and this is an important chal-
lenge for integrated risk governance at national and 
local levels. However, in the realm of hydrometeoro-
logical risk for example, a suite of applicable tools 
are available including those that address adapta-
tion/risk reduction, either planned or contingent, 
and management of extremes and disaster losses. 
A country could choose to coordinate these aspects 
of CCA/DRR assessments, provided the assess-
ments cover the dimensions and timescales rele-
vant to each type of risk, from the present through 
to the medium and long terms. 
However, as set out in Part I of this GAR, in fully inte-
grated approaches under the Sendai Framework, 
assessments and solutions must also consider 
369  (Tonga 2018)
JNAP is recognized as the summary of the 
country’s priorities regarding disaster risk and 
climate risk management. A high-profile docu-
ment for the government and NGOs and part-
ners, JNAPs are referred to by implementing 
ministries and NGOs refer to in their project pro-
posals – notably for projects related to climate 
change – reflecting the efficacy of this gover-
nance mechanism. The establishment of robust 
governance arrangements and approaches to 
integration, with dedicated technical resources 
are key success factors in Tonga. A three-per-
son JNAP Secretariat, for which human and 
financial resources have been made available, 
provides a focal point for activities identified for 
the JNAP Technical Committee, and is acknowl-
edged as critical in the successful coordina-
tion of JNAP in Tonga. While enduring external 
support by development partners is recognized 
as having been essential to ensure implementa-
tion, these resources may not be sustainable in 
the long term.
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risk from non-climate-related natural and man-
made hazards and risks (especially geophysical 
and biological, technological and environmental), 
as well as cascading and systemic risks, including 
possible amplifying effects of climate change.
Integrated and coordinated activities 
– minimizing complexity and avoiding 
duplication 
Many organizations have prepared supplemen-
tary materials to NAP technical guidelines, to offer 
advice on how to promote synergy with other frame-
works. A supplement that covers DRR issues is 
under development by UNDDR and UNFCCC in close 
collaboration with the Least Developed Countries 
Expert Group on Adaptation. It will provide options 
for countries to better coordinate their efforts at 
the national level when addressing DRR and CCA 
through NAPs.
There are other global frameworks and multilateral 
agreements that also entail actions which address 
CCA and DRR. For example, the NUA and regional 
frameworks – such as Africa 2063 – have areas of 
work that can be better integrated at the national 
level. A broader integrating framework, such as the 
NAP-SDG iFrame being developed by the UNFCCC 
Least Developed Countries Expert Group, may be 
suitable to support formulation and implementation 
of adaptation plans. 
Global attempts to create synergies are commonly 
successful when coordination at regional, national 
and local levels is assured by a strong lead insti-
tution with a robust coordination mandate. As 
DRR and CCA are issues that affect many sectors, 
isolated action is rarely successful, and real coher-
ence can take place only if silos are broken at the 
level where implementation occurs.
Integration of disaster risk reduction and 
climate change adaptation into financial and 
budgetary instruments and frameworks 
Many of the country cases cited illustrate the impor-
tance of adequate capacities and resources for 
implementation. While a strong governance mecha-
nism and accessible risk information are impera-
tive for implementation, risk reduction remains 
aspirational unless it is translated into a budget-
ary process. Instead of perpetuating institutional 
competition for separate resource streams, finan-
cial instruments need to be made available that 
operate at the nexus between DRR and CCA and 
provide comprehensive financial resources. Financ-
ing mechanisms still need to be adjusted to this 
paradigm. 
Overall, the approach of integrating DRR into CCA 
plans seems to be most successful where hydrome-
teorological disaster risks are most prominent, and 
the impact of climate change is felt most keenly. 
Integrated approaches may not be the right fit for all 
countries, but the potential for accelerating imple-
mentation is significant, when there is political will. 
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14.1 
Significance of urban 
areas and local-
level action in the 
2030 Agenda
Developing urban resilience has been the subject 
of a global effort and is enshrined in a number of 
international frameworks – including the Sendai 
Framework, the 2030 Agenda and NUA – all of 
which recognize the importance of urban action by 
local and subnational governments to create inclu-
sive, safe, resilient and sustainable human settle-
ments.370 At the United Nations WCDRR in 2015, 
local and subnational governments also commit-
ted to adopting local DRR strategies and plans, 
targets, indicators and time frames, as outlined in 
the Sendai Declaration of Local and Subnational 
Governments. This agenda recognizes the role 
of local governments as the primary, responsible 
authority during disasters, emphasizing the need 
for greater international collaboration with local and 
subnational governments.371 
The 2030 Agenda also recognized the importance 
of local-level action, particularly through SDG 11: To 
make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable. The objectives of SDG 
11 include: the enhancement by 2030 of inclusive 
370  (United Nations 2015a)
371  (Gencer and UNISDR 2017) 
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and sustainable urbanization and capacities for 
participatory, integrated and sustainable human 
settlement planning; to reduce deaths, number of 
people affected and direct economic losses caused 
by disasters, in particular water-related disasters, 
by 2030 with a focus on protecting the poor and 
the most vulnerable; and by 2020 to substantially 
The Paris Agreement also proposes a role for local 
governments. It welcomes the efforts of cities and 
local authorities, and invites them to “scale up their 
efforts and support actions to reduce emissions 
and/or to build resilience and decrease vulner-
ability to the adverse effects of climate change and 
demonstrate these efforts.”373  
NUA brings together all these frameworks by 
proposing implementable actions in urban areas. In 
particular, in its section on Environmentally Sustain-
able and Resilient Urban Development, NUA recog-
nizes that “urban centres worldwide, especially in 
developing countries, often have characteristics 
that make them and their inhabitants especially 
increase the number of cities and human settle-
ments adopting and implementing integrated 
policies and plans towards inclusion, resource effi-
ciency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, 
resilience to disasters and holistic DRM at all levels 
in line with the Sendai Framework.372  
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change 
and other natural and human-made hazards.” NUA 
calls for national urban policies that commit to 
“strengthening the resilience of cities and human 
settlements, including through the development of 
quality infrastructure and spatial planning, by adopt-
ing and implementing integrated, age- and gender-
responsive policies and plans, and ecosystem-based 
approaches in line with the Sendai Framework.”374 It 
also calls for mainstreaming data-informed DRR and 
management at all levels of government to reduce 
vulnerabilities and risk, and highlights that risk is 
present in areas of formal and informal settlements, 
including slums. An important element of NUA is 
that it aims to “enable households, communities, 
Figure 14.1. Number of urban areas with populations over 750,000 affected by disasters (1985–2015) 
(Source: Gencer and UNDDR 2017) 
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374  (United Nations 2017b)
375  (United Nations 2017b) 
376  (UN-GGIM 2017)
377  (Hardoy, Gencer and Winograd 2018)
378  (Anton et al. 2016)
institutions, and services to prepare for, respond 
to, adapt to, and rapidly recover from the effects of 
hazards, including shocks or latent stresses.”375 
The availability of relevant geospatial and statis-
tical information can assist countries to better 
understand, formulate policies on, and manage risk 
and impacts. For this reason, the United Nations 
Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial Infor-
mation Management has developed the Strategic 
Framework on Geospatial Information and Services 
for Disasters.376 This approach offers urban areas 
and cities options for strengthening risk gover-
nance, enabling these localities to access and 
utilize nationally generated geospatial informa-
tion as well as feeding local information back to 
the national level. This mitigates consistent chal-
lenges regarding the provision of geospatial infor-
mation and strengthens informed decision-making 
and monitoring, before, during and after hazardous 
events. 
14.2 
Opportunities and 
benefits of local 
disaster risk reduction 
strategies and plans 
For a local DRR strategy to be fully aligned with the 
Sendai Framework, it should be coherent with all 
the above-mentioned global frameworks, as well 
as being integrated into the development agenda 
for the relevant urban area or local government, 
subnational or national territory. The importance 
of taking local-level actions to reduce current risk, 
prevent risk creation and increase cities’ resilience, 
is affirmed by Member States in adopting the 
post-2015 global agreements. However, the reality 
is that integrated implementation is not consis-
tently pursued across countries or within States 
and regions. Nor do many national urban policies 
employ systems-based approaches to urban risk 
reduction. 
Mainstreaming DRR strategies in urban develop-
ment plans comes with distinct challenges, but 
also generates opportunities for sustainable devel-
opment, potentially bringing economic benefits. 
Impacts of disasters are most immediately and 
intensely felt at the local level. Hazards often occur 
and risk often manifests locally; thus many of the 
most effective tools to reduce exposure and vulner-
ability, are executed at the local level; these include 
land-use regulations and enforcement of building 
codes, as well as basic environmental manage-
ment and regulatory compliance that are essential 
for effective DRR. Governments and communities 
can best engage with each other and work together 
at the local level on DRR, but also in implement-
ing sustainable development and environmental 
management.377 
Some research suggests local governments are 
more likely to develop DRR strategies or undertake 
DRR and resilience building actions when these 
are absent or limited at national or regional govern-
ment level. In an examination of climate-compatible 
development by subnational actors across Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean by the 
Climate and Development Knowledge Network, it 
was found that “national governments may play a 
more passive role in creating enabling conditions 
through legal and policy frameworks that implic-
itly support climate-compatible development or, at 
least, do not undermine it.”378 It is still critical that 
national and subnational governments put in place 
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and continuously upgrade, and enforce and incen-
tivize, critical regulations, such as building and flood 
risk standards. 
Productive interplay among different levels of 
government can be observed. For example, a review 
of DRM and climate resilience building in the United 
States of America over the last two decades found 
that the existence of multiple layers of government 
has “been an effective safety guard against any indi-
vidual player’s potential unwillingness to undertake 
protective risk management or climate resilience 
building.” Where political will was lacking at state 
and regional levels, federal-level support combined 
with private sector initiatives and charitable foun-
dations could make valuable progress, although 
“climate resilience building actions in the USA have 
been proven most effective at the city administra-
tive level.”379 
Successful initiatives at the local level can influence 
regional and even national level actions, creating a 
second or third wave of initiatives inspired by the 
original project.380 Evaluators of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Neighborhood Approach project across urban 
informal settlements in Latin America observed 
that some of the local projects funded by USAID 
generated multiplier effects at different levels. For 
example: a land tenure strategy in Jamaica that was 
defined by the NGO Habitat for Humanity is planned 
to be extended to the whole country and to involve 
other civil society organizations and institutions; 
an afforestation strategy for land-use management 
and DRR in Peru has been recognized internation-
ally by FAO as good practice; and in Colombia, 
the Neighborhood Approach project reached out 
to the city’s communities and became part of an 
expanded municipal DRR approach.381 
Local-level DRR actions can be triggered by a disas-
ter event that provides “a window of opportunity” for 
resilience building. The aforementioned Neighbor-
hood Approach project has observed that several 
emergencies triggered by El Niño in 2017 in north-
ern Peru had actually facilitated the process of 
building disaster risk awareness in local authori-
ties.382 A similar assessment was made for DRM 
activities at the state level in India, where it was 
found that “[a] few States that encountered mega 
disasters have learnt from the catastrophes and 
developed systems and processes to deal with 
disasters”; however, “a few States that faced major 
disasters have not been so proactive in transform-
ing the challenges into opportunities.”383 Hence, 
there are many other triggering factors and benefits 
for local governments to prioritize DRR and resil-
ience as part of their development agenda. 
Reducing disaster risk and building resilience can 
establish a leadership legacy; wherein strengthened 
trust in, and legitimacy of, local political structures 
and authority, and opportunities for decentral-
ized competencies and optimization of resources, 
emerge. Developing sociocultural gains while simul-
taneously reducing disaster losses and sustaining 
economic growth can provide positive assurance 
for investors. Developing more liveable communi-
ties with balanced ecosystems, better urban plan-
ning and design, and active citizen participation can 
create a successful platform for urban governance. 
Finally, the development of an expanded knowl-
edge base with growing access to an expanding 
network of cities and partners committed to DRR 
can increase resilience through the exchange of 
practices, tools and expertise.384 
A research project that highlights the fundamen-
tals of successful collaborative networks and their 
relevance to developing the New Zealand Resil-
ience Network underscores the significance of 
global networks to share knowledge and resources. 
Through an assessment of the level of resilience 
in the seven largest cities in New Zealand, it was 
found that the larger, more dynamic cities of New 
Zealand – which included two member cities of the 
Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities Programme – were 
“well informed, have resilience plans and prioritized 
projects related to enhancing their resilience, and 
secured the financial, human, and other resources 
required.”385 While the study also noted that other 
small cities had more dispersed resilience initia-
tives, some of these were rated as “robust and 
effective”.386 This once again demonstrates the 
importance of adopting flexible, context-specific 
approaches to local risk reduction, especially where 
386 Chapter 14
379  (Gencer and Rhodes 2018)
380  (Sarmiento et al. 2019) 
381  (Sarmiento et al. 2019) 
382  (Sarmiento et al. 2019)
383  (Chakrabarti 2019)
384  (UNISDR 2012)
385  (Elkhidir, Wilkinson and Mannakkara 2019)
386  (Elkhidir, Wilkinson and Mannakkara 2019)
387  (UNISDR 2018b)
local capacities are limited and resources scarce. 
This learning is transferrable to urban contexts 
in developing countries, where a more practical 
and adaptive approach may be needed to achieve 
outcomes, rather than assuming that a complex 
and centralized planning and strategy process is the 
best option.
Making Cities Resilient project analysis – an 
example
Following the adoption of the 10 essentials of the 
MCR Campaign, UNDDR and partners developed a 
Disaster Resilience Scorecard. It aims to support 
cities in assessing their resilience and facilitate the 
development of local DRR strategies. Analysis of 
scorecards of 169 MCR Campaign cities revealed 
that most progress had been made in Essential 4: 
Pursue resilient urban development and design, 
including risk-informed urban planning and design, 
land-use planning and management, development 
and enforcement of building codes. Of the 169 
cities, 51 were in Asia, 48 in Africa, 50 in the Ameri-
cas and 20 in the Arab region.387  
Figure 14.2. Ten new essentials of the MCR Campaign used to develop local DRR strategies and plans
(Source: UNDDR 2017) 
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The analysis also found that Essential 3: Strengthen 
financial capacity for resilience scored the lowest 
across the regions; financial allocations did not 
encourage local governments to include DRR in 
their planning and implementation – “securing a 
substantial budget for DRR is a significant chal-
lenge for most of the cities.”388 Despite such budget-
ary constraints, 85% of the local governments 
included in the study have plans that offer full or 
partial compliance with the Sendai Framework, 
and cover some of the 10 essentials for MCR. 
However, only 12% of the local governments imple-
ment a fully integrated DRR plan in accordance with 
the Sendai Framework, incorporating all of the 10 
essentials; 15% of the local governments have no 
plan at all (see Figure 14.3). The question remains 
whether such plans can be implemented with little 
or no budget, or if they will remain aspirational 
without substantial financial allocations from either 
national or local city revenues.
388  (Amaratunga et al. 2019) 389  (Gencer and UNISDR 2017)
Figure 14.3. State of local DRR plans as reported by the 169 cities of the MCR Campaign
(Source: UNDDR 2019)
388 Chapter 14
(Source: Gencer and UNDDR 2017)
14.3 
Design, development 
and implementation 
challenges of local 
disaster risk reduction 
strategies and plans 
As the above analysis shows, the percentage of 
cities with DRR plans that are fully compliant with 
the Sendai Framework and the 10 essentials of 
the MCR Campaign is still low. One of the reasons 
is that the provision of clear mandates regarding 
DRR is still a challenge for many local governments. 
Decentralization of powers and vertical integration 
of risk governance among national and local author-
ities remains limited. This is compounded by a lack 
of tools to improve the quality of disaster-related 
decision-making; for systems analysis (simulation, 
optimization and multi-objective analysis) for 
example. Officials charged with managing urban 
areas need a complete, holistic understanding of 
physical system dynamics of disaster-affected 
areas and adjacent regions. Equally, insights into 
the variables that govern the interactions among 
human (people and economy) and natural (water, 
land and air) systems, and the built environment 
(buildings, roads, bridges, etc.) in particular, are 
much sought after. 
As regards the level of authority, capacities and 
responsibilities that local governments possess 
for activities related to the 10 essentials, only 
46.7% of surveyed governments have full author-
ity and capacity to undertake the 13 DRR actions 
identified at local level (see Box 14.1), 39.7% have 
partial powers (limited or distributed among other 
institutions) and 13.5% have no powers to under-
take these actions.389 In many instances, local 
governments have partial or no responsibility to 
develop a city vision or strategic plan; 1 in 10 of 
those assessed had no responsibility whatsoever, 
rather the responsibility is divided among multiple 
institutions.
a. Developing a city vision or strategic plan 
with concepts of resilience
b. Establishing a single point of coordination 
for DRR
c. Undertaking risk analysis for multiple hazards 
d. Developing financial planning for resilience 
e. Developing and updating urban plans with 
up-to-date risk information
f. Updating building codes and standards and 
enforcing their use 
g. Protecting, conserving and restoring eco-
systems for resilience 
h. Developing a critical infrastructure plan or 
strategy for resilience 
i. Strengthening institutional capacity for 
resilience 
j. Identifying and strengthening societal 
capacity for resilience 
k. Developing a disaster management and/
or emergency response plan and protocols 
l. Developing or ensuring connections to 
EWSs 
m. Developing a strategy for post-disaster 
recovery and reconstruction that ensures 
building back better 
Box 14.1. DRR actions that indicate local government powers and capacities
389
Shared responsibilities for the development of 
a city vision or strategic plan is not uncommon. 
For example: in Sendai city (Japan), the national 
government and the prefectural governments 
share responsibilities for the city vision and plan; 
in Makati city (Metro Manila, Philippines), the local 
authority, metropolitan bodies and national govern-
ment agencies share responsibilities for planning 
and development; and in Honduras and the Bolivar-
ian Republic of Venezuela, the central government 
is the primary body responsible for the develop-
ment of a city vision or strategic plan.390  From the 
city government perspective, this may be experi-
enced as a lack of adequate powers at local level, as 
Even where local governments have the relevant 
authority to develop DRR strategies or manage risk, 
limited capacities and resources hinder implemen-
tation. For example, the capacity to update and 
enforce the use of building codes and undertake 
multi-hazard risk analysis is frequently lacking.392 
emphasized in the Urban Climate Change Research 
Network Second Assessment Report on Climate 
Change and Cities, which pointed to important gaps 
between national policies and city government 
needs, particularly in small countries, where author-
ity to intervene mostly lies at the national level.391  
Figure 14.4 illustrates local governments’ overall 
authorities, capacities and responsibilities for 
DRR from the same study, demonstrating that 
the authority to plan for DRR, and even the legal 
authority to carry out the necessary actions, was 
not matched by the resources and capacities for 
implementation.
Climate-compatible development actions of subna-
tional authorities suffer similar issues, where “there 
is often disparity between the need for political 
and financial authority, resources, and capacity to 
respond to climate-related challenges at the subna-
tional level, and the actual power, resources, and 
Figure 14.4. Local government authorities, capacities and responsibilities for DRR (% full authority, capacity and/or responsi-
bility)
(Source: Gencer and UNDDR 2017)
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capacity available”. This is commonly a function 
of partial or unclear devolution of power, a lack of 
clear delegation or vertical integration.393  
Many local administrations do have clear author-
ity for specific DRR actions that are part of long-
established municipal activities, such as developing 
urban plans. However, for activities such as ecosys-
tem preservation and restoration, which are tradi-
tionally the responsibility of the environmental, 
regional or subnational authorities, legal authority 
for local governments tends to be limited.394  
Lack of coordination among horizontal and vertical 
agencies and sectoral silos can therefore exacer-
bate limitations on the powers of local governments 
to actively pursue DRR and resilience building. Such 
coordination is particularly important in addressing 
risks that span administrative and systems bound-
aries – environmental risks for example – where 
effective cooperation is essential.395 In essence, 
tackling urban risk requires a systems thinking 
approach to risk governance. This is a challenge 
for most national and local administrations, as it 
requires new approaches and tools to support verti-
cal and cross-sectoral integration.
Inadequate coordination and interactive stake-
holder partnerships can impede knowledge acqui-
sition and management in local governments. 
A project on Participatory Decision Making for 
Climate Resilient Development in three cities across 
Latin America found that there was adequate infor-
mation and data available in the three cities to start 
carrying out vulnerability and risk assessments, 
despite prior assumptions to the contrary. The chal-
lenge was that the information was held by differ-
ent actors – government offices, academic and 
research centres, and international organizations 
– and the difficulty lay in accessing data and infor-
mation.396 There were conflicting regimes for data 
verification and often incompatible formats that 
made it difficult to share information among institu-
tions and actors. Consequently, local governments 
could not access the technical capabilities to gener-
ate and process the information they needed.397 In 
addition to information gaps, other impediments 
to local DRR actions include the lack of technical 
capacity and training, and difficulties in assembling 
the technical-political teams with the right profile to 
influence decision-making.398  
Budgetary constraints represent the biggest chal-
lenge to local DRR and climate adaptation. To 
overcome this obstacle, it is important to be able 
to demonstrate in each context that ex ante DRR 
is a better use of scarce resources than the alter-
native of responding after damage and disruption 
occurs.399 Mobilizing private funding without the 
backing of national governments is still proving to 
be a major challenge for medium to small subna-
tional entities.400 Investments that can reduce risk 
and increase adaptive capacity are often not priori-
tized, while benefits may only show at a later stage 
and are thus heavily discounted.401 The creation of 
national and local urban policies including DRR are 
critical for long-term economic success, competi-
tiveness and resilience. However, short mandates 
and recurrent elections, deadlines of political 
agendas and urgencies of daily management can 
militate against such long-term systems thinking. 
The common corollary being a lack of investment 
in strengthening technical and professional capaci-
ties, and the failure to plan and work over the longer 
time frames required for resilient urban develop-
ment planning.402 
391
14.3.1 
Disaster-risk-informed city vision and sustainable growth strategy
It is often in the aftermath of major disaster events that the impetus to adopt city-wide approaches to DRR 
become apparent, as was the case in New York City following Hurricane Sandy.
New York City’s vision provides the basis for coher-
ent, convergent approaches pursuing sustainability, 
climate adaptation and resilience, and provides a 
road map for implementation of specific strategies 
and initiatives. 
In 2013, after Hurricane Sandy, New York City 
released PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient 
New York, which documented the lessons 
learned from Sandy, and developed a strat-
egy to build back better and achieve resilience 
towards the impacts of climate change, includ-
ing risk from rising sea levels and extreme 
weather events.403 In 2015, the city launched 
the latest city vision document, OneNYC: The 
Plan for a Strong and Just New York City, which 
was developed in partnership with the Rock-
efeller 100 Resilient Cities project. OneNYC 
cites “sustainability” as a cornerstone, stating 
that New York City will be the most sustain-
able big city in the world and a global leader in 
the fight against climate change. It also cites 
“resiliency”, ensuring that New York’s City’s 
neighbourhoods, economy and public services 
will be ready to withstand and emerge stronger 
from the impacts of climate change and other 
twenty-first century threats.
Within its vision of being a resilient city, New 
York City has made significant progress in 
terms of neighbourhood resilience. Since 2015, 
it has supported resilience and preparedness 
planning of community and faith-based orga-
nizations and small businesses, and promoted 
Case study: New York City 
volunteer and civic engagement across the five 
boroughs, to address risks from heat-waves 
and rising temperatures. It has provided small 
businesses with training, technical assess-
ments and preparedness grants to enhance 
their resilience. In terms of resilience of build-
ings, since Hurricane Sandy, the city has led 
efforts to adapt the existing building stock to 
evolving climate risks through a multi-layered 
approach, including upgrading of physical 
systems in family homes and multifamily build-
ings, changing zoning and land-use policy, 
working with FEMA to produce more accu-
rate maps, and educating building owners 
about climate risk and mitigation options. The 
city continues to address Hurricane Sandy’s 
impacts on its infrastructure, protecting its 
power, transportation and water systems, 
while also addressing emerging risks, such 
as extreme rainfall, through resilient design. 
The city has also advanced numerous coastal 
defence projects since 2015. In coordination 
with community stakeholders, it has sought to 
deliver cutting-edge flood risk mitigation solu-
tions that are integrated into the urban fabric of 
neighbourhoods and provide co-benefits such 
as recreational space wherever possible.
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14.3.2 
Challenges and opportunities in developing 
disaster risk reduction strategies in different 
regions
To speak of the urban implies cities, and there is 
a wide range of characteristics that fall under this 
subject. These include administrative limits, size 
of population, density, contiguous urban areas and 
their socioeconomic interconnections, governance 
mechanisms and resources. For the post-2015 
DRR agenda, there is no particular approach in the 
Sendai Framework, NUA, Paris Agreement or SDGs 
that contemplates the different conditions that exist 
in the broad spectrum of cities and city contexts. 
For NUA, the risk management regime considers 
cities with respect to income (low and high) and 
does not consider the cities’ typology or the implica-
tions of the size of the city and its population. These 
are critical conditions however for those developing 
countries that experience a steady increase in the 
size of small- and medium-sized cities.404 
According to The World’s Cities in 2018 report, an 
overwhelming majority of the world’s cities have 
fewer than 5 million inhabitants. Among these, 
598 cities have populations between 500,000 and 
1 million; 467 cities have populations between 1 
million and 5 million; 48 cities have populations 
between 5 million and 10 million; and 33 cities have 
more than 10 million inhabitants (megacities). The 
projected numbers for 2030 show an exponential 
increase: 710 cities are expected to have between 
500,000 and 1 million inhabitants; 597 cities with 
1 million to 5 million inhabitants; and 66 cities will 
403  (Gencer and UNISDR 2017); (City of New York 2011); 
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View of Mogadishu 
(Source: MDOGAN/Shutterstock.com) 
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have between 5 million and 10 million inhabitants, 
of which 13 will be located in Asia and 10 in Africa. 
The number of cities with more than 10 million 
inhabitants is projected to increase to 43.405  
To understand the challenges and opportunities in 
developing DRR strategies, it is also important to 
recognize the significant differences in the char-
acter of urban environments around the globe. 
For example, in the Arab and North Africa region, 
there is a growing number of large agglomerations 
with populations of more than 1 million people. 
These are expected to reach 18 by 2030, account-
ing for 24% of the total population of 128 million 
people in the region.406 The urban context, and thus 
vulnerability and risk in the region, are defined by 
unique aspects of demographics, sociopolitical 
and economic development. Such aspects include 
the increased flows of refugees and migrants; 
the region has the largest global number of IDPs, 
at 17.3 million. Urban slums are not a signifi-
cant feature in the Arab and North Africa region 
as a whole, but certain countries in North Africa 
have very high levels of informal settlement. For 
example, in Sudan, the share of the population living 
in poor informal settlements is 91.6%, in Mauritania, 
it is 79.7%, and in Somalia, it is 78.6%.407 
Many of the cities in the Arab and North Africa 
region are subject to hydrometeorological and 
geophysical hazards. The complex nature of the 
evolving risk landscape is most articulated in 
coastal areas, which are particularly susceptible to 
ﬂooding, as well as seismic and climate risks. Due 
to highly arid conditions, the region is one of the 
most vulnerable to climate change, putting cities at 
risk of water scarcity and extreme heat conditions. 
With these complex conditions, building resilience 
through developing strategies and plans to reduce 
risk in the cities of the Arab and North Africa region 
has become more essential than ever. 
A comparative analysis of 25 Arab region cities’ 
resilience assessments identified trends and inves-
tigated challenges and opportunities for implement-
ing the Sendai Framework in the Arab region at the 
local level.408 Of the 25 cities that participated in 
this study, 18 of them (72%) had a city master plan 
or relevant strategy in place that were in partial 
compliance with the Sendai Framework and cover-
ing some of the 10 essentials. However, it was 
found that the “underlying risks of humanitarian 
crisis and disasters challenge the process of build-
ing resilience in the Arab region, combined with the 
lack of coping capacities when faced with climate 
change, conflict, and displacement.”409 
Another impediment to the development of DRR 
strategies and plans in the Arab and North Africa 
region is the lack of disaster-related data. City-
wide hazard maps are often limited or do not exist, 
while updates on risk assessment are scarce and 
lack clear multi-hazard components, according to a 
recent assessment.410 This challenge is often linked 
to disaster risk governance, when the legal frame-
work fails to require the maintenance and updating 
of disaster data. Given the complex risk environ-
ment in the region, it is of paramount importance 
that urban DRR strategies are based on sound risk 
information, to ensure that implementation priori-
tizes the most at-risk population and assets. These 
challenges must be addressed in the near term in 
relevant cities, if city master plans that already exist 
are to be successfully realized.
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14.3.3 
Collaborative, integrated and holistic resilience building 
Resilience building is not something that can be undertaken effectively by local government authorities acting 
alone. The process undertaken in Maputo, Mozambique, illustrates the benefits to all of broad stakeholder and 
cross-sectoral engagement.
Mozambique is undergoing a process of rapid 
urbanization.411 While 32% of the nation’s 
population can be considered as living in 
“urban areas”, this percentage is projected to 
rise to 37% by 2020. By 2025, Mozambique 
is projected to be the fourth most-urban-
ized country in sub-Saharan Africa, with 50% 
urban dwellers. The Mozambique National 
Statistics Institute puts the population of the 
capital Maputo at over 1.273 million people. 
This poses enormous challenges for the local 
government in its efforts to deliver basic 
services, provide food and improve the city’s 
infrastructure, which creates enormous vulner-
abilities and exposure to risk.412 
Maputo is the largest city in Mozambique and 
the main financial, corporate and commercial 
centre of the country. Located on the western 
shore of Maputo Bay, the city is close to the 
triple border of Mozambique, South Africa and 
Eswatini (formerly known as Swaziland). As 
a function of its location, exposure to natural 
hazards – notably flooding and cyclones – 
is high, and expected to worsen as climate 
change brings sea-level rise. Maputo was 
fortunate on this occasion to have avoided 
the loss and damage wrought by Cyclone Idai 
in March 2019 on the city of Beira and large 
areas to its west, where the vulnerabilities of 
the city and surrounding region were laid bare 
(see section 13.4.5).413  
Changing rainfall patterns and the reduc-
tion of river flows are expected to lead to the 
decrease of soil water recharge and availabil-
ity of surface water. Of the total population, 
70% live in informal settlements, resulting 
in major urban challenges and widespread 
and entrenched vulnerabilities as a result of 
economic crises and unemployment. 
In 2010, the World Bank and the National 
Disaster Management Institute identified 
Maputo Municipality as one of the most risk 
prone in Mozambique. Since then, the munici-
pality has collaborated with international 
initiatives and programmes to better under-
stand and tackle the various shocks, stress-
ors and challenges in the city, especially those 
related to climate change. One of the flagship 
initiatives is the City Resilience Profiling Tool 
(CRPT), which was launched in 2017 and will 
continue through 2019, with the goal to better 
understand urban hazards, and their impacts 
on inhabitants and functionality through 
in-depth data collection, resilience analysis, 
identification of key actors and development 
of priority actions. 
Through the metrics provided in CRPT, Maputo 
has been able to conduct an analysis of its 
data along a resilience baseline. The result is 
the city’s own “resilience profile”, which high-
lights vulnerabilities, risks, data gaps and 
capacity bottlenecks. In Maputo, initial analy-
sis has indicated that epidemics and pandem-
ics such as malaria, natural hazard risks such 
as heat-waves, floods, drought and tropical 
cyclones, and environmental risks such as 
Case study: Maputo, Mozambique
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The resulting disaster resilience policy will be more 
easily integrated into existing urban development 
strategies and more readily implemented, because 
of the multi -stakeholder and cross-sectoral 
process.
Maputo’s approach to building city resilience is 
work in progress, but the highly engaged process 
has provided a strong base for a new policy, and 
has been successful in attracting resources and 
other necessary support to the local government. 
coastal erosion are the most pressing for the 
city. Although these risks may not be “new” to 
the city, through CRPT, the city has an evidence 
base to support action and an in-depth under-
standing of pressure points, stressors and key 
actors that should drive transformational and 
sustainable change. 
By providing robust guidance and assis-
tance in creating a policy to be called Actions 
for Resilience, the CRPT process is attract-
ing resources and other support to the local 
government to improve decision-making and 
to contribute to long-term, resilience-based 
sustainable urban development. 
To build on the stakeholder engagement 
developed throughout implementation, the 
Actions for Resilience will be finalized through 
a dialogue among city officials and relevant 
stakeholders. Furthermore, as the data collec-
tion, analysis and diagnosis stages take 
into account ongoing plans, policies and 
programmes in the city, the resulting Actions 
for Resilience in Maputo will be more easily 
integrated into existing urban development 
strategies as opposed to an isolated resilience 
action plan that might not be joined with other 
initiatives in the city. This process will allow 
integration with the Ecosystem Based Adap-
tation Plan and the Metropolitan Transport 
Project, as well as relevant new policies, plans 
and agreements that are currently being devel-
oped at the municipal level.
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14.4 
Enabling factors 
for developing and 
implementing local 
disaster risk reduction 
strategies and plans 
The previous section identified that one of the most 
important underlying factors for the successful 
design, development and implementation of urban 
DRR strategies and plans is sound risk governance. 
Commitment of a local government lead with a 
clear mandate and the necessary authorities is the 
first step to local-level DRR action. However, urban 
risk governance is a more complex than merely 
having the necessary legislation and institutions in 
place, it requires broad participation for effective 
implementation. 
Risk governance at the urban scale brings forth 
DRR stakeholder participation at all levels, from 
decision-making to design and implementation, and 
incorporates formal and informal urban contexts. 
It is conducive to the success of local-level DRR 
action and the development and implementation of 
local DRR strategies and plans in urban areas. Such 
urban risk governance will also be coherent with the 
2030 Agenda as it facilitates inclusive and sustain-
able urban development. 
A facilitating factor for the development, design 
and implementation of DRR strategies is access 
to adequate information, resources and technical 
capacity to process risk-related information to main-
stream into risk assessments and risk-informed 
development planning. While capacities are often 
very limited at local government levels, they can be 
enhanced by tapping into resources of the private 
sector, academic and research organizations, and 
civil society, provided their data are evidence based 
and streamlined in a format for easy use by local 
governments. Risk information needs to be gener-
ated through a “participatory and inclusive approach 
A view of Maputo 
(Source: hbpro/shutterstock.com)
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in generating, improving and managing informa-
tion” including risk-related geospatial information, 
which should be used by all entities engaged in DRM 
efforts.414 
Another critical factor for the successful develop-
ment and implementation of local DRR strategies 
and plans in urban areas is the strength of planning 
institutions and norms in that locality. The role of 
planning is indispensable for mainstreaming DRR 
into urban development plans. The aforementioned 
study of the USAID Neighborhood Approach project 
across informal settlements in Latin America found 
that it was the local governments that had the more 
comprehensive urban development capabilities 
that were most able to foster cross-sectoral inte-
gration and to mainstream DRR practices in urban 
development.415 
Various types and scales of urban plans, from terri-
torial to land-use zoning, can help to protect envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas, and hence increase 
resilience. They can: reduce disaster risk through 
better planned infrastructure and the creation of 
open spaces; reduce vulnerability through appropri-
ate location of housing and other critical services; 
mitigate climate change by ensuring optimum 
use of energy and reducing GHG emissions; and 
improve resilience by ensuring upgrading and retro-
fitting of poorly planned and constructed settle-
ments, ideally through a participatory process that 
will ensure implementation and sustainability.416 
Furthermore, the consideration of innovative plan-
ning and design ideas such as urban green growth 
strategies, transit-oriented design, creative open 
and public space development, and the use of green 
and blue infrastructure can help to reduce risk in 
urban areas while improving living conditions and 
driving cities towards sustainable and resilient 
development.417 
An example comes from China’s Sponge City 
Programme, which has established methods for 
flood risk reduction, water conservation, improved 
water quality and reduction of heat island effects 
by using ecological infrastructure. Run-off water 
volumes are reduced by preservation and restora-
tion of green spaces over hard impervious surfaces, 
which also reduces day- and night-time tempera-
tures. There are cultural, ecological and health 
benefits too, which all help to build community 
resilience.418  
Implementation of risk-sensitive planning can help 
reduce the risk in established informal and slum 
settlements, and the provision of suitable land for 
housing for all income groups can also reduce the 
growth of informal settlements. Given the presence 
of informal settlements in many rapidly urbanizing 
cities, participatory slum-upgrading practices may 
be a prerequisite for DRR and resilience building in 
these areas if it is not immediately possible to offer 
suitable land, infrastructure, and services to meet 
the needs of populations moving from impover-
ished rural economies, or as a result of conflict and 
crises.419 
An enabling factor for local DRR strategies in urban 
areas is developing an understanding of emerg-
ing risks, aided by developments in systems and 
systemic risk modelling, which allow the develop-
ment of context-specific approaches in local DRR 
strategies and planning from neighbourhood to 
city and territorial level. Such approaches must 
be backed up by the enforcement and updating of 
national codes and standards as part of national 
urban policies.
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14.4.1 
Participatory development of strategies for climate-resilient and inclusive urban development
Climate-resilient and inclusive urban development that involves government, community and private sector 
actors can be effective in managing disaster risk and addressing governance issues in cities, as was the 
case in Santo Tomé, Argentina.
Santo Tomé in Argentina is a rapidly growing 
small- to medium-sized Latin American city. It 
is prone to natural hazards and the impacts of 
climate change and is attempting to implement 
climate-resilient and inclusive urban develop-
ment to strengthen its resilience.420 
Santo Tomé is located in the province of Santa 
Fe and is part of the Greater Santa Fe Metro-
politan Area in Argentina. Within the last 
decade, the city has experienced rapid popula-
tion growth of 12%, almost twice the provincial 
average, a rate that is expected to grow further 
by 2025. Due to its location at the mouth of the 
Salado River, the city is prone to flooding; most 
exposed are the city’s informal settlements. 
The city has developed a system of defences 
and pumps, which are reaching their limit in 
terms of protection. Urban growth without 
adequate risk planning and inadequate infra-
structure and services has led to an increase in 
disaster risk in the city. 
A diverse group of actors including local govern-
ment representatives, hydraulic engineers, 
officials of public works and services, urban 
planning, social development, health and envi-
ronment, as well as civil society organizations 
identified the need to develop a risk information 
system and improve communication among 
local actors. They also recommended advancing 
a DRM plan within the urban planning process, 
and in the expansion and completion of infra-
structure and services so that they reduce risks. 
Priority actions taken cover a diverse range. 
They include: the strengthening of the solid 
waste collection system to reduce the obstruc-
tion of drains and environmental risks; educa-
tion campaigns and capacity-building for local 
actors in DRM, climate change and resilience 
issues; improved flood control infrastructure, 
city mobility, water infrastructure and water 
management and the incorporation of green 
infrastructure options based on existing norms.
Case study: Santo Tomé, Argentina 
and timescales. It involved a range of stakehold-
ers, including local and national government, civil 
society, scientific and technical experts, communi-
ties and students, as well as diverse implementa-
tion activities, including participatory risk mapping, 
use of geospatial data and public education. 
The case of San Tomé highlights the diversity of 
actors and scope of activities that may be needed 
when taking a systems-based approach to develop-
ing and implementing an integrated urban resilience 
plan.
The case study of Dar es Salaam, United Repub-
lic of Tanzania, that features prior to Part III, 
also highlights the importance of participatory 
approaches from a wide range of stakeholders to 
address urban risk across a range of sectors, levels 
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14.4.2 
Downscaling local resilience and sustainable development through multiscale and multilevel 
holistic approaches 
Support for greater city resilience can also be initiated at provincial level, as in the province of Potenza, Italy.
The example of the province of Potenza and its 
development of a Provincial Territorial Coordina-
tion Master Plan, demonstrates how a large group 
of municipalities in a region with common risks and 
challenges can achieve resource efficiencies and 
mutual capacity-building, using innovations such 
as clustering, and downscaled modelling from the 
provincial to city level.
The province of Potenza is an Italian Local 
Authority of super-municipal and subregional 
level. It comprises 100 municipalities in its terri-
tory and is exposed to a variety of natural and 
technological hazards.421 In 2013, the province 
outlined the #weResilient strategy aimed at 
pursuing territorial development through a struc-
tural combination of environmental sustainabil-
ity, territorial safety and climate change policies.
A milestone in the #weResilient strategy is the 
Provincial Territorial Coordination Master Plan 
(2013). It has been delivered to the commu-
nity as an important document for guiding and 
addressing governance of provincial territorial 
development and represents a “structural” tool 
for analysing needs and driving local govern-
ments’ choices with a wide-area strategic point 
of view and a multiscale and multilevel holistic 
approach. A new concept of territorial gover-
nance has been outlined that includes the struc-
tural introduction of “resilience” to disasters and 
climate change into territorial development poli-
cies and which are to be implemented through 
specific actions at local and urban levels. 
A fundamental aspect of the #weResilient 
implementation strategy is to build on active 
participation of communities in local decision-
making processes in territorial policies, and to 
assist and support municipalities. This ensures 
that specific urban/local strategies and actions 
are integrated into the general framework of 
#weResilient on sustainable and resilient terri-
torial development. 
The signatory municipalities are committed to 
integrating more focused sustainable develop-
ment and community resilience within urban 
planning and related actions, including in other 
relevant sectors. By downscaling the model 
proposed by the province of Potenza, and with 
its support, these municipalities are locally 
implementing a multi-stakeholder approach. 
This is based on the active involvement of local 
institutions, organizations and associations 
representing different professional and social 
categories, to give them the opportunity to 
become driving forces reducing disaster risk. 
These municipalities are engaged in clustering 
processes with key community actors across 
all sectors. They are also looking at working 
with the concept of social categories, experi-
menting with the use of concrete plans/actions 
to transform different social groups into forces 
for developing and implementing safe and 
sustainable urban policies. Through these 
different techniques, the approach is one of 
local engagement to generate new models of 
urban planning that work from the bottom up.
Case study: Province of Potenza, Italy 
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14.5
 
Conclusions 
Given the complex and dynamic nature of urban 
risk, and especially given current projections for 
rapid urban growth in developing economies, a 
focus on urban areas and local-level action is 
central and urgent to achieve inclusive, resilient 
and sustainable communities as understood in 
the Sendai Framework, the 2030 Agenda, the Paris 
Agreement and NUA. These global frameworks give 
prominence to the importance of urban risk reduc-
tion actions, and strategy and policy development. 
They reflect Member States’ clear understand-
ing that, without risk-informed planning, human 
lives will be in danger, assets will be exposed and 
development gains will be lost, and that this risk is 
especially acute in urban areas. More than half the 
world’s population currently lives in urban environ-
ments, a figure that is projected to grow dramati-
cally in the coming decades. Unplanned urban 
development that is undertaken without appropriate 
commitment to transdisciplinary, multi-risk assess-
ment and systems-based approaches in developing 
solutions could result in critical increases in vulner-
ability and exposure to both existing and new risks.
There are sound socioeconomic and ecological 
reasons for national governments to create national 
urban policies that include support for the develop-
ment and implementation of national and local risk 
reduction strategies and plans in urban areas. It is 
in the interests of local authorities to develop and 
implement local and urban DRR strategies that, in 
addition to context-specific benefits, also create 
a legacy of leadership based on trust and legiti-
macy of the local political structures and author-
ity, so that civil society, the private sector, scientific 
and technological institutions and development 
partners continue to engage. Local and urban DRR 
strategies safeguard sociocultural gains, and can 
promote social equality (including along gender 
lines), substantially reducing losses and sustaining 
economic activity while assuring investors that the 
environment is safe and reliable.
Local strategies also present opportunities for 
decentralized competencies and optimization of 
often scarce resources. As seen earlier, cities with 
limited resources and capacity often ignore risk, 
but may do so once forced to confront the conse-
quences of disaster. As has often been observed, 
disaster recovery may also present opportunities 
to integrate risk reduction in future development 
processes, as governments may use these situa-
tions as “triggers to increase the understanding of 
the risks and to mainstream the DRM approach in 
different sectors of development.”422 
Collaboration in global initiatives creates a knowl-
edge base with a growing access to an expand-
ing network of cities and partners committed to 
DRR and resilience building with the possibility 
of exchange of practices, tools and expertise.423 
However, despite increased awareness and obvious 
benefits of developing local DRR strategies and 
plans, many cities are still not progressing signifi-
cantly regarding design, development and imple-
mentation of DRR actions. 
Local governments experience a multitude of chal-
lenges that hinder the advancement of DRR and 
resilience building. The lack of sufficient authority 
for city governments, inadequate budget allocations 
and limitations in technical capacity, are comment 
and prominently cited concerns. Mobilizing private 
funding without the backing of national govern-
ments remains a major challenge for medium to 
small subnational entities.424  
In terms of risk information gaps, the lack of coordi-
nation among horizontal and vertical agencies and 
stakeholder partnerships, as well as sector silos, 
423  (UNISDR 2012)
424  (Anton et al. 2016)
421  (Attolico and Smaldone 2019)
422  (Maurizi and Fontana 2019)
401
seems to be the greatest impediment to addressing 
the knowledge deficit and enhancing capacities for 
DRR in local governments. This must be overcome, 
not least at the critical stage of designing DRR strat-
egies and action plans when sharing data is key. 
One of the biggest challenges for local DRR is to 
make the investment case; to convincing national 
and local government authorities and communities 
faced with limited resources and competing needs 
that it pays to invest in risk reduction because 
recovery and reconstruction costs more. The 
short-term nature of political process and cycles 
compounds this dilemma.
To overcome some of these challenges, three main 
enabling factors have been identified that support 
the development and implementation of local and 
urban DRR strategies.
Sound urban risk governance: Governmental struc-
tures, laws and policies need to support horizontal 
governance in providing stakeholder engagement 
and integration across sectors, within the city 
boundary and beyond with neighbouring counties 
and cities. This also applies to vertical governance 
that strengthens the downscaling of development 
efforts with international, regional and national enti-
ties and frameworks. Such urban risk governance 
should incorporate formal and informal contexts, 
bring forth public participation at all levels starting 
from data collection, assessment and decision-
making to facilitate context-relevant design and 
implementation of local DRR strategies and plans, 
particularly regarding issues that concern the most 
vulnerable populations. Such urban risk governance 
will also be coherent with other development frame-
works as it facilitates inclusive and sustainable 
urban development. Local participation strategies 
can also advance capacity and resource gaps by 
the inclusion of academia and research, as well as 
private sectors, in the process of resilience building. 
Sustained use and application of risk informa-
tion: Evidence-based risk data needs to be easy to 
identify and locate by local governments, even if 
its collection is dispersed through different govern-
mental entities, or located within the academic 
or private sector. Ease of application in decision-
making is also key; case studies have shown the 
success of generating geospatial data through 
participatory techniques and attaining such data in 
a streamlined manner in local government settings.
Risk-informed urban planning and develop-
ment: This is found to be another indispensable 
enabling factor for the success of local DRR strat-
egies and plans. The integration of hazard and 
risk information in urban planning, design and 
construction should be reinforced by relevant 
laws, regulations and guidelines, which should be 
updated on a regular basis. Risk-informed urban 
planning requires meaningful stakeholder partici-
pation, particularly when urban development 
processes, such as those that fail to provide access 
to critical infrastructure and services, can increase 
the vulnerability of urban populations. In the rapidly 
developing urban regions of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America where the absolute number of residents of 
informal settlement are growing with populations 
moving in increasing numbers from impoverished 
rural economies, industrial relocation, conflicts 
and crises, there is a need to understand emerg-
ing risk. This means involving the most vulnerable 
stakeholders in the planning processes, such as 
in participatory slum upgrading, and developing 
context-based approaches in local DRR strategies 
and planning, which may be applied at neighbour-
hood, city and territorial levels. It is also increasingly 
understood that integrating ecological infrastruc-
ture into resilient urban land-use planning has 
multiple benefits in reducing risk reduction, provid-
ing a cleaner water supply, reducing peak summer 
temperatures, and improving health and well-being.
Sound urban risk governance frameworks informed 
and bolstered by more readily available and more 
easily applicable risk information – supported by 
emerging capabilities in systems and systemic risk 
modelling – will be of crucial importance to enable 
effective, context-specific design, development and 
implementation of local DRR strategies and plans. 
Such approaches to building resilience in urban 
areas can be transformative, empowering commu-
nities and ensuring inclusive and sustainable urban 
development.  
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15.1 
Problem statement 
The Sendai Framework definitively articulates the 
shift from managing disasters to managing risk. 
This provides a powerful impetus for the “tradi-
tional” DRR community, seeking to redress practice 
that has for many years seen ex ante action articu-
lating the complex risk drivers from which disasters 
materialize eclipsed by action responding to the 
manifestation of disasters. Translating this shift 
into informed, systems-based decision-making, 
investment and practice in all contexts and at all 
scales, and reflecting this in local to national strate-
gies, is arguably the principal preoccupation of this 
community. 
Growing understanding of the complex risk environ-
ments in which disasters occur has raised ques-
tions for DRR policymakers and practitioners who 
frequently operate in complex contexts, be this 
in relation to complex health crises,425 or natural 
hazard-related disasters in contexts of environ-
mental or economic stress, or armed conflict,426 for 
example; or a combination of several or all of these. 
Contexts in which humanitarian response427 and 
DRR428 are implemented are therefore more compli-
cated and challenging than is often acknowledged 
or represented in policy and programmatic docu-
ments. This leads to questioning how to effectively 
Chapter 15: 
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design DRR strategies that adequately reflect and 
address the complexity of the context in which 
disaster risk manifests, and the diversity of disas-
ters themselves. 
The expanded remit of the Sendai Framework 
allows the DRR community to think beyond natural 
hazards and to engage with complex, systemic risk. 
This needs to be operationalized in combination 
with the other post-2015 frameworks, which include 
mechanisms, practitioners and tools better suited 
to dealing with other threats, hazards and shocks. 
In addition to those dealing with sustainable devel-
opment, climate change, good urbanization and 
financing development, the New York Declaration 
for Refugees and Migrants represents an issue 
that is also closely related to disaster risk in fragile 
contexts; all of these operate alongside threat-
specific frameworks at the national level. Calls for 
greater emphasis on coherence in implementation 
across the global frameworks feature prominently 
in discussions on resilience.429 And notable assess-
ments seeking to better understand the complexity 
of risk have emerged, including for example OECD 
resilient systems analysis.430
15.2 
Empirical examples of 
disaster risk reduction 
in fragile contexts 
Multiple interacting risks within a system, or 
complex risk, are present within all contexts, and 
the manifestation of this complexity is unique to 
each specific context. At different times within 
a given context, different combinations of risks 
may become more or less salient. For example, 
particular vulnerabilities in WASH systems may 
be expressed when health systems in a politically 
unstable country falter during a rainy season. Even 
within a given context, there are many ways that 
DRR can respond to the complex interplay among 
risks, which also points to the necessity of adaptive 
management. While complex systems are challeng-
ing to address, much less understand, the applica-
tion of a nuanced understanding of systemic risk 
to local to national DRR strategies provides for 
expanded opportunities to achieve the goals set 
forth in the Sendai Framework. 
The following diverse set of examples from Bangla-
desh, Iraq, Somalia and South Sudan show how 
disaster risks materialize and are managed in the 
context of new and emerging hazards and threats 
that comprise complex risk environments. While no 
context is simple, the examples are set in particu-
larly complex situations, illustrating how DRR has 
been adapted to engage more fully with environ-
mental, climatic, economic, social and political 
challenges, including conflict, environmental fragil-
ity and climate change, political upheaval, human 
displacement, economic shocks and health crises. 
The examples are not exhaustive, neither do they 
reflect traditional representations of DRR strategies, 
but they do touch on aspects of DRR policies, strat-
egies, frameworks and interventions that have been 
drawn from direct experiences of the DRR commu-
nity. They illustrate how disaster risk has been 
constructed – and reduced.
A theme that runs through all the cases is the chal-
lenge of conflict. Upsurges in violent conflict have 
been shown to slow, undermine or stall DRR strat-
egies and their implementation. With little in the 
way of practical policy guidance on how to navigate 
changing conflict contexts, many countries find the 
legislative approval of DRR laws halted – as was 
the case for Fiji and Nepal.431 In other contexts, 
increased insecurity can lead to DRR programmes 
429  (Peters et al. 2016)
430  (OECD 2014a)
431  (Wilkinson et al. 2017)
432  (Adapted from input from UNDP)
433  (Case study adapted from input from GFDRR, IDMC and 
UNHCR)
404 Chapter 15
being temporarily suspended. This has been the 
case in the Central African Republic (CAR). The 
violent conflict and political crisis that began in 
2013 has provoked humanitarian impacts that have 
led to large-scale human displacement, degradation 
of the education system, negative impacts on sani-
tation and access to water, and food insecurity.
Due to the security situation in CAR, the implemen-
tation of development projects and programmes 
has been temporarily suspended. Development 
partners have focused their attention and financ-
ing on the emergency situation at hand. These 
factors have delayed the creation of strategies and 
policies for DRR, but in spite of these challenges, 
the CAR government has established a reflection 
committee focused on DRR whose primary mission 
is to coordinate activities and create a plan for 
a national strategy. The first draft of NSDRR has 
taken the current political crisis into account. Addi-
tionally, armed conflict features among the types 
of risks and disasters mentioned in the strategy. 
Finalizing, validating and implementing the national 
strategy depends on financing, which is sorely 
needed.432 As evidenced in CAR, despite the diffi-
cult operating environment, advances in DRR in 
policy and practice, are feasible – as the cases 
below demonstrate. 
15.2.1 
Human displacement in the context of 
recurrent disasters and conflict 
In Somalia, the forced movement of people, most 
of which results in internal displacement rather 
than cross-border flight, can be a cause and a 
consequence of disaster and conflict. The regular 
occurrence of drought- and flood-related disasters, 
and outbreaks of conflict regularly drive people to 
flee their homes, sometimes more than once, and 
Somalia consistently has very high levels of annual 
new displacement movements. 
Somalia is a highly disaster-prone country. It is 
susceptible to drought, riverine and flash flood-
ing, and with its long coastline, storms and 
cyclones coming in from the Gulf of Aden and 
the Indian Ocean. It has also been affected by 
decades of conflict and political instability and 
insecurity.433 This includes attacks by armed 
groups, such as al Shabaab, and clan violence 
that can erupt over scarce natural resources 
such as water points and grazing areas. Unique 
and highly impactful combinations of disaster 
and conflict have materialized in Somalia, shift-
ing from year to year. These dynamic situations 
of complex risk have induced large-scale human 
displacement, which has added to the complex-
ity of the country’s disaster risk and vulnerability. 
As of July 2018, there were an estimated 
2 .6  mi l l ion  IDPs  in  Somal ia  aga inst  a 
backdrop of mult ifaceted confl icts and 
intensified competition for resources due to 
climate-related disaster events. According to 
the UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring 
Network, some 642,000 new internal displace-
ments were recorded between January and 
July 2018, with flooding the primary reason 
for displacement in 43% of cases, followed by 
drought in 29% of cases and conflict in 26% of 
cases. However, it should be noted that while 
there is usually a primary reason, displacement 
occurs often as the result of a combination 
of risk drivers, including economic pressures. 
These mounting pressures ultimately trigger 
people to leave their homes. Displaced people 
living in poorly resourced displacement camps 
or informal settlements are more likely to be 
displaced again by disasters.
Somalia has endured several severe drought 
episodes in recent decades. In 2011, the worst 
Case study: Somalia 
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drought in 60 years resulted in 260,000 deaths 
and affected 13 million people in the Horn of 
Africa. The drought combined with the political 
situation resulted in large-scale famine, and led 
to large-scale displacement, disruption of basic 
services and impoverishment. In early 2017, 
conditions in Somalia manifested as a major 
drought with high famine risk; half the popula-
tion was made acutely food insecure. Almost 
1.3 million new displacements were recorded 
in 2017 due to conflict and disasters, with 84% 
of IDPs citing drought-related reasons for their 
displacement. Thanks to a massive scale-up in 
humanitarian assistance, famine was averted, 
but it remains a looming risk in the future. 
Humanitarian efforts have not been simple or 
straightforward. Large parts of the drought-
affected rural areas in southern and central 
Somalia were controlled by al Shabaab and 
were inaccessible to the government and most 
humanitarian organizations and international 
actors. To assess drought impacts under these 
circumstances and guarantee the personal 
security of staff, humanitarian actors relied on 
remote assessment methods that combined 
remote-sensing technologies and social media 
analytics. This was combined with informa-
tion received from partner networks and limited 
household surveys conducted by a field pres-
ence in Somalia to determine the extent of 
drought impacts and humanitarian needs.
In addition to drought, Somalia is also highly 
affected by floods. Combined with conflict 
and insecurity, these have led to continued 
population displacement internally and across 
borders. In early 2018, widespread flash flood-
ing in the Horn of Africa destroyed extensive 
areas of farmland, damaged health facilities, 
disrupted schools and destroyed more than 
15,643 houses in Somalia. Among the areas 
suffering the impacts of flooding were over-
crowded IDP settlements. Many of the thou-
sands of people displaced in the Shabelle river 
basin in the south of Somalia were people who 
had previously been displaced by drought and 
were living in makeshift shelters unable to 
withstand heavy rain. Flooding in these settle-
ments further displaced people along riverine 
areas. The detrimental impacts of the flash 
floods on the Somali population also included 
rising cases of acute watery diarrhoea, cholera, 
contaminated drinking water and higher food 
prices. Tropical Cyclone Sagar, which struck the 
north of the country in May 2018, further inten-
sified the already burgeoning humanitarian 
needs of the affected population. 
Repeated disaster- and conflict-induced 
displacement in Somalia have led to an 
increase in urbanization, as large numbers of 
people relocate to urban centres to access 
humanitarian aid and other assistance. Demo-
graphic shifts contribute new layers of risk by 
adding additional stress to already strained key 
sectors such as land, housing, health, educa-
tion, water supply, sanitation and livelihood. 
Further, in Mogadishu, displaced persons arriv-
ing in the city tend to live in informal settle-
ments where they are susceptible to forced 
evictions, and subsequently face displacement 
anew. They are often displaced to still worse 
locations, creating a positive feedback loop 
of displacement and suffering. In response, 
drought assessment and recovery frameworks 
are increasingly including the urban sector as a 
priority area; according to some assessments, 
the urban sector accounted for the second-
highest recovery needs after agriculture.434
Attempts have been made to model disas-
ter displacement risk in the Horn of Africa. 
These show that socially created situations 
of vulnerability, along with the concentration 
of people in areas exposed to hazards, have 
a large impact on displacement risk. In fragile 
and conflict-affected settings, special atten-
tion has been paid to create interventions align-
ing short-term, urgent, life-saving assistance 
and protection of the most vulnerable with 
longer-term sustainable solutions for Somalia 
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to strengthen its resilience and address the 
root causes of underlying vulnerabilities. A 
comprehensive drought impact needs assess-
ment (DINA) improved the understanding of 
the dynamics and drivers of recurrent emer-
gencies, and a Recovery and Resilience Frame-
work proposes long-term durable solutions for 
building the resilience of the drought-affected 
population.435
Somalia has recently taken steps to formal-
ize DRR measures and is currently working 
on a NAP. It is also part of the IGAD Drought 
Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative 
(IDDRSI), for the period of 2013 to 2027, and 
has its own national plan within this process. 
IDDRSI explores the interlinkages between 
disasters and conflict, in the context of drought 
and the impacts on traditional livelihoods. It 
also discusses forced displacement as a cause 
and consequence of this, across borders and 
within countries. 
Somalia also relies on pre-existing networks 
and expertise already established in the 
country to formulate its DRR strategies. 
Technical experts (e.g. agronomists, meteo-
rologists, veterinarians and water engineers), 
funded by international organizations, have 
worked on issues related to drought and its 
effects on pastoralism and agriculture for 
many years. They have been using the knowl-
edge of and working with communities and 
local governments, sometimes informally, 
for decades.436 There are also multiple exam-
ples of cooperation between humanitarian 
and development organizations to: distrib-
ute food and non-food items and cash; treat 
malnutrition among children and pregnant or 
lactating women; increase the availability of 
improved water by repairing and rehabilitating 
water points; promote good hygiene practices; 
provide water treatment materials; and distrib-
ute livelihood inputs for agriculture, animal 
husbandry and riverine fishing. In addition, 
vulnerable communities are being supported to 
develop community-level drought preparedness 
and response plans.
Despite a complex situation of natural hazard risks 
and conflict-related displacement, Somalia contin-
ues to work towards formal risk reduction plan-
ning and climate change adaptation measures as 
essential tools to build and sustain socioeconomic 
development. In doing so, i t  also leverages 
networks of long-term humanitarian and devel-
opment partners in the country, to build capacity, 
provide technical support and humanitarian assis-
tance when needed.
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Since August 2017, violence against Rohingya 
communities in Rakhine State, Myanmar, has 
resulted in 727,000 people437 – mostly women and 
children – fleeing their homes across the border 
to Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh.438 This exodus 
brings the total number of displaced Rohingya 
population to about 919,000, vastly outnumber-
ing the people living in the host communities. The 
displaced Rohingya population account for about 
one third of the total population in Cox’s Bazar, an 
area that was already densely populated and facing 
severe development challenges.439
Rohinggya Camps in Cox’s Bazar 
(Source: Mohammad Tauheed, Flickr)
The displaced Rohingya people in Cox’s Bazar, 
Bangladesh, are sheltered in makeshift settle-
ments in extremely congested areas, including 
in the Kutupalong “mega-camp”, which quickly 
became the largest refugee camp in the world. 
The camps have minimal access to basic infra-
structure and services, and are prone to natural 
hazards, especially cyclones, floods and land-
slides. Setting up the camps has led to rapid 
deforestation, further increasing the vulnerability 
of the displaced Rohingya to the effects of mon-
soon rains. Relocation of households most at 
risk from landslides and flooding is under way, 
but there is insufficient suitable land available 
to accommodate even the highest-risk category 
of people.
An assessment of medium-term needs and a 
risk assessment identified priority investments 
to improve DRM and public service delivery to 
the displaced Rohingya population and host 
communities. These investments address health, 
education and emergency response. The Health 
Sector Support Project helped to further develop 
Case study: Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh
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disease surveillance and outbreak response 
capacities of the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare. Activities to strengthen disease out-
break response include vaccination campaigns 
and disease‐specific diagnosis and treatment 
services, as well as mechanisms for responding 
to the health impacts of possible disasters, such 
as the spread of cholera and diarrhoea as well as 
other water‐ and vector‐borne diseases and an 
increased risk of drowning and injuries associ-
ated with storms and flooding. 
Activities for the ongoing Reaching Out-
of-School Children Project are specifically 
designed to ensure safe and equitable learning 
opportunities for all 300,000 crisis-affected chil-
dren and youth in the region, including refugees 
and host communities. Interventions include the 
renovation of primary schools, procurement of 
learning materials, awareness-raising regarding 
GBV and promotion of psychosocial well-being 
activities to overcome the shock of violence and 
forced resettlement. In view of the high risk of 
disaster, the renovation work will include physi-
cal measures to ensure safe learning environ-
ments for children. 
The Emergency Multi-Sector Rohingya Crisis 
Response Project aims to strengthen the capac-
ity of the Government of Bangladesh to respond 
to the Rohingya crisis by improving access to 
basic services and building disaster and social 
resilience of the displaced Rohingya population. 
Project interventions include: improving access 
to clean water supply and sanitation; improv-
ing access to multipurpose disaster shelters, 
evacuation routes and disaster response capac-
ity; improving public service infrastructure; 
strengthening GBV support services; implement-
ing a community services and work programme 
to engage displaced Rohingya population in 
the delivery of small works and services in the 
camps; and institutional strengthening activities 
for government institutions responsible for man-
aging the crisis.
In parallel, host communities in the Cox’s Bazar 
District are being supported through existing 
projects addressing: multipurpose disaster shel-
ters that support disaster preparedness; improv-
ing municipal governance and basic urban 
services in participating urban local bodies; sup-
porting fiscal transfer systems; improving col-
laborative forest management; and increasing 
benefits for forest-dependent communities.440
Project-based initiatives in Cox’s Bazar, while 
providing valuable support to affected com-
munities, may be limited in their ability to 
secure longer-term risk reduction outcomes for 
affected communities, the host community of 
Cox’s Bazaar and the newly arrived Rohingya. 
The political sensitivities associated with issues 
such as permanent resettlement, citizenship 
and rights, from the perspective of the host 
States (Bangladesh and Myanmar), mean that 
international agencies have significant chal-
lenges in supporting DRR responses. Support-
ing responses that assure the dignity of affected 
populations, capitalizing on the resources and 
capacities of the refugees themselves are still 
more challenging.441 
The Bangladesh Cox’s Bazar case study illustrates 
that there is not an easy solution to the broader 
risks facing residents of Cox’s Bazar. Continued 
governmental engagement and capacity will be 
essential to longer-term risk reduction. Incremen-
tal gains can be made at the community level by 
supporting the host community and the newly 
arrived, and addressing the needs of the whole 
community through education and social welfare 
initiatives. 
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The situation in South Sudan shows the impact 
of compounded risks to the population of natural 
hazards and armed conflict. Nonetheless, the 
government response is to continue to build 
longer-term resilience, beginning with the most 
urgent disaster hazards and climate change 
impacts, while also meeting immediate humanitar-
ian needs.
15.2.2 
Reducing disaster risk with an arid and 
changing climate and the impacts of conflict
South Sudan is exposed to natural hazards such as 
drought, which often become disasters.442 Changes 
in weather patterns and climatic shocks are particu-
larly impactful in contexts like South Sudan where 
livelihoods are largely based on animal husbandry, 
agriculture, fishing and trade.443  South Sudan is 
also heavily affected by war and violence. South 
Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011 
after a 22-year civil war. 
After only two years of peace, South Sudan’s 
post-conflict transition has been mired in politi-
cal instability, power struggles and a new civil 
war since 2013. The combination of natural haz-
ards and war has had dire consequences for 
the South Sudanese people. After experienc-
ing years of drought and war, in April 2017, the 
United Nations declared that South Sudan was 
suffering from famine, which affected at least 
100,000 people.444 
Despite the protracted nature of conflict in 
South Sudan, State and non-State actors rec-
ognize the need to build longer-term resilience 
while balancing the need to address more 
immediate humanitarian demands. South Sudan 
launched its National Adaptation Programme 
of Action in 2017, outlining its most urgent cli-
mate adaptation needs. With this in place, State 
and non-State actors are now beginning dis-
cussions about a road map to develop South 
Sudan’s NAPs to address longer-term CCA prior-
ities. The national DRM policy, in its final stages, 
recognizes the need to reduce disaster risks and 
adapt to a changing climate. In parallel to these 
policy processes, civil society is working with 
local communities to integrate CCA, DRR and 
ecosystem management approaches.445 
This includes community-led wetland manage-
ment practices to preserve necessary ecosystem 
services to mitigate the impacts of floods and 
drought. Similarly, a VCA tool is applied, which is 
typically used in non-conflict settings, to identify 
appropriate strategies to understand prevailing 
risks and inform the design of appropriate risk 
reduction measures.446 In addition, a report about 
the state of the environment was issued in mid-
2018, which will guide the various government 
departments and non-State actors on sustainable 
management of the natural resources for DRR.447 
Despite these efforts, more work is required to 
better understand how to support coherence and 
complementarity between climate and disaster 
resilience policy and programmes, including in 
ways that are conflict sensitive.
442  (Adapted from input from IFRC)
443  (Overseas Development Institute and Humanitarian Prac-
tice Network 2013)
444  (IFRC 2018a)
445  (Wetlands International 2019)
446  (IFRC 2018b)
447  (UNEP 2018)
448  (Adapted from input from UNDP)
Case study: South Sudan 
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Extreme drought in Iraq has been brought about by 
environmental, development and political factors, 
with cascading consequences.448 Climate change 
has been intensifying drought and drying up water 
resources in the region, with the drought situation 
exacerbated by increased upstream water usage, 
including new dams along the Euphrates and Tigris 
Rivers beyond Iraq’s borders. The flow of river 
water into Iraq has dropped by about 50% in recent 
decades, and is expected to decline by another 50% 
as upstream water usage and drought from climate 
change increase.
Case study: Hawr al-Huweizah, Iraq
The problem of drought in Hawr al-Huweizah, 
Iraq, has emerged recently, after water supplies 
from the Islamic Republic of Iran ceased and 
water flows from the Mashrah and Kahla Rivers 
reduced. They are fed by the Tigris River, which 
is under water stress due to reduced in-flows 
and increased abstraction. The Ahwar marsh-
lands of southern Iraq, which were named as 
UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 2016 due to 
their cultural history and unique natural charac-
teristics, are among the ecosystems affected. 
Drought and intense water scarcity in the 
country have led to an increase in desertifica-
tion, a decline in green areas and agricultural 
land, and an increase in livestock mortality. 
Mosques, houses and streets that were ruined during the war in Mosul 
(Source: Photographer RM / Shutterstock.com)
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Agricultural production is expected to decrease 
signif icantly as pastures and f ields are 
degraded. The expected impacts on livelihoods 
have the potential to drive the rural Iraqi popula-
tion to migrate to cities and urban communities 
as they seek alternative livelihood opportunities 
to generate household income. Adding to these 
challenges, the disruption of electrical power 
systems will have a direct impact on the avail-
ability of electricity for households as well as 
industrial usage and infrastructural activities, 
such as sanitation. Without functioning sani-
tation systems, the risk to the Euphrates and 
Tigris Rivers of contamination (from multiple 
types of waste) and decreasing water quality of 
already-scarce water resources, is high. Addi-
tionally, scientists and environmentalists have 
warned of the possible collapse of the Mosul 
Dam, the largest dam in Iraq, and assessments 
have indicated that the overwhelming flooding 
that would ensue would lead to a severe loss 
of life. 
Iraq’s security situation also plays into the 
complexity of risk factors facing the country, 
with armed attacks having destroyed cities 
throughout the country, leading to death and 
displacement of civilians from the northern 
regions to central and southern Iraq. This 
has affected the economic and social life of 
the population, including through destruction 
of civil and governmental buildings and the 
disruption of public services, especially those 
related to health and education. Reconstruction 
is hindered by chemical pollution from conflict, 
and around 7 million m3 of debris that must be 
transported and examined to ensure it is free of 
radiation or toxic chemical agents.449 
Iraq has taken several measures specifi-
cally to address drought and desertification. 
These measures include CCA activities, such 
as the implementation of an integrated water 
resources management (IWRM) system, and 
the use of modern irrigation methods, such 
as sprinkler irrigation and drip irrigation. The 
country has taken measures to enforce envi-
ronmental legislation related to water usage 
and consumption and increased the monitor-
ing of its water, air and land resources through 
monitoring and control stations, including 
seismic monitoring stations, meteorological 
stations and radiation measurement stations.
Iraq has also made progress on actions related 
to DRR more broadly. DRR has been integrated 
into national development plans, and nation-
ally appropriate disaster mitigation actions are 
obtaining approval for implementation. The 
priorities of the National Strategy for Disas-
ter Management are based on the priorities 
of the Sendai Framework, but they employ 
measures specific to the priorities of action 
in Iraq, that is the environment, the climate, 
and the economic, social, cultural and political 
situation.450 
Iraq’s National Disaster Risk Reduction Strat-
egy describes the security context and includes 
actions to reduce security risk. In address-
ing systemic risk, the national strategy also 
includes a variety of programmes and plans 
to combat poverty and enhance societal 
resilience to reduce the risk of disasters and 
cascading impacts. Communities at particular 
and persistent risk of disasters include commu-
nities located near rivers, in close proximity to 
flood-prone dams, in low-lying areas prone to 
flooding during heavy rains, along seismically 
active zones and in areas affected by conflict. 
DRR activities include: awareness-raising; 
improvement and development of legislation 
and laws; formation of national committees 
and special forums on DRR; and regional and 
international cooperation in support of national 
and local plans and programmes.
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the UNISDR Regional Office for Arab States)
450  (Adapted from the Government of Iraq contribution via 
the UNISDR Regional Office for Arab States)
case studies above that are common to complex 
systems of risk. These themes include: the impor-
tance of addressing a wide range of vulnerabili-
ties where risks combine; considering particularly 
vulnerable persons and groups and engaging them 
in the risk reduction process; engaging long term 
across sectors and at multiple levels; and adapting 
to a rapidly changing and dynamic context. 
15.3.1 
Addressing a wide range of vulnerabilities 
where risks combine
DRR policies, strategies and projects operating 
in complex systems of risk must address a wider 
range of vulnerabilities than traditionally consid-
ered in the purview of DRR, because these vulner-
abilities interact to form disaster risks. For example, 
several of the case studies illustrated how disas-
ter, conflict and human displacement interact to 
create systems of complex and cascading risk (also 
discussed in Chapter 2). In Somalia, sudden- and 
slow-onset hazards and events compounded by 
protracted conflict have led to continued popula-
tion displacement internally and across borders. 
The IDMC Disaster Displacement Risk model for the 
Horn of Africa affirmed that socially created situa-
tions of vulnerability along with the concentration 
of people in areas exposed to hazards have a large 
impact on displacement risk. In CAR, Iraq, and for 
the Rohingya population, the ongoing crises and 
repeated disasters have led to large-scale popula-
tion displacement. 
These population displacements, including people 
who are displaced more than once, present multi-
ple challenges to DRR. Population shifts to already 
overcrowded IDP settlements, refugee camps and 
urban centres can overwhelm institutions and 
services that are already extended to or beyond 
capacity, particularly in situations of political 
Iraq faces a challenging set of risks, notably 
drought and water scarcity, that are compounded 
by the direct impacts of armed attacks and the 
contaminated residue and social dislocation that 
result. It has taken these as the foci for its national 
strategy and risk reduction measures, addressing 
IWRM and the security context, as well as the envi-
ronmental, climatic, social, cultural and political 
context. Reflecting the specificities of context, Iraq 
thus aims to address systemic risk through a range 
of socioeconomic measures that extend beyond the 
traditional concepts of DRR.
15.3  
Implications of 
complexity for 
addressing disaster risk
The above case studies illustrate the complex 
nature of the interaction of natural hazard risks and 
other environmental, social, political and economic 
conditions and variables. These “wicked problems” 
are challenging to understand, in part because it is 
difficult and even unproductive to determine where 
a disaster risk begins and ends in a complex world. 
Isolating one factor – disaster risk – in a complex 
interaction is artificial, because people experience 
natural hazards combined with other conditions and 
from the vantage point of their vulnerabilities and 
capabilities. The case studies also illustrate how dif-
ferent organizations focusing on DRR address com-
plex risk in different ways; there is no single, correct 
approach to achieving DRR in complex risk contexts. 
While complexity plays out in unique ways in each 
specific context, themes have emerged from the 
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instability or crisis. Cascading effects of disasters, 
conflict and displacement can lead to the deteriora-
tion of education, sanitation, health, food and water 
systems, and services, potentially leading to health 
crises such as cholera or diarrhoea, and intensified 
competition and conflict over scarce resources. 
Such cascading impacts are symptomatic of the 
failure to address a sufficiently wide range of risks 
and vulnerabilities, and can deepen vulnerabilities 
and amplify or create new risk. 
Several case studies indicate that a wider range of 
vulnerabilities must be addressed by DRR in these 
complex contexts. Examples include, programmes 
addressing underlying vulnerabilities associated 
with drought and famine in Somalia, or support to 
the Government of Bangladesh to build its capacity 
to respond to the Rohingya crisis through meeting 
immediate basic needs, as well as strengthen-
ing the social resilience of the displaced Rohingya 
population.451
In Iraq, the National Disaster Risk Reduction Strat-
egy addresses the persistent security threats 
facing the country, as well as risks stemming from 
floods, drought, and toxic and non-toxic remnants 
of the war, which create health risks and impede the 
extension of basic services. National and regional 
DRR policies across contexts must formally and 
explicitly recognize the interlinked risks of disasters, 
conflict and displacement with an eye to present 
and future conditions. Both current, and a range of 
likely future, conditions, should inform the design 
of immediate humanitarian and long-term develop-
ment strategies. 
In Afghanistan, another country facing complex 
risk, a multi-hazard risk assessment was completed 
in 2017. Afghanistan’s NSDRR recognizes that 
decades of conflict have undermined coping mech-
anisms and protective capacity in the country. In 
addition to an assessment of risk from five differ-
ent hazards (avalanche, earthquake, floods, drought 
and landslides), the vulnerability analysis section 
refers to years of conflicts as a factor that deter-
mines the degradation status and higher vulnerabil-
ity of infrastructure and public facilities.452 In CAR, 
the first draft of NSDRR has taken the political crisis 
and its negative repercussions into account, explic-
itly featuring armed conflict as a type of risk and 
disaster. 
15.3.2 
Considering particularly vulnerable persons 
and groups
In discussions about vulnerability (see Chapter 3 of 
this report), it is clear that individuals and groups 
experience unique combinations of risk and are 
thus in need of specific considerations. Groups that 
tend to have more concentrated vulnerability and 
critical needs include women and girls, youth and 
children, elderly, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
and intergender communities, disabled and differ-
ently abled, and otherwise religiously, ethnically, 
socioeconomically, and geographically disempow-
ered and marginalized groups. Providing assistance 
and support to the most vulnerable people and 
communities reduces the added vulnerability that 
can result from disaster impacts.453 In Afghanistan, 
socioeconomic inequalities are deepening, and 
this compounds disaster impacts and increases 
the vulnerability of particular groups. Afghanistan’s 
NSDRR commits to promoting equitable economic 
growth as well as to principles of social inclu-
sion and environmental conservation as a way to 
address disaster risk for particularly vulnerable 
groups, in addition to targeted capacity-building 
activities.454
These needs are magnified in places affected by 
conflict, political instability and violence, where 
vulnerable groups also include large numbers of 
victims of violence and those at heightened risk of 
violence. Disaster and conflict often lead to a higher 
rate of GBV, putting women, girls and lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intergender communities 
at heightened risk in these contexts.455 There are 
several examples of projects focused on address-
ing violence-related vulnerabilities. In Bangladesh, 
a dedicated project has been designed to ensure 
safe and equitable learning opportunities for all 
300,000 crisis-affected children and youth in the 
region, including refugees and host communities. 
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452  (Afghanistan, State Ministry of Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Affairs and Afghanistan National Disaster Manage-
ment Authority 2018)
453  (IFRC 2015); (Gaillard et al. 2017); (Gaillard, Gorman-Murray 
and Fordham 2017)
454  (Afghanistan, State Ministry of Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Affairs and Afghanistan National Disaster Manage-
ment Authority 2018)
455  (IFRC 2015); (Gaillard et al. 2017); (Gaillard, Gorman-Murray 
and Fordham 2017)
456  (GFDRR 2019)
Programming includes awareness-raising regard-
ing GBV and promoting psychosocial activities to 
overcome the shock of violence and forced reset-
tlement. In Somalia, GBV is addressed by combin-
ing economic empowerment interventions for 
Several of the case studies highlight the acute 
vulnerability of IDPs, refugees and host communi-
ties to disaster risks. In Bangladesh for example, 
the displaced Rohingya people are sheltered in 
makeshift settlements with minimal access to 
basic infrastructure and services, which makes 
women with integrated clinical, psychological and 
legal services for GBV survivors at the community 
level, as well as institutional strengthening and 
capacity-building.456 
them particularly vulnerable to natural hazards such 
as cyclones, floods and landslides. The quick estab-
lishment of makeshift shelters has caused defores-
tation, further increasing vulnerability to the effects 
of monsoon rains; as evidence by flash flooding 
and landslides in 2018. Rains “caused over 130 
People who carry water rest under a tree in the refugee camp in Baidoa, Somalia
(Source: Mustafa Olgun/shutterstock.com)
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landslides, damaged 3,300 shelters and affected 
28,000 refugees” near Cox’s Bazar, with women the 
most at risk of disaster impacts.457 The emergency 
relocation of refugees affected by the flooding has 
been challenged by a lack of suitable available land. 
In other contexts of cross-border displacement, it 
was highlighted that newly arrived refugees in some 
contexts may be less adapted to their host coun-
try’s climate, and they may face increased vulner-
ability to weather extremes during their adjustment 
period.458
Where livelihoods are heavily dependent on stable 
ecosystems, DRR processes should include 
concerned communities in the analysis of vulner-
ability and development of appropriate responses. 
In South Sudan, international actors are working 
with local communities to integrate CCA, DRR and 
ecosystem management approaches to preserve 
necessary ecosystem services and mitigate 
the impacts of floods and drought.459 In Bangla-
desh, a sustainable forests and livelihood project 
for host communities is improving collaborative 
forest management and increases benefits for 
forest-dependent communities. In Somalia, vulner-
able communities are being supported to develop 
community- level drought preparedness and 
response plans.460
15.3.3 
Engaging long term across sectors and at 
multiple scales
Resolving systemic risk is not achieved quickly. 
It requires long-term engagement across sectors 
and at multiple levels. The probability that recur-
rent emergencies will persist is high, even with 
well-planned and executed strategies. However, 
over time and with dedicated attention and often 
incremental action, complex disaster risks can be 
managed and reduced. Aligning DRR efforts with 
other international platforms, international and local 
humanitarian and development partners, the private 
sector, national and local governments, and local 
communities and governance structures provide 
opportunities to coordinate across sectors and at 
multiple levels of governance. Coordinated, collab-
orative action allows for organizations to play to 
their strengths and not extend beyond their own 
institutional capacity while also creating synergies 
and positive exchanges among actors. Harmo-
nized efforts also lessen the possibility that differ-
ent groups inadvertently duplicate efforts or fall 
short of meeting even immediate life-sustaining 
needs. Complexity demands that all actors must act 
together as partners on the front-line systemic risk 
reduction. 
In the case of Bangladesh, a Joint Response Plan 
was prepared between the Government of Bangla-
desh and development partners, and in Somalia, 
a DINA complemented rather than duplicated the 
Humanitarian Response Plan already in place. In 
Afghanistan, the National Afghanistan Strategy for 
Disaster Risk Reduction calls for DRR to be main-
streamed into development planning, sectoral 
plans, capacity-building, CCA, livelihood security, 
gender mainstreaming, community empowerment, 
and response and recovery management. It aims 
to improve coherence and integration in efforts 
to reduce the risks posed by disasters, climate 
change, conflict and fragility, with other develop-
ment imperatives, and places this at the centre of 
the pursuit of the achievement of the outcome and 
goals of the post-2015 international agreements 
and frameworks, including the SDGs.
The coordination among humanitarian and develop-
ment actors in Somalia has resulted in data sharing, 
integrating lessons learned on improving efficiency, 
and ensuring that funds are not diverted from emer-
gency needs.461 Likewise, new policies are particu-
larly successful when they build upon pre-existing 
networks and expertise that are already estab-
lished in the country, including international and 
local humanitarian organizations, technical experts 
and local governments. This coordination can be 
carried out in formal and informal capacities. In 
Afghanistan, shuras, or traditional informal commu-
nity-based approaches to hearings and judgments, 
serve multiple purposes, such as providing assis-
tance during disasters as well as local-level conflict 
resolution mechanisms.462 Conversely in the case 
of Iraq, more formal structures of cooperation, 
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including established international coordination 
mechanisms and partnerships, are more likely 
to facilitate solutions to meeting the country’s 
needs for funding, technological capabilities and 
capacity-building.
15.3.4 
Adapting to a rapidly changing and dynamic 
context
Situations of complex risk are inherently dynamic, 
and can change rapidly in unanticipated or unpre-
dictable ways. Because risk within this perspective 
is understood as polycentric, no one risk takes prior-
ity over the others. The removal of a specific risk 
may not fundamentally alter the system, and the 
manifestation of one risk has the potential to trigger 
other risks within the system. The speed of change, 
uncertainty surrounding that change and the multi-
tude of possible changes in a complex context have 
particular implications on long-term engagement 
and the need to deliver on commitments and goals. 
In contexts affected by political instability and 
social unrest, security may suddenly and dramati-
cally change the operational context, altering the 
ability to effectively design, plan, and implement 
strategies and programmes. 
In Somalia, the environmental and security context 
rapidly evolved throughout implementation phases, 
necessitating flexible and adaptable program-
ming.463 Ongoing attacks by armed groups and clan 
violence combined with drought- and flood-related 
disasters has necessitated shifts in programming. 
Becoming more adaptable through budgetary 
measures, such as merging the budget into a single-
line item, allows for programmatic shifts between 
categories when certain activities were prohib-
ited by a sudden change in the security situation. 
Likewise, monitoring systems need to be based on 
target ranges rather than fixed targets to remain 
adaptable to rapidly changing environments. Tech-
nology can be used in particularly insecure and 
dangerous operating contexts, for example in large 
parts of the drought-affected rural areas in southern 
Somalia which are controlled by al-Shabab militia 
and inaccessible for government counterparts and 
most humanitarian organizations.464 As presented 
in the case study in section 15.2, the use of remote 
assessment methods that combine remote-sensing 
technologies and social media analytics has been 
extremely useful. This information can then be 
combined with information received from partner 
networks and limited household surveys conducted 
by a vendor with field presence in Somalia. 
Environmental conditions also have the capacity to 
deteriorate rapidly or to oscillate among extremes, 
particularly when combined with environmen-
tal degradation and climate change impacts. For 
example, Somalia is vulnerable to flash floods and 
drought, both of which are connected to a suite of 
associated risks. In Bangladesh, the sudden and 
large-scale nature of the Rohingya refugee crisis led 
to deforestation and increased risk of flash flood-
ing and landslides. The impacts of climate change, 
which increase the risk factors for extreme and 
unpredictable weather patterns and events, also 
contribute to environmental fragility. For example, in 
2018 the Climate Centre (Red Cross Red Crescent) 
noted that Turkey is currently hosting approximately 
3,400,000 Syrian refugees while at the same time 
experiencing its hottest summer in 47 years. Wide-
spread heat-waves stretch humanitarian and health 
systems and point to the necessity of preparing 
institutions to reach the most vulnerable. 
Infrastructural conditions may also cause a rapid 
change in complex risk. In Iraq, the Mosul Dam is 
located in the city of Mosul, which is highly affected 
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by conflict and at risk of collapsing. The tenuous 
security situation makes DRR activities more chal-
lenging. If the dam were to fail, the security chal-
lenges would have the potential to affect disaster 
response and recovery.
15.4  
Conclusions
Disaster risks emanate from development path-
ways, manifesting from the trade-offs inherent 
in development processes. In some ways, this 
has always been well recognized. What is new in 
today’s increasingly interconnected society is the 
diversity and complexity of threats and hazards, 
and the complex interaction among them, which 
result in “an unprecedented global creation of risks, 
often due to previous socioeconomic development 
trends interacting with existing and new develop-
ment dynamics and emerging global threats.”465 
There are distinct characteristics that need to be 
addressed and understood – aspects of intercon-
nectivity, transboundary, transitional, transforma-
tional elements and simultaneity – in addition to 
facets of intensity, duration, frequency and rate.466 
But there are also opportunities that arise, as risks 
are merely a description of possible outcomes.467 
The exploration of the multidimensional nature of 
risk is improving and garnering greater attention in 
efforts to understand and manage risk. Answering 
and addressing these challenges calls for a more 
systemic approach to acknowledging the complex 
threats, risks and opportunities facing and resulting 
from development.468
The expanded scope of the Sendai Framework is a 
starting point, and must be reflected in the breath 
of national and local DRR strategies. So should the 
risk-informed development approach called for in 
the Sendai Framework, through the systematic inte-
gration of risk information across all sectoral plan-
ning processes. Delivering DRR is possible in any 
context, but the scope of what is viable and appro-
priate will change depending on the context. And for 
some, such as those affected by armed conflict and 
fragility, what this looks like is still to be learned.469 
There remains a dearth of practical and policy 
advice on how to devise and implement DRR strat-
egies for complex risk contexts, including where 
violent conflict forms part of the broader environ-
ment in which DRR takes place. As such, this is an 
area that warrants further attention to attain Target 
E of the Sendai Framework.
Taking a broader and more nuanced approach to 
understanding how threats, hazards and shocks 
interact reflects the growing move towards utiliz-
ing systems thinking, grappling with complex risk 
and engaging with uncertainty. In many respects, 
the DRR community is leading the way, as illustrated 
by the initiation of GRAF, for example. This will 
require adopting “good practice principles in risk-
informed development” such as inclusive and trans-
parent, phased and iterative, flexible and adaptive, 
continuous learning and reflection approaches.470 
Making development choices that support develop-
ment trajectories that harness benefits for reduced 
complex risk, avoid risk creation and better manage 
residual risk, must be the way forward.
465  (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia 2017)
466  (Opitz–Stapleton et al. 2019)
467  (World Bank 2013)
468  (Opitz–Stapleton et al. 2019)
469  (Harris, Keen and Mitchell 2013); (Peters 2018)
470  (Opitz–Stapleton et al. 2019)
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Conclusions
As Chapter 10 has illustrated, regional cooperation 
is key to knowledge-sharing and capacity-build-
ing among countries with similar risk profiles and 
regional concerns, as well as to providing mecha-
nisms for managing development funding and 
providing risk financing for their member coun-
tries. Regional platforms for DRR and other innova-
tive regional multi-stakeholder partnerships play an 
important role in DRR awareness and cooperation. 
Intergovernmental organizations in most hazard-
prone regions have developed cooperation on DRM, 
but a more active promotion of regional and national 
risk reduction is a role they could take on more 
strongly, for example by focusing on: (a) regional risk 
assessment and reduction, (b) the needs of SIDS, 
small countries and least developed countries for 
practical support in building capacity and risk infor-
mation systems, and (c) risk financing mechanisms.
The enabling environment at national level is 
essential to performing integrated risk gover-
nance at national, subnational and community 
levels; addressing aspects of the authority of local 
governments to plan for, and carry out, essential 
DRR actions. This requires a review of the enabling 
legislation and the institutional frameworks, which 
often encourage working in silos rather than cross-
sectorally and vertically from local to national 
levels. The enabling frameworks at national level 
are also the principal mechanism to ensure that the 
needs of vulnerable groups and the principles of 
equality and participation are integrated, especially 
for women and youth.
At national level, most countries identified in the 
research do not have coordination mechanisms 
among DRR, CCA and development planning. Some 
examples have been given of Pacific countries 
where the institutional structures are being built 
across these areas, and reinforced at the regional 
level with the 2016 FRDP. 
On the issue of creating DRR strategies and plans 
according to the principles of the Sendai Frame-
work, there are many different approaches at 
national level, ranging from stand-alone plans and 
strategies to full mainstreaming into development 
plans (Chapter 11). Target E of the Sendai Frame-
work does not necessarily require additional sepa-
rate plans, but it does require countries to review 
existing DRR strategies in light of the Sendai Frame-
work and ensure that local strategies dovetail with 
national level. Target E, to be met by 2020, is a small 
indication of what is required to accomplish the 
goal and outcome of the Sendai Framework. It is a 
stepping stone towards achieving this by 2030.
Integration of DRR into development planning strat-
egies and frameworks at national level remains 
a challenge for many States (Chapter 12). Again, 
there are good examples of countries implement-
ing this at national level, but so far, there has 
been insufficient time and information to deter-
mine whether these measures are affecting the 
outcomes of development planning, in particular to 
prevent the creation of new risk.
Integration of DRR into CCA policies and plans at 
national level is a new endeavour for most coun-
tries. The evidence gained from country practices is 
that it has not been undertaken by many countries 
so far (Chapter 13). Given the very threat to human-
ity posed by climate change, it is imperative that a 
more integrated approach is adopted to adapt to 
and mitigate climate change, together with broader 
development efforts preventing the creation of 
new risk and reducing existing risk. It must also 
be recognized that there are particular challenges 
for countries where effort to reduce other disaster 
risks, for example geophysical risk, are considered 
of greater priority. As called for in the Sendai Frame-
work, all countries must assure adequate attention 
to the reduction of natural and man-made hazards 
and related technological, biological and environ-
mental hazards and risks.
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A major challenge in integrating DRR with CCA and 
development planning is that faced by national and 
local governments in managing systemic risk in 
urban areas (Chapter 14). The dynamic, multidimen-
sional nature of interrelating risks in urban areas 
require systemic approaches, that seek to under-
stand the nature of interacting systems and adopt 
integrated risk governance adapted to the local 
context. 
Fragile and complex contexts, especially where 
there is significant internal and cross-border migra-
tion due to war, famine and social disruption, 
present a particular set of challenges for local and 
national risk reduction and for integrated risk gover-
nance (Chapter 15). The risk context and landscape 
are constantly changing, demanding flexibility and 
agility from national and local level processes so 
as to be able to accommodate new and emerging 
risks.
Recommendations
The key recommendations arising from Part III are 
that integrated risk governance, or policy coherence, 
is the key to effective risk reduction at national and 
local levels, with the following issues highlighted:
• It is urgent that all Member States give atten-
tion to establishing and aligning national and 
local DRR strategies with the Sendai Frame-
work, not only because 2020 is fast approach-
ing, but because these provide the foundation 
and enabling environment for so much of what 
is required to achieve the outcome, goal and 
targets of the Sendai Framework and the 2030 
Agenda. 
• Developments in climate science that were not 
available at the time of the development and 
adoption of the Sendai Framework in 2015, call 
for far greater urgency and ambition in our 
actions than was previously understood. This 
reinforces the need to treat risk as a systemic 
issue, taking into account short- and long-
term time frames. Based on the findings of the 
2018 IPCC SR1.5, make clear the need for DRR 
strategies to integrate CCA and mitigation 
centrally within risk reduction at national and 
local levels. 
• Coherent and integrated national and local 
plans are also the means by which Member 
States can best meet combined commitments 
made under the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agree-
ment, AAAA, NUA, and other agreements of a 
thematic, sectoral or regional nature. The multi-
dimensional nature of these commitments, 
and more importantly the underlying risks they 
address, require systems-based approaches, 
including in assessing needs and making 
national and local decisions about the most 
effective use of available resources. 
• It is recommended that governments and 
national stakeholders, with strong engagement 
of the private sector and civil society down to 
community level, review national and local 
enabling frameworks for equitable and sus-
tainable development, climate change and 
risk reduction. The objective is to identify the 
enablers and opportunities, as well as the bar-
riers to integrated risk governance, which may 
come in the form of legislative mandates, insti-
tutional structures, capacity, resources, social 
equality/vulnerability, gender roles, people’s 
awareness and habits of thinking about risk. 
This could also be described as an integrated 
risk governance assessment ,  taking into 
account multiple hazards (man-made, natural 
and mixed) and related risks, the way hazards, 
vulnerability and economic activity interacts 
with the environment and with each other within 
and among complex systems, and the need to 
adapt policy and implementation to enable sys-
tems-based approaches to risk reduction. 
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Fictional delta city of Drecca-Susdev 
–elements of integrated risk governance
(Source: UNDRR 2019)
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• 	 Floodplains and coastal foreshore are 
reserved for recreation, and for vegetation 
that absorbs flood waters or sea storm 
impacts
• 	 Mechanical or built barriers reduce impact 
and/or divert flood waters or storm surges
2. EWSs:
• 	 EWSs for flood and landslide risk based on 
weather forecasts, recorded rainfall and 
intensity, and for monitoring upstream river 
levels allow for flood mitigation through 
controlled dam releases, opening/closing 
of flood gates/levees around the city and 
evacuation response when needed
• 	 EWSs for sea storms, hurricanes and/
or tsunami, based on weather forecasts, 
seismic activity and other monitoring 
including regional/global systems allow for 
evacuation and use of mechanical barriers 
as needed
3. Health, housing and well-being: 
• 	 Medium- to high-density residential build-
ings on safe land include social housing, 
comply with updated codes for relevant 
risks, have water and sanitation, have 
access to health, welfare and education 
facilities, and give access to fire and emer-
gency services
• 	 “Green infrastructure” gardens and trees 
cool the city, improve health and provide 
space for recreation and cultural pursuits
• 	 Walking and cycling route networks improve 
safety and health, and reduce air pollution 
from vehicles
4. Water supply system: 
• 	 Multiple small dams give redundancy in 
water supply for farms and city, increasing 
drought resilience across the territory
• 	 Potable water systems, pumps and treat-
ment are flood-proofed
Managing complex risks while also governing the 
everyday aspects of life and encouraging socioeco-
nomic development can seem remote and theo-
retical. It can also be hard to imagine what success 
looks like in the face of so many demands. For this 
reason, this GAR offers an illustrated scenario of 
a fictional coastal delta city, Drecca-Susdev, which 
has taken a systems-based approach to managing 
risk. It is selective – it may even appear futuristic 
– but it is based on careful expert thought and is 
offered as an exercise of imagination towards “the 
future we want”. 
Many coastal delta cities face seasonal flood 
risk, cyclonic wind and storm surge, and poten-
tially seismic and tsunami risk. They are looking 
to a future of sea-level rise and increased weather 
extremes due to climate change, coupled with the 
socioeconomic challenges of rapid population 
growth, increased exposure and vulnerability, build-
ing and construction, energy needs, risk of environ-
mental pollution, pressures on waste management, 
water and food resources, transport and commu-
nications systems, as well as the urgent global 
need to reduce GHG emissions to mitigate climate 
change. Meeting these challenges and moving 
towards risk-informed sustainable development 
requires an understanding of the interrelationships 
among systems and subsystems, within local area 
planning and risk governance, and aligned with 
national socioeconomic development planning.
The figure illustrates some elements of integrated 
risk governance in the fictional coastal delta city, 
Drecca-Susdev. These include:
1. Risk reduction for flood, landslides and sea 
inundation: 
• 	 Revegetation and/or engineering stabilizes 
landslide-prone areas
• 	 Smaller more numerous dams reduce flood 
risk from dam failure 
• 	 Homes, businesses and sensitive infrastruc-
ture are kept off flood plains and the coastal 
foreshore, or raised/adapted to seasonal 
flooding/storms and built to relevant codes
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8. Energy: 
• 	 Small-scale hydro-dams supply local areas, 
and link into the power grid
• 	 Decentralized solar photovoltaics on city 
rooftops that heat, cool and power build-
ings, and which include energy storage and 
charging for electrical vehicles, reduce the 
need for major new investment in power 
distribution and increase resilience to grid 
system failures
• 	 Water is reused and recycled in the city, with 
a back-up energy source
5. Food supply system: 
• 	 Flood plains are preserved for crops that 
use seasonal flooding that also regenerates 
soil fertility
• 	 Flow-of-the-river dams allow fish breeding
• 	 Urban agriculture on balconies and roof-
tops boosts access to fresh produce; 
high-density commercial aquaponics food 
production combines plant and fish nutrient 
needs to reduce ocean overfishing and agri-
cultural nitrogen run-off
• 	 Resilient transport and communications 
maintain local and regional food supply 
chains
6. Waste management and environmental 
protection: 
• 	 All storm water run-off and human and 
industrial refuse and effluent is treated so 
that clean water is released into the land 
and marine environments
• 	 Recycling of materials is maximized
• 	 Solid waste is managed city wide
7. Transport, communications and other 
infrastructure: 
• 	 Bridges and roads are elevated and built 
strong enough to withstand more-extreme 
weather events and sea-level rise
• 	 Risk-assessed dedicated public transport is 
separate from the road system
• 	 Disaster-proofed communications infra-
structure increases resilience of all other 
city systems, including energy and supply 
chains
• 	 Transport and communications systems are 
designed to reduce cyberrisk with flexible 
system responses and redundancy
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African Union
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Development Assistance Committee
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